Full text of "History of the Finns in Minnesota"
https://archive.org/images/glogo.jpg
See other formats

We6h 1464473 GENEALOGY COLLECTION ALLE iil | UBLIC LIBR Mi O17 15-9 ee re ~ a a, ee ee LE by aye a Sa a 3 4 , a: 2 HISTORY OF THE FINNS IN MINNESOTA Hans R. Wasastjerna HISTORY OF THE FINNS IN MINNESOTA HANS R. WASASTJERNA EDITOR TRANSLATION BY TOIVO ROSVALL Published By MINNESOTA FINNISH - AMERICAN HISTORICAL SOCIETY Duluth, Minn, Copyright 1957 By Minnesota Finnish-American Historical Society Printed in U.S.A. NORTHWESTERN PUBLISHING COMPANY New York Mills, Minnesota Introduction by the President of the Finnish-American Historical Society - Three hundred years have passed since the first Finnish immigrants came to America and nearly a hundred years since the first Finnish settlers came to Midwestern United States. Attempts have been made in Finland to follow the life of the emigrants in their new surroundings in America. The building of this kindred bridge across the Atlantic progressed quite slowly at first. Suomi was not greatly concerned about the prodigals who had left nor did these emigrants desire to return to the homeland once they had left. But a time came when Finland was harrassed and attacked by strangers. The desire of the new Finnish-Americans to help Finland at that time resulted in the renewing of family ties and the creation of many new friendships. Greater value was placed upon the relatives on this side of the sea and as they began to more closely follow their lives and activi- ties it was recognized that here is another phase of the history of the people of Finland. 41464473 During this period Finnish-Americans were bringing to a close a phase in the development of their lives in the new land. They were also developing a greater appreciation of the legacy of their forefathers and their Finnish heritage. The younger American generation was now studying at colleges and universities without prejudices toward the past. The time had come when the fading historical material had to be saved and this had become a matter of cultural pride. The Finnish-American Historical Society started to carry on this work. From the very beginning the founders of the society had decided to compile a history of the Finnish people in their own state. They understood, however, that to gain their objective they would have to overcome many problems which are not necessary for me to enumerate here. Our Finnish friend, Mr. Wasastjerna, has impartially considered these and believes that they have all been necessary and helpful in the development of the society and the fostering of interest in its work. Our thoughts of thankfulness can no longer reach artist Juho Rissanen whose final large work of art provided the spark of inspiration for our society. After that the many organizers of our centennia! celebration have also sup- ported our work very enthusiastically. Vv So many people have worked so diligently and successfully in the efforts of our society that it is impossible to enumerate them all. I do, however, wish to express our thanks to our field secretaries, A. A. Parviainen, and Eero Pulli and also to Matti Erkkila who later worked for us. Through their efforts the many local societies were formed. Without the work that our editorial secretary, Eero Pulli, did in gathering the material and outlining the history, we would still be far from our objective. Of great importance at all times has been the work of our committee composed of the following: Arne Halonen, and also in the begin- ning his deceased brother Yrjo Halonen, A. A. Parviainen, Gust Aakula, Edith Koivisto, Toivo Merisalo and Lauri Lemberg. Mr. Lemberg, with his great experience and skill, has also been of great help to our editor, Hans R. Wasastjerna, a young scientist who spent three years of his life honoring the Finnish-Americans by studying their history. We cannot sufficiently thank those officials in the United States and Finland who arranged a scholar- ship for him to come to the United States. We are also indebted to Antti Lemberg for the attractive art work on the jackets of the book. The compiling and publishing of this history has been done by great economic sacrifice to the society. Having successfully com- pleted the Finnish edition of the History of the Finns in Minnesota, we are now happy to be able to present this new English language version of the same book. We consider this to be a great achieve- ment for our society and we also wish to thank Mr. Toivo Rosvall for the fine work that he has done in the translation of the original work into this edition. It is our hope that the Minnesota Finnish American Historical Society will continue to find ways and means of preserving and bringing to the public the history of the Finnish heritage as it has been brought to the United States, and particularly to Minnesota, by the immigrants from Finland. Alex Kyyhkynen MFAHS President. vi FOREWORD. One major aspect of the history of the United States has been the chronicle of immigration to these shores, the record of the subsequent assimilation of the varied nationality groups and the assessment of their contributions to the country’s growth and culture. The record of one important segment of that immigration is herewith offered as a contribution to a rich and complex story. The history of the Finns in America began in 1638, in the earliest period of settlement of the thirteen original colonies, but the major wave of Finnish immigration came considerably later, in that classic period of immigration which followed the Civil War and extended up to the period of World War I. It is significant that the forces which compelled thousands upon thousands of Finns to leave their own country occurred in the period when immigration to the United States knew no barriers; it is typical that once the Finns arrived here they tended to settle in regions that had a familiar look, making their major concentrations appear in New England and in the north central states, particularly in Minnesota. It is in Minnesota that their pioneering role has been perhaps their most significant one, and this history of the Finns there is an attempt to preserve the record of their contribu- tions within its boundaries. In general, the Finns in the United States have long realized the desirability of a record of their trials and tribulations in this country, but it was actually the Delaware Tercentenary in 1938 that made them more acutely aware of their history on this continent. The outbreak of World War II the following year, and Finland’s immediate involvement in it on the heels of Russia’s attack in November 1939, united the Finns in America as nothing before ever united them, awakened a new sense of pride and responsibility, and emphasized the ever greater urgency of the recording of their history here. Organizations came into being with the express purpose of supporting and sponsoring this task. The Minnesota Finnish American Historical Society is one of these organizations. Its birth, growth, contributions are history, too, and are discussed in these pages. Many names should be Vii cited for their work in connection with the society and its achieve- ments, of course, but the name of Alex Kyyhkynen cannot be left unmentioned here. It is to him that the society owes its birth and subsequently much of its effectiveness as an organization. For the society's major undertaking to date, the executive com- mittee appointed to carry out the project for a written history of the Finns in Minnesota has consisted of Alex Kyyhkynen, chairman, and Lauri Lemberg, Arne Halonen, A. A. Parviainen, Toivo Meri- salo, Gust Aakula and Edith Koivisto. Through its efforts, all possible pertinent material was collected, a great deal of it through the close cooperation and tireless efforts of local chapters of the society, and coordinated by Eero A. Pulli, but it was not until the fortuitous arrival in Minnesota of a young Finnish scholar, Hans R. Wasastjerna, that the collation of these materials, and the preparation of this history, became possible. A graduate of the University of Helsinki, and already a historian, Mr. Wasastjerna Was recipient in 1954 of an Asla-Fulbright Fellowship which brought him to America. While he continued his own studies for his doctorate at the University of Minnesota, where he was an Honorary Fellow, he also undertook the preparation of the present text, which was published in its Finnish language version by the Minnesota Finnish American Historical Society in time for the Minnesota Centenary Year, as one of the major contributions of the Finnish Americans to that commemoration. ‘That text now appears in English in the present volume; it is basically a trans- lation of the original version, with a few corrections, minor revisions and some additions. Obviously, a few gaps still remain in this record of the Finns during Minnesota’s first century, but by and large the story is complete, ready to take its place as the documen- tation for one vital chapter in the history of the Finns in the United States. Toivo Rosvall Worcester, Mass. Vili INDEX CHAPTER I—-Who Are They, Whence Did They Come - 1 The Finno-Ugric Language Family 1; The Orig- inal Home of the Finns 2; The Period of Swedish Domination 2; The Period of Russian Domination 10; The Period of Independence 34. CHAPTER II—The Finns In Immigration - - - - - 48 Early Finnish Immigration to the United States 45; Causes of the Large-Scale Immigration 46; The Extent of Finnish Immigration 54; The Com- position of the Finnish Immigrant Group 59; The Trip 64; The Finns in America 67. CHAPLER. Itl—-Minnesota. and lts.Growth, .- - -.- - {al The Land of the Sky Blue Water 71; A State Is Born 73; On the Eve of the Finnish Flood to Min- nesota 78; Why Did They Choose Minnesota? 82. CHAPTER IV—Southern Minnesota and _ Its Seas Of 2Finns)\), =) seets-eme - - +e 84 Red Wing 84; The Scuthern Counties 86. CHAPTER V—The Finnish Contribution In Central Minnesota = =e ete 91 Nicollet and the First Minnesota-Born Finnisl Child 91; Renville and the First Finnish Pioneer; 93; Wright County, Center of Finnish Farming 98; Meeker County and Its Finns 112; Douglas County 115; Todd County 117; Stearns County 117; Henne- pin County and Minneapolis 117; Ramsey County and St. Paul 129. CHAPTER VI—-The Pioneers of Northwest Minnesota - 135 Crow Wing County 136; Cuyuna Iron Range 138; Crosby 140; Otter Tail County 143; Newton Town- ship and New York Mills 144; Heinola 164; Leaf Lake Township 167; Otto Township 169; Home- stead Township 170; Butler Township 171; Heina- joki 171; Paddock Township 173; Wadena County 179; Sebeka 180; Menahga 187; Becker County 192; Snellman-Osage-Runeberg-Detroit Lakes 196; Other Northwest Counties 197-205. ix CHAPTER. VII—St. Louis’ Gounty: ‘Duluth -"-"==3 =" 3206 Duluth 206; Superior 335. CHAPTER VIII—St. Louis County: North From Duluth - 345 The Southeastern Sections of St. Louis County 345; The Finns in Brimson 350; Lake Vermilion and Its Iron Mines 355; The Temperance Move- ment Among the Finnish-Americans 359; Soudan and Ely 366; Finnish-American Religious Activity 372; The Finns in Ely 385; Sports in Finnish- American Life 391; Winton and Its Sawmills 403 CHAPTER IX—St. Louis County: The Iron Hills - - - 406 Mountain Iron 408; Virginia 412; Sparta 449; Gil- bert 453; Eveleth 456; Fayal Township 479; Biwabik Township 480; Aurora 482; Hoyt Lake 487; Mesaba 487; Great Scott Township 488; Buhl 488; Kinney 489; Chisholm 491; Hibbing 505; Stevenson 536. CHAPTER X-—-St. Louis County: Farm Country Fringes - 538 Embarrass 539; Waasa and Allen 545; Vermilion Lake and Payla 545; Pike 548; Sandy and Floren- ton 554; Angora 556; Alango 558; Cook 565; Beatty 566; Portage 567; Leiding-Orr-Pelican-Gheen 567; Willow Valley - Linden Grove 569; Bear River Sturgeon Lake-French 570; Zim 571; Cherry (Alavus) 574; Palo 577; Markham 582; Floodwood 583; Cedar Valley (Salo) 587; Toivola 588; Little Swan 592; Kelsey-Cotton-Elmer-Payne-Meadow- lands 594; Brookston-Perch Lake 595; Conclusion 596. CHAPTER XI—-The Finns of Northeast Minnesota - - 598 Lake and Cook Counties 598; Two Harbors 598; Clark 600; Larsmont-Knife River-Little Marais 600; Finland 601; Isabella 601; Toimi 603; Silver Bay and Taconite Harbor 603; Itasca County 604; Nashwauk 604; Cloverdale 616; Crooked Lake 616; Keewatin 617; Bovey-Trout Lake-Calumet-Coler- aine-Marble-Taconite 618; Wawina 620; Grand Rapids 620; Suomi 621; Balsam 622; Squaw