Rejoinder submitted by the United States of America
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INTERNATIONALCOURT OFJUSTICE

CASECONCERNINGOILPLATFORMS

(ISLAMICREPUBLICOFIRANV. UNITED STATESOFAMERICA)

REJOINDER

SUBMITTEDBY

THEUNITEDSTATES OFAMERICA TABLE OF CONTENTS

REJOINDER OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

INTRODUCTION .......................................................

PART 1 STATEMENT OF FACTS ...............................

INTRODUCTION .......................................

CHAPTER 1 IRAN ATTACKED U.S.ANDOTHER NEUTRAL

SHIPPING IN THE GULF ANDUSED ITS OIL

PLATFORMS IN THESE ATTACKS ......................

Section 1. Iran Systematically and Deliberately Attacked U.S.

and Other Neutra1Shipping ...............................

Section 2. Iran Used its Oil Platforms in its Attacks on U.S.and

Other Neutra1Shipping ..................................

A. The Iranian Exclusion Zone and the Channel for

Neutral Shipping ........................................

B. The Iranian Navy's Own Documents Confirm Iran's

Useofthe Platforms to Collect and Disseminate Military

Intelligence on the Movements of Foreign Shipping in the

Gulf ...................................................

C. The International Shipping Community Was Aware

of Iran's Use ofitsl Platforms in itsAttacks on U.S.

and Other Neutral Shipping ..............................

D. Iran's Assertions About the Character of the Platforms

Do Not Refute the Evidence of Their Use in its Attacks on

U.S. and OtherNeutra1Shipping ..........................

1. The Platforms Did Not Require Technologically

Advanced Equipment to Perform Their Military Role ......

(b) Communications equipment ........................

(c) Helicopter landingpads............................ 2. The Military Equipment Iran Placed on the Platforms

Could be Used Offensivelyas Well as Defensively ..........

CHAPTER II IRAN OPPOSED THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY'S

EFFORTS TO PROTECT NEUTRAL SHIPPING FROM

IRANIANATTACKS ...................................

Section1. The International Response to Iran's Attacks on

Neutral Shipping ........................................

A. Reflagging .............................................

B. Naval Escorts and Minesweepers ..........................

Section 2. Iran's Opposition to Efforts to Protect Neutra1 Shipping......

CHAPTER III IRAN IS RESPONSIBLE FOR THE ATTACK ON

SEAISLECITY ........................................

Section 1. The Evidence Demonstrates Iran's Responsibility for the

Attack on Sea Isle City ...................................

Section 2. Iran Used the Rostam Platform to Monitor andReport on

the Movements of Sea Isle City.............................

Section 3. Iran's Pattern of MissileLaunches from the Faw

Area is Consistent with its Acknowledged Policy of

Targeting Kuwait's Oil Trade .............................

Section 4. Iran's Efforts to Deny its Responsibility are Inconsistent

andIncredible ..........................................

Iran's Shifting Story on the Existence of Missile Sites

intheFawArea .........................................

Iraq Did Not Maintain a MissileLaunching Site in the

Faw Area at the Time of theAttack on Sea Isle City ...........

Iraq Could Not Have Attacked Sea Isle CityUsing a

Missile That Traveled Along a Circuitous Path ...............

The MissileThat Hit Sea Isle City Was Not Launched

FromtheAirorSea .....................................CHAPTERIV IRAN IS RESPONSIBLE FOR THE ATTACK ON

THE USSSAMUEL B. ROBERTS ......................... 48

Section 1.The Evidence DemonstratesIran's Responsibility for the

Aîtack on theSSSamuel B. Roberts....................... 48

Section 2.Iran's Denial of Responsibility for Mining is Refuted by

the Evidence and Conclusions of the International

Shipping Community .................................... 49

Section 3.Iraq is not Responsible for the Attack on the

uss ~amhelB. ~oberts................................... 52

CHAPTER V THE UNITED STATES TOOKLIMITED, LAWFUL

DEFENSIVE MEASURES AGAINST IRANIAN

OFFSHORE OIL PLATFORMS IN RESPONSE TO

IRAN'S ATTACKS ON SEA ISLE CITY AND

USSSAMUELB. ROBERTS .............................. 54

PART II THE COURT SHOULD DENY IRAN THE RELIEF

IT SEEKS BECAUSE OF IRAN'S OWN ILLEGAL

CONDUCT .............................................57

INTRODUCTION .......................................

CHAPTER 1 THE COURT SHOULD DENY RELIEF TO IRAN

BECAUSE IRAN ACTED IMPROPERLY WITH

RESPECT TO THE SUBJECT MATTER OF THE

DISPUTE ..............................................58

CHAPTER II THE COURT SHOULD DENY RELIEF TO IRAN

BECAUSE IRAN ITSELF VIOLATED OBLIGATIONS

IDENTICAL TO THOSE THAT ARE THE BASIS FOR

ITSAPPLICATION .................................... 61

CHAPTER III THE COURT SHOULD DENY RELIEF TO IRAN

BECAUSE THE UNITED STATESACTIONS WERE

TAKEN IN SELF-DEFENSE AS A RESULT OF

IRAN'S OWN ILLEGAL CONDUCT ...................... 64PART III THE UNITED STATES DID NOT VIOLATEDARTICLE X(l)

OF THE 1955TREATY BECAUSE THE ATTACKS

ON THE PLATFORMS DID NOT AFFECT "COMMERCE"

THATWAS "BETWEEN THE TERRITORIES" OF IRAN AND

THE UNITED STATES ..................................

INTRODUCTION .......................................

CHAPTER 1 THE COURT'S 1966JUDGEMENT DID NOT DECIDE

WHETHER THE EXTRACTION OF CRUDE OIL AT

THE IRANIAN PLATFORMS CONSTITUTES

"COMMERCE" WITHIN THE MEANING OF THE

1955TREATY ..........................................

CHAPTER II THE EXTRACTION OF CRUIDE OIL AT THE

IRANIAN PLATFORMS IS NOT "COMMERCE"

WITHIN THE MEANING OF ARTICLE X(l) OF

THE1955TREATY .....................................

Section1. The Term "Commerce" in Article X(l) Refers to

"Maritime Commerce" ...................................

The Context of Article X(l) ShowsThat it Relates to

Maritime Affairs ........................................

The History of Article X(l) Reinforces its

Maritime Character .....................................

Section 2. Even a Broad Interpretation of the Term "Commerce"

Would Not Sustain Iran's Interpretati....................

A. The Oscar Chinn Case ....................................

B. Definitions .............................................

C. United States "Commerce Clause" Jurisprudence.............

Section3. "Freedom of Commerce" Within the Meaning of the 1955

TreaQ also Does not Include the Oil Extraction Activities

of the Platforms.........................................CHAPTER III DURING THE RELEVANT PERIOD, IRANIANOIL

FROM THE PLATFORMS WAS NOT PART OF

"COMMERCE" "BETWEEN THE TERRITORIES"

OF IRAN ANDTHE UNITED STATES, ASREQUIRED

UNDER ARTICLE X(l) OF THE 1955TREATY ............

Section 1. The Oil Platforms Were Not Engaged in Maritime

Commerce .............................................

Section2. The Oil PlatformsWere Not Engaged in "Commerce"

Even Under an Interpretation of theTerm Not Limited

to MaritimeCommerce ...................................

A. The Function of Iran's Oil Platforms Did Not Include the

Production of Crude Oil in a Form Capable ofBeing

Exported, and Thus Did Not Involve Commerce .............

B. Neither the Platforms Nor the Pipelines Possesseda

Transport Function Within the Meaning of

"Commerce" in Article X(l) ...............................

C. OiUGasSeparation on the Platforms DoesNot

Constitute the Improvement of a Good Within the

Meaning of "Commerce" Under Article X(l) ................

Section3. The Activitiesof Iran's OilPlatforms Did Not Relate

to Commerce "Between the Territories" of Iranand

the United States........................................

A. The U.S.Embargo Prevented Iran from Exporting Oil

from the Platforms to Customers in the United States

During the Relevant Time Period ..........................

B. Iran's Assertions About U.S. Purchases of Petroleum

Products From Western Europe are Irrelevant ..............

1. The Odell Report Describes Iranian Oil Salesto

Western Europe, Not to the United States.................

2. Iran's Oil Sales to Western EuropeHad No

Connection with the Territory of the United States........

(a) Transactions between U.S. buyers and Western

European sellers had no connection with the

territoryofIran .................................. (b) The goodsthat U.S. bought from Western

Europe constituted different products than

those Iran sold to Western Euro...................

C. Damage to the Platforms Had NoEffect on the Amount

ofOilIranProduced .....................................

PART IV ARTICLE XX(l)(d) OF THE 1955TREATY EXCLUDES

FROM ITS OPERATION ANDAPPLICATION THE U.S.

ACTIONS AGAINST THE OIL PLATFORMS ..............

INTRODUCTION ......................................

CHAPTER 1 THE UNITED STATES ACTIONS WERE

"NECESSARY ...TO PROTECT ITS ESSENTIAL

SECURITY INTERESTS" ...............................

Section1. The Ordinary Meaning of Article XX(l)(d)..................

Section2. Iran Threatened "Essential Security Interests" of the

United States and the U.S. Actions to Protect Such

Interests Were Necessary................................

Section3. Iran's Interpretation of Article)(d) Deprives it of

Meaning, Contrary to Basic Principles of Treaty .........

CHAPTER II THE COURT SHOULD ALLOW THE PARTY

INVOKING ARTICLE (l)(d) A MEASURE OF

DISCRETION IN ITS APPLICATION .....................

Section 1. Sound Legal Principles Support According a Measure of

Discretion tothe Party Invoking Article XX(l).............

Section 2. Discretion is an Established Judicial Prin................

Section3. The Nicaragua Judgment Supportsthe Principle of

Discretion of the Party Invoking Article XX(l)............

CHAPTER III THE APPLICATION OF ARTICLE XX(l)(d) WOULD

OBVIATE ANYNEED TO RESOLVE QUESTIONS

RELATED TO THE LAW OF SELF-DEFENSE ............

PART V U.S. ACTIONSAGAINST THE OIL PLATFORMS WERE

LEGITIMATE ACTIONS IN SELF-DEFENSE UNDER

ARTICLE 51 OF THE UN CHARTER ..................... INTRODUCTION ....................................... 141

CHAPTER 1 IRAN'SARMED ATTACKS ON U.S. VESSELS GAVE

RISE TO THE RIGHT OF THE UNITED STATES TO

TAKE ACTION IN SELF-DEFENSE UNDER

ARTICLE51 ...........................................

Section 1. The "Armed Attack" Requirement of Article 51 of the

UNCharter .............................................

Section 2. Iran's Armed Attack on Sea Isle Ci........................

A. Iran's Attack on Sea Isle Citywas an "Armed Attack"

UnderArticle51 .........................................

Iran's Contention That a MissileAttack on a Single

Merchant Ship is, as a Rule, Not an "Armed Attack"

is Unavailing in Law and Dangerous in Practi...............

1. Small-ScaleAttacks Can Be "Armed Attacks" .............

2. Iran's Attack On A SingleMerchant ShipWas An

"Armed Attack" On the United States ...................

Iran's Argument That a Vesse1Must Be "Specifically

Targeted" to Amount to an "Armed Attack" is Spurious ......

It Makes NoDifference That Sea Isle City Was Attacked

in Kuwaiti Territorial Waters............................

Iran Committed an Armed Attack Against the

Section 3. USSSamuelB.Roberts ...................................

CHAPTER II THE U.S.ACTIONS TO DEFEND ITSELFMET ALL

APPLICABLE RULES CONCERNING THE USE OF

FORCE IN SELF-DEFENSE .............................

Section 1. The Elements of Legitimate Self-Defense....................

Section 2. The U.S.Responses in Self-DefenseWere Necessary ..........

A. Iran's Covert, Surprise Attacks Shaped the Timing

of the ResponsesTaken by the United States Against

the Oil Platforms........................................

vii B. The Oil PlatformsWere Lawful Targets ....................

C. There Were No Peaceful Alternatives......................

Section 3. The U.S. Actions in Self-Defense Were Proportiona.........

CHAPTER III CONCLUSION: THE U.S. ACTIONS AGAINST THE

PLATFORMSCOMPLIED WITH THE RULES OF

SELF-DEFENSE AND CANNOT BE CHARACTERIZED

ASREPRISALS ........................................

PART VI COUNTER-CLAIM .....................................

INTRODUCTION ......................................

CHAPTER 1 IRAN'S ILLEGAL ATTACKS ON

NEUTRALSHIPPING ...................................

CHAPTER II IRAN VIOLATED ITS FREEDOM OF COMMERCE

AND NAVIGATION OBLIGATIONS UNDER

ARTICLE X(l) OF THE 1955TREATY ....................

