The Battle Over Munich  April 24, 1944
Anatomy of the Big Air Battle over Munich - April 24, 1944 With permission of Bill Marshall, author "Our Might Always  Volume I,

A History of the 355th FG, the 355th TFW and the 355th FW"  December 27, 2011

A narrative of the events leading to, and details of, the battle between the Luftwaffe

and the 8th AF First Task Force, the 355th Fighter Group and the 357th Fighter Group.

With assistance from Dewayne "Ben Bennett"- pilot, 384th BG, Erich Brown, Mike Williams and Dr. Frank Olynyk - Historians, Joe Shea  pilot, 357th FG, Lieutenant Colonel Joerg Dietsch  German Air Force and Historian.

This narrative is about one of the last battles in which the Luftwaffe was successful enough to anticipate a critical target, skillfully place a very large reaction force of German Fighters at key spots in a bomber stream and inflict a loss greater than 10% of an 8thAF attacking force. The First Task Force, comprised of five Combat Wings of the First Bomb Division, would lose 27 of 268 bombers this day to flak and fighters. The corresponding claim by the Luftwaffe fighter force was for more than 50 B-17s and that didnt include the seven that landed later in Sweden due to battle damage.

On April 24, 1944 the 8th AF directed all three Bomb Divisions to attack a.) the Munich area airfields and manufacturing targets, b.) the Friedrichshafen area airfields and, c.) the Gablingen/Leipheim airfields. The Eighth would put up 716 bomber 'effectives' with the largest force comprised of 268 B-17s in 1st TF attacking Erding, Landsberg and Oberpfaffenhofen. The Oberphaffenhofen target was the Dornier complex currently tooling up for the Do335. The Landsberg attack was not only against the Me262s reputed to be on the base but also at the manufacturing facility for the Jumo turbine blades.

The Eighth Fighter Command, combined with P-47s and P-51s from 9th AF and RAF Mustangs and Spitfires, put over 800 fighter aircraft in the air to support this broad attack against German aircraft industry.

The strength of the Fighter Force is somewhat misleading as the P-47s from both the 8th and the 9th were only able to provide Penetration and late Withdrawal escort. The RAF Spitfires were restricted in range. as their Mustangs did not have the fuselage tanks, so could not quite reach the targets to bolster Target Escort.

The total effective fighter force which could possibly beat off Luftwaffe attacks from Stuttgart all the way to Munich and back to Frankfort was contained in the 4th, 352nd, 354th , 355th and 357th FGs Mustangs, plus the 20th , 55th, and 364th Lightnings. The Lightning groups had less long range capability than the Mustangs so they were assigned to the Freiderichshafen target support

The 4th FG was assigned to provide a Free Lance Sweep out in front of the entire bomber stream and remained in front of General Travis through the Stuttgart area.

The Order of Battle for the Luftwaffe

The LuftFlotte Reich defending force this day, was comprised of JG1, JG3, JG5, JG11, JG27, JG53, JG106, I./JG301, III./ZG26 and II./ZG76 plus a temporary placement of III./JG26 from LuftFlotte 3. In total there were more than 275 single engine and 40 twin engine fighters which were directed to attack the 8th Air Force along the southern Germany/Swiss border from Stuttgart/Worms through Ulm and Augsburg and Munich.

Approximately 33 Staffels of day fighters was put in the air to engage the 8th AF. The German fighter force in the Munich area was dominantly Me109G-6s with a few 109G-6/U4s and 109G-5s. In addition Sturmstaffel I, a new experimental bomber attack force, comprised of heavily armed and armored FW190 A-7s, plus approximately 25 Me110 G-2s from III./ZG26 and 12 Me410A-1s from II./ZG76 were directed to the Munich area.

The allocation of this force was as follows. JG1 and JG11 attacked in the Worms/Mannheim area around 1220, the rest attacked in Munich area from 1315-1415 in aggressive and sustained fights. The rest were formed from Ulm to Regensburg to the Munich areas.