Lake 623; Aitkin County 623; Jacobson-Rabey 623; East Lake-Balsam-Beaver-Rice Lake-Salo-Tama- rack-Lawler-Arthyde-Palisade 624; Pine County 627; Finlayson 628; Sandstone 629; Carlton County 630; Thomson 630; Esko 634; Cloquet 635; Moose Lake - Kettle River-Kalevala-Eagle Town - Crom- well 644. x CHAPTER XII—Finland’s President Visits the United eTishiatey elo Rg EES ae are ee es Alex Kyyhkynen Awarded White Rose of Finland Degree 657; Governor Youngdahl Proclaims Fin- nish Pioneer Day 658. Bibliography - - - - - - - - - = - = - = = Index of Photographs - - - - - - - - - - = - MFAHS Life Members and Donors ee | aber Vee Sa een OAIN INGE, eed st ee XJ 653 + ty es L $ugy . a: aaeed is Ea ry ~~ s i j 7 wy ¥ -e * $ 2 “ a i ; a <a =" é a ® ' is a she be, Cm ¥ ‘ pen eee ast -o-u Chapter | Who Are They, Whence Did They Come? An outline of Finnish history, based on most recent research The Finno-Ugric Language Family The overwhelming majority of American colonists, the pioneers and the immigrants, have come from Europe. All nationalities, from the Anglo-Saxons to the Slavs, from the Swedes to the Italians, have taken part in settling the new continent. It was a few thousand years ago that the Indo-Europeans first made their appearance on the old continent, and world history from that point on has essentially been the history of the Indo-Europeans. From a basic language common to them all there developed in time the present-day Babel of languages; today the differences are so great that only scholars can prove, for example, that English and Russian, or Swedish and Persian, are related tongues. Within this vast Indo-European area, there has managed to survive a small Finno-Ugric language group, to which some 18,000,000 people belong. The main clusters within it are the Hungarians, the Finns, the Esthonians, and the Mordvinians. The so-called Baltic Finns, to which belong the Finns, the Esthonians, the Carelians, the Vepsians, the Votians and the Livonians, form such a closely related group that their languages are as closely related to each other as are, for example, the Scandinavian languages. On the other hand, the Finnish and Hungarian languages differ from each other at least as much as does English from Russian. With such a degree of variance, all claims of blood relationships remain without concrete evidence. A Finno-Ugric parent people once did exist, but that was thousands of years ago. The parent group spoke the same language but was not racially unified. All peoples are formed of varied backgrounds, and so are the Finno-Ugric group. The distinction between language relationship and racial background has not always been sufficiently clearly made. The Finnish scholar, M. A. Castren, indicated the relationship between the Finno-Ugric languages and the Samoyedic; both belong to the language family of the Urals, as later research has.confirmed, but Castren’s claim of a relation- ship between the Ural and the Altai families is considered an assumption for which most recent research has found no evidence. Since the Altai family includes the Turco Tartar, the Mongolian and Tungus languages, and even Korean, the Finns have been mentioned as being related to the Mongolians. What has just been stated indicates that the language relationship does not exist, and since there are no racial characteristics in common, either, any assumed “relationship” is simply a deep-rooted fallacy. The Original Home of the Finns Formerly, Finns were said to be Asiatics, since they had come to their present home from far in the east, just as some scholars have considered Asia to be the original home of the Indo-Europeans as well. But most recent research has shown that the cradle of the parent Finno-Ugric group was not in Asia: scholars today are practically unanimous on the point that it lay in European Russia. There, in an area where the primeval forests and the immense steppes came together, there seems to have been a focal point from which the Finno-Ugric group subsequently began to spread out in all directions. The search for new hunting grounds gradually drew the Ostyaks and the Voguls east of the Urals, while their close relatives the Hungarians moved out in the opposite directions, across the steppes. The Baltic Finns retained contact with their sparsely populated central area between the Oka and Vaina rivers for some centuries longer, but finally they, too, scattered: the Finns are said to have arrived in Finland in a wave of migration and to have established fixed settlements there about the year 800 A.D.! The Period of Swedish Domination The northern land now known as Finland had been populated for thousands of years before the arrival of the Finns on the scene, but the old had to make way for the new. Trade, and the contact 1. Arvi Korhonen, Editor: Suomen Historian Kasikirja. Helsinki, 1949. Paavi Ra- vila, “Suomen Suku ja Suomen Kansa.” I, pp. 1-22. it provided with other nations, brought western cultural patterns to the Finns. Christianity began to be stabilized around the year 1150, as Sweden’s crusading spirit and aggressive eastern policies conquered Finland. The new area soon began to take shape as a geographical entity as well, and although the homogeneity Was most apparent in its religion, even as a state Finland began to appear as an entity. The population began to spread out along the southern coast, from the western shores toward the Carelian Isthmus, and in the interior Hame (Tavastland) was also relatively densely populated, but the rest of the land was still quite deserted. Western Finland already practised agriculture, while elsewhere the woodlands were being cleared. In the most densely populated areas there developed communities, from whose local self-governments developed the concepts of Finnish democracy.? During the reign of the first king of Sweden-Finland of the modern era, Gustavus Vasa (1523-1560), many reforms were put into effect. This same period saw Mikael Agricola guide the Reformation in Finland. It was a gradual turning from Catholicism to Lutheranism, and a literature was necessary for carrying out the process. Turning to the creation of a written Finnish language, Agricola proceeded systematically: first of all he published a Finnish primer, in 1542, then a Catechism in 1543, a prayer book the following year, and finally a translation of the New Testament in 1548. Thus he succeeded in creating a unified Finnish language, understood in all the various dialect areas. Agricola’s motives were primarily religious, but possibly colored in part with an awareness of a unified Finnish nation. Among the people themselves, any national spirit there may have been was still dormant. In the beginning of the 17th century, guided by Gustavus II Adolphus (1611-1632), Sweden-Finland rose to the position of a major power as a result of its active military campaigns and expansionist policies. The primary reason for success lay not so much in the power resources of Sweden-Finland as it did in the relative weakness of the surrounding countries. Finland was assigned the mission of the stabilization of its own eastern frontiers, but at the same time made its contribution to the kingdom as well: eight infantry regiments under the command of Gustav Horn and three cavalry regiments under Ake Tott added fifteen to sixteen thousand Finnish men to the Swedish armies, and the 2. op. cit. R. Rosen, ‘‘Varhaiskeskiaika’’, I, pp. 105-214. 3. op. cit. Pentti Renvall, ‘‘Uuden ajan murros’’, I, pp. 278-313. outcome of many battles was determined by the refusal of these men to yield an inch. During this great power period, much attention was given to strengthening the economy. The most lasting benefit of this policy in Finland was the establishment of new cities. Of course, the centers of population still presented very modest statistics: old Turku had a population of six to seven thousand, Viipuri some three to four thousand, and the new Helsinki about one thousand, while all the other centers had only a few hundred each. The spread of learning was also a feature of this period, and the founding of the university in Turku in 1640 meant a great step forward for Finland. Since the first printing press in Finland was set up at the same time, a purely Finnish learning began to develop. However, the Finnish language itself still remained as something kept alive only by the masses of people, in spite of the fact that a Swede, Eskil Petraeus, had written the first Finnish grammar in 1649. Society was divided into classes. The nobility kept the highest positions in its own hands, while the clergy formed another class, to which youths from the lower classes were able to aspire if they received a university education. The burgesses were beginning to increase in importance as the cities expanded. The Finnish farmers remained at the bottom, under pressure both from the national economy, with heavy taxes causing many farms to be abandoned, and from the power of the nobility which, as a privileged class, had received extensive domains as land grants. The formation of large estates, which had begun in the 1580s, continued on well into the 1630s, while poor farmers continued to be forced to sell their lands to freeholders, the clergy, the burgesses, governors and other officials, or retired soldiers, from which gradually developed an aristocratic landowning class. After the long years of wars, however, the shaky national economy forced reform in this sensi- tive land problem: after much discussion, lands granted as gifts Were withdrawn by instituting a ‘reduction. Directly only the State profited by it, but for the Finnish farmers it meant their being rescued from sinking to the status of tenants to the nobility.* Sweden-Finland’s role as a great power came to an end early in the 18th century. The end was preceded by the famine years, 1694-97, when privation and distress forced their way into every Finnish home, and then the Great Northern War (called the “Great Wrath” by the Finns) during which all Finland was 4. op. cit. Aimo Halila, “Suurvalta-aika”’, I, pp. 398-470. 4 occupied by the Russians. The cities of Helsinki, Lappeenranta, Pietarsaari and Porvoo were burned to the ground. The armies of Charles XII were scattered, and the nation was compelled to begin peace negotiations. Provinces conquered in Germany were ceded to England and Prussia, reparations were paid to Denmark, and in the Peace of Uusikaupunki (Nystadt) of 1721, Russia received Ingria, Esthonia, Livonia, and southeastern Finland as far inland as Viipuri and Kakisalmi. As a result of this peace, a new power factor entered the Baltic: imperial Russia. Of course, the danger from the east had been already apparent earlier as well, and, like the buffer it was, Finland had been forced to repel the pressure from the kingdom’s eastern enemy, a pressure which had been very great indeed at times. During the decades which now followed, the danger grew even greater as a result of Russia's increased strength. In the year 1703 was begun construction of the city of St. Petersburg at the head of the Gulf of Finland; the passage through that gulf to the Baltic was narrow, and to enlarge that passage and to assure the safety of the future capital became significant concerns in Russian foreign policy from that time on: the Finnish frontier lay much too close to St. Petersburg, and this factor has fundamentally affected Fin- land’s fate for two and a half centuries.° Any rise in either economic well-being or morale after the war between Charles XII and Peter the Great was very slow. Finland’s entire population amounted to about 335,000 and the army, for example, had but approximately 1,500 men. Life had hardly begun to approach what it had been before the catastrophe when war broke out again (1742-43) and once more devastated the land. The Swedes had intended to take advantage of a state of internal unrest in Russia to win back territories previously lost, but the war ended in defeat and in yet another portion of eastern Finland being lost to Russia in the peace treaty of Turku. Among the complications of the conflict there had been a remark- able document, the so-called Manifesto of 1742, in which Empress Elizabeth of Russia had tried to appeal to the Finns to break away from the “Swedish aggressors.” Even if the declaration had to be considered merely as war propaganda, the idea of Finnish independence was nevertheless given expression for the first time, and it was subsequently never forgotten.