MSCODE
Release 77 of the Official Code of Mississippi Annotated released 2020-04-02. 
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JUDICIAL DECISIONS

1. Examination and cross-examination in general.

2. Interest in cause.

3. Conviction of crime.

4. Contradiction and impeachment of witness.

5. Evidence.

6. Instructions.

7. Punishment for contempt.

8. Judgment.

1. Examination and cross-examination in general.

A trial court did not err in refusing to permit cross-examination of a witness concerning her use of marijuana and involvement in a robbery since specific instances of conduct may be used to attack the credibility of a witness on cross-examination only if probative of truthfulness or untruthfulness, and neither robbery nor marijuana use were probative of the witness’ character for truthfulness or untruthfulness. Johnston v. State, 618 So. 2d 90, 1993 Miss. LEXIS 181 (Miss. 1993).

At a hearing on a former wife’s petition to hold her former husband in contempt for failure to pay child support, the wife could not invoke her right against self-incrimination to shield herself from questions on cross-examination as to whether she maintained that the husband had an account at a particular bank, where the wife had voluntarily taken the stand on direct examination and unequivocally identified the signature on the bank account as the husband’s. A party may not testify as to material facts in proceedings which he or she initiated, and later invoke the privilege against self-incrimination on those same matters. Thus, when the wife voluntarily took the stand and testified to material matters on direct examination, she also waived her right against self-incrimination. Wallace v. Jones, 572 So. 2d 371, 1990 Miss. LEXIS 565 (Miss. 1990).

Although a judge has wide discretionary control over the extent of cross-examination, the arbitrary curtailment upon a proper subject of cross-examination may be grounds for reversal. Thus, denial of a defendant’s right to a broad and extensive cross-examination of a prosecution witness substantially affected the defendant’s rights where the prosecution’s evidence was largely circumstantial, with the exception of that witness. Sayles v. State, 552 So. 2d 1383, 1989 Miss. LEXIS 472 (Miss. 1989).

A defendant should have been permitted to cross-examine a prosecution witness as to an alleged affair between the defendant and the witness’ wife, even though the affair took place approximately 2 to 5 years prior to the trial; it was still likely that the witness could or would have a grudge against the defendant, and this question should have been determined by the jury. Sayles v. State, 552 So. 2d 1383, 1989 Miss. LEXIS 472 (Miss. 1989).

Bias of mother, who had not testified at trial, was not allowed to be established, although bias, motive, or interest are always material and may be proven by extrinsic evidence, because fact that mother, standing alone, had extreme bias and motive to lie was too remote to impeach credibility of children. Cantrell v. State, 507 So. 2d 325, 1987 Miss. LEXIS 2478 (Miss. 1987).

When witness voluntarily took the stand in a perjury trial and testified on behalf of the defendant therein as to the truthfulness of witness’ brother’s statements concerning a murder, to which witness had pled guilty and had been sentenced, witness waived his Fifth Amendment right and was subject to cross-examination on all relevant and material matters. Hentz v. State, 496 So. 2d 668, 1986 Miss. LEXIS 2712 (Miss. 1986).

Requiring witness, who had already pled guilty to the murder, to answer questions concerning that murder did not expose witness to prosecution for the murder and did not infringe upon his Fifth Amendment rights, where the witness’ petition for writ of habeas corpus or, in the alternative, petition to withdraw his guilty plea, came months after the term of court expired wherein he had pled and sentence had been entered. Hentz v. State, 496 So. 2d 668, 1986 Miss. LEXIS 2712 (Miss. 1986).

In prosecution for false pretenses by delivery of a bad check, it was not error for the state to cross-examine a witness who had once been married to defendant and to whom defendant had been furnishing child support. Parker v. State, 484 So. 2d 1033, 1986 Miss. LEXIS 2756 (Miss. 1986).

Code 1942 § 2120 [Code 1972 §13-1-13] does not permit the cross examination of an official charged with embezzlement as to censures by a grand jury. Interior Contractors, Inc. v. Western Waterproofing Co., 233 So. 2d 829, 1970 Miss. LEXIS 1687 (Miss. 1970).

Where the accused had taken the stand as a witness in a prosecution for unlawful possession of a slot machine, he could not complain of being asked whether he had ever sold intoxicating liquor at his place of business wherein the slot machine was found. Brady v. State, 229 Miss. 677, 91 So. 2d 751, 1957 Miss. LEXIS 314 (Miss. 1957).

Where the accused took the stand in prosecution for assault and battery and testified as a witness he necessarily placed his veracity at issue and this justified the state in attacking this veracity. Ables v. State, 223 Miss. 770, 79 So. 2d 241, 1955 Miss. LEXIS 437 (Miss. 1955).

It is only by virtue of this section [Code 1942, § 1693] that defendant’s conviction of former offenses could be inquired into on his cross-examination, and the statute must be strictly construed in favor of defendant. Berry v. State, 212 Miss. 164, 54 So. 2d 222, 1951 Miss. LEXIS 438 (Miss. 1951).

No witness is exempt from right of fair cross-examination. Mississippi Ice & Utilities Co. v. Pearce, 161 Miss. 252, 134 So. 164, 1931 Miss. LEXIS 244 (Miss. 1931).

2. Interest in cause.

Letters written by defendant to relatives and page from manuscript of book about defendant’s life, which expressed defendant’s hostile views toward blacks and civil rights leaders and proclaimed his involvement in the Ku Klux Klan, were relevant to establish defendant’s motive for killing black leader of civil rights organization, and more probative on such issue than prejudicial, especially as there was no evidence that defendant had ever met victim. De La Beckwith v. State, 707 So. 2d 547, 1997 Miss. LEXIS 749 (Miss. 1997), cert. denied, 525 U.S. 880, 119 S. Ct. 187, 142 L. Ed. 2d 153, 1998 U.S. LEXIS 5751 (U.S. 1998).

Testimony of federal agency informant who infiltrated Ku Klux Klan that defendant, a Klan member, discussed “selective killings” as a “partial solution to the right wing’s problem,” and then said that “he would never ask anyone to do anything that he hadn’t already done himself,” was relevant to show that defendant had violent tendencies towards his perceived political and social enemies, and therefore, testimony was admissible in prosecution for murder of black leader of civil rights organization. De La Beckwith v. State, 707 So. 2d 547, 1997 Miss. LEXIS 749 (Miss. 1997), cert. denied, 525 U.S. 880, 119 S. Ct. 187, 142 L. Ed. 2d 153, 1998 U.S. LEXIS 5751 (U.S. 1998).

Impeachment of former police officer through use of officer’s grand jury testimony was not error in murder prosecution; grand jury testimony was transcribed from tape recording, the transcript was provided to the defense, and the tape recording was offered to the defense. De La Beckwith v. State, 707 So. 2d 547, 1997 Miss. LEXIS 749 (Miss. 1997), cert. denied, 525 U.S. 880, 119 S. Ct. 187, 142 L. Ed. 2d 153, 1998 U.S. LEXIS 5751 (U.S. 1998).

Trial court improperly limited defendant’s right to testify and to cross-examine and impeach certain witnesses; trial court did not allow defendant to cross-examine co-indictee concerning his interest and bias in case by showing threats co-indictee made against defendant’s other witnesses; defendant also was prevented from questioning co-indictee regarding possible promises of leniency from prosecution in return for his testimony against defendant; trial court also improperly denied defendant opportunity to present witness to impeach co-indictee’s denial of threats against potential witnesses for defendant, on basis that proper predicate had not been laid for impeachment, where co-indictee had been asked if he threatened witness and he denied it; moreover, trial court sustained objections during co-indictee’s questioning which for all practical purposes prevented laying of full and proper predicate. Hill v. State, 512 So. 2d 883, 1987 Miss. LEXIS 2782 (Miss. 1987).

Counsel is not precluded from seeking in good faith on cross-examination to elicit interest, bias, or prejudice of witness because his answer may reveal that liability insurance company is interested. Mississippi Ice & Utilities Co. v. Pearce, 161 Miss. 252, 134 So. 164, 1931 Miss. LEXIS 244 (Miss. 1931).

3. Conviction of crime.

In a prosecution for sexual battery, the trial court should have granted the defendant’s motion in limine to preclude admission, for impeachment use pursuant to Rule 609, Miss. R. Ev., of his prior conviction of touching a child for lustful purposes, even though a social worker testified that a general characteristic of pedophiles is an inability to be truthful, since admission of the prior conviction would have been manifestly prejudicial and mere reference to the conviction during the trial would have prejudiced the jury irreparably. Hopkins v. State, 639 So. 2d 1247, 1993 Miss. LEXIS 486 (Miss. 1993).

A prior arson conviction might be admissible for impeachment purposes as a crime involving dishonesty or false statement in situations, for example, where the defendant burned a building as part of a scheme to defraud an insurance company. However, where an arson conviction was admitted for impeachment purposes and the prosecution failed to offer prima facie evidence that the arson involved fraud, dishonesty, false statement or other elements suggesting a propensity for lying, the case would be reversed and remanded for a new trial on all issues. McInnis v. State, 527 So. 2d 84, 1988 Miss. LEXIS 248 (Miss. 1988), overruled in part, White v. State, 785 So. 2d 1059, 2001 Miss. LEXIS 44 (Miss. 2001).

The decision whether to give an advance ruling on the admissibility of prior convictions for impeachment purposes is discretionary with the trial judge. McInnis v. State, 527 So. 2d 84, 1988 Miss. LEXIS 248 (Miss. 1988), overruled in part, White v. State, 785 So. 2d 1059, 2001 Miss. LEXIS 44 (Miss. 2001).

In ruling on the admissibility of a prior conviction for impeachment purposes, a trial judge must make a determination that the probative value outweighs the prejudicial effect of the evidence on the record, and should articulate the reasons for his findings. As a framework for articulating the court’s determination on the record, the judge should consider the impeachment value of the crime, the point in time of the conviction and the witness’s subsequent history, the similarity of the past crime and the charged crime, the importance of the defendant’s testimony, and the centrality of the credibility issue. Johnson v. State, 525 So. 2d 809, 1988 Miss. LEXIS 238 (Miss. 1988).

Prosecutor’s question concerning prior conviction, asking whether that crime had involved breaking “in on a little 12-year old girl,” was improper because, while accused who has taken stand on his own behalf may be questioned regarding previous convictions, defendant may not be asked to divulge any details of convictions including whether or not he served time for conviction; asking of question did not constitute reversible error, because upon defense objection, jury was instructed to ignore question and this admonition came before defendant could answer. Williams v. State, 512 So. 2d 666, 1987 Miss. LEXIS 2645 (Miss. 1987).

Police officer who arrests suspect may testify as subsequent trial that arrest was made pursuant to outstanding arrest warrant, where no mention is made of charges upon which warrant is based. Brown v. State, 483 So. 2d 328, 1986 Miss. LEXIS 2372 (Miss. 1986).

Criminal defendant is entitled to cross-examine witnesses upon whom state relies heavily regarding pending criminal charges against witnesses, notwithstanding lack of evidence of bargain between state and witnesses. Hall v. State, 476 So. 2d 26, 1985 Miss. LEXIS 2253 (Miss. 1985).

Defendant charged with armed robbery is denied fair trial by introduction of detail surrounding prior conviction and evidence of other crimes not resulting in convictions; error may be raised on appeal notwithstanding defendant’s failure to object at time of trial where development of inadmissible detail is lengthy and repetitious. Gallion v. State, 469 So. 2d 1247, 1985 Miss. LEXIS 2096 (Miss. 1985).