Section1. Iran Violated Article X(l) Because Its Attacks on U.S.

ShippingImpeded Protected Commerce and Navigation .......

A. There Was SubstantialMaritime Commerce and

Navigation Between Iran and the United State..............

B. Iran Created Conditions ThatWere Dangerous and

Detrimental to U.S. Maritime Commerce and Navigation ......

C. Commerceede.............................................

D. This Court's Decision in the Nicaragua Case Further

Supports a Finding That Iran's Actions Impeded

Commerce and Navigation ................................

Volume of Trade is Not the Correct Measurement of

Whether Commerce and Navigation was Impeded ............

The Meaning of "Between the Territories of the Two

High Contracting Parties" in Article X(...................

Vlll Section . Iran Violated the Freedoms Guaranteed Under

Article X(1). asInformed by ArticX(5) ....................

Section . The U.S. Reflagging Was Proper ...........................

Section . The U.S. Claim for U.S. Ships is Prope.....................

Section5. Iran's Reservation Under Article XX(l)(d)..................

CHAPTER III IRAN HAS NOT DEMONSTRATED A VALID

DEFENSE TO THE COUNTER-CLAIM ...................

Section 1. Iran's Actions Were Not Justified Under

InternationalLaw .......................................

A. Iran Has Not Demonstrated a Valid Claim of Self-Defense

With Respect to U.S. and Other Neutra1 Vessel..............

B. Iran's ActionsViolated the Law of Armed Conflict...........

Section . Damages Will Be the Subject of a Subsequent Proceeding......

SUBMISSIONS .......................................................... REJOINDER OFTHEUNITED STATESOF AMERICA

INTRODUCTION

1.01 In its Judgment of 12December1996,the Court found that it hasjurisdiction, onthe

basis of ArticleXXI, paragraph 2, ofthe 1955Treaty of Amity, Economic Relations and

Consular Rights between the United Statesand Iran (hereinafter"1955Treaty") to entertainthe

claims madeby the Islamic Republicof Iranunder Article X,paragraph 1,of that Treaty. On 23

June 1997,the United States filed its Counter-Memorialand Counter-Claim (hereinafter

"Counter-Memorial"). In its Orderof 10March 1998,the Court foundthat the counter-claim"is

admissible as such and forms a part ofthe currentproceedings". Iran filed its Replyand Defence

to Counter-Claim (hereinafter "Reply") on 10March 1999. This Rejoinder responds to Iran's

Reply .

1.02 TheUnited States will argue inthis Rejoinder that there remain four independent

grounds uponwhich Iran's claim shouldbe rejected in its entirety. First, the Courtshould deny

relief to Iranbecause of Iran's own repeatedillegal conduct. Second,the Court shoulddetermine

that the actionsofthe United Statesdid notviolate Article X,paragraph 1,ofthe 1955Treaty,

because these actions did not impedethe freedomof commercebetween the territoryof Iran and

the territory of the United Stateswithinthe meaning ofthat provision. Third, the Court should

find that the actions of the United Stateswere necessaryto protectthe essential securityinterests

of the United States, and accordinglywere excludedfromthe reach of the 1955Treatyby Article

XX,paragraph l(d). Finally, the Courtshouldfind that the actions of the United Stateswere not

wrongful becausethese actions weretaken in lawful self-defensein response to illegal armed

attacks by Iran. The United Stateswill not repeatin this Rejoinder each assertionthatt hasmade previously in these proceedings;unless otherwiseindicated in this Rejoinder, it

incorporates such assertions intothis pleading by meansofthis reference.

1.03 The final Part of this Rejoinder addressesthe issuesraised by Iran with respectto

the counter-claim of the United States. NotwithstandingIran's resortto arguments in its Reply

which areplainly inconsistent with the positions ithas taken with respect to its own claim,the

United Stateswill demonstrate in this Part that Iran's illegalconduct was dangerousand

detrimentalto maritime commerceand impeded the freedomsof commerceand navigation

between Iran and the United Stateswithinthe meaningofthe 1955Treaty. It will demonstrate

further that the defenses put forwardby Iran for itsillegalconduct are withoutmerit.

1.04 As will become clear inthe course of a reviewofthis Rejoinder,Iran seeks in this

proceedingto invoke the legalresponsibilityof theUnited Stateswith respectto circumstances

and conduct for which Iran itself was plainly and ultimatelyresponsible. Iran seeks to disguise

its responsibility, in some cases,by false representationsto this Court, and in others, by

incompleteand misleading representations. Iran'srepresentationsare beliedby the protests

submitted to Iran by numerous countries, the statements ofits own officiais,reports in

authoritativesources, the statementsand actions ofthe international shippingcomrnunity,

accounts of eyewitnesses, photographic evidence, physicalevidence and interna1Iranian

govenunent documents. TheUnited States urgesthe Courtto review carefullyIran's conduct in

thismatter, and to attribute responsibility inthis proceedingto that State which should

appropriatelybear it. PART1

STATEMENT OF FACTS

INTRODUCTION

1.O1 Although the Parties to this case have submitted detailed and voluminous evidence

to the Court, the basic facts of the caseare simple: Iran launched illegald attacks on U.S.

ships and cargoas part of its carnpaignof attackingneutral shippingduring the Iran-IraqWar,

and these attacks compelled the United Statesto take legitimate and necessary actionsboth in

self-defense andto protect essentialU.S. securityinterests.

1.O2 Between 1984and 1988Iran systematicallyand deliberately attacked ships

traveling in the Gulf from the United Statesand from other countriesthat were neutral in Iran's

war with Iraq. Over 200 ships from 31neutral countries were victimsof Iran's attacks'. At least

63 people died as a result of these attacks; 99morewere wounded2. U.S. ships which Iran

attacked included Bridgeton,Sungari, Sea Isle City,Lucy,EssoFreeport, Diane, Esso Demetia,

and USSSamuelB. Roberts.

1.O3 In response to Iran's unprovokedand ongoing attackson U.S. shipping, the United

States took limited self-defense actions againstthree offshoreIranian oil platform complex-s

'See U.S.Counter-Mernorial 23 June 1997(hereinafter"Counter-Memorial")p,ara.1.04.

Ibid.Staternentof Capt. Christian FeyerPuntewold, 15January1997,and attachments,Exhibit 11.

Exhibits1-179werefiledwiththe Counter-Mernoria alndExhibits180-261are attached to this Rejoinder.Rostam, Sassan,and Sirri - that Iran had used in its attackson U.S. and otherneutral shipping in

the Gulf.

1.O4 Iran bears sole responsibilityfor its illegal armedattacks on U.S. shipping and it

cannot complainof the U.S. actionsin self-defensethatresulted from them.

1.O5The evidence ofIran's illegal actionsisclear. It was well-establishedwithin the

internationalshipping comrnunitythat Iran was attackingU.S.and other neutralshipping, and

that Iran usedits oil platforms inthese attacks. Eyewitness accounts of Iran's illegal actions

make these facts undeniable. Shippingcompaniestookcostly steps to avoidIran's attacks.

Nations fromaround the worldprotested Iran's attacks andsent military shipsto the Gulf to

protect neutralshipping fromthose attacks. The UnitedNations Security Council,the Arab

League, andthe Gulf CooperationCouncil condemnedIran's attacks.

1.O6Iran asks this Courtnot to believe this internationalconsensus and the substantial

evidence demonstrating Iran's wrongdoing. Instead,Iran offersthis Courta series of

unsupported conjectures, manyof which are demonstrablyfalse, in an effortto cast doubt on its

responsibilityfor its attacks onneutral shipping. As thisRejoinder will demonstrate,Iran's

efforts to escapethe consequencesof its illegal actionsare simply not credible. But Iran has

compounded its credibility problemby making assertionsabout factual matters atissue in this

case that failto withstand evencasual scrutiny. Indeed,someof Iran's statementsraise questions

as to whetherany serious effortswere made to ascertaintheir truthfùlness. A few particularly

glaring examples,discussed inmore detail below, illustratethe point: Iran categorically denied the existenceof Iranian-controlled missile launching siteson

the Faw peninsula3,only to be forcedto abandonthis denial when confionted with

photographic evidence showing an activecruisemissile staging facility in Iranian

controlled territory in the Faw area4.

Iran has assertedthe existence ofan Iraqicontrolled missile siteat a location on the

Faw peninsula5,when photographic evidenceclearly indicatesthat nosuch site

existed atthat location at that time6.

Iran has deniedthat it laidmines in internationalwatersinthe Gulf7,when

photographic evidence and eyewitnessaccounts document the Iran Ajr in the act of

laying mines in international waters at the timeit was capturedby U.S. forces8.

Iran's Memorial, 8June 1993(hereinafter "Memorial"),para. 4.74 ("There was, in fact, no Iranian

rnissile-site inthe Fao peninsul...")In a numberof instances Iranhas adopted different spellings of

certain propernouns than those used by the United States in its Counter-Mernorial. In this Rejoinder,the

United States will continue to use the spellingsadopted inthe Counter-Mernorial.

Reply and Defenceto Counter-Claim, 10March 1999(hereinafter "Reply"),para. 4.19.

Ibid., para. 4.29.

Inj?a, para. 1.55.

7Reply, paras. 5.20-5.21.

Counter-Memorial, paras. 1.40-1.47. 1.O7 Disregardingthis Court's prior decisions9, Iran has pleaded with the Court to ignore

various statements made by its officiaisadmitting Iran's illegal actions, arguing that the Court

should not deem such statements to be reliable because they were made in time of war

"necessarily withpolitical and other considerations in mind"." In fact, the false, misleading, and

incredible nature of many of the assertions in Iran's pleadings suggests that the Court should

view Iran's other representations in this case as being of a similar character.

1.O8Iran also attempts to use these proceedings to assign blame for thewhole of the

Iran-Iraq War. Iran seemsto suggest that fault for itsdeliberate decision to target neutral

shipping properly rests, inter dia, with Iraq (for being Iran's enemy in the war and attacking

See Military and ParamiIitary Activities in and against Nicaragua (Nicaraguav. UnitedStates)

(hereinafter "Nicaraguar~M , erits, Judgment,1C.J. Reports 1986,para. 64 ("The Courttakes the view

that statements of this kind, emanatingfrom high-ranking official political figures,sometimes indeed of

the highest rank, are of particular probative value when theyacknowledge facts or conduct unfavourable

to the State represented by thepersonwho made them. They maythen be construed as a form of

admission."); Keith Highet, "Evidence,the Court, and the Nicaragua Case," 8 1 AmericanJournal of

International Law p. 37 (1987) ("This method was applied to statements made by President Reagan and

by Secretary of State Shultz, for the UnitedStates; and by President Ortega, for Nicaragua. In addition,

the quotation (by the press) of 'UnitedStates administration sources' assisted in establishing the Court's

conclusions that the United Stateswas responsiblefor miningthe Nicaraguan harbors and, among other

similar facts, that the CIA was responsiblefor production of a psychological warfare manual").See aIso

VelhsquezRodriguez Case, Inter-AmericanCourt of HurnanRights(Judgment of 29 July 1988), para.

146,reprinted inT. Buergenthal, R.Norris & D. Shelton, Protecting HumanRights intheAmericas p.

257 (3rd ed. 1990)("Many of the pressclippings offered by the Commission cannot be considered as

documentaryevidence as such. However,many of them contain public and well-knownfacts which, as

such do not require proof; others are of evidentiary value, as has been recognized in international

jurisprudence ... insofar as they textuallyreproduce public statements,especially those of high-ranking

members of the Armed Forces, of the Government, or evenof the Supreme Court of Honduras . ..").

10Reply, para.2.43.Iranianshipping); Kuwait, Saudi Arabia, and theUnitedStates (for beingsympathetic with Iraq

duringthe war); andthe international cornmunityas a whole (for failing to condernn andstop

various Iraqi actions against Iran)".

1.O9 These assertionsraise issues that areoutsidethis Court'sjurisdiction and have no

relevancetothis case. Iran never declared that theUnitedStates was a belligerent in its war with

Iraq. Rather,this case is about Iran's illegal armed attackson neutral U.S.shipping and the

United Stateslawful actions in responseto those attacks. Iran's efforts to vindicateits accountof

the Iran-IraqWar are beyondthe scopeof these proceedings,andthis Court should ignore them.

1.10 Ultimately, this Court must setasideIran'svarious diversionarytactics and false

assertions and focus on the central facts on which this caseturns. Iran systematically attacked

U.S. and other neutral shipping andit used its oil platformsin these attacks. Iran bears sole

responsibilityfor these actions, andcannot complainaboutthe limited actionstaken by the

United States both in self-defenseand to protect essentialU.S. security interests.