® After the war of 1742-43, one of the most important problems became the fortification of Finland. The Russians possessed a 5. op. cit. Eino S. Suolahti, “Isoviha’’, I, pp. 471-498. 6. op. cit. Hino Jutikkala, “Vapaudenaika”’, I, pp. 499-9589. naval base at Kronstadt, at the head of the Gulf of Finland, and Peter the Great had already intended to construct another on the Esthonian coast, opposite Helsinki. To prevent the Russians from gaining complete superiority in the Gulf of Finland, Sweden- Finland began the construction of the Viapori fort, in the outer harbor of Helsinki, thereby pointing up more sharply than ever Finland’s position as a shield for Sweden: “although all the blows Sweden has received from its worst enemy have been struck at the heart of Finland, this land remains a loyal part of the kingdom,” declared a memorandum of 29 January 1747 of the Swedish Diet. In the 1780s, certain Finns began to question why their land should be nothing more than Sweden’s shield and taxpayer. They saw in the American Revolution an example of a people which had succeeded in breaking away by force from a mother country. They saw also that since Russia would certainly seize Finland from Sweden sooner or later, Finland could save itself only if it worked actively in a direction Russia approved: “Our fate is in any case to fall under their supremacy some time or other, but it will be much harder for us if we do not voluntarily submit to their will,” was a statement of the feeling current at the time. Among the leaders of an incipient independence movement at that moment were Georg Maunu Sprengtporten and Johan Anders Jagerhorn. The latter formulated a plan whereby Finland was to become an independent republic with the aid of Russia, while Sprengtporten, during a trip to Holland, presented the Russian ambassador there with a plan for the separation of Finland from Sweden, and then, returning to Sweden, continued his negotiations with the Russian minister in Stockholm. “Since Sprengtporten takes General Washington as his model, perhaps we can follow the example of France in its relations with a former English colony,” the Russian minister wrote to his government, pointing out the possibility of Russia’s giving armed assistance to Finland’s separation from Sweden. Relations between Sweden and Russia, Sprengtporten had pointed out to the Russian diplomats, could never be free of mistrust as long as Finland was a part of the Swedish kingdom; Finland lay so close to the capital of Russia that as a part of Sweden it would always awaken fear, and Finland lay so far from Sweden that the latter would not be able to defend it. Finnish independence would wipe out both these problems. In the autumn of 1786 the Swedish government gave the military command in Finland plans for the eventuality of a revolt in Finland supported by Russia. Awareness of the independence movement spurred Gustav III’s ambitions to settle affairs by 6 victorious war with that country which threatened to aid the separatists. The war broke out in 1788. The threat of occupation hung over Finland again, and the alarmed Finnish army officers sought a way to negotiate, utilizing the contact the independence- minded group had establish with Russia. Jagerhorn pursued his plan for independence meanwhile; he wrote a letter to the Empress Catherine and succeeded in getting several high officers to sign his letter. In this so-called Liikala Note was explained the kingdom’s, and especially the Finnish peoples’, desire to see peace between Russia and Sweden. Jagerhorn was chosen carry the letter in person to St. Petersburg, and when he arrived there he requested Catherine both to call a Finnish Diet into session and to proclaim Finland an independent country, and he promised the Empress Finnish cooperation in carrying out the intent of such a proclama- tion. However, the Russians reacted to Jagerhorn’s proposals with mistrust, and the reply the Empress gave him to take back did not bear her signature, doubtless with the sound reason that it was improper to give the King of Sweden cause to argue that Russia had instigated revolt within the Finnish army. In her reply, Catherine appealed to the Finns to elect representatives to a Diet of their own; she further insisted that Finnish forces were to withdraw from Russian soil. When Gustav III heard of this contact of his officers with the enemy, he ordered them all to sign a statement, vowing to fight the kingdom’s enemies to the last man. Instead of giving such assurances, 113 officers commanding Finnish troops signed an- other and altogether different statement in Anjala: according to them, Sweden was the aggressor, and the military situation was depicted as being so hopeless that it was due not to Swedish arms but Russian magnanimity that death and destruction had not swept over all Finland, and consequently all who were signing this declaration assumed responsibility for the Liikala note and were turning to the Empress Catherine for help. The King thereupon made a proclamation: he listed his own and the Swedish kingdom’s activities on Finland’s behalf and pointed out as a warning to those who relied on the prospects of independence gained with the help of Russia the fate of Poland and the Crimea. The scales began to turn in favor of the King. The last sign of life of the Finnish independence movement was a “Diet” held at the end of the year on an isolated estate, attended by landowners from along the eastern border. Under Jagerhorn’s leadership, they formed a body which declared the Grand Duchy 7 of Finland independent, and they requested the Empress Cath- erine’s military and material assistance. Russia, however, was having difficulties, too, in its foreign policies: since it feared the prospect of gaining Prussia as an additional enemy, it gradually veered toward a settlement with Sweden. To the Finns who ap- pealed to her, Catherine appeared reserved, but to her secretary she confided: “Let them ask to be forgiven; why feed them with empty promises? I cannot help them.” In the armistice signed at Varala the boundaries remained unchanged, but as an epilogue to the war there remained the handing out of sentences to the Anjala officers. Since Sprengt- porten was not on hand to be arrested, he was sentenced to loss of his positions and his property, as well as to be hanged should he return to the country. Other officers who had fled to Russia were ordered to be shot on sight. Although the King had won, uncertainty continued, and the unrest did not end until a pistol shot aimed by a member of a secret league plotting revolution hit Gustav III at the Opera House in Stockholm in March 1792. The King died within a fortnight. Just as Gustav III had idealized Gustavus II Adolphus, the great warrior king before whom Europe had trembled, so his son idolized the soldier hero Charles XII. The new king, Gustavus IV Adolphus, became quite popular in Finland, which he visited twice, and of which he saw much on his second, extensive trip in 1802. Finland’s progress during this period was rapid, and the population increased rapidly, too, reaching the 900,000 mark before war broke out again. Following the Peace of Nystadt, Finland had become increas- ingly more pro-Swedish. Everyone educated to be an official or administrator, or who had more than an elementary school educa- tion, learned to speak Swedish. It is difficult, therefore, to under- stand the awakening of a national Finnish spirit at the beginning of the 19th century without noting the groundwork which had been started at approximately that same period at the University of Turku. The emergence of several distinguished scholars all at more or less the same time, at the end of the 18th century, presents a splendid picture. Among them, even for his con- temporaries, the many-sided scholar Henrik Gabriel Porthan was outstanding in this group. He was aware that the Finns had linguistic kin, and making a clear distinction between purely Finnish words and borrowed words, he formulated a picture of Finniso culture and the Finnish community. He prepared an out- line of Finnish history, and in a memorial address at the university 8 in 1804 he received the title that has remained his: Father of Finnish History.” Outside Finland, meanwhile, frontiers had begun to crumble and nations to be wiped off the map as Napoleon conquered more and more of the continent. And so war threatened Sweden-Finland too, now from the south, now from the east, and there was reason to fear some sudden alignment which would bring Sweden and Russia face to face once more, with Finland again the pawn. The fate of small nations is often to be a pawn in the struggles between larger nations, with the larger and the stronger deciding on their own advantages without consulting the desires of the weaker. Thus two of the worlds great men, Russia’s Czar Alexander I and French Emperor Napoleon I met at Tilsit in 1807, uniting in league against England. Since Sweden-Finland refused to comply with the demands made on it by this league, Russia was to demand compliance by force. The attack against Finland in 1808 was, in the beginning, a matter of military necessity: after the war, the occupied territories were supposed to be relinquished. The Russian forces crossed the frontier on February 21, without a declaration of war. The Finnish outposts, making no resistance, began to retreat. Buxhoevden, the Russian commander-in-chief, who assumed the Finns would retreat toward Helsinki, marched in that direction, with the Finns continuing to retreat rapidly before the superior forces. The Swedish general, af Klercker, had decided to join battle farther north, in the vicinity of Hameenlinna, but before he could do so the commander-in-chief, General Klingspor, accompanied by his chief of staff, Colonel Lowenhjelm, having driven in a sleigh around the Gulf of Bothnia, arrived at head- quarters. At the staff meeting which followed, everyone was in favor of battle — except Klingspor, who was in favor of retreat, fearing that an enemy pushing across Finland to the Gulf of Bothnia could cut off his retreat. The order to withdraw was given without delay, and as if to confirm his judgment, moments later word was received from the commander of the Savo brigade that the limited Finnish forces there, too, were retreating from the Russians who had crossed the border opposite them. Having taken Hameenlinna, Buxhoevden decided to pursue Klingspor but at the same time to take areas along the coast in southern Finland, in order to have them firmly under control before the ice melted to permit the Swedes, with the help of the English, to attempt landing parties. The Russian force advancing 7. op. cit. Eino Jutikkala, ‘““Kustavialainen aika’’, I, pp. 590-688. 8. op. cit. Erkki K. Osmonsalo, “‘Tilsitin politiikka,” I, pp. 689-699. to the north, meanwhile, overtook the Finns in Ostrobothnia, along the Pyhajoki (river). On April 16 a battle broke out in the vicinity of Yppari: Colonel L6wenhjelm had received permission to engage in battle with all three available brigades, and although Klingspor had once more changed his mind and given the order to retreat, L6wenhjelm had gone on with the battle on his own authority and had been wounded and taken prisoner. Two days later an almost similar situation developed and the Siikajoki battle commenced. Finnish victory in that battle, however, did not alter the general situation, for after the battle was ordered another retreat, a day's march toward Oulu. However, the contact between the forces indicated it was not impossible to win over the Russians. When Klingspor learned, then, that a detachment of the enemy had reached Revonlahti, he was afraid of being encircled and gave the order for battle. The Finns won, and with that victory there began a brief period of counter-attack. But the series of victories was followed by another period of withdrawals, all the way to the Swedish border. All that remained for the Russians now was the capture of the Viapori fortress in the outer harbor of Helsinki. In their advance, the Russians had left Viapori behind their backs, for taking that bastion swiftly would have been im- possible. It was considered wiser to trust to encirclement, to sporadic bombing to weaken its defenders, and to bribery. With this combination results were achieved, and the fortress surren- dered on the first of May. In spite of their successes, the Russian campaign in Finland did not come up to their expectations, for the war had dragged out too long. The world situation changed so radically that Russia seemed about to remain without those advantages in the Balkans, for the sake of which she had made her league with France. Therefore, in order to gain at least some profit, Alexander, at his meeting in Erfurt with Napoleon, wrung from him permission to keep Finland. And to this Sweden had to acquiese at the Peace of Hamina in 1809.10 The Period of Russian Domination Russian plans originally called for the four Estates of the Finnish Diet to meet together in February 1808, in order to have their help in organizing the country’s affairs within a new frame- work, but since this had to be delayed, Alexander requested that representatives of all four Estates from areas already occupied 9. op. cit. T. V. Viljanen,“Suomen sota vv. 1808-1809’, I, pp. 699-742. 