Prosecutor may not impeach witness by showing that witness’ relatives or acquaintances have prior convictions. Acevedo v. State, 467 So. 2d 220, 1985 Miss. LEXIS 2018 (Miss. 1985).

In a prosecution for burglary, defendant was not entitled to a mistrial based on the prosecution’s failure to prove, by extrinsic evidence the prior convictions of a witness that the prosecution had attempted to introduce to impeach the witness, where the witness either denied or claimed not to remember a number of the incidents referred to, the witness was questioned about 12 specific prior criminal convictions for impeachment purposes, the prosecution recited dates and crimes, no objection to the method of impeachment was made by the defendant, and where defendant’s attorney questioned the witness and then rested. Cummings v. State, 465 So. 2d 993, 1985 Miss. LEXIS 1847 (Miss. 1985).

When prosecution questions, for impeachment purposes, defense witness about specific prior criminal convictions, reciting dates and crimes, and no objection to method of impeachment is made, defendant may not obtain mistrial on basis of assertion that state has failed to prove prior convictions by extrinsic evidence. Cummings v. State, 465 So. 2d 993, 1985 Miss. LEXIS 1847 (Miss. 1985).

Limitation in §99-19-101 on use in sentencing phase of capital case of prior convictions for purpose of establishing aggravating circumstances in no way alters established rule of evidence (§13-1-13) under which defendant who testifies may have credibility impeached by prior convictions, whether misdemeanors or felonies. Mhoon v. State, 464 So. 2d 77, 1985 Miss. LEXIS 1904 (Miss. 1985), limited, Dotson v. Mississippi (Miss. Ct. App. 1996).

Where a witness does not deny a previous conviction but states that he cannot recall the conviction, evidence of the prior conviction may be introduced under §13-1-13. Lovelace v. State, 410 So. 2d 876, 1982 Miss. LEXIS 1875 (Miss. 1982).

Where the defendant took the stand in his own defense, the district attorney had a right to cross-examine him as to his previous criminal convictions. Thornton v. State, 313 So. 2d 16, 1975 Miss. LEXIS 1662 (Miss. 1975).

Evidence of a previous conviction, based on a plea of nolo contendere, is not admissible in another case. Dependents of Veasley v. Attala Co., 312 So. 2d 7, 1975 Miss. LEXIS 1634 (Miss. 1975).

Trial court erred in refusing to allow the defense counsel to ask a prosecution witness if he had ever been convicted of a crime or misdemeanor, and such error was not harmless as the credibility of the witness was the real issue for the jury to determine in the case. Baker v. State, 307 So. 2d 545, 1975 Miss. LEXIS 1819 (Miss. 1975), but see Bevill v. State, 556 So. 2d 699, 1990 Miss. LEXIS 27 (Miss. 1990).

Although the defendant admitted on direct examination that he had been previously convicted of a crime this did not foreclose the prosecution from cross-examining him on this point. Wells v. State, 288 So. 2d 860, 1974 Miss. LEXIS 1877 (Miss. 1974).

It is proper to impeach a witness by showing previous conviction of crimes. Clanton v. State, 279 So. 2d 599, 1973 Miss. LEXIS 1470 (Miss. 1973).

Nothing less than a final judgment, conclusively establishing guilt, will satisfy the meaning of the word “conviction” as used in Code 1942, § 1693. Murphree v. Hudnall, 278 So. 2d 427, 1973 Miss. LEXIS 1441 (Miss. 1973).

Examination of defendant as to other crimes must be limited to convictions and even then the details of the crime cannot be inquired into. Allison v. State, 274 So. 2d 678, 1973 Miss. LEXIS 1609 (Miss. 1973).

Even if defendant’s reputation for peace and violence was properly put in issue when defense counsel in effect inquired into the reputation of the defendant, nevertheless the district attorney went too far a field in attempting to contradict the testimony as to the good reputation of the defendant for peace and violence and to bring out details of crimes for which defendant had not even been indicted, such as 4 other assaults, an incident in which defendant allegedly killed a man, and an incident in which he also killed a baby with a stray shot. Allison v. State, 274 So. 2d 678, 1973 Miss. LEXIS 1609 (Miss. 1973).

In view of the provision in Code 1942, § 8280 to the effect that a person convicted of a traffic offense cannot have his credibility impeached for convictions of such offenses as speeding, driving without proper driver’s license and the like, a person convicted of such offenses cannot be examined with respect thereto under earlier § 1693. Jones v. State, 268 So. 2d 348, 1972 Miss. LEXIS 1198 (Miss. 1972).

The right to cross-examine a defendant with reference to his former convictions in order to impeach or discredit his testimony is limited to the fact that the defendant was convicted and does not include the right to go into the details of the former crime, nor into the punishment given as a result of the conviction. Murray v. State, 266 So. 2d 139, 1972 Miss. LEXIS 1388 (Miss. 1972), cert. denied, 411 U.S. 907, 93 S. Ct. 1534, 36 L. Ed. 2d 196, 1973 U.S. LEXIS 2937 (U.S. 1973).

Where, after the defendant had admitted one previous conviction, and the prosecutor had inferred that the defendant had been absent without official leave and had been convicted of crimes in three different states, the prosecutor responded to the defense statement that if the prosecution had any evidence of other convictions they should produce it in the proper manner, replied before the jury, “I will be glad to produce it,” without thereafter producing a scintilla of evidence of other convictions, prejudicial error was committed. Johns v. State, 255 So. 2d 322, 1971 Miss. LEXIS 1287 (Miss. 1971).

Under this section [Code 1942, § 1693] the state may show that the defendant had been convicted of criminal offenses for the purpose of discrediting him as a witness, provided that the details of the same are not given. Benedetti v. State, 249 So. 2d 671, 1971 Miss. LEXIS 1179 (Miss. 1971).

In a prosecution of a justice of the peace for embezzlement, the district attorney’s cross-examination of the defendant as to the number of times he had been criticized by the grand jury constituted reversible error, since, while the section [Code 1942, § 1693] permits a cross-examination of a defendant as to convictions, it never permits cross-examination as to indictments and certainly not as to censures by the grand jury, which are hearsay in nature and can only be enlisted for the purpose of degrading and prejudicing the defendant in the eyes of the jury. Interior Contractors, Inc. v. Western Waterproofing Co., 233 So. 2d 829, 1970 Miss. LEXIS 1687 (Miss. 1970).

While the district attorney is not permitted to question a defendant about details of prior convictions, where a defendant in response to a question as to prior convictions, testified that he had been convicted of traffic violations and burglary, and that he had been sentenced to the penitentiary and had been released on parole, the district attorney was authorized, by this section [Code 1942, § 1693], to cross-examine the defendant about former offenses not mentioned on direct testimony, which questioning did not extend to details of convictions. Mangrum v. State, 232 So. 2d 703, 1970 Miss. LEXIS 1634 (Miss. 1970).

Exclusion of certificates of conviction of adverse witnesses is not error where they admit having been convicted. Matthews v. State, 243 Miss. 568, 139 So. 2d 386, 1962 Miss. LEXIS 377 (Miss. 1962).

A witness may be questioned only as to conviction, and not as to whether he has been indicted. Statham v. Blaine, 234 Miss. 649, 107 So. 2d 93, 1959 Miss. LEXIS 575 (Miss. 1959).

Where the accused took the stand as a witness in a prosecution for second degree arson, he thereby subjected himself to cross-examination, and made competent his own testimony, or any other admissible evidence, tending to establish his former conviction of crimes. Dorroh v. State, 229 Miss. 315, 90 So. 2d 653, 1956 Miss. LEXIS 611 (Miss. 1956).

Questions to accused concerning his prior convictions were proper under this section [Code 1942, § 1693]. Jones v. State, 228 Miss. 458, 88 So. 2d 91, 1956 Miss. LEXIS 534 (Miss. 1956).

Error of the lower court in permitting the district attorney in prosecution for murder, over objection, to cross-examine the accused in regard to convictions while in the military service and in regard to the type of discharge he received from the military service, was harmless inasmuch as the accused freely and voluntarily confessed to a state of facts making out a clear case of murder and no question was raised in the record as to the confession not being entirely free and voluntary. McNair v. Mississippi, 223 Miss. 83, 77 So. 2d 306, 1955 Miss. LEXIS 356 (Miss. 1955).

In an action by a passenger against an owner of a taxicab for personal injuries, questions as to indictments pending against the passenger would have been improper. Garraga v. Yellow Cab Co., 222 Miss. 739, 77 So. 2d 276, 1955 Miss. LEXIS 658 (Miss. 1955).

In an action by a passenger against owner of a taxicab for injuries sustained where passenger fell out of a moving cab, it was proper cross-examination to ask passenger of convictions for violations of internal revenue laws. Garraga v. Yellow Cab Co., 222 Miss. 739, 77 So. 2d 276, 1955 Miss. LEXIS 658 (Miss. 1955).

At common law a person convicted of most felonies was disqualified as a witness, but the statute removes this disqualification and conviction now may be used to impeach his credibility. Wetzel v. State, 225 Miss. 450, 76 So. 2d 188, 76 So. 2d 194, 76 So. 2d 846, 78 So. 2d 774, 84 So. 2d 429, 1954 Miss. LEXIS 607, 1954 Miss. LEXIS 608, 1955 Miss. LEXIS 601, 1955 Miss. LEXIS 602, 1956 Miss. LEXIS 396, 1957 Miss. LEXIS 583 (Miss. 1957).

In prosecution for murder where the defendant made no objection to prosecutor’s cross-examination of five defense witnesses concerning prior conviction, except as to one question asked the defendant, and that objection was properly sustained and where appellant made no motion for a mistrial, even if there was an error in cross-examination the accused failed to preserve that point on appeal. Wetzel v. State, 225 Miss. 450, 76 So. 2d 188, 76 So. 2d 194, 76 So. 2d 846, 78 So. 2d 774, 84 So. 2d 429, 1954 Miss. LEXIS 607, 1954 Miss. LEXIS 608, 1955 Miss. LEXIS 601, 1955 Miss. LEXIS 602, 1956 Miss. LEXIS 396, 1957 Miss. LEXIS 583 (Miss. 1957).

Examination of a witness touching his conviction of a crime may extend to misdemeanors as well as to infamous crimes and the record of conviction of a misdemeanor is admissible to impeach the veracity of a witness. Breland v. State, 221 Miss. 371, 73 So. 2d 267, 1954 Miss. LEXIS 547 (Miss. 1954).

In a prosecution for unlawful sale of intoxicating liquors, where the accused denied that he was ever convicted of a crime, it was an error to allow admission in evidence of a justice of peace court docket which showed only that the accused was charged with a crime. Breland v. State, 221 Miss. 371, 73 So. 2d 267, 1954 Miss. LEXIS 547 (Miss. 1954).

This section [Code 1942, § 1693] permits a witness to be examined only concerning his conviction of a crime and not concerning its details. Smith v. State, 217 Miss. 123, 63 So. 2d 557, 1953 Miss. LEXIS 416 (Miss. 1953).

In prosecution for assault and battery with intent to kill, defendant’s prior conviction of drunkenness was competent evidence against him when both sides, without objection, entered upon proof of fact whether he was drunk or drinking on night of crime, and defendant took stand as witness, as his prior conviction of crime was competent as bearing upon weight of his testimony and his credibility as witness. Phillips v. State, 43 So. 2d 208 (Miss. 1949).

