HyperWar: The G.A.F. and the Invasion of Normandy, 1944
Extensive landing preparations on the south coast of England, together with various emergency measures taken by the British government such as an embargo on shipping to Ireland, a veto on exit from England, etc., led to the conclusion that a full-scale allied landing might take place at any time from the Channel area. Moreover, the concentrated activity of the allied air force confirmed this impression. Railroads, coastal batteries and launching-sites for V-weapons between the Scheldt and the Seine had been feverishly bombarded since the beginning of April. It looked as though the opponent was trying to sever the coast from the terrain behind it. Railroad junctions in Belgium were heavily damaged and the effect on supplies was very serious. In April, 1944, for the first time, 5,900 aircraft made night attacks on occupied western territory compared with 5,500 sorties across Luftflotte 3 zone and the North Sea area into the Reich, showing that the focal point of allied night bobbing had now switched to the west. Constant raids on German airfields near the coast not only depleted the air potential but so affected the ground organization as to make its operation difficult.

While the foregoing events focussed German attention on the Dunkirk-Dieppe sector and supported the theory held by both the Army High Command and the Supreme Command, Armed Forces, that the Allies would land in that area, there were, nevertheless, good reasons for accepting the Navy's view that the mouth of the Seine might prove to be the chosen spot. Absence of any allied effort to mine this part of the coast, good beaches and protection from westerly gales afforded by the Cotentin peninsula favored the latter theory. Conditions of tide, light and weather (high tide, full moon, good visibility and little wind) suggested the end of May as the most likely time for landing on the Channel coast.

But May came and went without invasion. In so far as allied air superiority allowed, German air reconnaissance confirmed the former picture of strong concentrations of shipping in the Channel area. The last satisfactory photographic report dates from 24 May and covers the harbors of Bournemouth, Poole, Portland, Weymouth, several river mouths and the coastal waters in this region. Folkestone and Dover were also photographed. Portland, Weymouth and Poole were particularly crowded with landing craft (L.S.I, loaded with L.C.P.) and all kinds of shipping. Twenty-five possible moles received special attention since the photograph of 25 May had already made mention of "large landing stages" measuring 68 × 20 m. Further efforts at reconnaissance on 28, 29 May failed owing, partly, to British fighter defense, partly to icing conditions at a height of 11,000 m. All in all it might be assumed that the landing craft comprised Some 500 L.S.T., approximately 3,600 L.C.T./L.C.E. and 4,000 L.C P./L.C.A. and other smaller units. Including the merchant ships which were in readiness, the Germans calculated that there was transport for some sixteen and a half divisions, German estimates at the end of May and beginning of

The strain put upon the German people by persistent allied air raids (U.S. bombers by day, British, bombers by night) was exploited by political propaganda encouraging them in their desire for some means of retaliation. For months they were comforted by the promise of the imminent use of special weapons against England. Allied bombardment, however, and difficulties of production continually delayed their employment. Until the V-weapons could finally be launched, there was, therefore, no alternative but to reinforce the G.A.F. in its attacks on the British Isles. Sixteen bomber Gruppen (8 Gruppen of Ju 88, 2 Gruppen of Do 217, 2 Gruppen of Me 410, 1 Gruppe He 177 and 3 Gruppen of Ju 188) were assembled with Luftflotte 3 and in the early part of the year resumed their attacks on harbors and industrial centers in south and central England with London as their chief target. This type of air warfare continued in varying, strength throughout the first quarter of 1944 and operations against allied invasion preparations began only towards the end of April when shipping concentrations at Spithead Reede were attacked for the first time on 25 April**. But it was not known how far the attack had succeeded owing to prompt overall smoke cover which impeded observation.

This decline was a clear warning. It showed that the fighting potential of Luftflotte 3 was being sacrificed to retaliation propaganda at a time when the Allies might any day spring the decisive operation of the war. In the place of a planned economy of forces in,attacks on the allied invasion fleet, and instead of building up moans of wireless communication and control, Luftflotte 3 prepared for a possible landing mainly by putting out of action coastal airfields and landing grounds and setting up a "circular system" of defense on other airfields, air force supply depots and ammunition dumps.

The British, on the other hand, made 2-3,000 daily sorties arid kept firmly to their objective. It was hopeless from the outset for Luftflotte 3 to attempt to wrest air supremacy over western France from the Allies with six fighter Gruppen and three night fighter Gruppen as their whole available strength. Towards the end of March, for example, 107 planes were destroyed on the ground in two days. Out of nine railroad bridges between Rouen and Paris only one was fit for use; the junctions in the Paris zone were almost wholly destroyed and the rolling stock had suffered considerable damage; from the end of February to the end of March, 399 railway engines had been totally wrecked. Yet the defense of the Reich would not permit of any change in the allotment of forces in favor of the west.