10. op. cit. Erkki K. Osmonsalo, “Suomen valtion perustaminen,”’ II, pp. 1-52. 10 by Russian armies be sent to St. Petersburg. Delegates were accordingly elected, and they started out for Russia under C. E. Mannerheim’s leadership, but when they reached their destination they pointed out that they were not empowered to represent the entire Finnish people and requested that a Diet be called. To this the Czar agreed. The Finnish Diet met in March 1809, in the town of Porvoo. All four Estates gave their oath of allegiance to the Czar-Grand Duke, and he for his part give his solemn pledge that the Finnish constitutional laws would be upheld. Thus Finland was raised to the position of a nation among nations, and a new life began for Finland as an autonomous, self-governing Grand Duchy attached to Russia. When the Czar pledged that Finnish constitutional laws would remain in force, the reference was to the form of government which had been set up in 1772, to the confirmation of its status in 1789, as well as to the inherited parliamentary form of Diet plus House of Nobles, which extended back to the days of Gustavus II Adolphus. From Finland’s point of view the unfortunate flaw in these arrangements was that there was no law requiring that the Diet be summoned ai any specific intervals. The calling together of the Diet depended, then, on the will of the ruler. While meeting in Porvoo, the Diet had received the impression that a new Diet would be called reasonably soon; there were many problems caused by Finland’s new status which, it was assumed, would make a Diet imperative. Nevertheless, no order for such a meeting was given. Broader political considerations frequently interfered with Fin- land’s internal governmental development. For example, in 1818 Alexander opened the first Polish Diet, being anxious to show that in that country which was attached to Russia, too, he was eager to proceed on a basis of constitutional government, but the results in Poland were not encouraging, and so he did not try to pursue this course in Finland, either. During the reign of his successor, Nicholas I, Finland now and then pointed out the necessity of calling the Diet, and the Czar himself is known to have made certain decisions with the remark that, according to the constitu- tion, those decisions should have been made with the approval of the Finnish Diet, but also with the added remark that the times were not suitable for calling a Diet together. Consequently, if Nicholas, who also believed in absolute sovereignty, frequently did stress that he understood decisions on certain matters re- quired approval of the Diet, during his reign it was never once 11 called into session. In this he did not break the letter of the law, since calling the Estates together depended exclusively on the ruler’s decision to do so, but without a doubt a government without the Estates participating at regular intervals was against the spirit of Finnish law. Since general interest in government was weak in Finland during the first half of the 19th century, however, the lack of a Diet did not seem oppressive, but as soon as a more liberal spirit began to blow through Europe, especially after the revolutionary movements of 1848, in Finland too the demand that the Diet be summoned grew more insistent. The Czar of Russia held the title in Finland of Grand Duke, and although he was an absolute sovereign in his own land, in Finland he was a constitutional monarch, under whom the Finnish Estates had the privilege of making laws. The Grand Duke had to rule Finland in accordance with its special position, and as his ad- ministrative arm he was required to use officials who had to prove Finnish citizenship and had to belong to the Lutheran church. The Czar alone was responsible for foreign affairs, how- ever, and one of the rights he enjoyed was to give statutes, and he was not personally responsible for his actions to anyone. It was his responsibility, on the other hand, to maintain justice, prepare proposals for the Diet, approve or veto laws passed by the Diet, prepare the budget, and act as commander-in-chief of the country’s armed forces. The Finnish citizen, in turn, was entitled to definite privileges: personal freedom, the right to live within the country at a place of his own choice, enjoyment of the protection of the law, with the right to appeal, recourse against the arbitrariness of official- dom, and equal rights before the law. In addition, within the limits of the law the citizen had the right of free speech, assembly, and freedom of the press, although the government was entitled to determine the extent of these privileges. A far-reaching consequence of Finland’s new position was that from the beginning of its autonomous status it had its own, inde- pendent economy and that, in accordance with arrangements made by Alexander I, money received in Finland was to be used entirely for the benefit of Finland. Its treasury was entrusted to the Czar, who had the right to independently and without the Diet’s approval dispense the so-called fixed income, which meant the income from crown property and monopolies plus those taxes which the Diet at various times had granted to meet the fixed requirements of the country. The ruler had to meet all fixed expenses out of these receipts, but a Diet committee was to be furnished an 12 accounting, in order that the Diet could determine if the income had been used in the best interests of the country. The ruler was not entitled to levy a new tax without the approval of the Diet, but if new outlays were required the Estates had the right to freely debate the issue and, if it then approved, to procure the funds required. To this ages-old Finnish right of self-taxation there was one important exception: the ruler’s right to control customs, and experience proved that by utilizing this right it was possible to manage the Finnish economy without calling the Finnish Diet together for half a century. Originally Turku had been the seat of the Finnish government, but for administrative reasons it was now desirable to have it located nearer to St. Petersburg. Helsinki, which was selected as the new capital, had led a quiet and insignificant existence up to this moment, and a destructive fire during the war had even burned most of it to the ground; nevertheless, on 4 April 1812 it was proclaimed the capital of Finland. In 1810, Helsinki’s pop- ulation had been 4,000, but now it began to grow rapidly, and in 1830 the population was already 11,110. One factor adding to this growth was that after the Turku fire in 1827, even the uni- versity was moved to Helsinki. During the period of Swedish domination Finland had lagged behind Sweden, although in matters of taxation and defense it had borne a disproportionately heavy burden. Since no former Swedish ruler had shown the interest in the future of the Finnish people that Alexander I did, many prominent men in Finland argued that the country should free itself from its former pro- Swedish orientation and learn to understand that Finland was a separate nation whose responsibilty was to take care of its own destiny only and faithfully to serve its sovereign. A liking for the Czar had made it easier for the leading circles to accomodate themselves to the new national situation: the status of the country was to be firmly fixed, by every available means, for the eventuality of more troubled times ahead. Alexander was succeeded by Nicholas I, who, as the Czar’s younger brother, had received the standard upbringing of princes. Having served in all the ranks of the army, he was deeply inter- ested in his army. As a sovereign, the feeling of responsibility was developed in him to the extreme, and he was imbued with a deep understanding of the significance of the royal word. Ascend- ing the throne, he gave as his predecessor had given his guarantees as a ruler to Finland, and attempts made to have him go back on his word were all in vain. 13 In Sweden, meanwhile, liberal beliefs were gaining ground. A consequence of this sliding toward the ‘left’ in the neighboring country was a growth in Finland’s importance, for in the series of buffer states created around Russia, Finland was once more the extreme outpost, but this time against revolutionary movements from the west. It was important to retain Finland as a contented part of the empire. Should it be asked how Nicholas and the Duke Menshikov, the Governor-General of Finland whom he appointed, succeeded in their plans, the fact can be pointed out that Finland remained faithful to its sovereign, even though there was no inclination toward the Russians and even though among the university youth at that time many opposed absolutism and glorified freedom. This generation of students in the Helsinki lecture halls was in a different situation from its predecessors in Turku. An age group was now coming forward which had received all its educa- tion in the era of Finland under Russian domination. They had a different point of departure: with the ever increasing foreign influence of the new philosophies and literatures, the national awakening previously sparked in Turku gained added awareness in the new surrounding and circumstances. Men who were later to be included among the great men of Finland — LOonnrot, Runeberg and Snellman — having begun their education in Turku, had already managed to arrive at the point where they could exert their influence. Within the framework of Helsinki University an informal ‘Saturday Circle’ was started in 1830, to which be- longed not only the three men just cited but also the cream of the academic youth. By the following year this group had established the Society for Finnish Literature, as the torchbearer for national, patriotic aspirations. Assuming the responsibility to develop an independent, national culture, the work ahead branched out in different directions. New educational theories led to the establish- ment of a new preparatory school, the Helsinki Lycee. Runeberg, working as a newspaperman in the capital, continued to work as a poet also, pointing up the uniqueness of the Finnish people. Lonnrot’s influence began with his writings in the Finnish- language periodical, The Honeybee, and when the Society for Finnish Literature arranged for the collecting of folk poetry, Lonn- rot was to contribute greatly. Snellman, as philosopher, was pre- occupied with the awakening of a feeling of Finnish nationalism: his thesis was the conviction that Finland’s new status as an autonomy within the framework of a big empire was dangerous and required the fostering of patriotic feeling, and so it was through 14 him that the idea of an awareness of Finnish nationality was to advance. Snellman, and the pro-Finnish youth of the time in general, gained confidence that the Finnish movement had a future from proof that, among other things, the Finnish people had demonstrated intellectual abilities — for example, in their folk poetry. A little something had already been done to foster the Finnish language itself: in 1828 an instructorship for the study of Finnish had been established at the university; since the supporters of the Finnish nationalistic movement had turned their attention in the 1830s to the collection and study of folk poetry and folklore, the authorities did not find it necessary to obstruct this work being carried out on behalf of the Finnish language. Continuing directly related to Snellman’s own activities, the Finnish nationalistic movement