Quality of Democracy
SGI Sustainable Governance Indicators Bertelsmann Stiftung Bertelsmann Stiftung
Bertelsmann Stiftung
The SGI is a platform built on a cross-national survey of governance that identifies reform needs in 41 EU and OECD countries. The SGI brings together a broad network of experts and practitioners aiming to understand what works best in sustainable governance. Advocating the exchange of best practices, we offer full access to our data set and enable the comparisons that generate innovation in governance.
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Key Findings

While electoral procedures are largely fair, Croatia receives comparatively low scores (rank 34) with regard to the quality of democracy. Its overall score in this area is unchanged relative to 2014.

Recent campaign-finance laws have increased transparency, but have failed to close a number of loopholes. Political influence over the media is strong, with reporters who criticize the government subject to dismissal, and defamation suits are often used to intimidate or harass journalists. Media pluralism is quite limited.

Civil rights are formally protected, but not always respected in practice. Domestic violence is a serious problem. Protections for gay people and minority nationalities have improved. A recent court ruling approved adoption by a gay couple for the first time. Discrimination against Roma people remains a problem.

Regulations are sometimes inconsistent and subject to revision. Frequent changes in criminal laws have diminished legal certainty. Corruption is an ongoing concern. High-profile politicians and public figures have been indicted, but many prominent individuals have been acquitted after interference by powerful interests.

Electoral Processes

#30

Candidacy Procedures

9

Candidacy procedures are largely fair and do not suffer from major procedural restrictions. However, participation in the elections to the national parliament and to local assemblies is easier for registered parties than for independent lists. Whereas the latter must collect a certain number of signatures, political parties must do so only for the presidential elections, as well as in local elections for prefects and mayors. A legal amendment which would have introduced uniform requirements was repealed by the Constitutional Court in a controversial decision shortly before the parliamentary elections in November 2015. However, the number of required signatures does not represent a major hurdle to the functioning of the democratic process. Prospective presidential candidates need to secure the support of at least 10,000 voters to stand in a presidential election. In parliamentary elections, only 500 signatures are required from the respective electoral unit for the candidacy of an independent list to be valid. In the case of local elections, the number ranges from 25 to 2,500, depending on the size of the locality. Over the last couple of years, the number of independent mayors and lists have surged. After the 2021 local elections, independent mayors controlled 130 cities and municipalities. They won 41 more seats than four years ago, and pushed the SDP to the position of the third-strongest political force at the local government level. HDZ remained the strongest political party at the local level, winning 250 out of 556 mayorships in cities and municipalities, and 15 out of 20 county-prefect positions.

Citations:

OSCE/ODIHR (2019): Needs Assessment Mission Report Republic of Croatia: Presidential Election 22 December 2019. Warsaw, 5-6 (https://www.osce.org/odihr/elections/croatia/440501).

OSCE/ODIHR (2020): Election Assessment Mission Final Report Republic of Croatia: Parliamentary Elections 5 July 2020. Warsaw. 28 September (https://www.osce.org/files/f/documents/b/4/465120_0.pdf)

To what extent do candidates and parties have fair access to the media and other means of communication?

10

9

All candidates and parties have equal opportunities of access to the media and other means of communication. All major media outlets provide a fair and balanced coverage of the range of different political positions.

8

7

6

Candidates and parties have largely equal opportunities of access to the media and other means of communication. The major media outlets provide a fair and balanced coverage of different political positions.

5

4

3

Candidates and parties often do not have equal opportunities of access to the media and other means of communication. While the major media outlets represent a partisan political bias, the media system as a whole provides fair coverage of different political positions.

2

1

Candidates and parties lack equal opportunities of access to the media and other means of communications. The major media outlets are biased in favor of certain political groups or views and discriminate against others.