But by 5 June all the signs pointed to a coming major operation:

At 2100 the British radio was issuing directives to French guerillas to attack certain prearranged targets (roads, main roads, canals, communications) within 24 or 48 hours.

Towards 2200 American bomber command began to transmit weather reports, and from 2300 onward, American twin-engined aircraft started meteorological reconnaissance.

Also about 2300 the radio intercept service learned of the transfer of the British tactical air force to the south. Shortly before midnight, London radio announced that the invasion was to begin within the next 48 hours from 6 June 0000.*

The fact that these indications overlapped and that the American heavy bomber formations had not previously flown meteorological reconnaissance at that hour, caused the Paris radio intercept reporting center West, to alert the subordinate stations. It is not known to the author how much of this information reached the supreme commands.**

Prom 0235 it was ascertained that American heavy bomber formations were concentrating north of London.

Aerial bombardment and paratroop landings began at 0300 in the zone between the Seine and the mouth of the Orne and lasted until 0400, continuing in the area south of Cherbourg, until 0630.

The German zone AOK 15 was alerted shortly after midnight, the Dieppe Flak unit about 0127 and the army Korps LXXXI about 0200.

On the nights of 6 and 7 June, two American air-borne divisions were landed on the Cotentin peninsula while one British air-borne and one Canadian paratroop, battalion were dropped to the south and east of Caen and near Deauville. In general the landings took place along the coast from 1° 20' west to 0° 05' east extending for about 100 km.

From 0500 of the 6th allied landing craft were identified from the coast and from 0630 landings were made over a stretch of 63 kms. around the mouth of the Orne and 19 kms. along the east coast of Cotentin. The 21st allied army group made the landings; it comprised the 1st U.S. Army and the 2nd British Army; of which the VII and XXX corps respectively were the first two ashore.

The landing accomplished, a bridgehead 30 km. wide and 8 km. deep was successfully established north of Caen. After the capture of St. Mere Eglice, another bridgehead was established to the east of the Cotentin peninsula. More paratroops were dropped during the night of the 7th in the Isigny sector. By the 8th, the bridgehead at Caen had been enlarged to an average depth of 10 to 12 km. and a breadth of 38 km. The next day, after heavy fighting north of Caen, and southeast and southwest of Bayeux, the bridgehead was further extended to the south and contact established with the second bridgehead near Caen. On 10 June, the Allies advanced, from Isigny to the Vire and on the 11th, extended the bridgehead at Bayeux in the direction of St. Lô. Fighting centered around the area north of Carentan and west of St. Mere Eglise at which point the opponent drove as far as Etienville.

According to "War at Sea" Vol. V. more than 6,000 vessels of all types were used to transport the invasion troops on 6 June, 1944; these included three British battleships, three American battleships, four British monitors, twenty British and American cruisers as well as two French and one Polish cruisers, and ninety-two British and American destroyers. Tanks were carried in the first wave and, within a quarter of an hour, fifty-six medium tanks had already been landed.

On 12 June, after 7 days' operation, the five bridgeheads were effectively linked up. Up to midday of 13 June, a total of 427,000 men and 105,175 tons of material had "been landed by 62,238 ships.

General Montgomery moved his headquarters to northern Prance. The Allies had successfully completed the first phase of the invasion.

Thus In spite of all the signs and warnings described above, the Allies achieved tactical surprise and made a successful landing at the first attempt. Apart from the choice.of time and place, the key to their success was their absolute air supremacy in the west which, together with bad weather conditions, in those crucial pre-invasion days, had prevented detailed reconnaissance of the south coast of England and of the channel area.

Since German coastal batteries and German divisions had failed to prevent the Allies from obtaining a foothold, the High Command's only chance was now to try to stop them from gaining any further ground, and then to throw them back to the sea. In anticipation of such a task, which called for the bringing up and assembly of German tanks and infantry, the air force had a decisive part to play. In conjunction with the navy, it must harass and finally paralyze the Allies' cross-channel supply lines and, in addition, attempt to shatter the bridgeheads.

In view of this situation, sorties could be made only at night. Fliegerkorps IX used bombs, aircraft mines and BM 1000 over the inner Seine bay and the bridgehead while Fliegerdivision 2 made torpedo attacks on allied transports in the Channel. The latter unit consisted in the main of 2 Gruppen of KG 26; it was stationed in the south of France and operated over intermediate airfields in the sector Chalons sur Saone--Dijon and Fecamp into the target area, returning to the bases in the south of France after the attacks. On an average, the torpedo units flew one sortie a week with 40 aircraft.

In order to keep the numbers of the bomber and fighter formations up to a reasonable level, all available sources both at home and in Italy (Luftflotte 2) were exploited.

Control and direction of the units was complicated by the activities of allied sabotage troops who had cut almost all tho telephone wires, while radio control was unreliable duo to the weather. Air reconnaissance, reports from the inner Seine bay were rare and operations had frequently to rely on data from observations at the naval coastal stations (area Le Havre).