It is competent for state to question defendant in criminal prosecution in regard to previous convictions of crime when accused has taken witness stand in his own behalf. Scarbrough v. State, 204 Miss. 487, 37 So. 2d 748, 1948 Miss. LEXIS 383 (Miss. 1948).

In criminal prosecution, it is not competent for state, in presenting its case in chief, to prove that defendant has been convicted or is guilty of other crimes wholly disconnected with, and having no direct bearing on, case under investigation. Scarbrough v. State, 204 Miss. 487, 37 So. 2d 748, 1948 Miss. LEXIS 383 (Miss. 1948).

Where the defendant on trial for burglary, in answer to a question on direct examination, stated that he had previously been convicted of wilful trespass, it was prejudicial error for the prosecuting attorney to make further inquiries for the purpose of showing that the conviction had followed withdrawal of a plea of guilty to a greater offense, wholly disconnected with the charge on which defendant was being tried. White v. State, 201 Miss. 556, 29 So. 2d 650, 1947 Miss. LEXIS 419 (Miss. 1947).

Under this section [Code 1942, § 1693], if the defendant, in a murder prosecution, offers himself as a witness, then proof of the fact that he has been previously convicted of a crime, but not the extent of the punishment imposed, would be competent to affect his credibility as a witness. Hartfield v. State, 186 Miss. 75, 189 So. 530, 1939 Miss. LEXIS 220 (Miss. 1939).

Admission, on cross-examination, by party jointly indicted with defendant that, in addition to crime for which he and defendant were being tried, there were indictments pending against him for other offenses, held reversible error where he had not been convicted of those offenses. Graham v. State, 179 So. 340 (Miss. 1938).

Where defendant on cross-examination admitted previous conviction of grand larceny, fact that jurors were informed by further cross-examination that defendant had served penitentiary term held not to warrant reversal. Roney v. State, 167 Miss. 532, 142 So. 475, 1932 Miss. LEXIS 196 (Miss. 1932).

Statute authorizing examination of witness regarding conviction does not permit details of crime to be shown. Walker v. State, 151 Miss. 862, 119 So. 796, 1929 Miss. LEXIS 248 (Miss. 1929).

Witness may be cross-examined as to any and all convictions of crime affecting credibility. Brown v. State, 96 Miss. 534, 51 So. 273, 1910 Miss. LEXIS 168 (Miss. 1910).

Proper to ask one accused of assault with intent to murder if he had been convicted of crime, but not, if he had been confined in penitentiary for cutting white man’s throat. Dodds v. State, 45 So. 863 (Miss. 1908).

Error to ask witness if he had ever been charged with committing an offense; statute allows only question as to conviction. Starling v. State, 89 Miss. 328, 42 So. 798, 1906 Miss. LEXIS 82 (Miss. 1906); McClelland v. State, 98 Miss. 735, 54 So. 251, 1910 Miss. LEXIS 120 (Miss. 1910).

The examination of witnesses may extend to misdemeanors as well as to infamous crimes. Lewis v. State, 85 Miss. 35, 37 So. 497, 1904 Miss. LEXIS 129 (Miss. 1904).

4. Contradiction and impeachment of witness.

Defendant was properly precluded from giving impeachment testimony about taped conversations in which state witness allegedly said that district attorney’s office was threatening to revoke probation if he did not testify, where defendant did not tell counsel about conversations until after witness had been excused, thus preventing the laying of proper predicate for impeachment testimony, where defendant made no objection to release of witness, and where defense counsel did not reveal existence of tape pursuant to discovery requirements when trial commenced the next day, but waited until defendant’s testimony to try to elicit that information. (Per Smith, Justice, with three Justices concurring). Harris v. State, 704 So. 2d 1286, 1997 Miss. LEXIS 47 (Miss.), cert. denied, 522 U.S. 827, 118 S. Ct. 90, 139 L. Ed. 2d 47, 1997 U.S. LEXIS 4857 (U.S. 1997).

A trial judge properly excluded evidence of a state witness’ refusal to talk to defense counsel prior to trial as irrelevant. The witness’ refusal to talk to the attorney was not indicative of a lack of veracity and was not relevant to credibility. Sayles v. State, 552 So. 2d 1383, 1989 Miss. LEXIS 472 (Miss. 1989).

The manufacture, possession or transportation of untaxed liquor is a crime involving dishonesty or false statement under Rule 609(a)(2), Miss. R. Ev., which permits impeachment of a witness’ testimony by evidence of conviction of such a crime. Johnson v. State, 529 So. 2d 577, 1988 Miss. LEXIS 272 (Miss. 1988).

Trial court improperly limited defendant’s right to testify and to cross-examine and impeach certain witnesses; trial court did not allow defendant to cross-examine co-indictee concerning his interest and bias in case by showing threats co-indictee made against defendant’s other witnesses; defendant also was prevented from questioning co-indictee regarding possible promises of leniency from prosecution in return for his testimony against defendant; trial court also improperly denied defendant opportunity to present witness to impeach co-indictee’s denial of threats against potential witnesses for defendant, on basis that proper predicate had not been laid for impeachment, where co-indictee had been asked if he threatened witness and he denied it; moreover, trial court sustained objections during co-indictee’s questioning which for all practical purposes prevented laying of full and proper predicate. Hill v. State, 512 So. 2d 883, 1987 Miss. LEXIS 2782 (Miss. 1987).

Where defendant did not testify at the guilt stage of his murder trial, evidence that defendant was on parole was not admissible for the purpose of impeaching his testimony under this section. Gray v. State, 351 So. 2d 1342, 1977 Miss. LEXIS 1951 (Miss. 1977).

Plea of guilty being tantamount to a conviction for purposes of this statute, the credibility as a witness of defendant in a burglary prosecution could properly be impeached by evidence of his prior plea of guilty in an out of state prosecution for forgery, even though sentence had not been imposed and final judgment had not been entered on that plea. Bridges v. State, 336 So. 2d 1309, 1976 Miss. LEXIS 1554 (Miss. 1976).

In seeking to impeach a prosecution witness, defense counsel could not question the witness as to mere charges of the commission of offenses, especially where such charges were pending and the witness’s testimony might incriminate him. Further, the witness could not be asked nor proof made of the details of an alleged crime said to have been committed by the witness sought to be impeached. Haralson v. State, 314 So. 2d 722, 1975 Miss. LEXIS 1682 (Miss. 1975).

If a defendant denies a former conviction he may be contradicted by the record of such conviction and such evidence goes only to the credibility of the witness. Berry v. State, 212 Miss. 164, 54 So. 2d 222, 1951 Miss. LEXIS 438 (Miss. 1951).

Where witness is sought to be impeached on ground of conviction, details of crime are not admissible, and he cannot be examined as to such details; only fact of conviction is admissible; in seeking to impeach credibility of accused it was error to ask if he had not been convicted of beating wife and child and to contradict denial. Powers v. State, 156 Miss. 316, 126 So. 12, 1930 Miss. LEXIS 173 (Miss. 1930).

Permitting state in murder prosecution to cross-examine husband of deceased as to statements relative to getting divorce and to contradict such testimony in rebuttal held proper. Hardy v. State, 143 Miss. 352, 108 So. 727, 1926 Miss. LEXIS 272 (Miss. 1926).

Person jointly indicted with accused, not on trial but testifying for accused, may be impeached by contradictory statement made by him as to commission of offense. Pickett v. State, 139 Miss. 529, 104 So. 358, 1925 Miss. LEXIS 174 (Miss. 1925).

5. Evidence.

Defendant could present evidence that police officers were biased and prejudiced against him during his direct testimony in armed robbery prosecution, and was not required to show bias during cross-examination of the officers. McLemore v. State, 669 So. 2d 19, 1996 Miss. LEXIS 9 (Miss. 1996).

Before evidence may be received under the other bad acts exception to the primary relevancy rule, the proponent must articulate precisely the evidential hypothesis by which the consequential act may be inferred from the proffered evidence. Houston v. State, 531 So. 2d 598, 1988 Miss. LEXIS 426 (Miss. 1988).

The certified abstract of a court record showing a defendant’s prior conviction was competent evidence of such conviction and was not rendered incompetent by the fact that the abstract included the punishment inflicted for the prior offense. Lovelace v. State, 410 So. 2d 876, 1982 Miss. LEXIS 1875 (Miss. 1982).

In a robbery prosecution against a daughter, who had testified that she had grabbed her mother’s metal box containing money and a pistol and fled to prevent the mother from obtaining the pistol, evidence that on several occasions the mother had shot at members of the accused’s family should have been permitted to go to the jury as tending to show the bias and prejudice of the mother, who was a prosecuting witness, even though it was not part of the res gestae. Hardin v. State, 232 Miss. 470, 99 So. 2d 600, 1958 Miss. LEXIS 294 (Miss. 1958).

Cross examination by district attorney in robbery prosecution of defendant’s witness as to number of times sheriff raided his place and concerning his sales of whisky was incompetent but not reversible error. Ivey v. State, 206 Miss. 734, 40 So. 2d 609, 1949 Miss. LEXIS 297 (Miss. 1949).

Conviction of crime admissible to impeach veracity of witness only after he has denied conviction. Alabama & V. R. Co. v. Thornhill, 106 Miss. 387, 63 So. 674, 1913 Miss. LEXIS 146 (Miss. 1913), overruled, New Orleans & G. N. R. Co. v. Walden, 160 Miss. 102, 133 So. 241, 1931 Miss. LEXIS 158 (Miss. 1931).

It is proper under this section [Code 1942, § 1693] to ask a witness on cross-examination if he had not confessed to having been a convict in the penitentiary, and his answer may be contradicted. The record of such conviction is only necessary where the object is to show conviction, but if the witness is asked for the purpose of discrediting him the question is competent without the production of the record. Jackson v. State, 75 Miss. 145, 21 So. 707, 1897 Miss. LEXIS 92 (Miss. 1897).

The record of a conviction of a misdemeanor is admissible. Helm v. State, 67 Miss. 562, 7 So. 487, 1890 Miss. LEXIS 102 (Miss. 1890).

6. Instructions.

Instruction that interest of witness might be considered not error, though defendant’s wife was his only witness. Jones v. State, 130 Miss. 703, 94 So. 851, 1922 Miss. LEXIS 243 (Miss. 1922).

7. Punishment for contempt.

While undue delay in imposition of punishment for contempt will not be tolerated, withholding imposition of punishment on witness found guilty of direct criminal contempt until the day following the conclusion of the trial did not constitute undue delay. Hentz v. State, 496 So. 2d 668, 1986 Miss. LEXIS 2712 (Miss. 1986).

8. Judgment.

A judgment which simply stated that witness had been found in contempt 27 times for refusing to answer questions, and had been punished for 6 acts, but did not specify the 6 acts, was not sufficiently clear and explicit to warrant Supreme Court to affirm, annul, reverse, or modify it. Hentz v. State, 496 So. 2d 668, 1986 Miss. LEXIS 2712 (Miss. 1986).

While contempt proceeding is summary and the judge may act upon that which he personally knows is direct contempt, the judgment of conviction should contain material facts constituting the contempt, and, in rendering the judgment and making up the record, the causes for contempt should be separately stated so as to constitute res judicata. Hentz v. State, 496 So. 2d 668, 1986 Miss. LEXIS 2712 (Miss. 1986).

RESEARCH REFERENCES

ALR.