One hundred P-51s of the 355th and 357th FGs lifted from Steeple Morden and Bodney. After early returns, eighty eight Mustangs would be all that stood between the First Bomb Division and most of the 250 plus Luftwaffe fighters fighting that day around Munich

The General Order of Battle for the USAAF Fighter Escort

The 4th FG was assigned to provide Free Lance Fighter Sweep ahead of the entire stream of B-17s and B-24s as they crossed Germany toward Mannheim. The 20th and 55th and 364th P-38s were covering the Second Task Force comprised of four Combat Wings of the Third Bomb Division, attacking Friedrichshafen area airfields. The 352nd and 354th FG Mustangs had the Third Task Force (Second Bomb Division) B-24s attacking Gablingen and Leipheim airfields.

The 355th and 357th FGs were assigned to provide Target Escort to the leading First Task Force, comprised of five Combat Wings of First Bomb Division B-17s, attacking Munich area.

Once past the Mannheim area, near Worms, the 4th FG met several squadrons of Fw190s from JG1 and JG11. They quickly claimed 12 for the loss of three Mustangs and subsequently chased them to the north.

The 55th and 364th FG P-38s provided Target escort to the Second Task Force attacking Friedrichshafen area. Near Lake Constance the 2nd Task Force separated from the leading 1st and for 15-20 minutes there was no fighter coverage anywhere near the1st Task Force from there all the way to Augsburg .

The lead five combat wings now proceeded alone due east along a track that would take them north of Leipheim, then Gablingen before turning east southeast past Augsburg toward Erding.

This is where the day begins for the two Groups assigned to provide cover for the First Task Force.

F.O.312  Erding A/D, Landsberg A/D, Oberpfaffenhofen/Daimler Werke A/D.

Plan for 8th Air Force attacks on Germany, 24 April 1944 (Click to enlarge) The 355th and 357th FG over Munich

Lieutenant Colonel Dix led the 355th on a Ramrod at the lead of 357 Squadron to the Munich area from 1106 to 1632. The 355th provided Target and Withdrawal support to the leading Combat Wing (41-A and 41-B) of First Division B-17s bombing Landsberg. The pilots were alerted that the Order of Battle was the 41st, 40th , 1st and 94th Combat Wings.

Major Dregne led the 357th FG to also provide Target and Withdrawal Support to the trailing three Combat Wings bombing Erding.

Neither fighter group was briefed concerning the unusual formation placement assigned for 41-B, was led by Colonel Dale Smith of 384th BG. It was placed line abreast, on the right side/dressed left, to 41-A to improve forward firepower of the leading bomber force against Company Front head-on attacks.

General Travis led 41-A to attack Landsberg and Smiths 41-B was to break away at the IP to attack the Daimler Werke factories at Oberpfaffenhofen. It was this critical facility which was manufacturing major subassemblies of the formidable Do335 twin engine fighter and turbine blades for the new and dangerous Me262.

It was probably assumed that fighter cover could be dropped back from 355th or moved forward from the 357th should the need arise. The 'need' would arise and there werent close to enough escorts to beat off 25-30 staffels of single engine fighters..

General Robert Travis led the First Task Force/First Division in the lead 303rd BG. By the time this bomber stream was over the Channel, Travis had over 700 B-17s and B-24s behind his Fortress

The Forts took off and assembled in the 0920 timeframe and proceeded to climb above the Channel and turn south toward Paris.

The 355th Rendezvous was to be made slightly northeast of Augsburg at 1322 to pick up 41A and 41B, and continue escort southeast toward Erding.

Some 10 minutes behind the 355th FG, Major Erwin Dregne led the 357FG to their RV point north of Munich soMe20 miles behind the 355th. Further in trail was the 2nd Division B-24s assigned to bomb Leipheim and Gablingen 10-20 minutes after the1st AD passed the area. This force was protected by the 352nd and 354th FGs and had cleared the Gablingen area by 1330, turning north and then west northwest for home. RAF Mustangs would pick them up northwest of Ingolstadt.