" Iran observes in its Reply that Kuwaithas apologizedto Iran for its supportfor Iraq during the Iran-Iraq

War. See Reply, para. 2.26. U.S. Secretaryof State MadeleineAlbright said that "aspects of U.S. policy

towards Iraq, during its conflict with Iran appear now to have beenregrettably shortsighted, especially in

lightof our subsequent experienceswith Saddam Hussein." MadeleineK. Albright, Remarks before the

American-IranianCouncil, 17March 2000. While suchstatementsmay be of diplornatic or historical

interest,they shed no light on thespecific facts or legal issues raisedby this case. CHAPTER1

IRAN ATTACKEDU.S.AND OTHER NEUTRAL SHIPPING INTHE GULF AND

USED ITS OIL PLATFORMS INTHESEATTACKS

Section 1. IranSystematically and Deliberately Attacked U.S. and OtheN r eutra1Shipping

1.11 An analysis of this case must begin with the undisputedfactthat Iran systematically

and deliberately attacked U.S. and other neutral shippinginthe Gulfingthe Iran-Iraq War. In

its Counter-Mernorial,the United Statesdemonstrated that:

Iran attacked over200merchant ships from 31neutralcountriesbetween 1984and

198812.

At least 63 people werekilled in these attacks;at least 99 morewere injuredI3.

Iran attacked neutral shipping generally;;t did notlimit its attacksto ships carrying

\ war materiel nor to shipsrefusing to submitto visit-and-searchI4.

U.S. ships which Iran attacked included Bridgeton,Sungari, Sea Isle City,Lucy,Esso

Freeport, Diane, Esso Demetia, and USSSamuelB.RobertsI5.

TheInternational Association of Tanker Owners(hereinafter"Intertanko"),the

General Council of British Shipping, Lloyd'sWeeklyCasualtyReporting Service,

LloydS List,Jane S Defence Weeklya ,nd otherpublications reported extensivelyon

Iran's attackson neutral shipping andrned vesselsto take appropriate

'?SeeCounter-Memorialp ,ara. 1.04.

l3IbidS.tatementofCapt.ChristianFeyerPuntervold,15 January1997,andattachments,Exhibit 11.

l4SeeCounter-Memorial, para1..07.

l5SeeCounter-Memorialp ,aras.1.1-1.62,6.08;seealsoinfraP,arVI. precautionary measures to avoid Iran's attacks16

Shippingcompaniestook costly steps, including changing routes, sailing only at

night, and loadingtheir vessels at less than full capacity, to avoidtraveling near

Iranian offshore oil platforms because it was known that Iran used these platforms in

its attacks on neutral shippingI7.

Iran's attacks on neutral shipping drew widespread diplornatic protests and

condemnation from, among others, the UN Security Coun~il'~,the Arab League19,the

l6Counter-Memorial, paras. 1.01-1.OS.This Court has previously reliedon reports contained in

authoritativeaccounts by major maritime organizations. See, e.g.,Nicaragua, Merits,Judgment, I.C.J.

Reports 1986,para. 77 (relying onLloyd'sList and Shipping Gazette).

" See Statement ofColin Eglington, former General SuperintendentOperations Kuwait Oil Tanker

Company, Exhibit 3 1;Statementof Thomas R. Moore, President,Chevron ShippingCompany LLC

(hereinafter "Chevron Statement"), Exhibit 180.

''See Resolution 552,United Nations Security Council(2546thmeeting, 1June 1984),reprinted in

United Nations Document SlRESl552,(1984), Exhibit27, ("Havingconsidered the letter dated 21 May

1984from the representatives of Bahrain, Kuwait, Oman, Qatar, SaudiArabia andthe United Arab

Emirates complaining against Iranianattacks on commercialships en route to and fromthe ports of

Kuwait and SaudiArabia" the SecurityCouncil "condemn[ed]these recent attacks on commercial ships

en route to and from the ports of Kuwait and Saudi Arabia").

l9See Statementof Mr. Chedli Klibi, Secretary-General of the Leagueof Arab States,to the United

Nations SecurityCouncil, 25 May 1984, United Nations Document SlPV.2541, pp. 36-37, Exhibit 181

("Navigation in the international waters ofthe Arab Gulf hasin fact beenthwarted by acts of aggression

by the Iranian Air Force, which hasattacked tankers belongingto two Arab Stateson the Gulf, Members

of the United Nations,that is, Kuwaitand the Kingdomof SaudiArabia ...[Tlhose acts, for which Iran

is responsible, are acts of aggression against the sovereignty, securityand integrity of the territorial

waters of SaudiArabia and Kuwait inviolation of the noms of good-neighbourliness,the United Nations

Charter and theConvention on the Law of the Sea.";Arab League, Text ofCommunique from Amman

Summit, 11November 1987,27 International LegalMaterials, p. 1651,Exhibit 182("The leaders. ..

voiced their indignation at the Iranian regime7sintransigence,provocations and threats tothe Arab Gulf

States. . .The leaders reviewed developments inthe Gulfregionand the dangerous results of the Iranian

tlireats, provocationsand aggressions. . ..The Conferenceaffirmed its support of Kuwait in al1the

measures itadopted to protect itsterritories and watersand safeguard its stability. The Conference

expressed its support of Kuwait inconfronting the threats andaggressions of the Iranian regime.") Gulf Cooperation Co~ncil~~,the UnitedKingdom2', K~wait~~,Bahrain, Oman, Qatar,

20See Gulf Cooperation Council, Ministerial Statementon Iran's attacks on Tankers, 17May 1984,

reprinted inBritish Broadcasting Company, 19May 1984. Exhibit 183("The GCCMinisterial Council

held an extraordinary meeting today ... and reviewed recent developmentsinthe region, represented in

Iran's aggression against shippingto and fromthe ports ofthe GCC member countries ...They also

reviewed the threats those attacks posedto the vital interests ofthe GCC member-countries andthe

violation of international law and ofthe UNCharterthat they entailed, as well asthe infringement of the

law of the sea andthe resultant heighteningof tension inthe area. The Ministerial Council recalled the

decision taken bythe Supreme Councilto regard any aggression againstone member-country as

aggression agaii~stthem al1and, in linewith that attitude, the Council expressedits denunciation ofthose

attackstt).

" See Letter dated 22September 1987fromthe Permanent Representativeof the United Kingdom of

Great Britain and Northern Irelandto the UnitedNations Addressedto the Presidentof the Security

Council, United Nations Document S119147,Exhibit 184,"TheBritish Governmenthave clear evidence

that theGentleBreezewas fired onby one or more Iranian naval vessels at the position2750N and

4948E. . ..This attack was clearly premeditatedand totaily unprovoked,and hencewholly unjustified.

The Gentle Breeze posedno conceivable threatto the interests of the Islamic Republicof Iran. The attack

was in clear violation of principles of freedom of navigation, and of international law, inparticular

Security Council Resolution598(1987) of 20 July 1987. The British Governmentreserves the right to

claim compensation fromthe Iranian Governmentfor any damage or expenses caused by the attack on

the Gentle Breeze,or any other such attacks. My Governmenthave demanded animmediateexplanation

of this outrage and anapology for it, together with an assurance from the Governmentof the Islamic

Republic of Iran that such deliberate, unprovokedand wholly unjustified attackson unarmed British

merchant vessels will not be repeated."; "British Protest," TheTimes(London),27 January 1987,Exhibit

185("The ForeignOffice yesterday summonedthe Iranian charge d'affaires, MrAkhumzadeh Basti. ..to

deliver a 'vigorous protest' to Iran over an attack on Friday against a British merchant ship in the Gulf").

*'See Letter dated 1September 1987fromthe Permanent Representativeof Kuwaittothe United Nations

Addressed to the Secretary-General,UnitedNations Document S119093,Exhibit 186(reporting on

Iranian attacks on Kuwaiti shipping and stating, "Whiledeploring Iran's continuedacts of piracy by its

navy against Kuwaitivessels, Kuwait drawsthe attention to the threat that these Iranian practices pose not

only to the navigation inthe high-seas of the Arabian Gulf but alsoto the territorial waters of neutral

States.");Letter dated 15October 1987fromthe Permanent Representativeof Kuwaittothe United

Nations Addressed to the Secretary-General,United Nations Document Sl19210,Exhibit 187(reporting

on Iranian attacks on Kuwaiti shippingand stating "Furtherto Ourprevious correspondencewith you

concerning the attacks launchedby Iran against Kuwait,we would liketo inform youthat Iran has

persisted in its hostileacts against Kuwait in disregard of international lawsand resolutions");etter

dated 16October 1987from the Permanent Representativeof Kuwaitto the UnitedNations Addressedto

the Secretary-General, UnitedNations Document SI19215,Exhibit 188(reporting on Iranian attacks on

Kuwaiti shipping). Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Ernirate~~~E , g~pt~~,Jordan2', France26,the Soviet

23See Letter dated 21 May 1984from the Representativesof Bahrain, Kuwait,Oman, Qatar, Saudi

Arabia, and the United Arab Emirates Addressedto the President ofthe SecurityCouncil, United Nations

Document SI16574, Exhibit 189("Upon instructionsfrom OurGovernments, we havethe honour to

request an urgent meetingof the SecurityCouncilto considerthe Iranian aggressions on the freedom of

navigation to and from the ports of our countries.Suchaggressions constitute a threattothe stability and

securityof the area and have serious implicationsto international peace andsecurity"). See aIso "Saudis

Break Diplomatic Ties with Iran, Citing Mecca Riots andGulf Raids," TheNew YorkTimes,27 April

1988,p. A10, Exhibit 190(Saudi announcement ofbreak in relations with Iran "citedIranian threats

against navigation inthe gulf').

24See Letter dated 26 October 1987fromthe Permanent Representative ofEgyptto the United Nations

Addressedtothe Secretary-General, UnitedNations Document Al421687,SI19232,Exhibit 191("The

Arab Republic of Egypt condemns with utmostvigourthe act of aggression just committed againstthe

fraternal State of Kuwait" by Iran);Letter dated28 July 1988fromthe PermanentRepresentative of

Egyptto the United Nations Addressedto the Secretary-General,United Nations Document A/43/494,

Sf20072,Exhibit 192(reporting on Iranian attack on Egyptian shipping).

25See Statement of Mr. Salah, Representative ofJordan,to the UN SecurityCouncil, 25 May 1984,

UnitedNations Document SfPV.2542,pp. 3,4-5, 11,Exhibit 193,("Iran's raids on Saudi and Kuwaiti

tankers, as well as its attack on civilianiippingin internationalwaters, constitute a grave development in

the Gulf region. This gravity is reflected intwo aspects: first, the illegalityand illegitimacy of those

attacks; secondly, the political consequencesof their continuation.... [I]t is incumbentupon this Council

promptly to condemn these actions, which representa gravethreat to the sovereignty, independence and

welfare of the States ofthe region, as well as to regionaland international peace andsecurity").

26See "Iranian Gunboats Fire on French Ship," TheTimes (London),14July 1987,p. 7, Exhibit 194

("France has ordered itsCharge d'Affaires inTehranto demand an explanationfor the attack. The envoy

has beentold to warn Iran that France will 'exerciseal1its rights following this grave affair'").27See "Iran FacesProspect of Isolation byEast and West,"TheTimes(London), 12May 1987,Exhibit 195

(". ..the Soviet news agency has condemned as an act of piracythe gunboat attack on a Soviet freighter

traveling fromKuwait last week for which shipping agentsinthe Gulf blame Iran").

28See "20 ShipsHit in Gulf in SixDays, Raising Fears of Maritime Nations,"The New YorkTimes,4

September 1987, Exhibit 196("The Italian Foreign Ministry summonedthe Iranian Ambassador in Rome

and sent instructionsto its Ambassadorin Teheren [sic]to deliver 'the strongest protest'to the Iranian

authorities" over an Iranian attack onthe Italian containershipJolly Rubino).

29See "JapanProteststo Iran Over itsSuspectedAttacksonVessels,"Japan Economic Newswire,2October

1987, Exhibit 197("Japan lodgeda strong protest to Iran Fridayover what is believed tobe Iranian attacks

on two Japanese tankers in the Persian Gulf Wednesday. Takashi Onda, Director General of the Foreign

Ministry's Middle Eastern and African Affairs Bureau, said he made the protest to Ali Asghar Farshchi,

Charge d'Affaires at the Iranian Embassy in Tokyo at his Ministry").

30 See GovernmentofNonvay, cablereporting protestto Iranianauthorities, 10February 1988,Exhibit 198

(hereinafter "Nonvay Cable"); "Nonvay Tells Iran It Will Not Tolerate Gulf Ship Strikes,"Reuters, 24

December 1987, Exhibit23 ("Norway toldIran on Thursdayitwouldnottolerateattackson itstankers inthe

Persian Gulf,theNonvegiannews agencyreported. An officialprotestnotewashandedtothe Iraniancharge

d'affaires inOslo following two recentattacks on Nonvegian ships, the agency said").