Testifying in civil proceeding as waiver of privilege against self-incrimination. 72 A.L.R.2d 830.

Plea of guilty or conviction as resulting in loss of privilege against self-incrimination as to crime in question. 9 A.L.R.3d 990.

Witness’ refusal to testify on ground of self-incrimination as justifying reception of evidence of prior statements or admissions. 43 A.L.R.3d 1413.

Cross-examination of witness as to his mental state or condition, to impeach competency or credibility. 44 A.L.R.3d 1203.

Propriety, on impeaching credibility of witness in civil case by showing former conviction, of questions relating to nature and extent of punishment. 67 A.L.R.3d 761.

Propriety, on impeaching credibility of witness in criminal case by showing former conviction, of questions relating to nature and extent of punishment. 67 A.L.R.3d 775.

Right to impeach credibility of accused by showing prior conviction, as affected by remoteness in time of prior offense. 67 A.L.R.3d 824.

Right to impeach witness in criminal case by inquiry or evidence as to witness’ criminal activity not having resulted in arrest or charge – modern state cases. 24 A.L.R.4th 333.

Use of plea bargain or grant of immunity as improper vouching for credibility of witness – state cases. 58 A.L.R.4th 1229.

Adverse presumption or inference based on party’s failure to produce or examine family member other than spouse – modern cases. 80 A.L.R.4th 337.

Adverse presumption or inference based on party’s failure to produce or examine witness with employment relationship to party – modern cases. 80 A.L.R.4th 405.

Adverse presumption or inference based on state’s failure to produce or examine informant in criminal prosecution – modern cases. 80 A.L.R.4th 547.

Requirement that defendant in state court testify in order to preserve alleged trial error in rulings on admissibility of prior conviction impeachment evidence under Uniform Rule of Evidence 609, or similar provision or holding – post-Luce cases. 80 A.L.R.4th 1028.

Adverse presumption or inference based on state’s failure to produce or examine law enforcement personnel – modern cases. 81 A.L.R.4th 872.

Adverse presumption or inference based on party’s failure to produce or examine transferor, transferee, broker, or other person allegedly involved in transaction at issue – modern cases. 81 A.L.R.4th 939.

Permissibility of testimony by telephone in state trial. 85 A.L.R.4th 476.

Propriety of using prior conviction for drug dealing to impeach witness in criminal trial. 37 A.L.R.5th 319.

Requirement that court advise accused of, and make inquiry with respect to, waiver of right to testify. 72 A.L.R.5th 403.

Propriety under Rule 403 of the Federal Rules of Evidence, permitting exclusion of relevant evidence on grounds of prejudice, confusion, or waste of time, of attack on credibility of witness for party. 48 A.L.R. Fed. 390.

Am. Jur.

81 Am. Jur. 2d (Rev), Witnesses §§ 743 et seq., 796 et seq.

3 Am. Jur. Proof of Facts, Conviction of Crime, Proof No. 1 (cross-examination concerning previous conviction).

3 Am. Jur. Proof of Facts, Conviction of Crime, Proof No. 2 (introduction of record after denial of previous conviction).

36 Am. Jur. Proof of Facts 2d 747, Impeachment of Witness by Prior Criminal Conviction.

6 Am. Jur. Trials, Cross-Examination of Defendant, §§ 17 et seq.

6 Am. Jur. Trials, Cross-Examination of Plaintiff and Plaintiff’s Witnesses, §§ 26 et seq.

CJS.

31A C.J.S., Evidence §§ 891–897, 922.

98 C.J.S., Witnesses §§ 244, 247 et seq.

Law Reviews.

1982 Mississippi Supreme Court Review: Criminal Law and Procedure: Rape. 53 Miss. L. J. 149, March 1983.

JUDICIAL DECISIONS

1. Validity.

2. Construction and application, generally.

3. What constitutes doing business within state.

4. Non-resident heirs of alleged tortfeasor.

5. Illustrative cases.

1. Validity.

Dismissal of the insured’s action against her insurer in Mississippi for bad faith was improper where there was no personal or subject matter jurisdiction over the insurer, Miss. Code Ann. §13-3-57; the only connection Mississippi had to the lawsuit was that the car accident occurred in Mississippi and the lawsuit was not about the accident. Hogrobrooks v. Progressive Direct, 858 So. 2d 913, 2003 Miss. App. LEXIS 1029 (Miss. Ct. App. 2003).

The long-arm statute was clearly enacted for the benefit of residents only, and it has not been expanded through the process of judicial interpretation to include nonresident plaintiffs not qualified to do business within the state; there is no defect under federal constitutional standards for limiting the long-arm statute to resident plaintiffs, since the state is not obligated to make its courts available to nonresidents, who themselves are not doing business in the state, to sue other nonresidents. American International Pictures, Inc. v. Morgan, 371 F. Supp. 528, 1974 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 12866 (N.D. Miss. 1974).

This section [Code 1942, § 1437] and Code 1942, § 8072 do not violate the due process clause of the Constitution of the United States. Jarrard Motors, Inc. v. Jackson Auto & Supply Co., 237 Miss. 660, 115 So. 2d 309, 1959 Miss. LEXIS 517 (Miss. 1959).

If a nonresident is doing such business in the state as would subject him to the jurisdiction of the court and such business is of such nature that it is hazardous or subject to the police powers of the state to be regulated, and the cause of action grows out of such business so done, then the substituted service is good and the statute is constitutional. Davis v. Nugent, 90 F. Supp. 522, 1950 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 3816 (D. Miss. 1950).

There is no denial of due process under the 14th Amendment of the United States Constitution in extending this section [Code 1942, § 1437] to contract, as well as to tort actions, arising out of business or acts done within state. Davis-Wood Lumber Co. v. Ladner, 210 Miss. 863, 50 So. 2d 615, 1951 Miss. LEXIS 322 (Miss. 1951).

Nonresident who engages in business in this state which is subject to state control is subject to suit for damages in this state on cause of action accruing here out of business transacted in this state and is properly brought into court by service of process upon secretary of state in manner provided by Code 1942, § 1438, and statutes so providing do not violate due process or immunities and privileges clauses of federal constitution. Condon v. Snipes, 205 Miss. 306, 38 So. 2d 752, 1949 Miss. LEXIS 433 (Miss. 1949).

This statute, as applied to a corporate citizen of another state engaged in levy construction work of large proportions in Mississippi employing many men to operate trucks and other heavy and cumbersome machinery and equipment, is not unconstitutional as denying defendant equal protection of the law, due process of law, or privileges and immunities afforded to residents, or as burdening interstate commerce. Sugg v. Hendrix, 142 F.2d 740, 1944 U.S. App. LEXIS 3496 (5th Cir. Miss. 1944).

Power of state to confer jurisdiction on courts over individual nonresidents by substituted service depends upon whether such enabling statute is a reasonable exercise of the state’s police power to regulate the business of such nonresident, and if the regulation is one for the protection of health, safety and welfare of those within its borders, rather than a mere attempt to extend the jurisdiction of its courts over citizens beyond its borders, the state may properly legislate to that end. Sugg v. Hendrix, 142 F.2d 740, 1944 U.S. App. LEXIS 3496 (5th Cir. Miss. 1944).

2. Construction and application, generally.

After an employee was terminated, and his employers refused to reimburse his expenses, the court did not have personal jurisdiction over the individuals working for the employer as the employee alleged no facts supporting the individuals’ involvement in his tort claims. Smith v. Antler Insanity, LLC, 58 F. Supp. 3d 716, 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 152484 (S.D. Miss. 2014).

In a breach of contract and tortious inference with business relations case that was removed to federal court pursuant to 28 U.S.C.S. § 1446 and in which the court accepted as true a Mississippi company’s assertion that it and a foreign company contemplated that the contract would be performed in part in Mississippi and that the contract was in fact performed in part in Mississippi, the district court had no difficulty concluding that Mississippi’s long-arm statute, Miss. Code Ann. §13-3-57, was satisfied; since the district court also found that the requirements of due process were met, the foreign company’s Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(2) motion to dismiss was denied. Barbour Int'l, Inc. v. Permasteel, Inc., 507 F. Supp. 2d 602, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 56518 (S.D. Miss. 2007).

In a matter arising out of a high speed chase, which allegedly resulted in decedents’ deaths, neither an Alabama county or that county’s sheriff from Alabama entered upon the highways of Mississippi, involving themselves in efforts to stop the fleeing felons, or in any other way subjected themselves to jurisdiction under Miss. Code Ann. §13-3-63; therefore, the supreme court proceeded with a long-arm analysis to determine if jurisdiction could be conferred upon them under the Mississippi long-arm statute, Miss. Code Ann. §13-3-57, and the supreme court found no minimum contacts, so the county and the sheriff were not subject to personal jurisdiction in Mississippi. City of Cherokee v. Parsons, 944 So. 2d 886, 2006 Miss. LEXIS 583 (Miss. 2006).

To establish the “contract” prong of the Mississippi long-arm statute, Miss. Code Ann. §13-3-57, a plaintiff must show that a nonresident defendant entered into a contract with the plaintiff which has been, or is to be, performed, at least in part, in Mississippi. Durham v. Katzman, 375 F. Supp. 2d 495, 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 17847 (S.D. Miss. 2005).

Trial court erred in denying New York commuter van company’s motion to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction under Miss. R. Civ. P. 12(b) in the Mississippi residents’ wrongful death action that arose following an auto accident that occurred in New York because, although the van company was not qualified to do business in Mississippi and, therefore, met the threshold requirement for coverage by the long-arm statute, Miss. Rev. Stat. §13-3-57, there was no evidence in the record to demonstrate that the van company’s actions had brought it under either the contract, tort, or “doing business in” provisions of the long-arm statute. Rockaway Commuter Line, Inc. v. Denham, 897 So. 2d 156, 2004 Miss. LEXIS 1325 (Miss. 2004).

Defendants, by demonstrating that the individuals’ claims against the non-diverse defendants were time-barred, sustained their burden of showing that no reasonable possibility of recovery existed against the non-diverse defendants on the claims raised in the individuals’ original complaint; while the individuals argued that their claims were not time-barred because defendants’ fraudulent concealment tolled the statute of limitations, they were unable to support their fraudulent concealment claim. Thus, the individuals’ motion to remand was denied. White v. City Fin. Co., 277 F. Supp. 2d 646, 2003 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 14205 (S.D. Miss. 2003).

The contract prong of the long-arm statute was satisfied by the allegations of breach of implied warranty of merchantability and the breach of implied warranty of fitness for a particular purpose claims where at least part of the warranty work was performed in the forum state; the misrepresentation claim against the manufacturer was sufficient to support jurisdiction under the tort prong of the long-arm statute because the materials and a representative were sent to the forum state. Jones v. Tread Rubber Corp., 199 F. Supp. 2d 539, 2002 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 9102 (S.D. Miss. 2002).

In an action arising from a contract under which the plaintiff was to sell 80 percent of its oil and gas working interest in an oil and gas field, the plaintiff set out a prima facie case for personal jurisdiction under the contract prong of the statute and, therefore, the district court erred in dismissing the defendant for lack of personal jurisdiction where the plaintiff argued that a codefendant entered into a contract with the plaintiff on behalf of itself and the defendant, which financed and purchased 75 percent of the 80 percent working interest in the oil and gas field. Stripling v. Jordan Prod. Co., 234 F.3d 863, 2000 U.S. App. LEXIS 29871 (5th Cir. Miss. 2000).