Media Access

6

Amendments to the election law in February 2015 changed the legal framework for media coverage of parliamentary elections as part of an effort to end the “clogging” of the media space by minor candidates. As a result of the amendments, private broadcasters are no longer obliged to cover the campaign and public broadcasters can decide themselves whether to provide candidates with proportional rather than equal coverage in reports and analysis. Moreover, debates among candidates have been restricted to only one per broadcaster. After the public broadcaster HRT decided to involve only five parties (a decision based on public opinion polls) for a scheduled debate in the run-up to the 2015 parliamentary elections, the State Electoral Committee judged this decision to be arbitrary and the debate was canceled. Before the 2016 parliamentary elections, HRT broadcast a debate with only the leading candidates of the two biggest parties, thereby ignoring Most-NL’s strong showing in the previous elections and its strategic role. Most-NL and the smaller parties thus complained of discrimination. In the case of the 2019 presidential elections, HTV reacted to these complaints and invited all 11 candidates to a public debate. In contrast, calls by several NGOs to give the Agency for Electronic Media of the Republic of Croatia a more important role in applying the media provisions of the electoral law were not taken up. The Electronic Media Council has the option of sanctioning media outlets that spread misinformation during an election campaign. However, it generally does not use tools to penalize disinformation and manipulative content, relying instead on the candidates who are the target of such disinformation campaigns to initiate proceedings. Coverage of the various political parties in the media during the election process is largely balanced. According to a survey of media experts in Croatia, restrictions on editorial autonomy and political control over media outlets are a much bigger problem.

Citations:

Grbeša, M., Volarević, M. (2021): Media in Croatia: From Freedom Fighters to Tabloid Avengers, in: Publizistik 66(3-4): 621-636.

Voting and Registration Rights

8

All citizens of voting age are entitled to participate in elections, and legislation on this issue is strongly inclusive. For example, prisoners are eligible to vote, and persons without legal capacity were allowed to participate for the first time in the April 2013 European Parliament elections. Before these 2013 elections, the highly outdated voting register was thoroughly cleaned. However, a controversial 2015 amendment to the Law on the Register of Voters limited the automatic registration of voters to those with a valid ID. A provision enabling Croatian citizens without permanent residence in Croatia to take part in national elections if they register in advance remains controversial.

The biggest shortcoming related to voting and registration rights relates to the unequal number of voters per constituency. When the proportional electoral system for parliamentary elections was introduced in 2000, 10 constituencies were established, and the law stipulated that the number of voters in those constituencies should not deviate by plus or minus 5% from the average across all constituencies. Even in the first elections under the current law, held in January 2000, three units jumped more than plus or minus 5% of the average unit, and in the last three parliamentary elections, held in 2015, 2016 and 2020, deviation in the number of voters of at least this amount was present in eight out of 10 units. The inequality in constituencies is due to mass emigration from several counties in the eastern area of Slavonia, and in the central part along the border with Bosnia and Herzegovina.

Due to such inequalities between constituencies, different results were obtained from some constituencies than would have been the case if they had been uniform, and many members of the Croatian parliament entered who would not otherwise have been elected. Political scientist Goran Čular, who researched the topic, concluded that up to three mandates per elections went to some parties solely due to the inequality of constituencies. As a proposal, he pointed out the possibility of designing constituencies with different numbers of deputies, according to the number of voters, or to create a new structure of constituencies and reduce their number.

Upon coming to office in October 2016, Prime Minister Plenković said the government would address the problem of the large differences in the number of voters per constituency, a fundamental flaw in the electoral system in Croatia. In the period under review, however, no changes were initiated.

Citations:

Čular, G. (2018) Metodološki izazovi ustavnog sudovanja: učinci podjele na izborne jedinice na rezultate izbora u Hrvatskoj 2000-2016. (Methodological Challenges of Constitutional Judgement: Effects of Apportionment on Electoral Results in Croatia, 2000-2016), in: Anali Hrvatskog politološkog društva 15(1): 7-28.

To what extent is private and public party financing and electoral campaign financing transparent, effectively monitored and in case of infringement of rules subject to proportionate and dissuasive sanction?

10

9

The state enforces that donations to political parties are made public and provides for independent monitoring to that respect. Effective measures to prevent evasion are effectively in place and infringements subject to effective, proportionate and dissuasive sanctions.