did not begin to show its true colors until the following decade, when Snellman became em- broiled with the authorities. At the same time, the countrys Swedish language literature was broadly nationalistic in spirit and was living its golden age. Such poets as Runeberg and Topelius, as well as Nervander, Fredrik Cygnaeus, and later Lauri Stenback and Emil von Qvanten, gave it its distinguishing features. This literature was characterized by a breadth of vision, an affirmation of the culture and idolization of everything national. The special zeal of the age also embraced the drama, which became more readily available with the founding of the Swedish Theater in Helsinki in 1827. Novels became fashion- able in the 1840s, particularly in translation, with the result that there was a gradual retreat from a high-flown idealism and an approach to more concrete problems of life. The common endeavors of the university group suffered a significant setback when material considerations forced Runeberg to move to Porvoo. At about the same time, Snellman’s activity at the university was hampered when he came into conflict with the authorities. From the point of view of Snellman’s personal development this was a decisive factor, for he went abroad in 1839 and, immersing himself in Sweden and in Germany in the wider social and cultural currents, he became in the following decade the champion of the Finnish movement through his news- paper activity. Lonnrot, too, had left the capital. In 1832 he had gone as a doctor to Oulu, and later to Kajaani, which brought him into the immediate vicinity of the singers of the old folk poetry and gave him the opportunity to continue the collection of folk poetry he had begun much earlier. The result of his work was the 15 compilation of the epic Kalevala (the so-called Old Kalevala in 1835-36, the New Kalevala in 1849) and the Kanteletar, a col- lection of lyric poetry (first edition in 1840, the second in 1864, and a third in 1887.) The interest in folk poetry which had already existed paved the way for a grateful reception for the Kalevala. Illustrative of the rise of a national awareness, which the publication of the epic caused, was J. G. Linsen’s statement of 1836 that this treasure trove of ancient Finnish poetry was so significant that not only was Finnish literature immeasurably enriched with its publication but it had thereby gained world recognition: Finland, the possessor of this folk poetry, should with increased awareness learn to understand its past and thus also its future; Finland could assure itself that it, too, now had its history. More intensive subsequent study of the folk poetry and its roots have altered the views expressed about the Kalevala when it first appeared, but they have not lessened its cultural and histori- cal value. In its time the work has been a strong source of power in elevating the national feeling and keeping bright a faith in the future and thus maintaining among the Finns a confidence in their intellectual abilities, in tying the past to the present, in strengthening national cultural traditions and above all in inspir- ing scholars and poets to new and further investigations. On the death of Nicholas I in 1855, Alexander II ascended the throne. By nature and upbringing he was more liberal than his predecessor, and he, too, gave the oath of ruler in Finland, promis- ing to maintain Finland’s special privileges. Furthermore, the necessity for improvements and increased pressure of public opinion also led to the Finnish Diet finally being called into session: in the year 1862, a committee of 48 were empowered to prepare the agenda, and on 15 September 1863 the Finnish Diet met for the first time since 1809. In the history of the Finnish Diet the sessions in the 1860s form their own chapter. It was a period of liberalism, and many believed that the possibilities for social and governmental develop- ments were almost limitless. The opening of the Diet was given a festive note by the arrival of the Czar for the occasion. The Czar-Grand Duke greeted the Estates, announcing that he would give them an accounting of the national economy and hand them a sheaf of proposals. The ruler stated his general political program to be the realization of constitutional-monarchic principles, and 11. op. cit. Erkki K. Osmonsalo, “‘Itsevaltiuden kausi,” II, pp. 53-163. 16 his speech was interpreted as a promise that the Diet would participate regularly in the development of national and social conditions. , The most important matters subsequently considered were constitutional questions concerning Diet reforms, and calling for sessions to be held at stated intervals. Soon after the Diet ended its session a committee was appointed by the Czar to prepare proposals on these matters, and so rapidly did the committee work that in 1865 the recommendations were already sent to the Czar. But the proposals were not acted upon, because in Russia itself the trend toward uniformity in government was gaining ground: the period of optimism, when the Diet had actually been in session, already seemed to belong irretrievably to the past. Three years later, however, the Estates were invited to assemble again. The most important matters which the Finns agreed upon were Diet reforms, on the basis of new laws prepared in cautious form and conservative fashion: the division into Estates was retained, but the Diet was to meet every fifth year. The further right to initiate legislation was not to come until 1886, while another weak point in the law was the lack of steps to broaden the franchise. In discussing the proposals, some had favored general elections and even the equal right to vote; however, it was realized that Finland’s position would have been a stumbling block to carrying through such far-reaching reforms. Not until forty years later was the Diet to be replaced by a truly democratic parliament. The halt in further governmental reforms in Finland was due to storm clouds rising in the eastern sky. The study of Hegelian philosophy in Russia had led to a national awakening there, as it had in Finland, and the Slavophile movement had been born: it stressed innate Russian superiority over anything and everything foreign. In particular, the importance of the Orthodox Church was increased. In glorifying everything native, everything foreign appeared hostile, and for the security of the empire anything western was considered dangerous. During the reign of Alexander II certain ideas had become prevalent in the west, and had slowly begun to win ground in Russian society, which Russia in general considered revolutionary. But alongside these, an extremist wing advocating the overthrow of the existing social structure also gained support. Michael Bakunin, who originally had been a Slavophile, had become the leader of this faction after he left the country; after the Russian government discovered the inflamma- tory role Bakunin was playing, it ordered all students studying 17 abroad to return home. Nevertheless, agents of revolution con- tinued to work in secret, inciting and spreading discontent, but since incitement alone was not enough to achieve results the revolutionaries began to make use of an extreme weapon, assassina- tion: in March 1881, Alexander II himself met his death at the hands of revolutionary assassins. In Finland the news of Alexander’s death was received with a feeling of deep shock. The dead monarch was remembered chiefly as a man who had respected and revitalized the constitu- tional basis of Finland, and furthermore as a man who, from the Finnish nationalistic point of view, had taken a favorable attitude toward attempts to foster the use of the Finnish language. He was said to have favored conditions leading to a more free economic life, and during his reign the Finnish monetary unit, the markka, had been given a firm basis by a liberating of the economy. All in all, then, the reign of Alexander II had meant a time of intellectual and material advances for Finland, and so the Finns have given his reign a different interpretation from what the Russians have, and he has remained closer to the Finns than has any other Grand Duke of Finland. When his reign was followed by a period of gloom, his memory only seemed to grow brighter, and its visible sign was the monument the Finns erected to him in 1894 in Helsinki. A characteristic of Finnish history during the period of autonomy has been that changes in reigns generally did not bring rapid, sharp changes in political conditions. The new monarchs regularly followed the main lines of policy laid down by their predecessors. Thus the first period of Alexander III’s reign (beginning with the customary guarantees, which for the time being assured the legal status of Finland) forms an organic con- tinuation of his father’s policies, but in the government of Russia itself, bureaucracy began to compete with this policy of self- determination. There began a relentless campaign against those revolutionary movements and reforms considered dangerous which had been instituted by the previous Czar. Finnish self-government seemed to be one of these dangerous reforms, since the country rapidly seemed to assume national, unique characteristics. This resulted in bitter attacks, first in the press, then in ‘scientific’ literature, against the foundations of the Finnish state, and these attacks assumed serious proportions in the latter half of Alexander II's reign. Factors in the russification policy were the needs of absolutism, bureaucracy with its own goals, and a national mania which in foreign policy led to Panslavism, in the attempt to unite 18 all Slav people into one, and which in internal policy led to the oppression of all minority nationalities. The attacks directed against Finland during the reign of.Alexander III were not, then, isolated phenomena but a link ina major, general persecution directed against the empire’s foreign members. In Finland, the postal system became the first victim: all Finnish aspects of it had to be erased, especially Finnish postage stamps. During the entire latter half of the reign, the attacks against Finland’s special position continued. When Alexander III died in 1894, the at- mosphere was tense.! Very little was known about the new sovereign, Nicholas II. In Finland, however, restlessness prevailed when he ascended the throne, because the customary oath to Finland took a week in coming, but as earlier rulers had done, so Nicholas II also guaran- teed to uphold the country’s religion and constitution, as well as the rights which the country’s inhabitants had enjoyed up to this time. At the same time, however, forces inimical to Finland continued their attacks unremittingly, particularly in the press, and no attempts to prevent their attacks were made. During Nicholas IIs reign, the tempest approached from two directions: the military conscription question as well as the issue of enactment of laws both seemed inflammable matters. The storm broke in 1898 with the appointment of N. I. Bobrikov as Governor-General of Finland. It was an appointment which indicated the victory of those circles which wanted the complete elimination of Finnish rights, for Bobrikov was known to be an ardent Panslavist. The first blow was an act which eliminated Finland’s special status with one stroke. This so-called February Manifesto of 1899 was a coup-detat and signified a turning point in Finnish history: it destroyed what Alexander I and his successors had done to regulate relations between Finland and the Empire. The measures which now followed forced the Finns at last to seek their own road, by-passing the seat of power and the institutions representing this imperial power. The way was cleared for the eventual complete separation from Russia as the country started down the final stretch toward independence. Just as a flash of lightning in the dark of night can suddenly show the wayfarer an abyss before him, so the February Manifesto brought into relief many social injustices in Finland. Opinion had been quite general in Finland that by virtue of the ancient heritage of the freedom of the peasants, social conditions were better there 12. op. cit. Erkki K. Osmonsalo, ‘‘Perustuslaillisen kehityksen kausi’”, II, pp. 164-288. 