31 See "GreeceLodgesForma1Protestwith Iran on ShippingAttacks,"Platt 'sOilgramNews,22 December

1987, p. 2, Exhibit 199("Greece delivered a sharp protestto Iran's Ambassadorto Athens over repeated

Iranian attackson Greek merchant ships in the Gulf (on 11/13)").

32 See "TurkeySticksto its GunsOverIranian Attack onAtlas 1Tanker,"Platt S OilgramNews, 19March

1986,p. 3, Exhibit200 ("The Iraniangovernment hasn'trepliedto Turkey's protest of an Iranian attack on

one of its tankers March 2, a Turkish Foreign Ministry spokesman said today (on 314).. ..Theday of the

attack, Turkey called the Iranian charge d'affaires to Ankaraand told him Turkey would 'reserve the right

to demand indemnity"').

33 See Statementof Mr. Farah Dirir, Representative ofDjibouti,to theUNSecurityCouncil,30 May 1984,

United Nations Document SlPV.2545,pp. 3, 5, Exhibit 201 (".. .my delegationurgesthe Security Council

to considerwithmore intentthe legitimacyand gravityofthecomplaintoftheGulf Stateswith regard to the

aggression ofthe Iranian war machineagainst oil tankers andother commercial vesselssailing to and from

theArab Gulfcountries that are not and have never been ina state of war with Iran").

34 See Statement of Mr. Mrani Zentar, Representative of Morocco, to theUN Security Council, 29 May

1984, UnitedNations Document SIPV.2543,pp. 9-10, 12-13,Exhibit 202 ("The Republicof Iran has thus

perpetrated undeclaredactsof waragainstcountrieswhicharepartiesto noconflictandwhichhave notbeen S~dan~~ ,nd Yemen36.

involved in any way in the hostilities between Iraqand Iran. Furthermore, the Iranian aggressive action,

which according to the Iranian authorities themselves can be expected to continue, is aimed at disrupting

navigation in international waters inthe Arab Gulf, paralyzingcommercial andother forms of traffic inthe

region and creating new difficulties for the world economy. This threatens not only many developed

countriesbutalso a great numberofthird-world countries, whichare besetbynumerouseconomic problems

and are sorely tested bythe high cost of energy. .. . Iran'sacts of aggression are wanton, unprovoked and

unjustifiable and are contrary to international law").

35See Statement of Mr. Birido, Representativeof Sudan,to the UN Security Council,25 May 1984,

United Nations Document SIPV.2542,pp. 17,18,21,Exhibit 193("The Iranian act of aggression against

the Kuwaiti and Saudi Arabian oil tankersclearly threatensthe sovereignty, independenceand territorial

integrity ofthe States of theregion. It isalso a flagrant threatto the freedom of navigation in

international waters and waterways leadingto and from the portsof al1the Gulf coastal States. .. .We

cal1upon Iranto desist from aggression, to respect the sovereigntyof the Statesof the region, their

territorial integrity,theiratenvays, ports and economic installations,to fulfill the obligations of good-

neighbourliness and to comply with the principles of theUnitedNations Charter and international law").

36See Statement of Mr. Sallam, Representative of the ArabRepublic of Yemen, to the UN Security

Council, 25 May 1984,UnitedNations Document SlPV.2541,pp. 24,26, Exhibit 181 ("...the delegation

of Yemen considersthat the acts of aggression committedby Iranian aircraft against Saudi and Kuwaiti

tankers in territorial waters and internationalnavigationchannels,far from areas that have been declared

as zones of hostility, should be denounced and theirpersistencecondemned, sincethey are aimed against

tankers belonging to two States that are not party to the conflict- something which heightenstension in

the region and constitutes a new threat to the peace, security and stabilityof those Statesand ofthe world

at large"). 1.12 In short, Iran's attackson neutral shipping were widespread, well documented, and

of great concernwithin the international shipping community. Consistentwith its past practice,

the Court rnaytakejudicial notice of the extensive publicrecordestablishing Iran's responsibility

for attacks on neutral ~hipping~~I .ranhas not attempted to denythese facts in its pleadings

before this Court. Its failure to do so should leadthis Court to concludethat Iran's responsibility

for attacks on neutral shipping hasbeenproven3*.

37See UnitedStatesDiplornaticandConsularStaffin Tehran, (UnitedStates oA f merica v. Iran,)

Judgment,I.C.J.Reports 1980,paras. 12-13(finding allegations of fact by the United States regarding the

seizure of the embassy and hostagesas well founded, giventhat they are matters of public knowledge

which have received extensive coverage inthe world press); Keith Highet, "Evidence,the Court, and the

Nicaragua Case," 8 1American Journal of InternationalLaw p. 39 (1987)(With reference tothe

paragraphs cited immediately above: "Thiscomment is useful in analyzingthe role played byjudicial

notice and the observation of 'currentevents' by thejudges. In the positionof the International Court,this

is a necessary, if not an inevitable, step inaccumulatingthe factual evidenceupon which determinations

as to internationalresponsibilitycan proceedto be founded");Nicaragua, Merits, JudgmentI,.C.J.

Reports 1986,para. 63 ("although it is perfectly properthat press informationshould not be treated in

itself as evidenceforjudicial purposes, publicknowledge of a fact rnaynevertheless be established by

means of these sources of information,andthe Court can attach a certainamount of weight to such public

knowledge"); Mojtaba Kazazi, BurdenofProofandRelatedIssues,p. 174(1996) ("the conceptof

judicial notice itself isundoubtedly admittedin international procedureand is applied by different

tribunals includingthe International Court of Justice").

38See Keith Highet, "Evidence, the Court, andthe Nicaragua Case," 81AmericanJournal of International

Lawpp. 33-34 (1987) ("Traditionally, the Court has operated in importantareas of factual conclusions by

an informed processof inference. The inferentialmethod rnay be 'negative,'inthat it seeksto conclude

about a state of affairs because of a failureto deny or rebut it. Thus,what is not denied rnaywell be

accepted: for example overflights by U.S.military aircraft in the Nicaraguacase .. ..The inferential

process rnayalso be 'affirmative'; it rnayengagethe responsibility of a state on the presumption that the

state must have intendedthe likelyor reasonably foreseeable consequencesofah earlier statement or

action"); MojtabaKazazi, BurdenofProofandRelated Issues, p. 371(1996)("The rule of actori

incumbitprobatiois affected bythe operationof presumptions inthe sensethat, inthe process of

evaluating evidence,the tribunal takes accountof any presumptions applicablein favour of the party that

carries the burdenof proof and not refuted by the other party. Generallyspeaking, presumptionsaffect

the burden of proof insofar as they createprima facie evidence or proof in favourof the party that 1.13 Indeed, during the war, Iran acknowledgedthat it maintained an illegalcampaign of

attacks against neutral shipping. For example, in February 1988,Nonvay's Ambassador to Iran

protested Iranianattacks on Nonvegian shippingtoHosseinSheikholeslam, Iran's Deputy

Foreign Minister. The Norwegian Ambassadornotedthat the Norwegian shipshadbeen

engaged "inlegal traffic between neutral harbors" at the time Iran attackedthem39

1.14 In response to this protest, Deputy ForeignMinister Sheikholeslamacknowledged

both Iran's responsibility forthe attacks in questionandthat Iran maintained an illegalpolicy of

attacking neutralshipping in the Gulf. According to the Nonvegian Ambassador'sreporting

cable on his conversation with Deputy Foreign Minister Sheikholeslam:

"Sheikholeslam did notdeny that Iran indeedwasresponsible for the attackson Happy

Kari,Berge Big, IglooEspoo,and PetrobulkRuler. He said he regrettedthat Nonvegian

ships had been targeted in such attacks, andaddedthat Iran's purposewas not to hm

Norwegian shipping. Itwas the cargothese shipswere carrying that wasthe real target.

Sheikholeslam stressedthat Iran was determinedtocontinue attacking - whenever

possible- al1ships canying cargo to or from docksin Saudi Arabia or Kuwait. When 1

arguedthat these are flagrant violations of internationallaw, he somewhatarrogantly

respondedthat he was fully aware of that. Sheikholeslammentioned thatthe Iranian

Navy had been instructedto seek to avoid lossofhuman lives duringthe attack40."

1.15 Iran's practice of attacking neutralshipping,and Iran's specifictargetingof U.S.

shipping, wasfurther confirmedin April 1988by CommodoreMohammad Hoseyn

benefitsfrornthem.Thisresults inthe shiftingoftheburdenofevidencefrornonepartytotheother").

39NorwayCable,Exhibit 198.

40Ibid.Malekzadegan, Commander ofthe IranianNavy, who acknowledgedthe existenceof "a

wholehearted task by the Navy overthe past year, comprisingindirectblows inparticular to the

US.fleet, affecting both its warshipsand its merchant vessels, withmines or missiles4'. ..."

1.16 Againstthis background,there can be no doubt of Iran's responsibilityfor attacks

on U.S. and other neutral shipping.

Section 2. Iran Used itsOilPlatforms inits Attacks on U.S.andOtherNeutra1Shipping

1.17 The evidenceis also clear that Iran used its oil platformsin its attacks on U.S. and

other neutral shipping. Indeed,the plans and communications of Iran's Navy,as well as

numerous eyewitness reports,make it impossiblefor Iran crediblytodenyits military useofthe

platforrns. Iran's only responseto this evidence isto suggestto the Courtthat there were limits

to the military role thatthe oil platforms played. Iran's responsein no way refutes the substantial

body of direct evidence demonstrating Iran's useof the platforms in its attacks on U.S. and other

neutral shipping.

41"Radio Phone-InProgram WithDefense Officials," Foreign BroadcastInformationService, 14April

1988, p. 53, Exhibit 13(emphasis added). This Court should viewsuchstatementsby senior Iranian

Government officiaisas particularly probative since they constitute admissionsagainst Iran's interest.

See supra, note9. A. THEIRANIAE NXCLUSIO ZNONE ANDTHECHANNE LORNEUTRAS LHIPPING

1.18 As a matter of context,it is importantto understandthat, during the Iran-Iraq War,

neutral shippingwas required to travel alonga route that passed close to the Rostarn, Sassan, and

Sirri platform complexes. This necessity arose from Iran's declarationof an exclusion zone

along its coast in the Gulf which renderedoff limits the routesto the north of the platforms that

commercial shippinghad followedprior tothe war. Routesto the extreme south of the platforms

were not viable because shallowerwaterthere created risksthat fully loadedtankers wrund

agr~und~~.As a result of Iran's exclusionzone, the routeU.S.tankers took through the Gulf

carried them fewerthan 15nautical milesfrom the Sirriand Rostam platforms, and fewer than

30 nautical miles from Sa~san~~. he evidence is clearthat Iranseizedon this circumstanceto

incorporatethe platforms into its militarycommand structureand to use the platforms in its

attacks on U.S. and other neutral shippingin the Gulf.

1.19 Documents issuedby the IranianNavy establishconclusivelythat Iranused its oil

platforms aspart of its military apparatus,by means ofwhich it attacked neutral shipping. This

42See Statement of Colin Eglington, 10,Exhibit 1.

43SeeCounter-Memorial Map 1.2.evidence includesa document entitled "Joint SeaCoast 1Combat Group(Operations)Sea Coast

1OperationsPlan Ghadir"(hereinafter"Operations Plan")44.U.S. forcestook possession of the

OperationsPlan when they boardedthe Iran Ajrafterwitnessing its crew layingmines in the

Gulf. The United States immediatelytreatedthe documentas highly classifiedand has not

previously disclosed its possessionof the document. In light of Iran'sposition in its Reply, the

United Stateshas taken the extraordinarystep of declassifyingthis documentto permit its use in

this case.

1.20 The Operations Plan is marked "TOPSECRET" in Farsiand indicatesthat it is copy

32 of 50 copies of the document inexistence. A register in the frontof the OperationsPlan

indicatesthat the document wasupdated regularly,and that it had beenupdated on 24 June 1987,

just over three months priorto the seizureofthe IranAjr. The OperationsPlan describesthe

organizationand responsibilitiesof the Iranianforcesthat make up the Sea-Coast 1Combat

Group, contains information gatheredby Iranian intelligence aboutthe posture and intentions of

the forces of other countries presentin the Gulf, and contains operationalplans that the Sea-

Coast 1Combat Group shouldhave been preparedto cany out if orderedto do so.