8

7

6

The state enforces that donations to political parties are made public and provides for independent monitoring. Although infringements are subject to proportionate sanctions, some, although few, loopholes and options for circumvention still exist.

5

4

3

The state provides that donations to political parties shall be published. Party financing is subject to some degree of independent monitoring but monitoring either proves regularly ineffective or proportionate sanctions in case of infringement do not follow.

2

1

The rules for party and campaign financing do not effectively enforce the obligation to make the donations public. Party and campaign financing is neither monitored independently nor, in case of infringements, subject to proportionate sanctions.

Party Financing

4

The legal framework for the financing of parties and campaigns has undergone frequent changes over time. The new law on the financing of political activities, election campaigns and referendums, adopted in March 2019, has regulated the financing of referendum campaigns for the first time. It has increased the limits on private and corporate donations to political parties, and campaign financing limits, and has also introduced a new system for publishing the reports of parties and candidates. The new law enables electronic submission of reports by political parties and individual candidates on donations received and funds spent in the election campaign, and provides for the centralized publication of all this information on the website of the State Election Commission. This represents a small step forward in the regulation of party funding, and has at least minimally improved the transparency and accountability of political finance.

However, it has failed to close a number of loopholes. One particular problem is the fact that the State Election Commission and local election commissions refuse to play a more active role in sanctioning the spending of public funds for election campaigns (which is prohibited by law), and are unwilling to monitor expenditures on advertising in electronic media and social networks. Because of all this, preliminary financial statements appear today to be a relatively unreliable regulatory tool in presenting the financial flows used to finance political parties’ and candidates’ electoral campaigns.

Do citizens have the opportunity to take binding political decisions when they want to do so?

10

9

Citizens have the effective opportunity to actively propose and take binding decisions on issues of importance to them through popular initiatives and referendums. The set of eligible issues is extensive, and includes national, regional, and local issues.

8

7

6

Citizens have the effective opportunity to take binding decisions on issues of importance to them through either popular initiatives or referendums. The set of eligible issues covers at least two levels of government.

5

4

3

Citizens have the effective opportunity to vote on issues of importance to them through a legally binding measure. The set of eligible issues is limited to one level of government.

2

1

Citizens have no effective opportunity to vote on issues of importance to them through a legally binding measure.

Popular Decision-Making

6

While the law provides for some forms of popular decision-making, there is no strong tradition of organizing and holding referendums in Croatia. The Sabor, the Croatian parliament, can call a national referendum if it is proposed by at least 10% of the electorate. The legal framework governing the organization and conduct of referendums in Croatia is extremely complicated, and is indeed one of the most demanding in Europe. In addition, the same rules do not apply to state and local referendums. In a local referendum, a proposed measure must receive more than 50% support of all registered voters in that locality or region. In a state referendum, a measure may be approved by the majority of voters who have participated in the referendum.

In the past, the Sabor has refused to do so even in cases of high-profile initiatives by war veterans (2000) and trade unions (2010). Local referendums have also been rare; only a few have ever taken place. However, the success of the referendum on the constitutional definition of marriage in early December 2013 ushered in a wave of initiatives in following years. In mid-June of 2018, conservative NGOs requested the Sabor to initiate two referendums. The initiative “The People Decide” called for the number of members of parliament to be cut from 150 to 120, for an increase in preferential voting on party slates from one to three votes, and for a restriction in minority members of parliament’s voting rights. The initiative “The Truth about the Istanbul Convention,” strongly supported by the Catholic Church, mobilized against the ratification of the Istanbul Convention. Asked by the Sabor to check the number and authenticity of the collected signatures, and the lawfulness of their collection, however, the government found that more than one-tenth of the almost 750,000 signatures provided by the two initiatives were invalid, so that the required thresholds were missed. In February 2019, the Sabor decided against calling the two referendums. Between April and May 2019, trade unions collected signatures in favor of a referendum on amending the 2018 Pension Insurance Act. Although the required number of signatures was collected, no referendum was called, as the government eventually accepted all demands in September 2019. In December 2021, the right-wing political party Most began collecting signatures for a referendum on the abolition of COVID-19 certificates and the transfer of the power to adopt coronavirus-related measures from the Civil Protection Headquarters to the Croatian parliament, which – under the terms of the measure – could impose such measures only with a two-thirds majority. On December 22, the party announced that it had collected 400,000 signatures, amounting to more than 10% of the electorate, and that in January 2022 they would hand over all collected signatures to the Croatian parliament.