19 than in many other countries. Snellman, who had been able to study the progress in other countries, had found cause for some admonition, and the later leader of the Finnish movement, Yrjo- Koskinen, had pleaded, from the viewpoint of his own times, pointing out inequalities in land ownership provisions, for equality for land laborers. But neither Snellman nor Yrj6-Koskinen had been able to fully comprehend the instability that tenants faced. Not until Bobrikov’s stooges went about the countryside and promised land to the dispossessed, if only the “Emperor’s Law” were made the law in Finland, were the dangers clearly seen. The socially-minded politicians were spurred on to prepare land reform proposals, which were later realized, in almost every particular. It was against this same patriotic background that the cooperative movement was born, in the belief that cooperation would teach the people to act thriftily, even ethically. Finally, the February Manifesto even brought an interim solution to the language ques- tion. The quarrels of Finnish versus Swedish had hindered develop- ment for decades, and although even in educated families there were some who considered themselves Finns, others Swedes, the February Manifesto made pro-Swedes feel closer to the Young Finland movement, which in turn was prepared to delay solution of the language problem as long as the very existence of the country was at stake. The anxious state of mind in 1899 demanded exceptional initiative from the entire population. It was decided to prepare a huge petition for which, in fact, 522,931 signatures were collected within just ten days. A group of some five hundred citizens elected in the various communities were to deliver the petition to St. Petersburg, but the Czar refused to receive them. To bolster the attemt of the Finns, leading citizens in western European countries signed another petition, and a group of internationally famous intellectuals set out to deliver it, but the Czar also refused to receive this committee. After this, the russification activities con- tinued in even swifter tempo. The reaction to these attemps split the Finnish people in two, and two opposing political parties were born: the Constitutionalists and the Pro-Finns. The former took the stand of passive resistance, refusing frequently, even at the cost of losing their own official positions, to cooperate in carrying out illegal demands, while the latter considered such resistance unwise: since little Finland did not possess the capabilities of successfully carrying out a policy of civil disobedience against its big neighbor, it ought to try to salvage something of Finland’s special status by a resilient attitude. 20 When the Russians promulgated a new military service act passive resistance became the more serious. It was organized and directed by a secret group calling itself the Kagal, and which soon gained an important role in the direction of all passive resist- ance. The resistance-minded wanted to make it impossible to materialize conscription from the very beginning: the clergy were not to read the conscription notices to their parishes; the parish clerks were not to prepare lists of draftees or the communes to appoint draft boards; doctors were to refuse to examine the draftees, and the draftees themselves were not to report for service. The major result of this battle against illegal conscription was an increase in emigration. At the same time, the Finnish labor movement began to take shape as a political factor. Its antecedents had been labor societies, predominantly under the control of an intelligentsia which had tried to guide the rising labor movement into channels offering no threats to existing society. However, the movement quickly became more radical, and in a meeting in Turku in the summer of 1899, a program for the new party was approved, and so the Finnish Labor Party, accepting the principles adopted by the international labor movement as regarded social progress strove in every way to achieve the economic and social liberation of Finnish workers. Beginning with a declaration promising to maintain and guard Finland’s legal position, its immediate goal became the granting of a general, equal, direct and secret franchise for all Finnish citizens, regardless of sex, on reaching the age of 21. In addition, the right to initiate legislation and to levy taxes for Finland through parliament was demanded, as well as un- limited freedom of assembly, speech and press, an 8-hour work day and the setting of minimum wages, compusory free education, the complete equality of men and women, prohibition, the develop- ment of protective laws for labor, a graduated income and inheritance tax and the removal of all indirect taxes, and the free use of the courts and free medical care. This program was prepared in accordance with German prototypes, although the later Finnish Social Democrats were also influenced by the revolutionary movements in Russia. In a party meeting in Viipuri in 1901, the question of joining the international socialistic movement was discussed, but the decision to join was not made until the Forssa meeting in 1903. This decision to support the international class struggle was a blow to the nation’s home front, but at the same time the politically organized workers were resolute against repressive Russian tactics and autocracy, and 21 they were not beguiled by Bobrikov’s deceitful promises of reforms. When passive resistance proved insufficient, the more con- vinced Constitutionalists discussed joint action with Russian revolutionaries. In a meeting in Stockholm early in 1903, it was decided to send Finnish delegates to a meeting of Russian revolutionaries scheduled to be held in Paris in October of that same year, and in Paris the decision was reached to take steps to end autocracy in Russia and, when that was accomplished, to restore to Finland the rights of which it had been illegally deprived. The following year there was secretly organized in Helsinki a new ‘Finnish Active Resistance Party to work along those lines. Naturally the Finns tried every possible way to rid themselves of Bobrikov, who had received additional authority and had become a dictator in fact. When attempts to influence the Czar to correct Finnish conditions came to nothing, an official of the school administration, Eugen Schauman, assassinated the hated Governor-General and then killed himself in the Senate building on 16 April 1904. In Schauman’s pocket was found a letter in which he addressed the Czar in stirring fashion, explaining the purely patriotic motives of his deed. After the assassination of Bobrikov, and following the subsequent assassination in St. Petersburg of Plehve, Russias feared Minister of the Interior, who was also Minister Secretary of State for Finland, imperial advisers began to believe that only a man of high aristocratic rank could restore in Finland the faltering respect for the Czar: Duke Ivan Obolensky was considered capable of accomplishing this, and so he was appointed Governor-General of Finland at the end of June, 1904. Obolensky arrived in Finland obviously prepared to be conciliatory. The Diet received an invitation to meet, and other signs of improvement began to be apparent: a Finn, Kon- stantin Linder, was appointed Minister Secretary of State, and before long even the illegal conscription program was halted. In Russia, meanwhile, revolutionary activity continued. Seem-. ingly brought under control and even halted at times during the reign of Alexander III, the foment broke out again with the Russo- Japanese war, which Czar Nicholas’ desire to annex Manchuria and Korea had brought about. Russian unawareness of Japan’s strength brought serious consequences: Japanese torpedo boats penetrated the inner harbor of Port Arthur on 8 February 1904 under the cover of darkness and crippled Russia’s best Far East navy units there for a long time, so that the Japanese were able to land troops on the mainland without interference. The sequel was just as unfortunate for the Russians: its land forces were 22 defeated, too, and there was nothing left but to sue for peace. Realizing the gravity of the internal situation, the Russian govern- ment tried to ease the pressure by conciliatory counter-measures: to succeed the ruthless Plehve, the good-natured Duke Swiatopolk- Mirsky was named Minister of the Interior, and most important of all, the Russian Duma, the parliamentary body of Russia, was established. But of course this was not enough to satisfy Russia’s restless masses, which had become aware of the glaring abuses and had come to realize the government’s weakness. Revolutionary Waves swept over Russia, and in October a general strike began. Factories were shut down, the railroads stopped running, the telegraph and telephone networks were out of operation, power was cut off — and huge mobs moved about everywhere, unrest prevailed, and there seemed to be in the air a premonition of some disastrous explosion such as Russia had never before experienced. Under the circumstances the Czar agreed to a proclamation containing not only guarantees of individual security but also freedom of conscience, assembly and speech, and promis- ing that no laws would be enacted in the future without the approval of the Duma. It is obvious that the Russian defeat pleased the Finns and that far-reaching governmental changes were fervently hoped for also in Finland. To speed the materialization of something better in place of the old and the bad the Finns availed themselves of a general strike, too. The first step was taken in Viipuri, where the workers in two large factories decided to stay away from their jobs for two days. Then similar action followed in Helsinki, where a mass meeting decided to continue the strike until there were reassurances of the country’s future. Governor-General Obolensky promptly summoned representatives of the Constitutional and Old Finn parties to discuss the situation, and the result of this was the draft of a proclamation prepared chiefly by Leo Mechelin, approved by Obolensky and submitted to St. Petersburg, from where it was returned, approved by the Czar. On Sunday, 5 November 1905, the proclamation was read aloud in all the churches of Finland for the whole nation to hear: the implementa- tion of the illegal edicts under the February 1899 proclamation was declared suspended. The Czar further requested the Senate to prepare, inter alia, a proposal for a new parliamentary system, with members to the new body to be elected on the basis of a free and equal franchise. Thus ended the first phase of russification, with the Czarist government suffering a definite defeat. 23 That first phase of russification, meanwhile, had not stifled economic development in Finland. On the contrary, political oppression had forced the Finns to greater efforts. The land reform question had already come under discussion, and by the spring of 1904 the sub-committee for the landless population had prepared a plan for making homesteads of the crown lands, which had restored hope among the dispossessed of getting land of their own. In addition, the state had purchased several large estates and had subdivided them among the landless. During the latter phases of this action the harvests had been excellent also, and that had improved the country’s economic position. Special mention must also be made of the birth and rapid growth of the cooperative movement: the law permitting cooperatives had become effective in September 1901, and by the end of 1902 there were 51 registered cooperative associations, while three years later their number had grown to 559. Intellectual life, too, had experienced an upswing. The illus- trious name of Alexis Kivi already belonged to the past, to be sure, but now Juhani Aho was writing the best of his sketches, and Teuvo Pakkala his play, Tukkijoella (The Logging Stream), which had an unprecedented success, and no wonder, for in Finland almost every community had its own amateur theater. Johannes Linnankoski brought out his large-scale drama of ideas, The Eternal Struggle (Ikuinen taistelu) and his novel, The Song of the Blood- Red Flower. Maila Talvio wrote her first significant work, Pimedn Pirtin Hdvitys (The Destruction of the Dark Cabin), and the poet Eino Leino was beginning his brilliant ascent. Larin-Kyésti was already productive, and Otto Manninen became one of the great names of Finnish poetry. Joel Lehtonen broke into print, and the moral proclaimer of ‘love thy neighbor’, author Arvid Jarne- felt, stepped into the limelight. Another event signalling the advance of Finnish language culture was the new home for the National Theater, opened in 1902; and one of its actresses to enjoy Europe-wide fame at that time was Ida Aalberg. The name of Jean Sibelius was also already known far beyond Finland’s borders. Of Finnish singers, Aino Ackte rose to the heights of fame, and Maikki Jarnefelt and Ida Ekman enjoyed their share of renown. Finnish art had also proved its merit: sculptor Ville Vallgren achieved a name and a position in the art life of Paris, and in their native country the sculptures of R. K. Stigell and E. Vikstro6m were enthusiastically received. Finnish painting reached even greater heights with a quartet of painters, Albert 24 Edelfelt, Akseli Gallen-Kallela, Pekka Halonen and Eero Jarnefeit, whose likes had never appeared before.