An unanticipated effect of the Echelon Left formation for the First Task Force was that every time a left turn was made, the 41-B B-17s to the right of 41-A were 'slung away' to the right of, and further behind, the lead wing and forced to throttle up to 158 mph IAS to try to catch up. Despite the trailing wing commanders pleading with the First Task Force commander, General Travis, to slow down, he continued to pace them at 150+ mph IAS. Twice a left turn was made and each time the 41-B fell further behind, opening a dangerous gap between 41-A, 41-B and the boxes of B-17s behind the lead wing. Ultimately the 41-B was isolated off to the right of the bomber stream as the trailing wings closed on 41-A, leaving no 'opening' for 41-B to slide into.

So, instead of the trail squadrons of 355th able to cover the two boxes of both 41-A and 41-B, and the lead squadron of 357th FG able to overlap the trailing three bomber wings, 41-B was left dangerously exposed 10+ miles behind the lead combat wing and off to the right of the trailing wings with disastrous consequences. The German controllers quickly identified the issues with formation integrity, found that 41-B was isolated, and exploited the situation at Ulm.

Near Wurms JG11 and JG1 attacked from the northeast at 1150-1200 and the 4th FG destroyed 12 for the loss of three. At 1255 the P-47 Penetration escorts started breaking escort and were out of sight by 1300.

The 355th FG was still some 10-15 minutes away from the planned rendezvous point near Augsburg, and the 357th FG was at least 20 minutes away. The 56th and 361st FGs were now near the Channel after breaking escort to 1st Task Force southeast of Stuttgart. The escort fighters for the Second and Third Bomb divisions were 30+ miles away. There was an escort coverage vacuum, not by flawed timing but calculated risk by planners that did not have enough Mustangs and Lightnings to cover everybody all the time.

At 1305 west of Ulm, the German controller put I./JG3 in the same space as the First Task Force. West of Gablingen, they started making persistent and effective attacks from 1305-1320 on both 41-A and the isolated 41-B boxes. These first attacks resulted in three B-17s going down in 41-B plus another one from 41-A. The bombers were on 'C' channel pleading for help.

Both the 355th and 357th FG bent their throttles to get to the rendezvous point faster than planned.

At 1320 Gruppenkommandeur III./JG26, Hauptmann Staiger, led 30 pilots equipped with Me109G-6/U4s, toward the B-17s. Mk 108 30mm cannon firing through the nose and the two 20mm cannon slung on under wing gondolas were very effective. He was joined by III./JG3. He noticed that the 355th had arrived and decided to stalk the bombers awaiting the opportunity to attack. He made one head on pass just before the 355th arrived and then retreated to cloud cover to await further opportunity.

JG26 claimed five B-17s from Augsburg to Dachau during that one head on pass, along with 12 more claims by JG3 in the same area from 1305 to 1335. Post strike de-briefings place six B-17s downed in that area and time frame, although several were damaged and later went to Switzerland on the way home.

Between Erding and Oberpfaffenhofen JG26 would exploit a lack of fighter escorts near the IP.

Captain Dewayne "Ben" Bennett, pilot in the low squadron of the 384th BG, in 41-B, estimated 50-60 German single engine fighters plus another 20 Me109s flying top cover, made the first of many head on attacks. For approximately 15 minutes the unescorted B-17s were in serious trouble. In addition to the four of the 384th B-17s shot down in the Leipheim to Augsburg area, there were also about 20 more B-17s with varying degrees of damage, some of which would fall later.

As the beleaguered Forts struggled toward the planned 355th Fighter Group R/V point, the Group arrived early north of Augsburg at 1319, heading southeast toward Munich. Trailing the lead 357FS was next the 354FS and then the 358FS, which arrived at 1322.

Lieutenant Colonel Gerald Dix saw the second box of B-17s under attack, as was their own assigned first combat box of B-17s further ahead. Dix led the 357FS to attack and directed Captain Henry Kucheman, leading the 354FS and Captain Emil Sluga, leading the 358FS, to catch up to the 41A now heading southeast, due north of Munich, toward the Erding airfields.

At this time, a second force of German fighters came in from the northeast. Approximately fifty more Me109s and Fw190s, with approximately 20 of those Me109s flying top cover, made a diving right turn for the first head on pass.

The fighters split into formations of 4-6 each and made what were later described as "persistent and skilled" attacks, boring through the B-17 formations and returning for more head on attacks. These attacks started at approximately 1335 to 1340 and continued over Erding and thence to the south.