Access to Information

#35

Media Freedom

4

Media freedom in Croatia is limited. Political influence on public media is still fairly strong, as is the influence of private owners on private media. After the change in the governing coalition in May 2017, the HDZ intensified its control over the public media. In some cases, controversial journalists have been fired and critical programs discontinued. Media freedom has also suffered from the large number of defamation lawsuits against journalists and media. In January 2019, there were more than 1,000 ongoing trials against Croatian journalists or media outlets. Some of them have been brought to the courts by the public broadcaster HRT, which has been unique in suing its own journalists, other media outlets and professional journalist associations. As a result, many Croatian journalists who investigate corruption, organized crime or war crimes are often subject to harassment campaigns. The government has weakened independent media by delaying the allocation of EU funding for non-profit media. Even after the fall of Balkan tycoon Ivica Todorić in 2017, there are still many cases of powerful businesspeople using advertising to hinder media freedom. In 2019 and 2020, however, a new generation of investigative journalists have brought a series of scandals involving public officials to the fore, which have resulted in several high-profile resignations.

In November 2021, the president of the Croatian Journalists’ Association (HND), Hrvoje Zovko paid a visit to independent media organizations in Serbia. During the trip, he noted that the media in Croatia face major problems, such as the large number of lawsuits filed against journalists (making Croatia one of the worst locales Europe in this regard), various forms of pressure exerted particularly on local media, and the significant influence by political forces on the public media services (the Croatian Radio-Television, HRT). However, he added that the situation in Croatia is incomparably better than in Serbia, Hungary, or Bosnia and Herzegovina.

To what extent are the media characterized by an ownership structure that ensures a pluralism of opinions?

10

9

Diversified ownership structures characterize both the electronic and print media market, providing a well-balanced pluralism of opinions. Effective anti-monopoly policies and impartial, open public media guarantee a pluralism of opinions.

8

7

6

Diversified ownership structures prevail in the electronic and print media market. Public media compensate for deficiencies or biases in private media reporting by representing a wider range of opinions.

5

4

3

Oligopolistic ownership structures characterize either the electronic or the print media market. Important opinions are represented but there are no or only weak institutional guarantees against the predominance of certain opinions.

2

1

Oligopolistic ownership structures characterize both the electronic and the print media market. Few companies dominate the media, most programs are biased, and there is evidence that certain opinions are not published or are marginalized.

Media Pluralism

4

Media pluralism in Croatia is limited. The TV market is dominated by the public TV station Croatian Radiotelevision (Hrvatska radiotelevizija, HRT) and two private broadcasters, Nova TV and RTL. After some haggling, Nova TV was taken over by Slovenia Broadband, a subsidiary of United Media, in July 2018. While United Media had been forced by Croatia’s Electronic Media Council (AZTN) to sell its shares in Total TV, it also owns the N1 (cable) television and multimedia platform that has a growing audience in Croatia. The market for print media has likewise been dominated by a handful of companies.

In October 2021 the parliament amended the electronic media law and several other regulations with the aim of increasing transparency in the publication of information by making public the ownership structure of media service providers.

Research on media pluralism in Croatia has shown that there is a medium level of risk with regard to the protection afforded to journalists and the standards of the journalistic profession. This is reflected primarily in the relatively large number of lawsuits against journalists and lack of editorial autonomy. However, a much higher level of risk exists in the area of market pluralism, which is reflected in the high level of concentration shown by digital platforms and a significant share of the traditional media organizations. Negative aspects of media pluralism are also reflected in the market’s impact on media content and the insufficient protection given to the preservation of competition in the field of digital media.