The defendant was subject to personal jurisdiction within Mississippi in an action for libel and slander where the plaintiff alleged that the defendant published the alleged defamatory information complained of on the Internet and allowed access and publication within Mississippi and among Mississippi residents. Lofton v. Turbine Design, Inc., 100 F. Supp. 2d 404, 2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 4593 (N.D. Miss. 2000).

The defendants were subject to personal jurisdiction in an action for breach of a contract regarding a distribution agreement where part of the contract required the plaintiff to perform acts in Mississippi and where the plaintiff also alleged, with evidentiary support, that the defendants committed various torts at least in part in Mississippi which resulted in injury to the plaintiff and that the defendants were engaged in doing business in Mississippi. Genesis Press, Inc. v. Carol Publ. Group, Inc., 2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 4595 (N.D. Miss. Mar. 30, 2000).

The parties did not enter into a contract to be performed in whole or in part by any party in Mississippi where the defendant agreed to provide certain land accommodations in Greece and round-trip airfare from New York to Greece, but did not agree to deliver air tickets to the plaintiffs in Mississippi. Christian Tours, Inc. v. Homeric Tours, Inc., 2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 4594 (N.D. Miss. Mar. 30, 2000), aff'd, 239 F.3d 366, 2000 U.S. App. LEXIS 30099 (5th Cir. Miss. 2000).

A contract between the plaintiff Mississippi corporation and the defendant Tennessee corporation involving the purchase of the defendant’s assets required actions in Mississippi, and therefore, the defendant fell under the broad reach of the Mississippi long-arm statute. Willowbrook Found., Inc. v. Visiting Nurse Ass'n, 87 F. Supp. 2d 629, 2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 2105 (N.D. Miss. 2000).

Where resident plaintiffs alleged, with evidentiary support, that the defendants committed the torts of defamation and tortious interference with business relations, at least in part, through their activities in Mississippi, such was sufficient to establish a prima facie case of personal jurisdiction under the tort prong of the statute. Wells v. Taylor, 1999 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 17891 (N.D. Miss. Oct. 25, 1999).

The defendant Arkansas corporation was not subject to personal jurisdiction under the Mississippi long-arm statute where the defendant had limited contact with Mississippi, such contacts were sporadic, incidental and indirectly associated with the forum, and the defendant did not and had not conducted business in Mississippi. Thrash Aviation, Inc. v. Kelner Turbine, Inc., 72 F. Supp. 2d 709, 1999 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 17788 (S.D. Miss. 1999).

Under tort prong of Mississippi long-arm statute, personal jurisdiction is proper if any element of tort (or any part of any element) takes place in Mississippi. Allred v. Moore & Peterson, 117 F.3d 278, 1997 U.S. App. LEXIS 18148 (5th Cir. Miss. 1997), cert. denied, 522 U.S. 1048, 118 S. Ct. 691, 139 L. Ed. 2d 637, 1998 U.S. LEXIS 71 (U.S. 1998).

Under Mississippi law, malicious prosecution requires institution or continuation of original judicial proceedings, either criminal or civil; by, or at instance of defendants; termination of such proceedings in plaintiff’s favor; malice in instituting proceedings; want of probable cause in proceedings; and suffering of damages as result of action or prosecution complained of. Allred v. Moore & Peterson, 117 F.3d 278, 1997 U.S. App. LEXIS 18148 (5th Cir. Miss. 1997), cert. denied, 522 U.S. 1048, 118 S. Ct. 691, 139 L. Ed. 2d 637, 1998 U.S. LEXIS 71 (U.S. 1998).

Suffering of damages within state from alleged malicious prosecution was insufficient, without more, to support personal jurisdiction under tort prong of Mississippi long-arm statute. Allred v. Moore & Peterson, 117 F.3d 278, 1997 U.S. App. LEXIS 18148 (5th Cir. Miss. 1997), cert. denied, 522 U.S. 1048, 118 S. Ct. 691, 139 L. Ed. 2d 637, 1998 U.S. LEXIS 71 (U.S. 1998).

For purposes of Mississippi long-arm statute, injury suffered in malicious prosecution tort is institution of criminal or civil proceedings where institution ought not to have occurred (and occurred for an improper reason); Mississippi does not permit damages to serve as a proxy for injury in personal jurisdiction calculus. Allred v. Moore & Peterson, 117 F.3d 278, 1997 U.S. App. LEXIS 18148 (5th Cir. Miss. 1997), cert. denied, 522 U.S. 1048, 118 S. Ct. 691, 139 L. Ed. 2d 637, 1998 U.S. LEXIS 71 (U.S. 1998).

Service of process by certified mail from out of state, apart from actual filing of suit, was not basis for malicious prosecution claim and could not support exercise of personal jurisdiction under tort prong of Mississippi long-arm statute. Allred v. Moore & Peterson, 117 F.3d 278, 1997 U.S. App. LEXIS 18148 (5th Cir. Miss. 1997), cert. denied, 522 U.S. 1048, 118 S. Ct. 691, 139 L. Ed. 2d 637, 1998 U.S. LEXIS 71 (U.S. 1998).

In a medical malpractice action against a Tennessee hospital and its emergency room personnel arising from the death of a patient who was to be transported from Mississippi to the hospital, neither the contract nor the doing business prong of the long-arm statute (§13-3-57) was available to the plaintiff as a means of acquiring jurisdiction over the hospital where the plaintiff was a nonresident of Mississippi. Cowart v. Shelby County Health Care Corp., 911 F. Supp. 248, 1996 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 579 (S.D. Miss. 1996).

In a medical malpractice action against a Tennessee hospital and its emergency room personnel arising from the death of a patient who was allegedly treated with inappropriate medication while being transported from a Mississippi hospital to the hospital in Tennessee, the plaintiff made a prima facie showing of jurisdiction over the Tennessee hospital pursuant to §13-3-57 for the alleged actions of an emergency room physician who agreed to accept the transfer. Cowart v. Shelby County Health Care Corp., 911 F. Supp. 248, 1996 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 579 (S.D. Miss. 1996).

In an action by a Mississippi plaintiff alleging various torts arising from a Missouri defendant’s repair and replacement of the plaintiff’s diesel engines, the defendant was not subject to personal jurisdiction in Mississippi, although the tort prong of Mississippi’s long arm statute (§13-3-57) applied because the engines malfunctioned in Mississippi, where, inter alia, the defendant was not qualified to do business in Mississippi, had never done business in Mississippi, owned no property in Mississippi, had no place of business in Mississippi, did not advertise or sell products in Mississippi, and was careful to protect its distribution agreement, which forbid it from providing any sales and services outside Kansas and part of Missouri; exercise of jurisdiction under the long-arm statute would not comport with the dictates of Fourteenth Amendment. Fava Custom Applicators v. Cummins Mid-America, 907 F. Supp. 224, 1995 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 18797 (N.D. Miss. 1995).

A foreign defendant was not amenable to suit under the “contract” provision of Mississippi’s long-arm statute (§13-3-57) where the final version of the contract was signed in Louisiana, the parties never contemplated that the contract would be performed in whole or in part in Mississippi, and the work under the contract was actually performed in Algeria; the fact that the plaintiff flew to the job site in Algeria from Mississippi did not render his travel from Mississippi equivalent to part performance in Mississippi. Peterson v. Test Int'l, E.C., 904 F. Supp. 574, 1995 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 17100 (S.D. Miss. 1995).

In an action for alleged interference with an employment contract, a foreign defendant was not amenable to suit under the “tort” provision of Mississippi’s long-arm statute (§13-3-57) where the plaintiff was hired to provide services in Algeria, and the alleged injury occurred in Algeria (where the plaintiff was terminated); the fact that the plaintiff, as a Mississippi resident, might have suffered adverse economic consequences in Mississippi from his termination in Algeria did not recategorize the tort as occurring “in whole or in part” in Mississippi. Peterson v. Test Int'l, E.C., 904 F. Supp. 574, 1995 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 17100 (S.D. Miss. 1995).

In a personal injury action by a Mississippi plaintiff arising from an automobile accident that occurred in Tennessee, the nonresident defendant’s consummation of an agreement to breed her dog in Mississippi, and her installation of a telephone line at a friend’s home in Mississippi when she briefly stayed there, were insufficient to meet the “contract” prong of the Mississippi long arm statute (§13-3-57) where the Tennessee automobile accident was unrelated to the contracts performed by the defendant in Mississippi. McLaurin v. Nazar, 883 F. Supp. 112, 1995 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 5550 (N.D. Miss.), aff'd, 71 F.3d 878, 1995 U.S. App. LEXIS 36819 (5th Cir. Miss. 1995).

In an action for an alleged breach of an agreement to purchase shares of stock in a coal mining company located in Kentucky, the requirements of the Mississippi long-arm statute (§13-3-57) were met as to the Kentucky defendants where all parties had duties of performance in Mississippi under the sale and escrow agreements, and negotiations conducted by one defendant by telephone or facsimile to Mississippi were made on behalf of both defendants. First Miss. Corp. v. Thunderbird Energy, 876 F. Supp. 840, 1995 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 1875 (S.D. Miss. 1995).

In an action by a Mississippi insurer against an Alabama resident and his Alabama attorney for breach of a settlement agreement arising out of a medical malpractice action, the defendants were subject to jurisdiction under Mississippi’s long-arm statute (§13-3-57), although the defendants received and cashed the settlement check in Alabama, and executed (and altered) the release document in Alabama, where the parties negotiated and ultimately entered the settlement agreement with the Mississippi insurance company in Mississippi, the settlement check was sent from Mississippi and ultimately paid by a Mississippi bank, and the release was sent to the defendants from Mississippi and was to be returned to Mississippi. Medical Assurance Co. v. Jackson, 864 F. Supp. 576, 1994 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 14703 (S.D. Miss. 1994).

A nonresident defendant must do more than merely place its product in the “stream of commerce” before its actions will be deemed “purposefully directed” at Mississippi for purposes of due process analysis. Sorrells v. R & R Custom Coach Works, 636 So. 2d 668, 1994 Miss. LEXIS 240 (Miss. 1994).

A nonresident manufacturer’s placement of its product into the stream of commerce did not constitute an act “purposefully directed” toward Mississippi where there was no evidence of any activity by the manufacturer indicative of an intent to serve the Mississippi market; thus, the limitations of the due process clause prevented utilization of §13-3-57 to gain personal jurisdiction over the manufacturer. Sorrells v. R & R Custom Coach Works, 636 So. 2d 668, 1994 Miss. LEXIS 240 (Miss. 1994).

In an action against a nonresident church and archdiocese, alleging that a priest engaged in homosexual activity with the plaintiff at homes in Mississippi and that church officials knew that the plaintiff was staying overnight with the priest, and should have known that homosexual activity would occur, personal jurisdiction did not exist over the church and archdiocese under the Mississippi long-arm statute (§13-3-57), since the plaintiff failed to prove a prima facie case on which jurisdiction was based predicated on theories of respondeat superior, negligent hiring, or negligent supervision. Tichenor v. Roman Catholic Church, 869 F. Supp. 429, 1993 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 20435 (E.D. La. 1993).

Long-arm statute could not be used as basis for obtaining personal jurisdiction in product liability action brought against non-resident defendants who were doing business in Mississippi and who were licensed as automobile manufacturers or dealers under Mississippi Motor Vehicle Commission Law, where defendants were not registered to do business in Mississippi, automobile accident which gave rise to action occurred in another state, and action was brought by non-resident plaintiffs. Herrley v. Volkswagen of America, Inc., 957 F.2d 216, 1992 U.S. App. LEXIS 6167 (5th Cir. Miss. 1992).