The 357FS quickly engaged the Fw190s from Sturmstaffel 1 and their Me109G-6 escorts from Stab.III./JG3. Then more Me109s from II. and III./JG3 piled on. The sky due north of Munich was filled with B-17s, P-51s, Me109s and Fw190s.

The 357FS Red and Yellow flights quickly shot down four plus damaged several more. Lt. Col. Gerald Dix shot down a Fw190 whose pilot bailed out and saluted him as Dix flew by, returning the salute. Dix then tacked on to a very skilled pilot leading the109 escorts and the fight ranged from 23,000 feet in rolling dive to the deck, then hard skids, zooming climbing turns and snap rolls near the deck until the German pilot finally straightened out in a valley hugging trees.

The pilot was probably ace Ltn. Franz Schwaiger, 1./JG3 StaffelKaptain . Dix hit him hard from canopy to nose, but then his own canopy fogged up and he lost him on the deck. Dix only claimed the 109 as a 'Damaged' but Schwaiger apparently belly landed just ahead, southwest of Regensburg. According to a witness Schwaiger crash landed and then was strafed by a Mustang before he could escape - but no encounter report for either 355th or 357th Fighter Group contains an account of a strafing during this mission.

357FS Yellow flight leader Captain Henry Bille also scored in this fight on a Fw190 northwest of Munich. His destroyed claim was later reduced to 'probable'.

Lieutenant Les Minchew, flying wingman to Dix, engaged and damaged a Me109 which was chasing Dix and then was separated from Dix in the fight. Shortly afterwards he shot down a Me109 northwest of Munich.

At approximately 1322 the 354th FS arrived to take stock of the situation. Yellow flights Lieutenant Bill Boulet, flying wing to Captain Robert Woody, received a call for help from 41A. Element leader Lieutenant Bud Fortier simultaneously spotted the isolated bomb wing to the south under attack with more German fighters heading toward them. Five 109s in string formation then crossed high and in front of Yellow flight in a shallow dive.

Capt. Henry Kucheman, ordered Blue and Green flights to remain with the bombers and then led Red flight in a climb to intercept 20-25 more 109s inbound from the northeast, just north of Munich.

Captain Woody took Yellow flight and sped after the five 109s boring in on the B-17s of 41B.

At 1330 only the 358FS and two flights of the 354th were left intact to cover the lead boxes and 41B was isolated to the south.

The 364FS drew their first blood in the Munich area breaking up an attack on the trailing 94th CW. Lieutenants Richard Peterson and Charles Sumner destroyed a Me109 apiece north of Munich and then Lieutenants Robert Shaw and 1st Lt. John Carder claimed one Me109 destroyed and one probable. Back to the northeast, 2nd Lt. Tom McKinney found himself alone with three 109s, shot down one and ducked into cloud cover east of Augsburg.

The 364FS was in this fight trailing behind the 355th as the bomber track ran southeast toward Erding, thence southward toward the IP. In all, they shot down six Me109s from north of Augsburg through Munich and then to south of Munich in the1345-1415 timeframe.

By the time the 364FS engaged only the 362FS/357th FG and 358FS/355th FG were still intact and still escorting the First Task Force east of Munich

Several flights of the 362FS and 363FS of the 357th FG cornered Me110 s from III./ZG26 south of Erding trying to sneak out of the area and quickly claimed 10 for loss of two in mid air collisions. The high scorers were Lieutenants Fletcher Adams and John England with three each, while Second Lieutenants James Roughgarden damaged two. Lieutenants Alden Smith damaged one plus a probable, John Coon damaged one, Ollie Harris damaged one and Frank Connaghan destroyed another.

Capt. Fred Smith downed a Me 109 attacking the bombers near Wurm Lake. 1st Lt. William Reese would destroy one more Me109 over Munich to finish the 357th Fighter Group scoring for the day.

Lieutenants Connaghan (KIA) of 362nd and Donnell (POW) of 363rd were victims of mid air collisions with the Me110s they shot down. Connaghan sliced through the wing of one and was seen to bail out but turned up dead later.