}% The general strike had crushed Bobrikov’s program of repression with a single blow; within a week the political situation had changed completely. With the outbreak of unrest, the Czar had entrusted Count Witte with the reins of government; he became the chairman of the Council of Ministers, actually the Prime Minister, which Russia had not previously had. Juridically, there was no change in Finland’s position; the Czar remained its Grand Duke, and no other Russian bodies had anything to say about affairs in Finland. But in actuality the situation gradually became unfavorable for Finland. Previously, not even Finland’s enemies had been able to do anything if the ruler was on its side: in his time, Snellman had proved this with his statement that in the final analysis the Emperor’s word was Finland’s only safe- guard, and what the breaking of this word meant the Finns had been able to experience acutely enough, especially in the years after 1899. It was the hope that a lessened autocracy would ease Finland’s situation, and it was believed that western concepts of justice and freedom would prevail in the new Russian Duma. And with skillful measures Witte indeed succeeded in checking the revolutionary forces, which lacked purposeful leadership, since the army was still loyal to the Czar. Even before the November proclamation, there had been dis- cussion in Finland of forming a new Senate, and a coalition government was attempted, but after heated debate it was decided that a constitutionally based cabinet list would be presented to the Governor-General. The list was approved almost as it stood: Leo Mechelin became chairman of the economics committee and vice-chairman of the Senate, and of the rest, it should be men- tioned that K. J. Stohlberg became chairman of the industry committee and that as a sign of the changed times, a Social Democrat, J. K. Kari, was also appointed a Senator. Of the members of this new government, approximately half were pro-Swedes, while the rest were Young Finns. Kari at first represented the Social Democrats but was soon expelled from his party, “having joined a bourgeois government without permission.” For the first time during the entire period of autonomy, the Senate was made up entirely of new men; for the first time since the Porvoo Diet of almost a century earlier, the Czar had been forced 13. op. cit. K. N. Rantakari, ‘‘“Routavuodet’’, II, pp. 289-371. 25 by prevailing circumstances to accept a list of appointments pro- posed by the Finns themselves. The formation of a constitutional government was followed by elections for a new Diet. A brief but heated election campaign was followed by a complete victory for the Constitutionalists. They received the majority in all three of the unprivileged Estates, and since the Nobles had already previously been securely in their hands, the constitutionalist pattern of thought was predominant in this Diet. The pressure of revolutionary forces had caused what seemed to be a tremendous leap from the old-fashioned four Estate form straight to the more democratic unicameral parliament. According to the reform, the new parliament was to have 200 members, to be elected by universal and equal franchise (with Finland thus becoming one of the first countries to give women the right to vote), on the basis of proportional representation and a secret ballot. The age limit for voters was set at 24 years. Elec- tions were to be held every third year, unless the sovereign dissolved parliament before that time. From that point on, the whole nation was to support the parliament, in which every party received the proportionate number of seats that the number of votes called for. The provisions made in 1906 were so carefully formulated that up to the present time nothing but minor changes have been made; for example, the age for voting eligibility has been lowered to 21, and the interval for elections has been lengthened to four years. Mechelin’s Senate was the result of joint action between the Young Finns and the Pro-Swedes, which had started during Bobrikov’s governorship. In principle, all the factions in Finland had the same aim: the return of a legal status for the country. The only question left to argue was that of the proper procedure. The Constitutionalists clung to their conviction that passive resist- ance was the proper weapon and the only course which would not break the nation’s backbone. The Old Finns, on the other hand, considered the main thing was to make certain concessions, since in that way time could be won and official posts would remain in Finnish hands; according to them, Finland in the long run would gain nothing by mere passive resistance, considering Russia's overwhelming strength. History has subsequently furnished justification for both these ways of thinking, and fortunately for the country, both courses were resorted to during those difficult years. Then, with the organization of a new parliamentary sys- tem, significant changes modified these old party alignments: the parties had to be reorganized on an entirely new basis, if for 26 no other reason than that the parliamentary changes brought the new franchise, which brought a tenfold increase in the number of voters. As a result of these changes, the Pro-Swedes lost the most ground. Previously, they had held a majority in two Estates, so that it had been impossible to reach any Diet decisions without their approval, while in the new parliament the Swedes faced the prospect of holding but one-eighth of all the seats, and that only if all Swedish-speaking Finns gave that party their vote. The Swedes perforce organized their party on a new basis: with the aim of safeguarding the linguistic and cultural advantages they possessed, they tried to unite all Swedish-speaking Finns, regard- less of what class of society they belonged to, within the Swedish Peoples’ Party (Svenska folkpartiet). Their social platform con- sequently remained a cautious one, and the Swedish-speaking population, fearing that Swedish influence would otherwise be at the mercy of a victorious Finnish trend, was generally gathered into the fold. (In 1956, the party still existed, and its program still remained, unchanged. ) The Finnish or Old Finnish party, on the other hand, adopted a radical social program and, above all, a sharply pro-Finnish stand which was greatly to its advantage, since its strongest opponent, the Young Finns, were in coalition with the Swedes. The Young Finns, therefore, also had to adjust their program in an attempt to increase their influence. In social issues their program became almost as radical as that of the Old Finns, with demands for improvements in the lot of tenant farmers and cotters and industrial workers, in the realization of compulsory education, the advancement of temperance, and so forth. (After the battles for Finnish independence in 1918, both these parties disappeared when new political parties were formed. ) A totally new party on the scene was the Agrarian League, founded in 1906. As its name indicated, it was concerned primarily with representing the rural population and small farmers, and in constitutional issues it followed the line of the Young Finns, but in the language issue it took a somewhat stronger stand. (In 1956, the Agrarian League was Finland’s second largest pol- itical party. ) The battle for parliamentary reforms meant a period of rapid progress for the Social Democratic Party. The general strike had been a touchstone for the labor movement, and the party had come through with increased strength. Previously, the ordinary people had lived their day to day existence without concerning 27 themselves about political movements, but now a class conscious- ness began to appear. In 1904, there had been 99 Social Demo- cratic labor societies with a membership of 16,000, but the year following saw the number of societies rise to 177 and the mem- bership to 45,000, while in the years immediately following the growth continued to remain rapid. The biggest victory for the Social Democrats came when the tenant farmers joined them. Parallel with the political activity was the development of the labor union movement, whose most noteworthy organizational achievement was the founding of SAK, the Finnish Federation of Labor, in 1907. Thus the bottom class, with socialism as its torchbearer, awakened to the political, social and economic ways of thought. Some of their leaders, among them Valpas-Hanninen, carried on a hard class struggle action on the Marxist lines; another leader, Yrjo Makelin, gained fame as an interpreter of national ideals, and when he analyzed them even his opponents listened. (In 1956, the Social Democratic Party was Finland's largest. ) The elections for Finland’s unicameral parliament took place in 1907. The campaign was heated, and the outcome was a surprise to everyone. Of the 1,125,000 entitled to vote, 899,000 voted. The Social Democrats won 80 seats, or two-fifths of the total number, the Old Finns 59, the Young Finns 26, the Swedes 24, the Agrarian League 9, and a party founded on the eve of the election, the Christian Labor League, 2 seats. The results clearly indicated the scant support for the Mechelin Senate: only 50 members out of 200 belonged to parties represented in that govern- ment. Of the bourgeois opposition parties, the Old Finns had come out well, thanks to their tight organization as well as their clearly drawn social and linguistic program. The amazing results achieved by the Social Democrats showed everyone that there was opposition in the country to the prevailing social abuses, and that the workers’ party was expected to correct the abuses. The Parliament met at the end of May, 1907, and a straight- forward fighter for justice, the Young Finn member P. E. Svin- hufvud, was chosen Speaker. One of the most important issues discussed in the 1907 Parliament was the prohibition question. Although the chairman of the trade and industry committee, Stahlberg, who was most closely responsible for the Senate stand in the matter, opposed complete prohibition on the grounds that it would probably be impossible to achieve and would benumb the sense of obedience to law, Parliament nevertheless enthusiastically passed a law to prohibit all sales of alcoholic beverages. However, since the Senate suggested it be vetoed, and since the Czar was of 28 the same opinion, the law was not signed. Even so, as soon as Parliament had cast its votes for the law, Stahlberg resigned, for he considered the vote an expression of lack of confidence, and he did not want to present the Czar a law which he considered unsatisfactory. Many other important issues were before Parliament for dis- cussion. In the beginning it revealed inexperience in its work, a great deal of partisanship and even intolerance toward those of differing opinions, but the session also indicated great enthusiasm and a desire to carry out reforms. And it did not take long before Parliament had to take a stand against a new attack being pre- pared in St. Peterburg. Since the position of the Mechelin Senate began to be untenable, many of its members resigned, and the Czar dissolved the Parlia- ment in April, 1908. At the same time a new bourgeois Senate was named: its vice-chairman became the Young Finn, Edward Hjelt, and two new members were J. R. Danielson-Kalmari and J. K. Paasikivi of the Old Finns. This government had to perform in even more difficult circumstances than its predecessors, for 1909 brought with it another crisis: in that year the constitutional trend begun in 1905 was forced to a stop altogether, while a new russification