1.21 The OperationsPlan andother IranianNavy documents and communications which

the United States submitted with its Counter-Mernorialdemonstrate conclusivelythat the

Rostam, Sassan, and Sirri platform complexeswere an integral part of Iran's military operations

44IslamicRepublicof IranNavalForces,JointSea-Coast1CombatGroup(Operations)Sea-Coast1

Operations Plan GhadirE ,xhibit203.structure, andthat Iranused the platforms in its conductof military operations, which included

Iran's attacks on neutral shipping in the Gulf. Specifically:

Iran deployed military observationsposts "onthe oil platforms in thesouthernparts of

the Persian Gulf' - including onRostarn,Sassan, and Sirri - "inorderto gather

information aboutthe enemy'sair andseatraffic and destroy its craft4'."These posts

included military observerswhose "goal" was "[tlhe immediateexchangeof intelligence

from the oil platformsto Sirriand Lavanusing the radios ofobserverson the platforms

and then, the immediate andsecuretransmission of these messages fromthe Islands to

Fleet Headquarters andthe 1"Naval District (Bandar Abbas) 46.''

The Reshadat (Rostam)andNasr (Sirri)platforms are listed in the OperationsPlan's

Combat Organization Annex as " 1"Naval District Naval Facilities". This listing also

specifically refers to Rostamas a "radar site" andto Sirri as a "temporaryradarsite47"

The OperationsPlan's IntelligenceAnnex statesthat "Oilplatforms subordinateto the

Sea-Coast 1Combat Group areto report the following informationas soon as it is

received: any movement of foreignvessels nearthe oil platforms4'...." The platforms'

broad order to report on "anymovementof foreign vesselsnearthe platforms" contrasts

with other orders elsewhereinthe OperationsPlan that relateonlyto "movementsor

activities of enemy ve~sels~~" .learlythe mandateof the platforms extended to reporting

on the movements of neutral commercial shipping.

The Operations Plan states that the1"Naval District InstallationsCornrnand,which

includesthe Rostam and Sirriplatforms,is charged with the tasks of"conduct[ing]visual

45Islamic Republic of Iran ArmedForces, Fleet, 1"Naval District ((Intelligence)),Instructions for the

Deployment of Observers inthe Persian Gulf, p. 3, Exhibit 115.

46Annex G (Cominunications), p. 9, Exhibit 115.

47Islamic Republic of Iran Naval Forces, Joint Sea-Coast 1Combat Group (Operations) Sea-Coast 1

Operations Plan Ghadir, p.20, Exhibit 203.

48Ibid.,pp. 23-24.

49Compare Instructionsto Oii Platforms, ibid.,with "Requests from Adjacent Units,"ibid.,pp.24-25. andradar surface and airsurveillancefor the 1" Naval District" and "be[ing]preparedto

conductjoint operationswith the ships and the marine brigade5'."

Outgoingmessages foundon the Rostam platformreport onthe composition,location,

movements, and speed ofshippingconvoys traveling inthe Gulf. These includea

message reporting onthe movementsof a U.S.escorted convoy of ships that included Sea

IsleCi@'. These messagesconfirmthat, consistentwith Iran's militaryplans, Iran in

fact used the oil platformsto monitor shippingtraveling in the Gulf andto communicate

that information to otherelementsof the Iranianmilitary.

Messages from the Rostamplatform found aboardIran Ajrconfirmthat Iranused its oil

platforms to transmit informationdirectlyto shipsof the IranianNavy, includingthose

engaged in minelaying5'.

1.22 As noted above,the locationof Iran's exclusion zone inthe Gulf requiredneutral

shipping to travel a course close tothe Rostam, Sassan,and Sirri platform complexes. These

platforms were thus ideally placedto carry out their ordersto report onthe locations and

movements of foreign shipping. Theplatforms playedthe additional role of communicatingthis

informationto Sirri and LavanIslands for further disseminationto other elements ofthe Iranian

Navy, as well as directly to Iraniannaval vessels conductingoperationsin the Gulf. Reportsas

to the location,course, and speedof shipsincludingSea Isle C~S,allowed Iranto target these

50Ibid.,p. 14.

5'See SelectedMessages fromArchiveof Incoming Messages,RostamOil Platform,Exhibit 119;infra,

paras.1.43-1.45

52See Translationsof the SelectedPaper-TapeMessagesSentFrom,andReceivedbythe IranAjr, Tapes

1, 16,and 21,Exhibit71.ships with missiles and mines aspart of its illegal campaignof attackingneutralshipping inthe

Gulf.

C. THEINTERNATION SHLIPPINGCOMMUNIT WYASAWARE OFIRAN'S USEOFITSOIL

PLATFORM ISITSATTACKO SNU.S.ANDOTHER NEUTRAS LHIPPING

1.23 As the United Statesdemonstrated inits Counter-Memorial,the international

shipping community waswell awarethat Iran was usingits oil platforms initsattacks on U.S.

and other neutral shipping. Specifically,the United States demonstratedthat:

During the Iran-IraqWar,Iranian forcesattacked 45-50 ships within50 nautical milesof

the Rostam platform; 35-40shipswithin 50 nautical miles of the Sassanplatform;and

35-40 ships within 50nautical miles oftherri platforms3.

Members of the crewsof neutral commercial vessels attackedby Iran witnessed Iran

using its oil platformsto launchits armed attackss4.These eyewitnessreports included:

An eyewitness accountby a crew memberof the Nonvegian shipBerge King that

"he saw two helicopterson theranianoff-shore installation,Rostam Island. One

of them liftedand attacked, butthe missile fell harmlessly intotheThe other

helicopter lifted whenthe first one returnedtothe installationand a misile

[sic] which landedinthe air conditioning room withoutexpl~ding~~."

53SeeCounter-Memorial, para1.91and Rejoinder Map 1. Some of the ships attacked were within the

range of more than oneof the platforms.

54This Court has previously found highlyprobative evidence that came from disinteresteSeeitnesses.

Nicaragua, Merits,udgment,I.C.JReports1986,para. 69 ("In the general practiceof courts, two forms

of testimony which are regarded as prima facie of superior credibility are, first the evidence of a

disinterested witness - one who is nota party to the proceedings and stands to gain or lose nothing from

its outcome-and secondly so muchof the evidence of a party as is against itsown interest").

55See"Tanker Safety Circular Letter No.Intertanko16April 1986,para. 3, Exhibit 17. An eyewitness accountby the Captainof the Panamanian ship Steliosthat he saw

the helicopter that launcheda missile attack onteliostake off fromRostam

Islands6.

a An eyewitness accountby a crewmemberof the French ship Chaumont that he

observed "du décollagede deuxhélicoptèren son identifiésdes deuxplate formes

du champ pétrolifèreROSTAN, a alors aperçu un des hélicoptères ouvrir le feu

d'une distanceévaluée à 1'5 et d'unealtitude de60 métres. Aussitôt à 17.58par

25.47N et 52.43Ele navire a été touché par un missileà tribord arrièrà la

hauteur du pont 2 sousune incidencede 20" environde l'axe dunavire. Sous

l'impact extinctionde la chaudièreTribord, émission de fuméenoire épaisse.

Retour des hélicoptères a leurbases7."

In additionto these specificeyewitnessaccounts, numerous independent shipping

sources,on the basis of datacompiled from a nurnber of sources, reported that Iran was

using its oil platforms tounchattacks on neutral shipping. These reports include:

a

A report by Intertankostating that "[alt least 14shipsare reported to havebeen

attacked from this installationcalled Rostam Island, located about 100m from

the Iranian shoreline5'."This same information wasalso reported by Jane S

Defence WeeklY9.

A report by the GeneralCouncil of British Shippingstatingthat "[rleportsindicate

that the Iranians arenow also usinghelicopters operatedfrom their oil platforms

in the Rostram [sic]Field (25.50N 52.53E), Sassan Field (25.30N 53.08E)and

See ibid.

57See ProtestofCapt.M.Faury,5March1986,Exhibit 110 (theeyewitness observed "thetake-offof

twounidentifiedhelicoptersfrom tworigs inRostamoilfield. Hethensaw one ofthehelicoptersopen

fireatanestimateddistanceof 1'5andanaltitudeof50 meters. Thereupon,at 1758hours, at25'47'N

and52'43'E,tlievesse1washitbyamissileontherearstarboardside,levelwithdeck2,atanangleof

approximately20' inrelationtothevessel'saxis").

58"TankerSafetyCircularLetterNo.54," Intertanko,16April 1986p ,ara.3,Exhibit17.

59See "IranMountsAirStrikesfrom OilPlatform," Jane's DefenceWeekln 26April 1986,Exhibit109.As

noted supra,note54,thisCourthas viewedasprobativereportsbymajormaritime organizations. i

L I l

1 i

1 I

'.

SECTION OF BRITISH ADMIRALTY CHART #2858 ..m

:'---.J?

GULFOF OMAN TO SHATT AL 'ARAB

CHART DEPICTS:

1. IRANIAN EXCLUSIONZONE

2. IRANIAN OIL PLATFORMSWlTH 50 NAUTICALMILE RANGE ARCS

3. IRANIAN ATTACKSON MERCHANTSHlPPlNG

HELICOPTERATTACKS

REVOLUTIONARYGUARDSMALL BOAT ATTACKS

IRANIAN AIR FORCE ATTACKS

IRANIAN NAVY ATTACKS more recently fromAbu Musa Island(25O53N55'02E)" in connection with

attacks on commercial shipping60.

A report by International Defense Review stating that "toextendtheir range and

time on station,Iranianhelicopterpilots make use of forward operating bases.

These have beenknownto includethe disused Rostamoil production platform in

the central GulP1... ."

A report by Lloyd SList stating that "Iranianattacksthis year havecome fiom

helicopters oftenactingalone and basedon rigs near the Sirri and Fateh oil

terrninals6'Ii

An additionalreportby Lloyd's List statingthat "[olther recent Iranianraids have

been launchedfrom a helicopterpad on a disused oil rigat Rostam Island,

midway betweenIran and Qatar -andpossibly a similar structureonthe nearby

Sassan oil field63."

Reports by theNonvegian Shipowners'Association to shipping companies and

merchant shippingorganizations indicatingthat"Iranianforces wereusing the

Rostam, Sirriand Sassanplatforms formilitary purposes - specifically,to launch

small boat andhelicopter attacks on neutral shippingduring the period 1985-

198864."

Shipping companiestook costly steps to avoidtraveling nearthe platforms because they

were aware of and concemedabout Iran'suseof the platforms to attack neutral

60"IranIIraqT:he SituationintheGulf, GuidanceNotesforShipping,"General Councilof British

Shipping, 30 May 1986, p. 14,Exhibit104.

6'"GulfWarIntensifies,"International DefenseReview, March1987,Exhibit14.

62"HOW GulfShippingTollis Mounting," Lloyd's List, 7August 1986,Exhibit108.

63"IranSetsUpNew TankerAttackBase,"Lloyd's List, 14May 1986,Exhibit108.

64Statementof Capt.Christian Feyer Puntervold,15January1997,Exhibit11. ~hipping~~.

1.24 In sum, it was well-establishedwithinthe international shippingcommunitythat

Iran useditoil platforms in its attacksonU.S. andother neutralshipping. Iran's actions were

observed by numerous eyewitnessesandwidely reportedby shipping industry sources. Shipping

companies, at greatpense, took necessaryprecautionary measuresin response. Documents

from theIranianNavy confirm the militaryroleofthe platforms. This vast body of evidence

makes it impossible for Iran crediblytodenyits use of the platforms in its attacks on U.S. and

other neutral shipping.

D. IRAN'S ASSERTION ASBOUT THECHARACTE RFTHEPLATFORM DSONOTREFUTE THE

EVIDENCE OFTHEIR USEINITSATTACKO SNU.S.ANDOTHER NEUTRAS LHIPPING

1.25 Faced with the vast body of evidence establishingits use of the oil platforms for

attacks on U.S. and other neutral shipping,Iranoffers little direct response. Indeed, Iran has

specifically acknowledgedeveralofthe facts establishing the military role ofthe platforms:

Iran acknowledges that it stationed 12soldiersand a petty officeronthe Rostam

platform, about 12oldierson the Sassanplatform,and up to 15naval personnel on

65SeeStatement of Colin Eglington, para. 10,E1("Becauseof our concernsabout Iran's

platforms, we charted new routes that would take our vessels much further south where they would be

least expectednto as shallow water aswe could giventhe ships' 'draft'behveen 18and 22 metres. We

wanted to keephe vessels as far away from Iran and itsoil platformsas possible. Navigation of these

routes would have been difficult and dangerousin any case, but wasmade more so by the lack of surveys

of the area we were to navigate. Obviously, thechange in routes and additional waitingtime increased

KOTC's costs again tremendouslseealsoChevron Statement, Exhibit 180. the Sirriplatfoxd6.

Iranfurther acknowledgesthatthese military personnelused communications

equipmenton the platfoms to communicate withnavalbases at Lavan and Sirri

Islands6'.