Citations:

Bilic, P. (2020) Monitoring Media Pluralism in the Digital Era: Application of the Media Pluralism Monitor in the European Union, Albania and Turkey in the years 2018-2019. Country Report: Croatia. Florence: European University Institute.

https://www.jutarnji.hr/tag/Zakon_o_elektroni%C4%8Dkim_medijima

To what extent can citizens obtain official information?

10

9

Legal regulations guarantee free and easy access to official information, contain few, reasonable restrictions, and there are effective mechanisms of appeal and oversight enabling citizens to access information.

8

7

6

Access to official information is regulated by law. Most restrictions are justified, but access is sometimes complicated by bureaucratic procedures. Existing appeal and oversight mechanisms permit citizens to enforce their right of access.

5

4

3

Access to official information is partially regulated by law, but complicated by bureaucratic procedures and some poorly justified restrictions. Existing appeal and oversight mechanisms are often ineffective.

2

1

Access to official information is not regulated by law; there are many restrictions of access, bureaucratic procedures and no or ineffective mechanisms of enforcement.

Access to Government Information

7

The Right of Access to Information Act has been in place since 2003 and the legislative framework is relatively well established, thanks in particular to later amendments to the act. In October 2013, a long-standing demand by NGOs was met and Anamarija Musa, a public administration scholar, was appointed by parliament as the first commissioner for the right of access to information. Thanks to her efforts, access to information has significantly improved. More than 80% of the 5,900 distinct public authorities now submit the required regular reports on the enforcement of the act and about 85% have an information officer in charge of handling information requests. Transparency is lower at the local and regional level and in the case of public companies. While most of the requests are – fully or partially – met, violations are rarely penalized. Commissioner Musa and others have criticized the fact that court procedures have been cumbersome, and courts have rarely passed verdicts against public authorities. The Ombudsman for Human Rights has complained several times about having been denied information about police treatment of migrants. In 2018, the Croatian parliament elected Zoran Pičuljan as the new information commissioner. He has sought to retain the fundamental achievements in the right of access to information gained during Musa’s tenure.

Civil Rights and Political Liberties

#35

Civil Rights

5

Civil rights are formally protected by the constitution and other laws, but not always respected in practice. The ombudsman and specialized ombudspersons play an important role in the protection of human rights. However, the ombudsman’s recommendations are not always carefully followed up on. The need to reduce the backlog of civil, commercial and enforcement cases is still pressing, and the demonization of human rights’ advocates has continued.

After much of political controversy, the Croatian parliament ratified the Istanbul Convention in 2018. However, data for 2019 show an increase in the number of family-related violence cases, most of which encompass male offenders. These cases are also more shocking in terms of the brutality displayed. Prevention initiatives and the penal system have been too inert in tackling the issue. The government endorsed stiffer penalties for offenders, while attacks on social workers will now be treated as criminal offenses. It remains to be seen whether the stiffer penalties will deter serious offenders and molesters in light of the very slow and inefficient judiciary.

In terms of the freedom of expression and access to justice, Croatia still posts unsatisfactory results. However, in other walks of life, such as protecting civil and political rights (especially of gay people and minority nationalities), Croatia has made steady improvements or maintained relatively high standards. According to the Othering and Belonging Institute at UC Berkeley’s 2019 Inclusiveness Index, Croatia ranks a very credible 13 out of 132 countries worldwide.

Citations:

Human Rights House Croatia (2018): Human Rights Defenders in Croatia: Obstacles and Challenges. Zagreb (https://humanrightshouse.org/articles/human-rights-in-croatia-overview-of-2018/).

Othering & Belonging Institute (2019): The Inclusiveness Index Report 2019. Berkeley (https://belonging.berkeley.edu/inclusivenessindex).

To what extent does the state concede and protect political liberties?

10

9

All state institutions concede and effectively protect political liberties.

8

7

6

All state institutions for the most part concede and protect political liberties. There are only few infringements.

5

4

3

State institutions concede political liberties but infringements occur regularly in practice.