phase began. Some men were appointed senators who could only nominally be said to have retained their status as Finns, such as army officers and officials who had taken up resi- dence in Russia, but even they were soon pushed aside and replaced by pure Russians. Governor-General Gerard was recalled in 1908, and his successor General Bockman was recalled the following year, when the position was given to F. A. Seyn, who had been one of Finland’s most bitter enemies from as far back as the Bobrikov era. The new repressive policies were now more skill- fully carried out than in earlier attempts; an open show of force was avoided, and the press was not treated as harshly as it had been during the first period of repression. Instead of that, the police organization was gradually put into Russian hands, and the influence of the gendarmerie was increased. The Finnish Parlia- ment tried its best to defend the country’s rights, but it always found itself dissolved for even the slightest show of stubbornness. In elections which followed rapidly one after the other, there were no significant changes in the relative party strengths, and the voters continued to go to the polls again and again, almost as a demonstration of their determination. In June 1910, P. A. Stolypin, who had become Prime Minister of Russia four years earlier, made a speech in the Duma, aimed 29 directly against Finland. He remarked, for example, that national legislation did not fall into the competence of the Finnish Parlia- ment, and he demanded that the Finns, like the rest of the minorities within the Russian Empire, elect representatives to a joint Duma. Two members of the opposition spoke up for Finland, but in vain. The majority of the Duma approved a decision ac- cording to which laws and statutes applicable to Finland would be made henceforth by Russia’s lawmaking organs. One member of the Duma even raised a shout, “Finis Finlandiae!’ In the Russian cabinet the matter was also approved with a large majority, and the Czar signed it into law on last day of June. Finnish protests had no effect, and it seemed as if Finland had reached the end.'4 The second period of repression, then, was at its darkest. Even passive resistance seemed to have become paralyzed in the face of this superior power. But with the outbreak of war in 1914, it was hoped that Russia would be led into difficulties such as the war against Japan had brought it a decade earlier. Public opinion wavered between two extremes: there were those who believed that an Allied victory would bring a breakthrough to more liberal ideas, and who hoped that when peace came those ideas would be realized in Finland, too; there were those who believed that ereater support should be given to the idea of cooperation with Russia's enemy, imperial Germany, for when someone fighting vastly superior forces has reached the end of his own resources and is about to perish he will use every opportunity and every ally he can call to his aid: mighty Germany was the strongest enemy of Russia and the only one whose armed victory could undermine the czarist regime, and only on the ruins of that system could a new day dawn for Finland. Finnish active resistance circles began to seek contact with the Central Powers, and in 1915 several hundred young men secretly fled the country, leaving their homes for patriotic reasons, and facing the dangers of going to Germany for military training. All classes of society, from uni- versity students to factory workers, were represented in this ‘Jaeger movement, and by 1917 the Jaeger Battalion had grown to a strength of two thousand men. In Finland, repressive measures continued in all severity until the March, 1917 revolution toppled the czarist government and brought into power a provisional government. As soon as this situation seemed stabilized, there were Finnish-Russian negotia- 14. op. cit. O. Seitkari, ‘““Eduskuntauudistus ja uusi sortokausi’’, II, pp. 372-420. 30 tions in Helsinki and St. Petersburg concerning Finland’s future status. Both sides were agreed that the re-establishment of Fin- land’s rights could be achieved by following the tradition of making a proclamation. In fact, the Russians did proclaim in March that all illegal actions taken in Finland were therewith repealed, and this manifesto was accepted on the whole as an indication of the new Russian government’s favorable attitude and was considered an appropriate point of departure for the trend in Finnish policy, since it restored Finland its official right to speak. Once the Provisional Government had approved the coalition Senate formed by Oskari Tokoi, based on the proportionate parliamentary party strengths, and once permission was granted for Parliament to come into session in early April, Finland’s government had returned to its normal channels. In Tokoi’s Senate, Vaino Tanner, M. Paasivuori, V. Voionmaa, J. Ailio, W. Wuolijoki, as well as Tokoi himself, were members of the Social Democratic party, while E. N. Setala, Rudolf Holsti, A. Serlachius, A. Tulenheimo, Leo Ehrenrooth and K. Kallio represented the bourgeois parties. The March Revolution brought a sudden change into Finnish political life, and the immediate future offered broadened per- spectives for political developments. The question of the proper procedure under the circumstances was discussed from all angles when Parliament sat, and the all-important question arose of how the powers which had belonged to the Grand Duke were to be held in the future. Feelings on this problem crossed old party lines. According to some, the Russian Provisional Government was completely in the right in exercising the rights inherited from the Grand Duke, and the Finns had no alternative but to comply. During the spring and summer of 1917, the majority of bourgeois elements supported this view. Others, however, believed that the powers in question had belonged only to the overthrown Grand Duke and did not belong to the Provisional Government. This line of thought fostered the demand for self-inspired action and set off the move- ment for independence. Within the Social Democratic party there were no such dis- agreements on policy as the bourgeois elements exhibited. The results of a late April 1917 meeting of the party’s parliamentary steering committee showed that the Socialists considered that very moment the opportune one for the realization of Finland’s independence When the Russian Provisional Government in June authorized consideration of this problem of the highest authority by the Finnish Parliament, the Socialists followed their own course 31 and tried to transfer more of the Grand Duke’s rights and privileges to Finnish organs of state than the law proposal implied. On this socialist initiative, and with the support of the Agrarian League and the Young Finns, Parliament did pass on 18 June the so-called Authority of the State measure, but the Russians considered this to be a seizure of authority whereby the Finnish Parliament had taken all authority into its own hands. The Provisional Govern- ment refused to approve the law; instead, it dissolved Parliament and ordered new elections. At first the left tried to keep Parliament in session with its socialist majority but gave up when the bour- geois parties began to prepare for new elections. In the subsequent October voting, the Social Democrats lost their majority, which seemed to indicate that the Authority of the State supporters would meet stiffened opposition. Simultaneously, however, the position of the Provisional Government was growing weaker day by day, and in the Parliament which assembled on the first of November, the new majority no longer considered itself able to maintain its earlier stand on the issue of state authority. Thus, with the two opposing viewpoints gradually drawing together, Finnish inde- pendence seemed to have reached the point of realization. The bourgeois parties sought to find a compromise solution through joint negotiation. It was proposed that the authority which had belonged to the Grand Duke be transferred to an ad- ministrative group to be elected by Parliament — at first it was proposed that just one person be chosen, but upon the Agrarian League claiming that this seemed monarchial, a group of three was decided upon — with foreign affairs and military matters to still be left in the care of the Russian Provisional Government. The Agrarians would have supported the socialist line on the authority of the state issue, but the Social Democrats were no longer disposed to send their measure to the Provisional Government for approval. They were prepared to accept a solution by way of manifesto only on condition that all powers of the Grand Duke be renounced by the Provisional Government, which legally did not possess them. Those who were for independence tended to accept the socialist stand, but opinion on the issue of by whom the supreme authority should be exercised remained divided. The Socialists wanted that authority to rest with Parliament, while the other independence-minded wanted it to be given to a government administrator or to the Senate. Conferences between the bourgeois parties resulted in a compromise proposal according to which the Russian Provisional Government would by proclamation re- nounce the exercising of the authority of the Grand Duke of 32 Finland, but which would also state that Finnish foreign affairs would continue to remain in the hands of the highest Russian authority, and that no changes were to be made in Finland’s military establishment, or in matters concerning Russian in- dividuals living in Finnish territory or Russian installations existing in Finland, without Russian permission. However, when the then Governor-General Nekrasov arrived in St. Petersburg on 5 Novem- ber with the draft of this proclamation, it was already too late: a new, bolshevik revolution had begun. The Age of Independence In Russia, battlefield losses and stagnation in commerce and industry had led to the growing influence of the Bolsheviks, whose armed revolt then led to the overthrow of the Provisional Government and replaced it with the Soviet of Peoples’ Commissars under Lenin. Russian internal developments had reached a point which forced the Finns to make another evaluation of the situation. After a few days of fumbling, Parliament on 15 November de- clared itself the holder of the highest authority in Finland, and since Russia made no claims reserving authority over foreign affairs or military command, the action of Parliament can be said to have marked the actual breaking of the ties which had held Finland and Russia together. Possessing not only the authority to make laws but also the executive authority in Finland, Parliament was faced with the appointment of a new Senate. Strikes breaking out that same month intensified the disagreements between the bourgeois major- ity and the Social Democrats, and the dichotomy persisted in the attempts to form a new government, with one setting as its goal a coalition government and the other demanding a ‘red Senate’. The relative parliamentary party strengths dictated the solution, and Svinhufvud’s strictly bourgeois list of senators was approved in Parliament by a vote of 100 to 80. Subsequently, since the November 15th declaration of Parliament demanded in its final statement a declaration of independence, the Senate took up this matter as its first task: on the 4th of December Parliament was presented with the Senate’s proposal for a new form of govern- ment, calling for Finland to be an independent republic, for which the Senate intended to seek immediate recognition abroad. Parlia- ment approved these proposals on 6 December 1917, but not without a vote. There was unanimity on the question of inde- pendence, but the Social Democrats would have preferred to have it materialize through a mutual understanding with the Bolsheviks 33 in power in Russia, a government which the bourgeois parties on the other hand were reluctant to recognize as the legal government of Russia. 4 Since Finland had made its definite break with Russia, it was important that the step taken meet with Russia’s approval. The Senate first tried to get Germany to assist in procuring Russian recognition of Finnish sovereignty, and the Senate believed this assistance would be readily forthcoming since Germany, victorious on the eastern front, was now negotiating a peace treaty with the Russians at Br