In the specific case of the Rostam platform, Iran acknowledgesthat documents found

aboardthe Iranianmilitaryvesse1Iran Ajrdemonstratethat Rostam wasused to relay

messages to theIran Ajr,andthat documents found on Rostamshow that Rostam

"waspart of a communicationsnetworkof stations6*".

Notably, though Iranhas attemptedto cast doubton the evidence against it,ithas not

categorically deniedthat itaunchedattacks on neutral shippingfromthe platforms.

1.26 BecauseIran cannot refütethe evidence establishingthat itused the oilplatforms to

attack neutral shipping,it has limited itself tomaking a seriesof assertions that failto respond to

the case against it. Iran asserts that there were limitsto the militaryrole thatthe platforms were

capable of playing, but none of these asserted limits is inconsistentwith the military role that,as

the evidence demonstrates,the platfoms actually played. Iran also asserts that ithad ways of

attacking neutral shipping without using the platforms, but the existenceofh alternative

means again is in no way inconsistent withthe military role thatthe platforms actually played.

Put simply, none of Iran's assertions refutesthe evidence, that Iran in fact usedits oil platforms

to attack neutral shipping.

66See Reply, paras. 3.43.63.

67See ibid .,ra. 3.41.

See ibid .aras. 3.47-3.48, 3.63. 1. The Platforms DidNot RequireTechnolo~icallyAdvanced Equipmentto Perform

TheirMilitarv Role

1.27 Iran's Replydevotesmuchspaceto explainingthat Rostam, Sassan,and Sirri were

not equippedwith advanced radar andcommunicationsequipment. Iran's suggestion appearsto

be that suchadvanced equipmentwasnecessary fortheplatforms to perform military functions.

This suggestionis wrong. The personnel and equipmentwhichIran acknowledgeswere

stationed onthe platforms were sufficientfor Iranto usethe platforms in connection withits

military operations. Andthe evidenceoutlined aboveestablishes that Iran,in fact, did usethe

platforms formilitary purposes.

(a) Radar

1.28 Iran acknowledges thatthe Rostarnplatformwas equipped with a Decca navigation

surface radarwith a range ofup to 48 nautical rniles'j9.While Iran observes that the radaris of

the sametype used by yachtsandcommercial vessels,Iranhas not responded to evidence

indicating that itused this radar to supportits military operations.

1.29 The United Stateshas demonstratedthatIranattacked between45and 50ships

within 50nautical miles of the Rostamplatf~rm'~.Eachof these attacks occurredwithinthe

--

69See ibidp.ara. 3.35.

70See Counter-Mernorial, para. 11and Map 1.range of the Decca radar aboard Rostam acknowledgedby Iran. Iran'suseof the radar in

connection with military activities is further indicatedby documents fromIran's own military,

which indicate that the Rostam platformwas a "radarsite" and that the Sirriplatform was a

"temporaryradar site7'". Moreover, accordingto the Iranianmilitary's Instructionsforthe

Deployment of Observers in the Persian Gulf, Iran'spurpose for placing militaryobservers on

Rostam, Sassan,and Sirriplatforms was "... to gather information abouttheenemy's airand

sea traffic and destroy itscraft"and to providefor "the immediateexchangeof intelligence from

the oil platforms to Sirri and Lavanusing the radiosof observers on the p1atfoi-m~'~".Iran's

assertion that the radar aboardRostarnwas not sophisticated does not rebutthe evidence

indicating that Iran usedthe radar for militarypurposes; nordoes it respondto the evidence that

Iran's militaryused the Sirriplatformas a temporary radar site.

(b) Communications equipment

1.30 Iran also acknowledgesthat each ofthe platforms wasequippedwith

communications eq~ipment~~.Iran's observationthat commercial oil platforms would ordinarily

" Islamic Republic of Iran Naval Forces, JointSea-Coast 1 Combat Group (Operations) Sea-Coast 1

Operations Plan Ghadir, p. 20, Exhibit 203.

72Islamic Republic of Iran Armed Forces, Fleet, 1"Naval District ((Intelligence)),Instructionsforthe

Deployment of Observers inthe Persian Gulf, p. 9, Exhibit 115.

73Reply, para 3.41(indicating thatNasr (Sirri) was equipped with a VHF radio anda multi-channel sailor

radio; that Reshadat (Rostam) was equippedwith a telephone linkand a short-rangesailor radar; andthat

Salman (Sassan) was equippedwith a telephone link and a radio room).be expected to be equipped with communicationsequipmentagain fails to addressthe evidence

that Iran usedthis communications equipment for military purposes.

1.31 Iran's Reply acknowledgesthat military observersonthe platforms usedthe

platforms' equipmentto cornmunicatewith Iraniannaval baseson Sirri and LavanIslands74.The

evidence also shows that the platformstransmitted messages directlyto the Iranianmine-laying

ship Iran Ajr75. And Iran's own documentsclearly statethat Iran's goal in placing military

observers onthe platforms was "theimmediate exchangeof intelligence from the oil platforms to

Sirri and Lavanusing the radiosofobservers on the platforms andthen, the immediate and

secure transmission of these messagesfrom the Islandsto Fleet Headquartersandthe 1" Naval

District (BandarAbbas) 76."Again,Iran has offeredno substantiveresponse to this evidence.

(c) Helicopterlandingpads

1.32 Iran acknowledges thateach ofthe platforms contained a pad from which

helicopters couldtake off and land77.Iran observes, however,thathelicopter pads "were

74See ibid. ("ThemilitarypersonnelusedNIOC'sradiostocommunicatewithLavanandSirriIslandbases").

75SeeTranslationsof the Selected Paper-TapeMessages SentFrom, andReceived bytheIran Ajr, Tapes 1,

16,and 21, Exhibit 71.

76Islamic Republic of Iran Armed Forces,Fleet, 1"Naval District((Intelligence)), Instructionsfor the

Deployment of Observers in the PersianGulf, Annex G (Communications), p. 9, Exhibit 115.

77See Reply, para.3.42 ("In orderto allow forthe transport of NIOC personnel, spare parts and

provisions to and from the platforms, eachcomplex had a helicopter padfor NIOC's Bell and Alouette

helicopters").perfectly ordinary facilities thatcould befound on virtually any offshore oilp1atfo1-m~~".

1.33 Iran's assertionsas tothe "ordinary"characterof the helicopterpadsdoes not refute

the evidencethat Iran used the helicopter pads for military purposes. Asthe United States

demonstrated in paragraph 1.23above,eyewitnesses observedIranianmilitaryhelicopters lifting

off from the oil platforms andproceedingto launchattacks on neutralshipping. Iran's only

response to the evidence that it usedthe Rostam platform to launch an attack on theFrench ship

Chaumont comes from a personwhowas not presentat the time of the attackandwho has

offeredthe Court nothing more than conjectureand speculationto supporthis vie^^^. Iran has

offered no substantive responseat al1to the eyewitness testimony of itsuse of Rostam to launch

attacks on Berge King and Steliospo.

2. The Military EquivmentIran Placedon the Platforms Couldbe Used Offensivelv as

Wellas Defensively

1.34 Iran also seekstobluntthe force ofthe evidence demonstratingthe military role

played by the platforms by assertingthatthe platforms'role in Iran's military communications

structure was solely defensivein nature. Accordingto Iran, the presenceof military personnel

''Ibid.

79See Statementof MohsenSalehin,, Reply,Vol. VI, para.7 (basingassertions aboutthe Chaumont

attackon reviewof theProtestof Capt.M.Faury,butnoton anyfirsthandknowledgeof the incident).

See supra,para.1.23.and equipmentonthe platforms "wascomrnensurateonly with the need to defendthe platforms,

and was not designed for offensive use8'." Butmilitaryobservers, radar, and communications

equipment are not inherently defensivein nature. Any system capable of gatheringand

transmitting information for use in defensivemilitaryoperationscan as easily be used to

facilitate offensivemilitary operations. As the evidencedemonstrates, Iran used the equipment

stationed onthe platforms to gather informationaboutthe location of neutral shipping,to

transmit this information to other elernentsof the IranianNavy, and to launch helicopterswhich

carried out attackson neutral shipping.

81

Reply, para.3.33. CHAPTERII

IRANOPPOSEDTHEINTERNATIONALCOMMUNITY'S EFFORTS TO PROTECT

NEUTRALSHIPPINGFROMIRANIANATTACKS

Section 1. The InternationalResponseto Iran's Attackson Neutra1Shipping

1.35 As discussed above,Iran's illegal attacks on neutral shippingwerewell-established,

and of great concern, throughoutthe international shippingcommunity. In additionto making

numerous diplornaticprotests as detailedabove,the international communityfurther

demonstrated its opposition to Iran's attacksby mobilizingefforts to protect neutralshipping

traveling through the Gulf. Iranrespondedto these effortswith a new setof illegalattacks

specifically targeted against the internationalcommunity'sefforts to protect neutral shipping in

the Gulf.

A. REFLAGGING

1.36As discussed inthe Counter-MemorialandPart VI below, in response to a request

by the Government of Kuwait,the UnitedStates andthe United Kingdom reflagged a number of

Kuwaiti vessels in an effortto deterfurtherIranian attacksagainst them. Four ships ofthe

Kuwait Oil Tanker Company (hereinafter"KOTC")wereflagged under United Kingdom registry

and elevenKOTC ships wereflaggedunder U.S. registry. To similar effect, the Soviet Union

provided four Soviet ships on a charterbasisto KOTC. B. NAVAL ESCORTA SNDMINESWEEPERS

1.37 In order to ensure that neutral vesselswouldbe able to transitthe Gulf safely,

France, the UnitedKingdom, Italy, Belgium,the Netherlands and the Soviet Union sent combat

ships andlor minesweepers to the Gulf. TheUnitedStates also sentmilitary shipsto protect

neutral shippingaspart of Operation EarnestWill. The total force senttothe Gulf by the

international community numbered over70vesselsS2.

1.38 These efforts of the internationalcomrnunityto protect neutral shippinginthe Gulf

demonstrated its united opposition to Iran's illegal attacks and its determination tomaintain

freedom of navigationin international watersandensurethe unimpededflow of oil through the

Gulf.

Section2. Iran's Oppositionto Effortsto ProtectNeutra1Shipping

1.39 Iran began attackingthe internationalcommunity'sreflagging andescort operations

immediately upontheir establishment. Asthe United States demonstratedin its Counter-

Mernorial:

Iranattacked with a mine the Soviet oil tankerMarshal Chuykovon its first mission

as a charteresse1for the Kuwait Oil Tanker Companyon 16May 198783.According

toJane 'sDefence Weekly,shippingofficiaisat the time concluded thatthe attack was

'"ee Anthony H.Cordesmanand Abraham R.Wagner, TheLessonsof ModernWarfare,VolumeII:The

Iran-IraqWar, p.317(1990), Exhibit204.

83See Counter-Memorial, para ..19. part of an intensifiedIranianmining campaign "aimedat disnipting plans forthe US

and Soviet navies to start escortingconvoysof vessels to protect them from Iranian

surface and air attackg4."

Iran attacked with aminethe U.S. flaggedvesse1Bridgeton, which was part of the

first convoy of U.S.Navyescorted merchantvessels on 24 July 1987.

1.40 Iranian officials publiclyannouncedtheir plansto target the international effortsto

protect neutral shipping in the Gulf. Shortly afier the attackon Marshal Chuykov,Iran's

Ambassador to the United Nations, SaidRajaie-Khorassani,stated: "ifmy country has the

intention of attacking a Kuwaiti tanker, it will continuewith that policy, regardlessof whose flag

it is carryingg5."Similarly, on the day ofthe attack on the Bridgeton, Ali Akbar Hashami

Rafsanjani, Speaker of Iran's Majlis,praisedthe attack, saying:

"Well,in tmth these are God'sangelsthat descendand do what is necessaryat the

appropriatetime. . . Wehave saidthat Ourplan is clear. We have stated: ifour ships

are hit, the ships of Iraq's partners willbe hit. Ofcourse, we will not claim responsibility

for anything, for it is an invisibleshotthat isbeingfired.

.. .[Tlhey will provide escortfor four ships,whataboutthe rest? Each dayseveral ships

berth in Kuwait and then set sail;these are cargoships carrying goods, oil and other

commodities. Therefore, severalvessels visit Kuwait every day. How extensive a

retaliation do we need? Twoper week, eightper month, five?. .. Consequently, nothing

can stop us from retaliating. Then why is the United States botheringto undertake such

an expensive operationg6?"

84"Iraniansin MinelayingCampaign AgainsK t uwait,Jane's DefenceWeekly2 , 7June1987,p. 1344,

Exhibit35.

85"WeinbergerWarns AgainstAttacks in Gulf;IranThreatens,"UnitedPressInternational,25May

1987, Exhibit4 1.