2

1

Political liberties are unsatisfactory codified and frequently violated.

Political Liberties

7

In Croatia, political liberties are largely respected. There are laws that guarantee the freedom of assembly and the freedom of association. However, the Law on Public Assembly is more restrictive than in France or the United States, containing an obligation to outline the purpose of an assembly, and limiting spaces available for public assemblies. While the constitution guarantees freedom of expression, the criminalization of defamation, insult and shaming remains at odds with international standards. According to a survey conducted by the Croatian Journalists’ Association in 2021, at least 924 active lawsuits had at that time been filed against journalists and media. A total of 97% of these were civil actions against publishers, their editors and their journalists, seeking compensation for alleged damages to honor and reputation based on published texts and articles, while the remaining share of lawsuits related to currently active criminal proceedings.

Citations:

https://www.hnd.hr/eng/cja-survey-at-least-924-lawsuits-against-journalists-and-the-media-currently-active-in-croatia

How effectively does the state protect against different forms of discrimination?

10

9

State institutions effectively protect against and actively prevent discrimination. Cases of discrimination are extremely rare.

8

7

6

State anti-discrimination protections are moderately successful. Few cases of discrimination are observed.

5

4

3

State anti-discrimination efforts show limited success. Many cases of discrimination can be observed.

2

1

The state does not offer effective protection against discrimination. Discrimination is widespread in the public sector and in society.

Non-discrimination

5

Although discrimination has been prohibited by several different legislative acts for some time, the new Anti-discrimination Act (ADA), which entered into force in 2009, was an important step. The new act prohibits discrimination in 10 specific areas of social life and distinguishes 17 different forms of discrimination. It has enabled new forms of judicial redress for cases of discrimination. The Ombudsman institutions have a large role in combating discrimination, and the Office of the Public Ombudsman serves as a central anti-discrimination body under the ADA. However, although discrimination is prohibited by the law, the legislation has not been fully implemented, and certain vulnerable groups still experience discrimination. In particular, the Roma sometimes encounter discrimination in education and employment. The rights of LGBT persons have been occasionally circumscribed, but Zagreb and Split Pride, as well as the failure of conservative NGOs to collect sufficient signatures for a referendum against the Istanbul Convention suggest that the overall social climate toward LGBT community has significantly improved. Despite the fact that gay couples are denied the right to officially marry, they can enter into same-sex partnerships with almost equal rights to opposite-sex partnerships since 2014. A court decision in December 2019 finally acknowledged the right of gay couples to become foster parents. In April 2021, in a case in which life partners Mladen Kožić and Ivo Šegota sought to adopt a child, the Administrative Court of Croatia ruled that they could be adoptive parents. The court ruled that there should be no discrimination in the right to adopt children. This was the first such decision made in Croatia.

Citations:

https://rm.coe.int/5th-op-croatia-en/1680a2cb49

Rule of Law

#33

Legal Certainty

5

The Croatian legal system puts heavy emphasis on the rule of law. In practice, however, legal certainty is often limited. Regulation is sometimes inconsistent and changes often, administrative bodies frequently lack the necessary legal expertise, and executive ordinances do not always comply with the original legal mandate. As a result, citizens often lack confidence in administrative procedures and frequently perceive the acts of administrative bodies to be arbitrary. Frequent changes in criminal laws have also had a negative impact on legal certainty in Croatia. Some amendments to acts have been implemented even without the much-needed majority in the parliament, which further negatively affected the level of legal certainty.

Judicial Review

5

Croatia has the highest number of judges per 100,000 people in the EU-28 and spends almost 0.45% of GDP, the fifth highest share in the European Union, on the judiciary. At the same time, the independence, quality and efficiency of the judiciary have been limited. The level of trust in the Croatian judicial system remains the worst of any EU member state, both among ordinary citizens and businesses.

The fact that in recent years a number of prominent individuals accused of crimes were acquitted has underscored the Croatian judiciary’s lack of effectiveness and independence. The main impediment to the perceived lack of courts’ independence is to be found in interference by government and politicians, which is closely followed by interference from economic or other specific interests. The State’s Attorney Office is also often perceived as lacking skilled personnel with integrity, and under constant pressure from powerful political players to either start or stall processes against their adversaries.