A Louisiana railroad corporation which was not qualified to do business in Mississippi was not amenable to suit in Mississippi under §13-3-57 where neither the plaintiff nor the accident giving rise to the action had any connection with Mississippi or with any business conducted by the railroad corporation in Mississippi. Southern Pacific Transp. Co. v. Fox, 609 So. 2d 357, 1992 Miss. LEXIS 421 (Miss. 1992).

Personal jurisdiction could be exercised over a nonresident putative father in a paternity and support action where the nonresident had been present in the state as a student at a state university, he had sexual relations with the mother in the state, and he had subsequently failed to support the child who resided in the state. Jones v. Chandler, 592 So. 2d 966, 1991 Miss. LEXIS 984 (Miss. 1991).

“Doing business” prong of long-arm statute may not be utilized by nonresident plaintiff. Madison v. Revlon, Inc., 789 F. Supp. 758, 1991 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 20080 (S.D. Miss. 1991).

In action, brought by truck driver who was injured when rubber strap broke as driver was attempting to attach it to tarp, against Ohio manufacturer of strap which sold strap to Alabama company which in turn sold it to plaintiff’s employee, evidence failed to establish that part of tort occurred in Mississippi for purposes of determining whether personal jurisdiction could be asserted there over Ohio manufacturer; although plaintiff made products liability allegation that he received box containing allegedly defective straps from his employer in Mississippi, plaintiff did not attempt to use strap until he reached Oklahoma, injury occurred in Oklahoma, none of manufacturer’s actions were directed towards Mississippi, and none of alleged acts took place in Mississippi. Yates v. Turzin, 786 F. Supp. 594, 1991 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 20499 (S.D. Miss. 1991).

In action, brought by truck driver injured when rubber strap broke as he attempted to attach it to tarp, against Ohio manufacturer of strap which sold strap to Alabama company which in turn sold it to plaintiff’s employer, evidence failed to establish sufficient basis to subject manufacturer to long-arm jurisdiction on theory of strict tort liability, notwithstanding that manufacturer was sufficiently engaged in business of selling rubber strap to be considered “seller,” as none of manufacturer’s sales activities or solicitations took place in or were directed towards Mississippi. Yates v. Turzin, 786 F. Supp. 594, 1991 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 20499 (S.D. Miss. 1991).

Non-resident plaintiff may not use “doing business” prong of long-arm statute to obtain in personam jurisdiction over non-resident defendant. Prince v. F. Hoffmann-La Roche & Co., 780 F. Supp. 417, 1991 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 18821 (S.D. Miss. 1991).

Assuming it was otherwise available to plaintiff, Mississippi statute providing that non-resident corporations found doing business in Mississippi would be subject to suit in state to same extent as domestic corporations, regardless of whether cause of action accrued within or outside of state, did not provide statutory basis for assertion of personal jurisdiction over nonresident corporation in personal injury action by nonresident plaintiff, where Mississippi long-arm statute would not allow that result. Prince v. F. Hoffmann-La Roche & Co., 780 F. Supp. 417, 1991 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 18821 (S.D. Miss. 1991).

Nonresident defendant is amenable to personal jurisdiction in federal diversity case to extent permitted by state court in state in which federal court sits. Falco Lime, Inc. v. Tide Towing Co., 779 F. Supp. 58, 1991 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 17756 (N.D. Miss. 1991).

Under particular facts, it would not be unfair or offend due process for Mississippi court to exercise jurisdiction in suit by Mississippi corporation against Illinois corporation which had agreed to move Mississippi corporation’s barges which had become stranded in river; defendant’s activities in Mississippi were such that it could reasonably foresee being hailed into court in Mississippi. Falco Lime, Inc. v. Tide Towing Co., 779 F. Supp. 58, 1991 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 17756 (N.D. Miss. 1991).

In determining whether exercise of long arm jurisdiction under state statute comports with due process requirements, court must determine whether defendant has established sufficient contacts with forum state indicating purposeful availment of privilege of conducting activities within forum and thereby invoking benefits and protection of its laws, with focus of inquiry at this stage being upon nature of underlying litigation. Falco Lime, Inc. v. Tide Towing Co., 779 F. Supp. 58, 1991 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 17756 (N.D. Miss. 1991).

Extent of jurisdiction of federal court over nonresident defendant depends on whether defendant is amenable to service of process under forum state’s long arm statute and whether such exercise of jurisdiction would comport with dictates of due process. Falco Lime, Inc. v. Tide Towing Co., 779 F. Supp. 58, 1991 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 17756 (N.D. Miss. 1991).

In deciding whether federal court sitting in diversity has jurisdiction over nonresident defendant, reach of long arm statute should be determined before considering whether exercise of jurisdiction would comport with due process, for if service was defective under state statute, constitutional issue should not even be considered. Falco Lime, Inc. v. Tide Towing Co., 779 F. Supp. 58, 1991 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 17756 (N.D. Miss. 1991).

State’s long-arm statute relating to tort actions did not authorize jurisdiction over foreign corporation which had entered into charter agreement with Mississippi corporation seeking damages for loss of use of barges which allegedly went aground as result of Illinois corporation’s negligence in maintaining and operating tug. Falco Lime, Inc. v. Tide Towing Co., 779 F. Supp. 58, 1991 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 17756 (N.D. Miss. 1991).

Mississippi’s long arm statute’s contract provision served to confer personal jurisdiction over Illinois corporation which had entered into charter agreement with Mississippi corporation seeking damages for loss of use of barges which allegedly ran aground as result of Illinois corporation’s negligent maintenance and operation of tug. Falco Lime, Inc. v. Tide Towing Co., 779 F. Supp. 58, 1991 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 17756 (N.D. Miss. 1991).

In order for “tort” prong of long-arm statute to apply, at least some part of tort must have been committed within Mississippi. Murray v. Remington Arms Co., 795 F. Supp. 805, 1991 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 20550 (S.D. Miss. 1991).

In products liability action brought against defendant manufacturer of rifle, tort provision of long-arm statute would not form basis for jurisdiction over nonresident manufacturer where allegations are that injuries to various plaintiffs occurred in Texas, Washington, and Canada. Murray v. Remington Arms Co., 795 F. Supp. 805, 1991 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 20550 (S.D. Miss. 1991).

Nonresident plaintiffs may not utilize “doing business” provision of long-arm statute to obtain jurisdiction over nonresident defendant. Murray v. Remington Arms Co., 795 F. Supp. 805, 1991 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 20550 (S.D. Miss. 1991).

In products liability action, nonresident plaintiffs could not use “doing business” provision of long-arm statute to obtain personal jurisdiction over nonresident defendant manufacturer, even if court considered as true, for purposes of litigation, assertion that defendant manufacturer was alter ego of co-defendant, its parent corporation, which had registered agent in state and had not challenged personal jurisdiction; there was no Mississippi law to support intended use of alter ego theory to impute residency of parent corporation to subsidiary. Murray v. Remington Arms Co., 795 F. Supp. 805, 1991 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 20550 (S.D. Miss. 1991).

Nonresidents may not utilize “doing business” provision of long-arm statute to invoke jurisdiction in Mississippi over foreign corporation. Ferry v. Langston Corp., 792 F. Supp. 512, 1990 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 20053 (S.D. Miss. 1990).

For defendant to be amenable to process under “doing business” provision of long-arm statute, there must be nexus between defendant’s activities in Mississippi and plaintiff’s cause of action; however, there is no requirement that there be direct relation or nexus between the two, claim must merely be “incident to” such business. Ferry v. Langston Corp., 792 F. Supp. 512, 1990 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 20053 (S.D. Miss. 1990).

There was no sufficient connection, to form basis for long-arm jurisdiction, between defendant manufacturer’s business activity in Mississippi and injury sustained by plaintiffs’ deceased by machine manufactured by defendant, where defendant was New Jersey corporation which sold machine to deceased’s employer in Louisiana, deceased had lived and worked in Louisiana, and plaintiffs resided in Louisiana; all that appeared from submissions to court was that defendant sold equipment in interstate commerce and had sold equipment which was distributed to Mississippi purchasers. Ferry v. Langston Corp., 792 F. Supp. 512, 1990 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 20053 (S.D. Miss. 1990).

Nonresident of state of Mississippi may not utilize “doing business” provision of long-arm statute as basis for jurisdiction over foreign corporation in Mississippi. Bailiff v. Manville Forest Products Corp., 792 F. Supp. 509, 1990 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 20052 (S.D. Miss. 1990).

Personal jurisdiction would not lie, over nonresident manufacturer, under long-arm statute or under due process clause, where manufacturer was organized or existed under laws of Federal Republic of Germany, was not qualified to do business in Mississippi, had no real estate, personal property, bank accounts, or other property in state, had never entered into contract to be performed within state, and had never performed any act which had or could have had effect within state. Bailiff v. Manville Forest Products Corp., 792 F. Supp. 509, 1990 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 20052 (S.D. Miss. 1990).

Mississippi long-arm statute allows for assertion of jurisdiction over person of nonresident defendant who makes contract with resident of Mississippi to be performed in whole or in part, by either party, within Mississippi; or who commits tort in whole or in part in Mississippi; or who does any business or performs any character of work or service in state. Bailiff v. Manville Forest Products Corp., 792 F. Supp. 509, 1990 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 20052 (S.D. Miss. 1990).

In action brought by California residents against asbestos products manufacturers alleging damages as result of presence of asbestos-containing materials in buildings located outside Mississippi, claims for fraud and conspiracy accrued at time of sale of products, which was before 1980 when §13-3-57 was amended, thus District Court in Mississippi lacked jurisdiction under tort prong of statute. Black v. Carey Canada, Inc., 791 F. Supp. 1120, 1990 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 20087 (S.D. Miss. 1990).

Sale of asbestos-containing products in Mississippi and alleged misrepresentation by defendant manufacturers as to consequences of exposure of such products did not subject defendants to service of process under tort provisions of §13-3-57; otherwise all manufacturers who commit mass torts would be subject to service of process under tort provisions of statute, which would swallow all restrictions placed on long-arm statute. Black v. Carey Canada, Inc., 791 F. Supp. 1120, 1990 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 20087 (S.D. Miss. 1990).

In order for jurisdiction to have been proper as to defendants who owned a weekend home in Mississippi but whose “usual place of abode” was in Louisiana, service of process should have been made pursuant to Mississippi’s long-arm statute, since the defendants owned real property in Mississippi, and thus had taken advantage of the laws of Mississippi and the protections afforded under such laws. Alpaugh v. Moore, 568 So. 2d 291, 1990 Miss. LEXIS 606 (Miss. 1990).

A court had personal jurisdiction over a former Mississippi resident in an action brought by his former wife who alleged that she incurred $5,000 in debts by reason of his desertion, where the allegations included a debt incurred in Mississippi by reason of the former husband’s conduct in Mississippi. Petters v. Petters, 560 So. 2d 722, 1990 Miss. LEXIS 201 (Miss. 1990).

