Prof Bill Buchanan OBE FRSE on LinkedIn: And who was Taher ElGamal's PhD supervisor? That would be the Hellman in…
Prof Bill Buchanan OBE FRSE
And who was Taher ElGamal&#39;s PhD supervisor? That would be the Hellman in the Diffie-Hellman method: Marty Hellman. Apart from working on the first version of…
https://static.licdn.com/aero-v1/sc/h/al2o9zrvru7aqj8e1x2rzsrca
While Microsoft tried to roll-out a service which took a screenshot of your screen every few seconds, and send it into the Cloud for it to extract text, and then store it back on your machine as a data source for finding things, Apple keeps itself at the forefront of user privacy and scales its secure hardware into the Cloud, and ready for a world of privacy-aware AI: https://lnkd.in/e7ca9RiT

Bob Goes to Disneyland and Gets Some Macaroons Bob is so excited. He has two tickets to Disneyland. For this trip, he is taking Bob Jnr along with him, as it’s a celebration of Bob Jnr turning 18. So, Bob and Bob Jnr show their tickets at the gate, and at every ride that has an over 18s only ride, Bob Jnr — who has only just turned 18 — has to show his identity as proof and is then allowed onto the ride. Bob gets tired of this and goes to see the manager of the park. “Why don’t you just check the ID of people at the gate, and then write on the ticket if there are restrictions, and add your signature? Then the ticket would have all the caveats on it”. “Great idea, let’s do it!”. On the next day, those under 18 have bold writing on their ticket of, “Not allowed on over 18 rides”, and with the signature of the manager. The check for ID is then done at the gate, and not on the rides. This can be defined as distributed authorization. Read more: https://lnkd.in/eHQAk7_8

Braid Cryptography for Diffie-Hellman Key Exchange Cryptography is great fun, and I discover new things every single day. One method is the usage of Braid Cryptography. With this, we use a Braid Group, which relates to having a number of threads and where we cross over our threads. This leads to a braiding pattern. In the following, we have four threads, and where the first thread (red) goes over the second one. Next, the red thread goes over the blue one. Finally, the red thread goes over the green one: https://lnkd.in/eBJnFmgy

Provable Security With Oil and Vinegar Overall, quantum computers will be able to break our existing public key methods, such as discrete logs, RSA and elliptic curves. Unfortunately, within Round 1 of the NIST PQC digital assessment, the parameters set in the original specification for Rainbow were cracked and took around 50 hours on an eight-core laptop. Overall, Rainbow has a multivariate cryptography approach but does not have strong security proofs and a weak parameter set. PROV (PRovable unbalanced Oil and Vinegar) [1] uses a multivariate cryptography-based approach to create a Post Quantum Robust (PQC) digital signature. While there have been recent attacks on multivariate methods, PROV provides security proof. The proof is similar to the MAYO signature scheme where there is a larger oil space than the output of the scheme (defined often as UOV (Unbalanced Oil and Vinegar). The UOV approach was first defined by Kipnis, Patarin and Goubin [2] and integrates a hash-and-sign signature scheme into the GPV framework [3]. It was adapted in [4] for multivariate cryptography methods. Generally, multivariate cryptography generates relatively short signatures but has relatively long public and private keys. https://lnkd.in/ddRHr6DM [1] Faugere, J. C., Fouque, P. A., Macario-Rat, G., Minaud, B., & Patarin, J. PROV: PRovable unbalanced Oil and Vinegar Specification v1. 0–06/01/2023.. [2] Kipnis, A., Patarin, J., & Goubin, L. (1999, April). Unbalanced oil and vinegar signature schemes. In International Conference on the Theory and Applications of Cryptographic Techniques (pp. 206–222). Berlin, Heidelberg: Springer Berlin Heidelberg. [3] Gentry, C., Peikert, C., & Vaikuntanathan, V. (2008, May). Trapdoors for hard lattices and new cryptographic constructions. In Proceedings of the fortieth annual ACM symposium on Theory of computing (pp. 197–206). [4] Kosuge, H., & Xagawa, K. (2024, April). Probabilistic hash-and-sign with retry in the quantum random oracle model. In IACR International Conference on Public-Key Cryptography (pp. 259–288). Cham: Springer Nature Switzerland.