1944 : The War In The East And On The Neighbouring Fronts [PDF] [1jnhhk435s18]
Germany And The Second World War. Volume Viii, The Eastern Front 1943-1944 : The War In The East And On The Neighbouring Fronts [PDF] [1jnhhk435s18]. The latest volume in the magisterial Germany and the Second World War series, volume VIII deals with one of the most eve...
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Germany and the Second World War

Copyright

Contents

List of Maps

List of Tables

Notes on the Authors

Abbreviations

SHORT DESIGNATIONS FOR DEPARTMENTS OFTHE ARMY OPERATIONS STAFF

Key to Symbols

Introduction

PART I: FROM STALINGRAD TO KURSK

I. Basic Problems in German Conduct of the War after Stalingrad

1. STALINGRAD A TURNING POINT?

2. LOSSES AND RESOURCES: THE CHANGING STRATEGIC COORDINATES

(a) The Manpower Situation of the Eastern Army and the Failure of Total Mobilization

(b) Material Losses and Ostensible Successes in the War Economy 3. 'FORTRESS EUROPE' AND THE PROBLEM OF THE SECOND FRONTII. German Alliance Policy and the Question of a Separate Peace

1. THE EROSION OF THE AXIS PACT

2. THE ILLUSION OF A SEPARATE PEACE

III. The Genesis of the Battle of Kursk

1. BASIC CONSIDERATIONS

2. THE CONFLICT OVER THE TIMING OF THE ATTACK

PART II: THE BATTLE OF THE KURSK SALIENT

I. The Hopeless German Starting Position

1. DISASTROUS PLANNING: A FRONTAL ATTACK WITHOUT THE ELEMENT OF SURPRISE

2. RELATIVE STRENGTH: AN ASSAULT AGAINST AN AVALANCHE

(a) The German Potential in the Kursk Salient (B) The Soviet Potential in the Kursk Salient(c) Ratio of Opposing Forces in Operation CITADEL

(d) Comparison of Total Potential in the Kursk-Orel Area

(e) The Bottom Line: Soviet Superiority and the Impossibility of a Decisive Battle

3. 'FORTRESS KURSK'

II. The Failure of Operation CITADEL

1. THE ABORTIVE SOVIET PRE-EMPTIVE STRIKE

2. THE FAILED ATTACK BY NINTH ARMY (5 TO 13 JULY 1943)

3. THE ADVANCE OF ARMY GROUP SOUTH UP TO 12 JULY

4. THE MYTH OF PROKHOROVKA

(a) The Soviet Encirclement Plan

(b) Prokhorovka: Legend and Reality

(c) Balance-Sheet of the Soviet Debacle (D) Epilogue: The Tank Battle that Never Took Place5. HITLER'S ORDER TO HALT THE OFFENSIVE-'VICTORY THROWN AWAY'?

(a) Operation ROLAND's Chances of Success

(b) The Donets-Mius Offensive

(c) The Offensive in the Orel Bulge

(d) The Allied Landing in Sicily

III. Operation CITADEL-A Turning Point?

1. CAUSES OF THE GERMAN FAILURE

2. QUANTITATIVE BALANCE-SHEET: ASYMMETRICAL LOSSES

3. TECHNOLOGICAL AND TACTICAL BALANCE-SHEET: THE QUALITATIVE TURNAROUND IN FAVOUR OF GERMAN ARMOUR

(a) 'Tiger Shock' and Soviet Armour's 'Technology Gap'

(b) Tactical Efficiency

Tank turret

Radio Mission-type tacticsCombined arms combat

Training and group cohesion

4. STRATEGIC BALANCE-SHEET: CITADEL-ONLY A VIRTUAL TURNING POINT

IV. The Soviet Counter-Offensives

1. THE OREL COUNTER-OFFENSIVE (OPERATION KUTUZOV), 12 JULY TO 18 AUGUST 1943

2. THE BELGOROD-KHARKOV OFFENSIVE OF 3 TO 23 AUGUST (OPERATION RUMYANTSEV)

3. BALANCE OF LOSSES IN THE 'GREATEST BATTLE IN HISTORY'

PART III: THE PERPLEXITIES OF WAR: The Soviet Theatre in German Policy and Strategy from the Summer of 1943

I. The Soviet Theatre of War in German Policy and Strategy from the Summer of 1943