By virtue of the supremacy clause, the Federal Uniformed Services Former Spouses’ Protection Act overrides Mississippi’s long-arm statutes to the extent that Mississippi law would exceed the limitations of the federal enactment. Thus, a former husband’s absence from Mississippi for 15 continuous years precluded personal jurisdiction by reason of residence or domicile since the language of the federal Act makes it clear that only current domicile or residence may suffice to confer authority upon a court to adjudge rights in a former service person’s military retirement pension. Petters v. Petters, 560 So. 2d 722, 1990 Miss. LEXIS 201 (Miss. 1990).

Mississippi long-arm statute could not bring owners of trucking company located and primarily doing business in Nevada and Colorado into court in Mississippi where only contacts between defendants and Mississippi were permit to carry property through the state and purchase of operating authorities permitting shipment into Mississippi. Cycles, Ltd. v. W.J. Digby, Inc., 889 F.2d 612, 1989 U.S. App. LEXIS 18373 (5th Cir. Miss. 1989).

The “doing-business” provision of Mississippi’s long-arm statute may not be used by nonresident plaintiffs to bring nonresident defendants into court in the state; even residents must establish a nexus between plaintiff’s cause of action and defendant’s in-state business contacts to use such long-arm provision. Mills v. Dieco, Inc., 722 F. Supp. 296, 1989 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 12349 (N.D. Miss. 1989).

Section 13-3-57 requires no direct nexus to the non-resident’s business done in Mississippi, but requires only that the claim be incident thereto. The statute thus requires far less than that the liability generating conduct have occurred in Mississippi. There is no constitutional imperative that the action arise out of the non-resident defendant’s contacts/activities in this state. All that is required is that the non-resident defendant have continuous and systematic general contacts with Mississippi. These contacts must amount to something more than occasional “fortuitous” instances where the defendant had in the past come into some casual, isolated contact with an in-state resident. McDaniel v. Ritter, 556 So. 2d 303, 1989 Miss. LEXIS 501 (Miss. 1989).

An airline passenger’s personal representatives’ claim against the estate of an airline pilot arose out of facts sufficiently incident to business done by the pilot in Mississippi that the pilot’s estate was amenable to suit in Mississippi under §13-3-57 where the pilot and the passenger were employees of a Mississippi corporation which had an office in Mississippi, and the airplane crash which gave rise to the passenger’s claim occurred during a trip made on behalf of the corporation. McDaniel v. Ritter, 556 So. 2d 303, 1989 Miss. LEXIS 501 (Miss. 1989).

The use of the word “representative” in §13-3-57 encompasses executors and administrators of an estate and contemplates that the actions of a decedent during his or her lifetime which would have rendered him or her amenable to suit will similarly subject his or her administrator or executor (i.e. his or her personal “representative”) to in personam jurisdiction in Mississippi. McDaniel v. Ritter, 556 So. 2d 303, 1989 Miss. LEXIS 501 (Miss. 1989).

Writers of book “published” or “communicated” allegedly defamatory writing to publisher, which republished book on widespread basis, and therefore writers are subject to in personam jurisdiction by virtue of fact that they committed tort within state. Mitchell v. Random House, Inc., 703 F. Supp. 1250, 1988 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 15738 (S.D. Miss. 1988), aff'd, 865 F.2d 664, 1989 U.S. App. LEXIS 1670 (5th Cir. Miss. 1989).

Negotiations conducted telephonically and through use of mails by out of state business do not evidence “purposeful availment” of benefits of forum state so as to permit in personam jurisdiction over business, where no representative of business ever visited state during negotiation process or at anytime, and where contract in question calls for performance and interpretation of contract under Pennsylvania law. General Equipment Mfrs. v. Coco Bros., Inc., 702 F. Supp. 608, 1988 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 15313 (S.D. Miss. 1988).

When nonresident defendant moves to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction, plaintiffs need not make full showing on merits that jurisdiction is proper, but must make prima facie showing of facts upon which in personam jurisdiction is predicated; plaintiffs failed to come forward with proof in acceptable form to controvert defendant’s unrebutted affidavit, which conclusively established that defendant was not doing business and had never done business in Mississippi. Strong v. RG Industries, Inc., 691 F. Supp. 1017, 1988 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 9037 (S.D. Miss. 1988).

Jurisdiction under Mississippi Long-Arm statute based on contract with nonresident to be performed in whole or in part in Mississippi does not apply where patient alleging medical malpractice for acts that had taken place in Tennessee had not identified any act that she, doctor, or professional corporation had performed, or were to be performed, in Mississippi, pursuant to either explicit or implicit contract. Rittenhouse v. Mabry, 832 F.2d 1380, 1987 U.S. App. LEXIS 15605 (5th Cir. Miss. 1987), but see, Gross v. Chevrolet Country, 655 So. 2d 873, 1995 Miss. LEXIS 226 (Miss. 1995), cert. denied, 516 U.S. 1094, 116 S. Ct. 817, 133 L. Ed. 2d 761, 1996 U.S. LEXIS 776 (U.S. 1996).

Physician and professional corporation were not amenable to jurisdiction under tort prong of long-arm statute because act of alleged negligence was committed and completed in Tennessee. Rittenhouse v. Mabry, 832 F.2d 1380, 1987 U.S. App. LEXIS 15605 (5th Cir. Miss. 1987), but see, Gross v. Chevrolet Country, 655 So. 2d 873, 1995 Miss. LEXIS 226 (Miss. 1995), cert. denied, 516 U.S. 1094, 116 S. Ct. 817, 133 L. Ed. 2d 761, 1996 U.S. LEXIS 776 (U.S. 1996).

Non-resident defendant who initiated contractual relationship out of which litigation arose with resident plaintiff, was subject to exercise of personal jurisdiction of court pursuant to Miss Code §13-3-57 where language of contract itself and defendant’s subsequent correspondence with plaintiff clearly reflected defendant’s intent and understanding that critical and meaningful work in furtherance of contract was to be performed, and in fact was performed, in Mississippi. Owen v. Woods, 661 F. Supp. 15, 1986 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 16354 (S.D. Miss. 1986).

Individual defendants’ motions for dismissal are properly denied, where motions are apparently based on plaintiff’s failure to specifically designate in both his original and his first amended complaints the provision of §13-3-57 upon which jurisdiction is based, where plaintiff’s second amended complaint, filed subsequent to defendants’ motions, premises long-arm jurisdiction on tort prong of statute, and where plaintiff has sufficiently alleged tortious acts committed in whole or in part in Mississippi to support long-arm jurisdiction against individual defendants in their individual capacities. White v. Franklin, 637 F. Supp. 601, 1986 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 25121 (N.D. Miss. 1986).

Tests for determining whether foreign corporation is “doing business” includes purposeful commission of act which consummates in transaction in Mississippi with cause of action arising from or being connected with such acts or transactions and consistency of assumption of personal jurisdiction with traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice; foreign corporation’s mailing of royalty checks to Mississippi residents for oil and gas production of out of state properties is not sufficient for jurisdictional purposes; execution of employment contracts and power of attorney in foreign state concerning administration of estate located in foreign state does not support Mississippi jurisdiction over claim by Mississippi law firm concerning work performed in Alabama for Alabama residents. Martin & Martin v. Jones, 616 F. Supp. 339, 1985 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 17567 (S.D. Miss. 1985).

Sections 13-3-57 and 79-1-27[Repealed] must be harmonized to support state’s valid policy of opening doors of Mississippi courts to foreign corporations found doing business in state to sue and be sued from all bona fide causes of action; merely doing business in Mississippi is not sufficient to support exercise of personal jurisdiction, and business in Mississippi of non-resident defendant must be of systematic and ongoing nature, cause of action must be incident to business activity, and assertion of jurisdiction must not offend notions of fairness and substantial justice; busline which does not maintain ticket agents, representatives, employees, offices, or property in Mississippi and which does not advertise or solicit business or negotiate or execute contracts in Mississippi but whose charter service has merely passed through state is not subject to jurisdiction for cause of action which does not arise out of activities of busline in state. Allen v. Jefferson Lines, Inc., 610 F. Supp. 236, 1985 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 19139 (S.D. Miss. 1985).

Despite fact that none of the plaintiffs in wrongful death action is resident of Mississippi, long-arm statute is available to plaintiffs where decedents, in whose shoes plaintiffs stand, were residents of Mississippi. Thompson v. Chrysler Motors Corp., 755 F.2d 1162, 1985 U.S. App. LEXIS 28452 (5th Cir. Miss. 1985).

If plaintiffs in wrongful death action amend pleadings to specifically allege that automobile accident giving rise to suit was caused by defect in master cylinder, plaintiffs will have satisfied minimum contacts test for determining whether personal jurisdiction over defendant satisfies federal due process requirements, where, although vehicle in question was sold and delivered by defendant dealer, who is Alabama Corporation, to decedents in Alabama, dealer aided Mississippi dealership in latter’s attempt to repair brakes by selling and shipping master cylinder to Mississippi dealership. Thompson v. Chrysler Motors Corp., 755 F.2d 1162, 1985 U.S. App. LEXIS 28452 (5th Cir. Miss. 1985).

Provision of §13-3-57 giving Mississippi courts jurisdiction over nonresident who commits tort in whole or in part in Mississippi potentially confers jurisdiction over Alabama car dealership in action arising from Mississippi automobile accident notwithstanding that dealer sold car involved in accident to decedent in Alabama, since tort is not complete until injury occurs and thus at least part of tort allegedly committed by dealer was committed in Mississippi. Thompson v. Chrysler Motors Corp., 755 F.2d 1162, 1985 U.S. App. LEXIS 28452 (5th Cir. Miss. 1985).

Subjecting Alabama car dealership to jurisdiction of Mississippi court in wrongful death action arising from automobile accident occurring in Mississippi but allegedly resulting from dealer’s sale and shipment to Mississippi dealership of master cylinder for use in attempting to repair vehicle’s brakes would not offend traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice so as to violate federal due process requirements, where (1) most of witnesses reside in Mississippi, (2) two or three defendants reside in Mississippi, (3) only Mississippi court can resolve matter in single action, and (4) Alabama dealer is not inconvenienced unreasonably since distance between Alabama and Mississippi is not great; moreover, Mississippi has exceptionally strong interest in providing forum for redress of injuries to its residents occurring within its borders and caused by allegedly defective product shipped from outside state. Thompson v. Chrysler Motors Corp., 755 F.2d 1162, 1985 U.S. App. LEXIS 28452 (5th Cir. Miss. 1985).

Tripartite test, under which applicability of long-arm statute is determined on basis of whether nonresident defendant has purposefully done act or consummated transaction in forum state, whether cause of action has arisen from or is connected with such act of transaction, and whether assumption of jurisdiction by forum state offends traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice, applies only to “doing business” category of statute. Thompson v. Chrysler Motors Corp., 755 F.2d 1162, 1985 U.S. App. LEXIS 28452 (5th Cir. Miss. 1985).

1980 amendment to §13-3-57 allowing nonresident plaintiff to obtain service of process upon nonresident defendant who has committed tort in whole or in part in Mississippi against nonresident plaintiff applies so as to permit nonresident plaintiff injured in automobile accident to obtain service upon Alabama car dealership to extent that dealership is subject to in personam jurisdiction of Mississippi Court where accident occurred after effective date of amendment. Thompson v. Chrysler Motors Corp., 755 F.2d 1162, 1985 U.S. App. LEXIS 28452 (5th Cir. Miss. 1985).

Where a New York resident brought an action against a nonresident for alienation of affection and criminal conversation with his wife, and where the complaint contained sufficient allegations that the defendant committed a tort at least in part within Mississippi, the trial court had in personam jurisdiction over defendant by virtue of §13-3-57. Camp v. Roberts, 462 So. 2d 726, 1985 Miss. LEXIS 1858 (Miss. 1985).