Despite all these obstacles Luftflotte 3 lost no time in coming to grips with the allied-Invasion fleet.

The-battle of Normandy was marked by overwhelming allied superiority particularly where the air force was concerned.

Allied ground organization and communications in the landing area were rapidly built up. On 14 Juno, 2 fighter airfields for Spitfires and an airfield for transport planes were already in use. A further airfield for medium bombers was under construction. Up to 14 June, 270 special machines for airfield construction had been brought by air to the landing area. By 24 June there were no less than 23 airfields in the American and 17 in the British sector. Allied sorties amounted to 6,000 dally; constant fighter cover above and behind the battle sectors immobilized the Germans by day and- finally compelled Luftflotte III to stop using fighters in day bombing operations and to attach them to the IInd fighter korps for defense purpose only. The latter was now responsible for all fighter formations operating in the west which were devoted entirely to clearing the supply lines and to protection of army assembly areas.

Long-distance bombersof the U.S.A.A.F. and R.A.F. met scarcely any opposition and attacked communications, troop concentrations, coastal fortifications and harbor installations, with slight losses. On 14 June, British bombers attacking Le Havre dealt a severe blow to the navy's striking power--three torpodoboats, nine M.T.B.s, five patrol boats, one minesweeper and three R-boats were destroyed and other vessels sunk. On 15 June, there was a heavy raid on

Meanwhile the Allies had begun night-fighter operations over the Seine bay, thus rendering more difficult the IXth Fliegerkorps' task of attacking ship targets. Under these conditions, large-scale mining of ship targets within the Seine bay appeared to offer greater prospects, while operations with air torpedoes outside the bay and in the Channel area could be maintained by the 2nd Fliegerdivision. Although such a change of plan for the IXth Korps had not been previously contemplated and the question of the firing mechanism for the mines was cleared up only after long negotiations, there were no difficulties regarding storage and supply of BM 1000 and 1MB. Luftflotte 3 employed several trains to bring mines from the Atlantic coast in the south of France and set up special G.A.F. air bases for aerial mining. Prom 16 June, the new mine-firing unit with pressure-acting chamber was put into use after its release by the Navy on 7 June*.

The perilous situation called for maximum efficiency from personnel and material. During daily sorties between 14 June and the end of the month, 971 BM 1000 and 614 LMB were laid in the course of attacks on ship targets, convoys were torpedoed and attacks made in support of the army. In operations on ship targets, bombs of the heaviest caliber (PC 1400 kilog. and PC 1800 kilog.) were used.

It was characteristic of the air situation that the G.A.P. did not succeed in obtaining photographic reconnaissance northwest of the Orne until 22 June.

Heavy fighting marked the month of July which, despite very strenuous German resistance, was to bring the Allies into the open terrain of France.

On 7 July , in a major attack northwest of St. Lô, the Allies gained a new bridgehead across the Vire and pushed farther to the south and southwest. On 8 July they began their concentrated attack on Caen which fell in the course of 9 and 10 July, in battles which took a haavy toll of both sides the allies eventually advanced along the entire front, systematically gaining ground. On 18 July, they entered St. Lô and were likewise successful in the Caen sector, where a German counter-attack failed owing to strong allied air intervention.

The following days saw the commencement of a full-scale attack by the Allies on either side of St. Lô, forcing a deep withdrawal of German forces on 27 July and, that evening, breaking through the German line in several places in a rapid advance southward. On 31 July they entered Avranches. Along the remaining fronts the German formations were broken in several sectors, while southwest of Caen the allies were thrusting in the direction of Falaise.

Luftflotte 3 also continued their attack on the Seine bay during July. Operations were largely influenced by allied superiority in the air which, combined with their successes on land, forced the Germans to evacuate coastal airfields. Continual damage and interference with these fields led to frequent transfer of units, diminished their operational readiness and hampered control. During the first half of the month they concentrated on ship targets and mining of the Seine bay in an effort to prevent the allies' major ships from supporting the army on land in the Caen sector. The existing distribution of effort between Fliegerkorps IX and X on the one hand and the 2nd Fliegerdivision on the other was maintained. The former concentrated on the Seine bay, the latter harassed allied supplies. All resources were aimed at increasing the number of sinkings; in addition to Hs 293, glider bombs and normal torpedoes, circling torpedoes LT 350, armor-piercing wireless-controlled heavy caliber "PX" bombs, and normal armor-piercing bombs of heavy caliber PC 1400, PC 1800, were used as well as a "Mistel" (i.e. a Ju 88 filled with high explosive and flown by a fighter aircraft mounted on the Ju.; the attack is effected in a dive during which the Ju 88 is released and glides down like a bomb, exploding bn contact).