The giveaway: Elton Brand and Sixers show devaluing second-round picks is an organizational mindset
Philadelphia 76ers
Derek Bodner
Bodner: The Sixers seemingly treat these picks as a burden rather than an opportunity, giving these assets away at an alarming rate.
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The Athletic
The Philadelphia 76ers were able to walk away with one of the best perimeter defenders in the draft in Matisse Thybulle, but it came at a significant cost.

The Sixers sent the Boston Celtics the third pick in the second round (No. 33) for the right to move up four spots — from No. 24 to No. 20 — to make sure they got their first-round target.

“As we know, as I’ve been saying all along, we have championship aspirations,” general manager Elton Brand told the media following the draft. “We needed (Thybulle). We needed that kind of toughness, we need that type of culture, we need that piece that can step in right now.”

Thybulle, 22, averaged 9.1 points, 3.1 rebounds, 3.5 steals, 2.3 blocks and 2.1 assists per game for Washington last season.

He’s long been rumored as a target for the Sixers. The Athletic, ESPN and Sports Illustrated all projected Thybulle as the Sixers’ pick in recent mock drafts. That the Sixers targeted him wasn’t surprising in the least. That they had to forfeit a quality second-round pick to do so was the part that stuck out, especially since most draft watchers expected him to be there when the Sixers were slotted to pick just four spots later.

There were two reasons many pegged the Sixers as a likely landing spot for Thybulle. First, he didn’t work out for any teams leading up to the draft, a clear indication that he’d received a promise from someone. Second, as a potential 3-and-D wing, Thybulle filled an organizational need and fit the Sixers’ timeline. Analysts correctly added two and two and came up with four, leading to widespread speculation that the Sixers would take Thybulle.

On Thursday night, Thybulle confirmed that he canceled his draft workouts because of interest from the Sixers.

“Philly showed interest early and we just trusted them, and decided that we were going to put our faith in them and kind of shut things down,” Thybulle said when asked about his lack of draft workouts.

Here’s the problem: The analysts weren’t the only ones who sniffed out the Sixers’ interest. According to ESPN’s Jonathan Givony, the Celtics took advantage of said interest, declaring their intention to take Thybulle at No. 20, which forced Philadelphia to give up a valuable asset if they wanted to get their man.

The move kicked off a disappointing night for a team that entered the draft with five picks, three of which came in the top 34. After trading the No. 33 pick to move up for Thybulle, the Sixers shipped the No. 42 pick and Jonathon Simmons to the Washington Wizards for a bit of salary cap flexibility. They then traded the No. 34 pick to the Atlanta Hawks for the No. 57 selection and two future second-round picks.

There are two major justifications for how the Sixers handled the draft, both of which Brand either hinted at or outright stated. First, if Thybulle works out, a second-round pick doesn’t matter much in the grand scheme of things. Second, the Sixers only have so many roster spots they can devote to young players while still hoping to compete for a title.

There is risk in becoming too locked-in on any one player this late in the draft, as it’s easy to overstate the certainty that a prospect you like will work out. After all, there are reasons why your pre-draft evaluation places a player at the top of the available options.

“When we saw him on the board, (and) a few other players in our box that we liked were gone, and he was our target,” Brand said on Friday. “We had to move up to get him. Whatever it took. Dealing with whatever team. I had to get it done.”

When dealing with this portion of the draft, that can be a dangerous mindset.

It’s easy to say “such and such will be a quality role player, we had to get him,” and justify a move up — even just a few spots — to ensure you get your preference. But all that you’ve really guaranteed is that you got your target, not that he will work out (of course). Often, the reality is that Player A, selected at No. 20, might have about a 40 percent chance of becoming a starter, while the best option left at No. 24 might have a 30 percent chance, and the players left at No. 33 and 34 might have an 18 percent chance. The loss of any one draft pick isn’t likely to be devastating, but the cumulative loss of many picks can have long-term consequences.

The difference between outcomes in this range, especially this late in a draft widely regarded as having little separation, often isn’t as precipitous a drop as it may seem. The late first-round and early second-round portions of the draft are still a numbers game — getting more bites at that apple is the best way to improve your odds of success.