86"Hashemi-RafsanjanP ioliticalSermon,"Foreign Broadcast InformationService,24July 1987,Exhibit

50. Asnotedbefore,thisCourtshould view suchstatementsbyseniorIranianofficialsas particularly 1.41 Iran's policy was thus clear. Iran wouldattack "wheneverp~ssible*~"vessels

involved intransporting Kuwaiti or Saudi oil through the Gulf, regardlessof their nationality or

their status as neutrals. Iran would also attack vesselsinvolved in effortsto protect the right of

neutral shipping to travel through the Gulf.ursuantto this policy, Iranfollowed its attackson

Marshal Chuykovand Bridgetonwith additionalattacks on U.S. shippinginthe Gulf. Among

other attacks on U.S. shipping,these attacks included Iran's 16October 1987missile attack on

the U.S. flaggedoil tanker Sea IslCit ynd Iran's 14April 1988mine attackon the U.S. warship

USSSamuelB. Roberts, which was returning to Bahrainafter escortinga convoy of U.S. flagged

merchant vessels.

probative sincethey constitute admissions againstIran's interest. Seesupra,note 9.

87Norway Cable, Exhibit 198. CHAPTER III

IRANIS RESPONSIBLE FORTHEATTACKONSEA ISLE CITY

Section1. The EvidenceDemonstratesIran'sResponsibilityfor the AttackonSea Isle City

1.42 The United States demonstratedin its Counter-Memorial that Iranis responsiblefor

the 16October 1987attack on the U.S. flagged oil tankerSea IsleCity. Specifically,theU.S.

Counter-Memorialshowed that:

Eyewitnesses observed themissilethat hitSea Isle Citycoming from Iranian-controlled

territory in the Faw area. The missilewas easily identifiablebecause of its bright plume,

low altitude,and relatively lowspeedof flight88.

Satellite imagery takenjust fourhours afterthe attack showsthat Iran maintained in the

Faw area an active cruise missile stagingfa~ility~~.

In the weeks prior to the attackonSea Isle City, eyewitnesses observed thelaunchingof

four similarmissile attacksfiom Iranian-controlledterritoryin the Faw area. These

missiles bore the sarnevisual signaturesofthe missilethat hit Sea Isle City: bright

plume, low altitude, and relativelylow speedof flightgO.

Fragments recovered from oneofthese missiles demonstratedit to be a Chinese-

manufactured HY-2missile ofthe type used by Iranduringthe Iran-Iraq War9'.

Counter-Mernorialp,aras.1.63, 1.70.

89See ibid.para.1.75.

90See ibid.para.1.70.

91See ibid.paras.1.71-1.73. Fragmentscollected froma missile launched fromIranian-controlledterritory in the Faw

area on 21January 1987yielded the sameconcl~sion~~.

Oneof the missiles Iranfired from the Faw arealanded south of Mina Abdullah, over 100

kilometers from the Fawarea, thus clearly demonstratingthat Iran'sHY-2missile had

sufficientrange to reachSeaIsle Ci@,whichwas locatedless than 100kilometers from

the Faw area when it was atta~ked~~.

Iran's President AliKharneiniannounced Iran'sintentionto attackU.S. targets in the

Gulffewer than threemonths earlier, saying "Theyhadbetter leavethe region, othenvise

we shallstrike them so hard they will regretwhatthey have d~ne~~."

Lloyd'sMaritime InformationService,the GeneralCouncil of British Shipping,Jane 's

Intelligence Reviewandother authoritativepublicsourcesconcludedwhat this evidence

makes abundantly clear: Iran is responsibleforthe missile attackon Sea Isle City95.

Particularly in light of Iran's exclusive control oftheterritoryin the Faw area fiom which the

missile that hitSea Isle Ci@was fired, this evidencefullysatisfiesthe burden of establishing that

Iran is responsible for the attackon Sea Isle Ci@96.

92See ibid

93See ibid., para. 1.59.

" Ibid, para. 1.31

95See ibid., para. 1.66.

96See Corfi ChannelCase, (UnitedKingdornv.Albania), Merits(hereinafter "Cor- Channel'i),

Judgrnent,I.C.J. Reports 1949, p.18 (in discussing Albania'sexclusive controlover the waters in which

mines were laid,the Court foundthat "the fact of this exclusiveterritorial control exercised by a State

within its frontiershas a bearing uponthe methods of proofavailableto establish the knowledge of that

State as tosuchevents. By reasonof this exclusive control,the other State, the victim ofa breach of

international law, is often unableto furnish direct proofof facts giving rise to responsibility. Such a State

should be allowed a more liberalrecourse to inferencesof fact and circumstantial evidence.This indirect

evidence isadmitted in al1systemsof law, and its use is recognizedby international decisions. It mustbe

regarded as of specialweight when itis based on a seriesof facts linkedtogether and leading logicallyto

a single conclusion"); ShabtaiRosenne, The Lawand PracticeoftheInternationalCourt, 1920-1996, Section2. Iran Used the Rostam Platformto Monitor and Reporton the Movements

ofSeaIsle City

1.43 Theevidencealso conclusivelydemonstrates thatIranused the Rostam platform to

monitor and reporton the movementsof SeaIsle City A.s noted above, U.S. tankers traveling

through the Gulf were required to passfewerthan 15nautical milesfrom the Rostam platform

because the Iranianexclusion zonerenderedoff limits routes northof Iran's offshore oil

platforms that commercial shippinghad followedpriorto the war. The Rostam platform,which

Iran acknowledgescontained a surfacesearch radarwith a range of48 nautical miles,was thus

ideally placed to monitor the movementsofU.S. tankers travelingthrough the Gulf.

1.44 WhenSea Isle Cit yassedby the Rostam platform as partof a U.S. escorted

convoy, the Rostam platform monitoredand reportedon its movements. On 8August 1987,the

Rostam platform transmitted the followingreport:

"2. THE CONVOY AT 172327WASSEENON RADAR BEARING 096DISTANCE

48 MILESFROM THE PLATFORMANDWAS TRACKEDAND PLOTTED.

3. THENUMBER OF MILITARYVESSELSIN THE CONVOYIS 6 SHIPS AND

THEY ARE TRAVELING IN SINGLEFILEAND THEIR CURRENT POSITION IS

VolumeIII, pp.1089-90 (3ded. 1997)("Theunderlyingtheorymaybestated asbeingthat, ingiven

circumstances(whichthe substantiveaw defines)iissufficientfortheapplicant Statetoestablishthe

conditionoffacttheresultofwhich willbeapresumptionr,ebuttablebytherespondentState,thatthe

respondentisliableinlaw.Furthermore,the presumptiomaybeestablishedbyreasonable inferences In

internationalawthisdoctrine isdevelopeinconnection withresponsibility rctsoccurringona

State'sterritory:thecircumstanceswhich inferentialprooisadmitted are determindythematerial

law, andthe effecisnotsomuchtoshifttheburdenofproofas tolay upontherespondentwhatmaybe

regardedasa burden of negativeproof'). 335DEGREES, DISTANCE21 MILES FROMTHE PLATFORM AND THEIR

COURSEAND SPEEDIS 285 DEGREES, 7 KNOTS.

4. IFAPPROVED, THEPLATFORM WILLTURN OFFTHE RADAR,AND ONCE

EVERY 15OR 30 MINUTES, WILLTURNONTHE RADAR AND PLOTTHE

CONVOY. FACTS ARE REPORTEDFOR INFORMATIONAND NECESSARY

ACTION.

SIGNED: WARRANT OFFICER 3 ?KARIMI?[illegible]97"

1.45 The composition and location ofthe convoyreportedcoincidewith the composition

and route ofa U.S.-led escort mission conductedaspart of Operation Earnest Will. Earnest Will

Mission 003left the Gulf of Omanon 8 August 1987at 0249hours. It consisted ofsix ships:

three tankersGasKing, OceanCity,and Sea Isle City-and three escort ships, the USS

Crommelin,the USSJarrett, andthe USSKidd. Theship's deck logfromthe USSCrommelin

shows that it maderadar landfall onthe ShahAllum ShoalRacon inthe vicinity ofthe Rostam

platform at0356on 9 August 198798.This log entryis consistent withthe report ofthe convoy's

location issued bythe Rostam platform,and leavesno doubt that Iranused the Rostarnplatform

to monitor and report on the movementsofa Isle City.This informationis depictedin Map 2.

1.46 On 11October 1987,Sea Isle Citywas againpart of a convoy aspart of Operation

Earnest Will. Between 10p.m. and 11p.m. on that date,Sea Isle Cityagain passed within 15

97SelectedMessagesfromArchiveof Incoming Messages,RostamOilPlatform,Exhib119.

98See USSCrommelin,Deck Log, commencing0000,Ol August1987 andending2400,31August 1987,

Exhibit205. @) 0238 hours,8 August1987

@ 0356 hours,9 August1987

DepartsKhawr Fakkan anchorage USS Crommelin makes radarlandfall

on ShahAllum Shoal Raconbearing

@ 2327hours,8 August 1987 293 2 degrees true at a distance of

Rostam platform reports sighting 41 3 nautical miles

a "six-ship convoy"on a "bearing 096 (26O11'N/053°08'Eapproximate)

distance 48 miles from the platform"

traveling in a singlefile at 7 knots @ 1622 hours,9 August1987

(25O53'N/053O42'approximate) USS Crommelinside lookout spots

possible mines

(26°48'N/051039'Eapproximate)

lnbound Earnest Will

convoys disperse near

Mina alAhmadi termihal

EarnestWill Convoy 11

0051 hours,Il October1987

USS Klakring enters Straitof Hormuz,

bearing 270 degrees, speed14knots.

(26O36'N/056O33'Epproximate)

2000to 2100 hours,11October 1987

USS Klakring passes Rostam and

Rakhsh oil platforms.This is calculated

from the course and speed at the

midnight watch turnover in item

(25°48'N/053002'Eapproximate)

0008 hours,12 October1987

USS Klakring watch changes

Heading311degrees at 14knots ' Gulf of Oman

(26°20'N/052021'Eapproximate)

nodefined \

\ boundary

1656 hours,13October1987 -38 a-é11 ' o Utop:ted - \

USS Hawes dropsanchorat ''4n

destination USS Klakring arrives '".,

four minuteslaterat 1700 hours Arabi3 \'"., Eiawiafes 01~1t"ll

'% nneceaanlyaumontauvenis

MAP2nautical milesof the Rostam platform, and wasagainexposed to monitoring fromR0stan-1~~.

Five days later, at the end of this voyage, Iran launcheda missile attack againstSeaCity.

Section 3. Iran's Pattern of Missile Launchesfromthe Faw Area is Consistent with its

Acknowledged Policyof TargetingKuwait's OilTrade

1.47 The missile that hit Sea Isle Citywas one of a series of missiles launched by Iran

from the Fawarea during 1987'0°.Each ofthesemissilelaunches was inthe direction of

Kuwait's oil loading terminalat Al-Ahmadi SeaIsland. Theday before Iran attacked Sea Isle

Ci@, it launched a missile fromthe Faw areathat hit theU.S. owned tankerSungari, which was

anchored south of Al-Ahmadi and near the locationwhereSea Isle Citywas hit. In September

1987,Iran launched three missiles in the samegeneraldirection: one on September2 that landed

inthe water northeast of Faylakah Island; oneon September4 that landedsouth of Mina

Abdullah; and one on September 5that landedin KuwaitBay. Iran also launchedtwo missiles

from the Fawarea in January 1987,bothof which landednear Faylakah Island.

1.48 These missile launches are consistentwith Iran's acknowledged policyof attacking

ships carryingKuwaiti cargo1O'.By firingmissilesinthe direction of the Al-Ahmadi Sea Island

99SeeUSS Klackring,Deck Log, commencing 0431, 10October 1987and ending 2400, 14 October 1987,

Exhibit 206.

'OSee Counter-Memorial, paras. 1.54-1.62.

'OSee Nonvay Cable, Exhibit 198;Statement of Thomas Flamminio, Aerospace Engineer,U.S.

Department of Defense, Exhibit 207.Terminal, Iran could hope to preventshipsfrom traveling to and fromthe terminal, and thereby

disrupt Kuwait'soil trade. In light of Iran's desire to disruptthis trade, Iranhad a clear incentive

to launch missileattacks directedtowardAl-Ahmadi.

Section4. Iran's Efforts to Deny its ResponsibilityareInconsistentand Incredible

1.49 In its desperation to deny its responsibility for theSea Isle City attack in spite of

this substantial body of evidence,Iranhas offered this Courtan ever-shiftingset of assertions,

apparently unconstrainedby anyconcern fortheir veracity. None of Iran'svarious accounts of

the attack is credible.