As the 363rd FS was busy northeast of Munich, and about 10 minutes before the trailing 362FS/357th FG Mustangs attacked Me110s east of Munich, the 354FS of the 355th FG saw that the "stray middle" box (the unlucky 41B), now south of Erding A/F and heading south, was coming under attack again.

In this fight, Stab./JG301 and I./JG301 lost six 190G-6s shot down, three WIA plus 3 KIA, and Gruppenkommandeur Major Walter Bredensbach was hit badly and crash landed his Me109 at Holzkirchen airfield shortly afterwards. Ofw Muller of 2./JG301 also crash landed his Gustav at Holzkirchen with severe battle damage incurred with the 357th FG.

During this period all five combat wings headed toward the Initial Point southeast of Munich where they would turn due west-northwest on the bomb run. The trailing four boxes had already bombed Erding. The leading 41A wing was now just north of the IP.

It was about this time that Colonel Dale Smith, leading the 41B Wing with the 384th BG, found himself visibly separated from 41A by heavy cloud cover in front and to the east. He decided to turn slightly to the south-southwest to avoid possible mid air collisions and try to catch up with 41A near the IP. After emerging from the cloud cover, he was startled to note that his 41B was now LEADING the First Task Force!

What happened was that the 41B CW finally had the inside position on the turn back to the west and had unknowingly "cut the corner".

There was a heated exchange between General Travis and Colonel Smith regarding the 'new' Lead heading into the IP and bomb run, but Smith decided he was taking too many losses to turn his entire Combat Wing in a 360 degree circle in order to let Travis regain the Lead! Nor was it certain that the trailing wings would 'open up' and let him resume a trail position to 41A. Unfortunately, the last concentrated gaggle of German fighters was once again positioned to attack an uncovered box of bombers

Captain Brady Williamson, leading the intact 354FS Blue and Green flights weaving above General Travis 303rd BG leading 41A, spotted the 384th BG once again under heavy attack by Me109s from the south and southwest by JG26, JG27 and JG3. He took his seven ship section and sped westward to break up the attack.

Luftwaffe Experten Staiger, leading III./JG26, had patiently stalked the first two combat boxes up sun after abandoning his attacks when the 355th had arrived at the R/V earlier. When the 41B forged ahead of the 41A on the way to the IP, they became uncovered by both the 355th and 357th FGs, frantically trying to cover everybody.

Staiger led JG26 into the leading B-17 formations south and southwest of Munich and personally claimed two B-17s with his 30mm equipped Me109G-6/U4 and the rest of JG 26 claimed 14 more B-17s.

Of the 17 claimed destroyed by German fighters south and southwest of Munich, only nine were actually badly damaged by German fighters and anti-aircraft fire. Of the nine B-17s, five evaded to Switzerland. One of the five was shot down and destroyed by a Swiss fighter while on final approach near Lake Grifensee  the crew all KIA. The rest landed safely and were interred for the duration. Two more B-17s hit near Ulm and Augsburg also made it safely to Switzerland some 30 minutes earlier.

Only the 358th FS/355FG and a couple of flights from the entire 357FG remained to continue escorting the 220 remaining B-17s of the 1st TF, as the rest of the Mustangs were engaged all around Munich in groups of two and four apiece.

Over the next 20 minutes seven more B-17s would stagger into Switzerland to land or crash land as the1st Task Force headed home. One of them was shot down during final approach by Swiss Fighters and crashed. One more would land in Sweden and one would ditch in the Channel before the day was over.

As the 41A was on bomb run to Landsberg, and 41B headed for Oberpfaffenhofen. Blue flight leader Williamson jumped a flight of Me109s just south of Munich headed for the Oberpfaffenhofen bound box of B-17s. He hit and damaged one, but broke off when another 109 got on his tail. Lieutenant Henry Brown picked up the leader who was on Williamsons tail and caught the 109 in a wild chase to the deck scoring all the way in the dive. In desperation, the 109 pilot bailed out only 100 feet above the ground as his fighter blew up.