Mississippi Code §79-1-27[Repealed], providing that any corporation doing business in Mississippi is subject to suit there, must be construed and harmonized with §13-3-57 “doing business” clause, which cannot be used by non-resident plaintiff; to extend jurisdiction over nonresident corporation in suit by non-resident plaintiff on authority of §79-1-27[Repealed] would be contrary to intention of Mississippi legislature. Smith v. De Walt Products Corp., 743 F.2d 277, 1984 U.S. App. LEXIS 17911 (5th Cir. Miss. 1984).

Plaintiff in products liability action against Pennsylvania corporation cannot avoid requirements of Mississippi long-arm statute on ground that “equality of treatment” requires that Pennsylvania corporation, which would not be precluded from bringing suit in Mississippi, should also be subject to suit in Mississippi as defendant. Smith v. De Walt Products Corp., 743 F.2d 277, 1984 U.S. App. LEXIS 17911 (5th Cir. Miss. 1984).

“Doing-business” provision of §13-3-57 is not available to non-resident plaintiffs. Smith v. De Walt Products Corp., 743 F.2d 277, 1984 U.S. App. LEXIS 17911 (5th Cir. Miss. 1984).

Nonresident plaintiff who serves process on registered agent of nonresident defendant, qualified to do business in Mississippi, acquires in personam jurisdiction over defendant, even though cause of action arose outside of Mississippi. Herrley v. Volkswagen of America, Inc., 598 F. Supp. 690, 1984 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 21686 (S.D. Miss. 1984), aff'd, 957 F.2d 216, 1992 U.S. App. LEXIS 6167 (5th Cir. Miss. 1992).

Mississippi long-arm statute applies in product liability action against foreign corporation where Mississippi resident employed as truckdriver died in Mississippi as result of accident caused by defective design and manufacture of hauler-container being transported by deceased at time of accident. Cannon v. Tokyu Car Corp., 580 F. Supp. 1451, 1984 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 19082 (S.D. Miss. 1984).

In a diversity action one long-distance telephone call that was alleged to constitute a tort committed “in whole or in part” in Mississippi was a proper basis on which to predicate federal diversity jurisdiction under Code §13-3-57, since the statute includes in its reach defendants who commit a single tort, an alleged tortfeasor need not have been present in the state, and if the alleged tortfeasor causes injury in Mississippi he is covered by the statute. Brown v. Flowers Industries, Inc., 688 F.2d 328, 1982 U.S. App. LEXIS 25419 (5th Cir. Miss. 1982), cert. denied, 460 U.S. 1023, 103 S. Ct. 1275, 75 L. Ed. 2d 496, 1983 U.S. LEXIS 4089 (U.S. 1983).

Service of process in an action for personal injuries sustained in an automobile accident was improperly made pursuant to §13-3-57, where although the plaintiff was a Mississippi resident when the accident occurred, she was not a resident when suit was filed and, at that time, the Mississippi statute could be used against nonresident defendants only by a plaintiff who was a resident when the suit was filed. Golden v. Cox Furniture Mfg. Co., 683 F.2d 115, 1982 U.S. App. LEXIS 17055 (5th Cir. Miss. 1982).

The 1980 amendment to §13-3-57 merely creates a right in nonresidents to make use of the statute where the tort is committed in whole or in part in the state; otherwise the statute remains the same and the amendment strengthens the view that a nonresident may not use the statute as a vehicle to bring suit in the courts of the state against nonresidents or foreign corporations not qualified under the constitution or state law to do business in the state when incidents giving rise to the cause of action occur outside of Mississippi. Thompson v. F. W. Woolworth Co., 508 F. Supp. 522, 1981 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 10531 (N.D. Miss. 1981).

In an action arising out of the sale of a grinding machine, service of summons on the nonresident defendants pursuant to the state long-arm statute was improper, notwithstanding plaintiff buyers’ allegations that defendants, the company’s owner and sales director, had committed a tort in part in Mississippi against a resident and that the owner had also made a contract to be performed by a party in Mississippi, where the sales had been made through a Tennessee corporation doing business in Tennessee, where the contacts leading up to the sales at issue had been made in Tennessee, and where the transactions had been closed in that state and the machines delivered to plaintiffs at their place of business in Tennessee; thus, the court did not possess in personam jurisdiction over defendants. Blanton v. American Tool & Grinding Co., 472 F. Supp. 257, 1979 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 12938 (N.D. Miss. 1979).

In an action against a nonresident corporate landowner for personal injuries sustained by plaintiff’s minor child in the waters surrounding defendant’s land, the trial court committed reversible error in sustaining a motion to dismiss for lack of in personam jurisdiction where allegations of negligence and of knowledge of a dangerous condition in such waters were sufficient for the trial court to acquire jurisdiction under the long-arm statute. Mandel v. James Graham Brown Foundation, Inc., 375 So. 2d 1017, 1979 Miss. LEXIS 2444 (Miss. 1979).

If a plaintiff can obtain process on a non-resident defendant, in a suit filed under the long arm statute, he will not be excused for his failure to sue and will not be entitled to claim that the statute of limitations is tolled during the absence of the defendant from the state; if a plaintiff makes such a claim, the burden is on him to show the duration of the defendant’s absence from the state and to show that defendant cannot be served with process under any of the ways provided by the long arm statute. Gulf Nat'l Bank v. King, 362 So. 2d 1253, 1978 Miss. LEXIS 2162 (Miss. 1978).

The application of the long-arm statute did not deny defendants due process of law where, inter alia, the execution of the contract at issue occurred largely in Mississippi, following telephone negotiations initiated in the state, and where defendant partially performed its part of the contract in Mississippi. Sheridan, Inc. v. C. K. Marshall & Co., 360 So. 2d 1223, 1978 Miss. LEXIS 2322 (Miss. 1978).

In an action to collect an amount allegedly due on a sale of products manufactured in Mississippi and sold to a Maine buyer on open account, the court lacked in personam jurisdiction over defendant buyer where the sale of the system at issue, for use on an egg farm, had been negotiated by telephone and correspondence, where defendant had not been present in Mississippi at any time and where he had no other business connections in the state; the only fact that could arguably justify in personam jurisdiction was that the system had been fabricated in Mississippi according to plans and specifications especially prepared in the state by plaintiff, but this activity was performed by plaintiff in order to place itself in a position to make the sale to its Maine customer. Reed-Joseph Co. v. De Coster, 461 F. Supp. 748, 1978 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 16847 (N.D. Miss. 1978).

In an action arising when a Tennessee auctioneer sold certain livestock over which the Mississippi plaintiff had a security interest, defendant’s motion to dismiss for lack of in personam jurisdiction would be granted, in accordance with the state long arm statute, where the contract between defendant and the plaintiff’s debtor was wholly performed in Tennessee and where, if treated as a tort action, the action in its entirety occurred in Tennessee; although defendant’s contacts with the state would satisfy the mandate of due process, the presence of one representative within the state and the act of advertising within the state would not constitute doing business within the meaning of the statute where there was no causal relationship between the cause of action alleged and the activities of the defendant within the forum state. Indianola Production Credit Asso. v. Burnette-Carter Co., 450 F. Supp. 303, 1977 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 12823 (N.D. Miss. 1977).

Defendants’ motion to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction would be granted where, according to their uncontradicted affidavits, neither defendant was qualified to do business, was doing business, or had ever done business in the state, where neither had committed a tort in the state, and where neither had entered into a contract with a resident of the state to be performed in whole or in part in the state. Haire v. Miller, 447 F. Supp. 57, 1977 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 13680 (N.D. Miss. 1977).

In an action for breach of contract brought by a New York corporation qualified to do and doing business in Mississippi against a Belgian corporation not otherwise connected with the state, in personam jurisdiction would be exercised pursuant to the long-arm statute and in accordance with the requirements of due process where the contract was partly performed in the state. Chromcraft Corp. v. Mirox, S. A., 446 F. Supp. 342, 1977 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 14242 (N.D. Miss. 1977).

A Louisiana shipping corporation was subject to personal jurisdiction in Mississippi in an action for breach of contract where, inter alia, the shipper either loaded or unloaded petroleum products at a port in Mississippi on 8 different occasions and where it submitted reports concerning the movement of petroleum products to proper state officials. Smego Marine Transport, Inc. v. International Trading & Transport, Ltd., 446 F. Supp. 21, 1977 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 14966 (N.D. Miss. 1977).

In personam jurisdiction over a third-party nonresident defendant was not available under the long-arm statute in an action concerning certain defective goods which it shipped to a Mississippi retailer and which were, in turn, delivered to a Mississippi buyer where the nonresident’s only contact with the state consisted of the isolated acts of receiving a telephone call and supplying goods from a point outside Mississippi; the exercise of personal jurisdiction under such circumstances would also be a violation of due process. R. Clinton Constr. Co. v. Bryant & Reaves, Inc., 442 F. Supp. 838, 1977 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 12222 (N.D. Miss. 1977).

Service of process under this section was available to a non-resident plaintiff in an action against a non-resident corporate defendant arising from an injury arising in Mississippi. Daniels v. McDonough Power Equipment, Inc., 430 F. Supp. 1203, 1977 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 16159 (S.D. Miss. 1977).

In an action against a foreign corporation alleging that the corporation interfered in a business relationship between its Mississippi subsidiary and a Mississippi resident, a foreign merger agreement involving the subsidiary was not a contract with a Mississippi resident within the meaning of this section; The corporation’s exercise of its legitimate business interest in selling its subsidiary did not constitute a tort against a Mississippi resident within the meaning of this section; The corporation was not doing business in Mississippi within the meaning of this section, even though its Mississippi subsidiary was wholly owned, the subsidiary’s financing had to be obtained through the corporation, the subsidiary’s long range plans were submitted to the corporation for approval, the boards of directors of the two corporations were nearly identical and board meetings of the subsidiary were held at the corporate offices of the corporation, where the formal legal requirements dividing the two corporations were scrupulously observed, where the subsidiary was recognized as a corporate entity legally distinct from its parent, where the subsidiary was adequately financed, where the subsidiary paid all of the salaries of its employees and its own expenses, including payment for services rendered by its parent, where there was no commingling of funds, and where the subsidiary maintained its own books, records, and a balance sheet. Johnson v. Warnaco, Inc., 426 F. Supp. 44, 1976 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 13363 (S.D. Miss. 1976).

Nonresident limited partners of a nonresident limited partnership doing business in the state could not be made subject to jurisdiction of the state’s courts in an action against the partnership where they had done none of the acts specified by the long arm statute (§13-3-57) as prerequisites to jurisdiction, and had paid their indebtedness to the partnership in full, thus, under the statute governing circumstances in which limited partners are proper parties to a suit against the partnership (§§79-13-3,79-13-51), not being subject to being made parties. Ga-Pak Lumber Co. v. Nalley, 337 So. 2d 1270, 1976 Miss. LEXIS 1615 (Miss. 1976).

Where the notice of service of a non-resident corporation was delivered to the president of the corporation in accord with statutory requirements, and an interlocutory default judgment was entered upon failure of the defendant to answer, the default judgment could not be set aside on the grounds that the president of the corporation mislaid the notice due to anxiety over his wife’s recent death. Western Chain Co. v. Brownlee, 317 So. 2d 418, 1975 Miss. LEXIS 1758 (