1.50 Iran began by assertingthat it could not havebeenresponsible forthe Sea Isle City

attack because it did not maintain missile sites on the Faw Peninsula. Iran's assertionwas

categorical and without reservation:

"Thetrue explanation is that the missile was neverfiredby Iran! Therewas, infact, no

Iranian missile-site in theFaopeninsula which theUnited States could have attacked.

Iran's own conclusion isthat themissile was firedby Iraq, frommotives no more devious

than the Iraqi attack on the U.S.S. Stark,or the hundredsof attackson vessels, including

Kuwaitivessels, by Iraqi aircraftand Iraqi Silkwonn missiles during the previous five

years'02."

'O2Memorial, para. 4.74 (emphasis added). 1.51 Without any explanation,Iran hasnow abandoned this untruthfulposition

completely. Confronted with satellite imagery demonstratingIraniancontrol of an active cruise

missile staging facility inthe Faw area'03,Irannow acknowledgesthat it capturedthree missile

sites in the Faw area in early 1986. Iran's Reply states,in direct contradictionto its earlier

representationto this Court, that

".. .it is true that Iran captured three Iraqi missile siteson the Faopeninsula as part of its

counter-offensiveduring the course of 1986. These sites contained concrete shelters and

fixed launching pads for Iraqirnis~iles'~~."

Iranadds, however, thatbecause "al1accessroads to the missile sites were totally destroyed",

these sites "became useless and remained inoperativeduring al1the time that Faw was under

Iraniancontr01."'~~This assertion is also completely false;U.S. satellite imagerytaken on 16

October 1987 -the day of the attack onSeaIsleCit y shows vehicles operatingon the roads

leadingto oneof the Iranian missile sitesonthe Faw peninsula and in the vicinityof the site

itselfIo6.Iran's missile sites were intact, accessible,and capable of firingmissiles like the one

that hitSeaIsleCity.

1.52 Iran also suggests that the imagery ofIranianmissile stagingareas that the United

'OSee U.S. reconnaissancesatelliphotographs,Exhibit94.

'O4Reply,para.4.19.See alsoStatementofMohammadYoussefi,Reply Vol. VIp ,ara.14.

'O5SeeStatementof Mohammad Youssefi,Reply Vol. VIp,ara15.

'O6SeeU.S. overheadimageryoftheFawarea(hereinafter"Imagery")E ,xhibit208,image 5.States submitted with its Counter-Memorial is insufficientto demonstrate that Iran maintained

missile launching sites inthe Faw area1O( 7although, as notedabove,Iran now acknowledgesthat

it did maintain such sites). To removeany doubt on this point,the United States is submitting

with this Rejoinder additional imagery showing the existence of fourHY-2missile sites on

Iranian-controlled territory in the Fawarealos. Duringoral proceedingson the merits, theUnited

States will present expert testimony toexplain and confirmto the Court the substanceof this

evidence and the other overhead imagery thatthe UnitedStateshas introduced in thiscase.

1.53 Faced withthe loss of its chief defensewith respecttothe Sea Isle Ciiy attack, Iran

has invented a newone in its Reply. Iran now assertsthat, in additionto the Iranian-controlled

missile sites inthe Faw area (the existenceof which Iranhad previously denied), Iraq retained

control over an additional siteinthe vicinity. Iran assertsthatIraq could have used this site to

launch the attack on Sea Isle Ci@. As was the case with Iran's last assertion, U.S. satellite

imagery demonstrates that this assertionis completely false;no such Iraqi site existed atthe time

of the attack onSea Isle Ciiy.

'O7See Reply,paras.4.21-4.24;Statementof ColonelMahmoodFarshadfarI,ranReply VolVI.,para.3.

'O8Imagery,Exhibit208, images 2-11. 1.54 Iran has providedthe Court an undatedphotograph montage whichit asserts was

taken "beforethe capture of theFaw Peninsula" showingthe existence of an additional missile

sitein the Faw area apart fromthose controlled by IranIo9.The Statement ofMohammad

YoussefiStatesthat this additionalmissile sitewas locatedat coordinates 300012N-481705E on

the front part of the Faw Peninsu1a''O.

1.55 U.S. satellite imagerytaken between 5May 1987and 13November 1987

demonstratesthat no missile site existed at that time anywhere inthe vicinity ofthe location

specifiedby Iran1". Overheadimagery confirmsthat a missilesite was constructed nearthat

location, at coordinates 295806N-0481955Earound April1989,but no such sitewas there in

October 1987Il2.

1.56 Like Iran's previous assertions, Iran's assertionthat an Iraqi-controlledmissile site

inthe Faw areacould havebeenthe source ofthe attackon Sea Isle Cityis clearly and

demonstrably false. OnlyIranpossessed missilelaunchingsites in the Faw area at the time of

the attack on Sea Isle City,andthus only Iran couldhave launched an attack fromthe Faw.

'O9Statement of Mohammed Youssefi, Reply Vol. VI, para. 8.

"O See ibid.para.9.

"' Imagery, Exliibi208, images 9-12.

"' Imagery, Exhibit208, image 13. Overhead imageryfirstdisclosedthe constructionof amissile site atthis

location in April1989;the imageofthis site contained in image13 was taken in October 1994. 1.57 Iran attempts to create doubtsas to its responsibilityfortheSea Isle Ci@attackby

offering this Courtthe unsustainable theory thatIraqattacked Sea Isle Cityusing a missile that

traveled alonga circuitous route (rather than in a straight line). Iranarguesthat such a missile

would concealthe location fromwhichit had beenfired,making a missile firedfrom Iraqi-

controlled territory appear as if it had been fired fromIranian-controlledterritory. Accordingto

Iran's Reply, ". .. it was entirely possible for a missile targeting Kuwait's harbour tobe launched

from the remaining Iraqi site in the vicinityof Fao andto be programmedso as to fly over both

Bubiyan and Faylakah Islands en route toits destination'l3."Onceagain,Iran's theory is clearly

and demonstrablywrong.

1.58 First, Iran's theory is based on an Iraqi missile beingfired"fromthe remaining Iraqi

site in the vicinityof the Fao". Asthe United Stateshas conclusively demonstrated, no such

Iraqi site existedat the time of the attackon Sea Isle Cio. Thus, Iraq wasnot in a positionto fire

the missile thathit Sea Isle Ci@even if the missile wereable to travelin a circuitous route.

1.59 Second,the missile that hitSea Isle Citywas not equippedwith a guidance system

capable of guidingthe missile along a circuitous route. Iran's expert,JeanFrancois Briand,

asserts that Iraqcould have fired an HY-2missile fromthe alleged "fourthsite" and prograrnmed

it to execute atum near the tip of Faylakah Island that would haveallowedthe missile to assume

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113Reply, para. 4.51.a course consistent with thatofthe missile that hitSea IsleCity114. Mr. Briand's statement is

incorrect.

1.60 As explained in the Statement of Mark Pitt, the guidance systemof the HY-2directs

the missile in a straight lineuntil a timer activates the missile's seekerandthe seeker begins to

search fortargets. The seekersearchesfor targetsby using a radarbeamto scanan area 12

degreesto the right and left ofthe seeker'scenter. The seekerthen locks ont0 the first object of

suitablesize it finds within this area and within the 17km range of the seeker's radar,and guides

the missileon a course to hit that target'15.

1.61 This system doesnot allow the missileto beprogrammedto turn at a particular time

as assertedby Mr. Briand. Hadthe missile begunto execute aturn near the tip of Faylakah

Island, as Mr. Briand asserts, it would have onlydone so because its seekerhad already been

activated and had lockedont0 atarget toward which the seeker was directingthe missile. Such a

target wouldneed to be within 17km of the tip of Faylakah Island,becausethis is the maximum

range of the missile's seeker. The locationwherethe SeaIsle City was hit was about 60 km from

the tip of Faylakah Island,making it impossible for the missileat that locationto selectSea Isle

City as a target'I6.

Il4SeeRapport de M.JeanFrancoisBriand at para ..09andaccompanying map,Reply, Vol. VI.

StatementofMarkPitt,SeniorMissileAnalyst,AustraliaD nefenceIntelligenceOrganisation, paras.-5,

Exhibit209.

Il6See ibidpara. 11. 1.62 As illustrated inExhibit21O"',Iran'smissile sites inthe Faw area were orientedto

aim missiles directly towardKuwaitHarbor, whereSea Isle Citywas anchoredwhen it was hit.

As demonstrated above, the HY-2missile that hitSeaIsle Citywas capableof following onlya

direct path toward its target. OnlyIran was in a position tolaunchthis missile.

D. THEMISSILE THAT HITSm ISLE CITYWASNOTLAUNCHEF DROM THEAIRORSEA

1.63 In a fùrther effortto divertthe Court's attention fromthe evidence establishing its

responsibility forthe attack on Sea IsleCity,Iran invitesthe Courtto speculatethat the missile

that hit Sea Isle Citycould have beenlaunchedby Iraq from the air or sea. Beyond observing

that Iraq operatedboth an airforceand a navyat the time of the attack onSea Isle City,Iranhas

offered the Courtno evidenceto supportan air or seanch theory. Asthe United States

demonstrated in its Counter-Memorial,the physical evidence collected fromthe series of missile

attacks from the Faw area in 1987is inconsistent with Iran's speculationthatthe missile that hit

Sea Isle Citycouldhave beenlaunchedfrom the air or sea'l8. Onthe contrary,that evidence

serves toconfirmthat the missilewas launchedby Iran from land in theFaw area.

1.64 In sum, Iran'sresponsetothe evidence demonstrating its responsibility for the

attack onSea Isle Cityamountsto little more than a series of unsupportedand frivolous attempts

"'SeeReferenceMap,Exhibit 210.

"*SeeCounter-Mernorial, para1.71-1.73.to escape responsibilityby blaming Iraq. As the evidencepresented bythe United Stateshas

demonstrated, Iran'svarious conjecturesabout Iraqi responsibilitysimplyare not credible.

Indeed,Iran's abandonmentof its previous representations,andthe United States'systematic

disproving of Iran'snew assertionsandtheories, showthat Iran's pleadings have providedthe

Court nothingon these points on whichthe Court may rely.

1.65 In the period followingIran's attack onSeaIsleCity,Iran continuedto attack U.S.

and other neutral shipping in the Gulf. According to Lloyd's Maritime Information Service, Iran

was responsible for attacks onno fewer than 57 neutralvesselsin the Gulf between 16October

1987(the date ofIran's attack onSeaIsle City)and 14April 1988(the date ofIran's attackon

the USSSamuelB.Roberts)' 19.Theseattacks included the 15November 1987attack on the U.S.

owned tankerLucy,the 16November 1987attack on the U.S.owned tankerEssoFreeport, and

the 7 February 1988attack onthe U.S. owned tankerDiane'20.There was thus no break in Iran's

attacks inthe period following the attack onSea Isle City;ratherthese attacks continued

unabated.

Il9See "VesselsReported toHaveBeenAttackedandDamagedDuetoActsof HostilityBy theIraqisand

IraniansintheGulfAreaSinceMay1981 ,"Lloyd SMaritime InformationService, Exhibit9.

''OSee infi.a,PartVI. CHAPTERIV

IRAN IS RESPONSIBLEFORTHEATTACK ONTHE USSSAMUELB.ROBERTS

Section 1. TheEvidenceDemonstratesIran's Responsibility for the Attack

onthe USSSamuelB. Roberts

1.66 The United Statesdemonstratedin its Counter-Memorialthat Iran is responsible for

the 14April 1988attack on theU.S warship USSSamuelB. Roberts. Specifically,the U.S.

Counter-Memorial showed that:

USSSamuelB. Robertshit a mine while sailingnearthe ShahAllum Shoal inthe central

GulfI2'.

The day after the attack,U.S.Navy diversdiscoveredtwo additionalminesin the same

vicinity. The mines weremoored to anchorsand not encrustedwith marine growth,

indicating that theyhadbeen laid re~ently'~~.

The two mines bore serialnumbers whoseformat matched serialnumbers foundon mines

aboard the IranAjr in September 1987andtwo other Iranianmines discoveredin 1987123.

Three days after the attack,mine-clearing forcesfrom Belgium andthe Netherlands found

additional mines in the vicinity which alsoboreIranian serialn~mbers'~~.

Onthe day of the attackonthe USSSamuelB.Roberts,the Commanderofthe Iranian

Navy, Commodore MoharnmadHoseynMalekzadegan,acknowledgedthat theIranian

Navy had been engagedin "awholeheartedtask ... over the pastyear, comprising

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12SeeCounter-Mernorialp ,ara1.105.

"' Seeibid.para. 1.106.

12See ibid.

Iz4Seeibid.,para.1.107. indirect blows in particularto the U.S. fleet, affectingbothits warships and itsmerchant

vessels, with 