Now separated from his flight, Brown spotted another Me 109 on the deck to the northwest and closed on him over one of the lakes west of Munich. He closed to within 100 yards and clobbered the 109. The German pilot bailed out over an airfield as Brown continued in the general direction of Steeple Morden. This last score was between 1420 and 1430 which represented the closing shots of the battle around Munich.

The wreckage of 45+ downed Me109s and Me110 s and a Fw190, combined with crashed B-17s and six Mustangs littered the Bavarian countryside from Augsburg to Regensburg to east and south and southwest and west of Munich.

Woody and Brown became the 355th FGs groups fourth and fifth air aces. Robert Woody was the first 8th AF FC pilot to destroy more than four in the air as he had four plus one shared plus one damaged.

Demers was lost on the way home attacking barge traffic on the Rhine ~1425. He had a structural failure on pull up, losing both wings near Minden. On the way home, Fortier picked up Brown and Williamson and spotted approximately 10 Me109s and Fw190s NW Trier and led his three strays into them, but they turned away and no more combat ensued.

The 355th FG claimed 24 but the final score was later reduced to 20-1-6 for the loss of four, three to fighters, all 357FS

The 357th FG had an even better day in the same area with 23-2-7 credits awarded. The 357th FG later lost Lieutenant Stager on the way home. He was hit by flak while strafing an airfield near Ludwigshafen and bailed out near Strasbourg. The 357th FG also ended the day with four lost, three in air combat.

For the 357th FG, Bochays Me109, Adams three Me109s and John Englands three Me110s raised their scores to air ace on this day.

The 358FS had opportunities but stuck with the 41A CW to cover them all the way. 41A did not lose any B-17s to German fighters.

In all it was bad day for the both the Luftwaffe and Combat Wing 41B. It was also a bad day for USAAF. The 8th AF Bomber Command lost a total of 40 B-17s to fighters and flak and take off accidents, including 7 crossing the border to land or crash in Switzerland. One more ditched in the Channel to make the total 40 lost in this mission.

The 1st TF lost a total of 27 to flak, fighters, evasion to Switzerland, one ditching in the Channel and two damaged badly on take-off.

The III./JG26 Gruppe was particularly effective, stalking the 384th and 306th Bomb Groups and probably responsible for half of the B-17s actually downed by fighters north and east and south and then west of Munich. Although the final total of actual B-17s downed by the Luftwaffe fighters was about one third of their claims, over 100 returned with some form of damage.

The Luftwaffe controllers were successful at exploiting the gap in coverage between the 357FG and 355FG in trying to cover the entire 1st Task Force - and took complete advantage of 41Bs isolation to the right and behind its assigned position.

In all, over 220-250 German fighters made contact in that area. The order of engagement seems to be Sturmstaffel 1. with 1/JG3 flying top cover around 1315-1320, followed by III./JG3 around 1325, then Stab IV./JG3 with IV./JG3, and III./JG26 in the1330-1335 timeframe. Then Stab./JG301, I./JG301 plus I. and IV./JG 27 and I./JG5 appeared in the1336-1340 timeframe east and southeast of Munich, followed by II./ZG26.

The battle of Munich raged from Ulm to Augsburg and Dachau in the northwest to Regensburg to the north, to Erding, Muhldorf and Landshut in the northeast, to Rogoersdorf and Waldkraiburg in the southeast to Landsberg and Oberpfaffenhofen to the west of Munich. It started at 1315 and the last shots were fired around 1430 with the better part of two 8th AF Fighter Groups reduced to two and four ship formations..

On the plus side of the day some of the Do335 production tooling was badly damaged setting the program back for months. In all only 40 of these formidable fighters were produced by VE Day.

The Luftwaffe lost a Gruppenkommandeur KIA, two StaffelKaptains, a top ace KIA, plus several experienced flight leaders KIA/WIA in this battle. Including those fighters lost near Worms earlier, the Luftwaffe lost sixty fighters, 39 pilots KIA and 12 WIA. The fighter losses do not include several badly damaged fighters that crash landed but were not written off.

For the US, rarely did two different Fighter Groups cooperate so well in the same area but even two veteran Fighter Groups were not enough to prevent serious B-17 losses on this day.

Roster of combatants and aircraft lost, as well as victory credits awarded by the respective Air Forces.