Both the No. 33 and No. 34 picks are legitimate bites, with success rates drastically different than picks in the 40s and 50s. Here’s a quick, though imperfect, explanation of this: ESPN’s Kevin Pelton recently released his draft-pick value chart, placing a numerical value on each pick in the draft. The No. 31 pick was worth 470 “points,” in his estimation. The No. 34 pick, 400. But the No. 54 pick was valued at just 20. So, some of these picks have drastically different success rates, and labeling them as just “second-round picks” does a disservice to showing their respective value.

Every year, there is at least one player selected in the 30s who becomes a legitimate NBA rotation piece, whether that’s Jalen Brunson and Mitchell Robinson last season, Jordan Bell (2017), Malcolm Brogdon (2016), Montrezl Harrell and Willy Hernangomez (2015), or Spencer Dinwiddie and Jerami Grant (2014). The list goes on and on. The selection of just one Brogdon, Dinwiddie or Pascal Siakam (the No. 27 pick in the 2016 draft) can drastically alter the direction of your franchise. The best way to get “lucky” in this area of the draft is to have as many selections as possible.

Yet the Sixers, desperate for cost-controlled depth, seemingly treat these draft picks as a burden rather than an opportunity, and give these assets away at an alarming rate. They could have had the 31st, 33rd and 34th overall picks in this year’s draft. But they gave away No. 31 in a trade for two months of Trevor Booker, who spent last season playing in China. They gave up No. 33 because they were recklessly transparent. Then, they traded away No. 34 for a pair of draft picks unlikely to ever be as valuable as the one they handed away.

You can’t get lucky with a second-round pick if you keep giving away your best ones for practically nothing.

There’s this notion that the Sixers can only devote so many roster spots to young players, something that Brand flat-out said Thursday night. “We’re gonna develop Zhaire (Smith), Jonah’s (Bolden) developing, Shake (Milton) is developing, now Matisse (Thybulle) is gonna develop. Too many young guys with a team with championship aspirations does not work.”

But the Sixers, as currently constructed, are only going to definitely devote three NBA roster spots to young players — Bolden, Smith and Thybulle. They still have the option to bring back Milton on the final year of his two-year, two-way contract, which would allow them to keep him around without occupying an NBA roster spot.

On a team that wants to stick to an eight- or nine-man rotation in the playoffs, the Sixers have plenty of roster spots to add veterans head coach Brett Brown can rely on in the playoffs, while still devoting another spot or two to developing these early second-round picks.

Coming away with just one legitimate prospect out of this draft is a huge disappointment, even though that prospect is a relatively intriguing one.

The financial implications

By moving up from the No. 24 pick, which had a cap hit of $2.19 million, to the No. 20 pick (cap hit of $2.579 million), the Sixers will lose just more than $388,000 in cap room, thanks to the Celtics correctly guessing their draft strategy.

The Sixers recouped that by sending Jonathon Simmons and the No. 42 pick to Washington. Simmons would have been due $5.7 million if he were on the roster on July 1, but that was never going to happen, as just $1 million of that total is guaranteed.

Still, the Sixers could have waived Simmons prior to July 1, then stretched that $1 million cap hit out over three seasons, dropping the 2019-20 cap casualty down to $333,000. Stretching the contract has some consequences, as the team expects to be in the luxury tax and approaching the Apron in future seasons, but the actual cap flexibility gained by making the trade was minimal.

Unsigned second-round picks have a zero dollar cap hold, so there was no flexibility gained by not making a selection at No. 33, No. 34 or No. 42.

It would be easy to blame the Sixers’ frequent selling of second-round picks for cash considerations on ownership, but that would let Sixers management off the hook, whose job description includes convincing ownership of the value in such pursuits. Based on the words of Brand, and the actions of this front office in recent years, the devaluing of second-round picks — even quality ones in the 30s and 40s — is an organizational mindset.

(Photo: Mitchell Leff / Getty Images)