In Croatia, judges of ordinary courts are appointed by the National Judicial Council, an independent body consisting of 11 members – 7 judges, two university professors of law and two members of the parliament (one from the opposition). This composition has turned out to be debatable, because it is not certain whether this strategy can ensure the full independence of the judiciary branch in appointing judges. The problems with approach to appointing judges became clear in 2017, when a constitutional blockade of the National Judicial Council took place at one moment after the representatives of the government and the opposition could not agree on the appointment of their respective members into this body. As a result, the work of the National Judicial Council was obstructed because reaching a majority required for decision-making became difficult. This is why legal experts suggest that citizens’ representatives be included in the Council instead of members of the parliament. These representatives, trained lawyers, would be proposed by the parliamentary Judiciary Committee.

The long duration of judicial procedures and the large backlog of cases continue to be a major problem in Croatia’s judicial system. Successive ministers of justice have failed to deal with the backlog. Dražen Bošnjaković, HDZ’s incumbent minister, has also prioritized it, together with digitalization of the judiciary.

To what extent does the process of appointing (supreme or constitutional court) justices guarantee the independence of the judiciary?

10

9

Justices are appointed in a cooperative appointment process with special majority requirements.

8

7

6

Justices are exclusively appointed by different bodies with special majority requirements or in a cooperative selection process without special majority requirements.

5

4

3

Justices are exclusively appointed by different bodies without special majority requirements.

2

1

All judges are appointed exclusively by a single body irrespective of other institutions.

Appointment of Justices

7

The Constitutional Court of the Republic of Croatia has 13 judges who are elected for a term of eight years. Judges are appointed by the Croatian parliament (Sabor) on the basis of a qualified majority (two-thirds of all members of the Sabor). Prescribed by a constitutional law, the eligibility criteria are rather general and represent a minimum that candidates need to fulfill in order to apply. Candidates are interviewed by the parliamentary committee tasked with proposing the list of candidates to the plenary session. There is a notable lack of consistency in this interview process, as the committee does not employ professional selection criteria. The latest round of appointments in 2016 included many judges with dubious backgrounds.

The most important issue related to the appointment of judges in 2021 concerned the election of the president of the Supreme Court. The president of the republic has the right to nominate a candidate for the head of that court; however, the Law on Courts stipulates that he must nominate someone from the circle of candidates who apply to the State Judicial Council (DSV). However, President Milanović proposed Zlata Đurđević, a distinguished professor of criminal procedural law from the University of Zagreb, who did not apply in this manner. As this led to a dispute between President Milanović and the HDZ-controlled government bodies, the Constitutional Court had to rule on all of this. In March, the Constitutional Court ruled that the president of the republic could not voluntarily propose to parliament any candidate for the presidency of the Supreme Court that he wanted, but only one of the candidates who had applied through the DSV. Professor Đurđević subsequently applied in this way, but in June 2021, the parliament rejected her with 81 votes against (76 votes were needed for a majority).

After President Milanović and Prime Minister Plenković finally agreed on a candidate for the president of the Supreme Court in July 2021, Radovan Dobronić was elected to the post in October. Dobronić came to this position as a judge of the Commercial Court, outside the circle of judges of the Supreme Court, and he gained wide popularity in the public when in 2013 he ruled against banks in their dispute with Swiss-franc-denominated account-holders.

To what extent are public officeholders prevented from abusing their position for private interests?

10

9

Legal, political and public integrity mechanisms effectively prevent public officeholders from abusing their positions.

8

7

6

Most integrity mechanisms function effectively and provide disincentives for public officeholders willing to abuse their positions.

5

4

3

Some integrity mechanisms function, but do not effectively prevent public officeholders from abusing their positions.

2

1

Public officeholders can exploit their offices for private gain as they see fit without fear of legal consequences or adverse publicity.

Corruption Prevention

4