MSCODE
Release 73 of the Official Code of Mississippi Annotated released 2019-03-26. 
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JUDICIAL DECISIONS

1. Validity.

2. Construction and application, generally.

3. What constitutes doing business within state.

4. Non-resident heirs of alleged tortfeasor.

5. Illustrative cases.

1. Validity.

Dismissal of the insured’s action against her insurer in Mississippi for bad faith was improper where there was no personal or subject matter jurisdiction over the insurer, Miss. Code Ann. §13-3-57; the only connection Mississippi had to the lawsuit was that the car accident occurred in Mississippi and the lawsuit was not about the accident. Hogrobrooks v. Progressive Direct, 858 So. 2d 913, 2003 Miss. App. LEXIS 1029 (Miss. Ct. App. 2003).

The long-arm statute was clearly enacted for the benefit of residents only, and it has not been expanded through the process of judicial interpretation to include nonresident plaintiffs not qualified to do business within the state; there is no defect under federal constitutional standards for limiting the long-arm statute to resident plaintiffs, since the state is not obligated to make its courts available to nonresidents, who themselves are not doing business in the state, to sue other nonresidents. American International Pictures, Inc. v. Morgan, 371 F. Supp. 528, 1974 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 12866 (N.D. Miss. 1974).

This section [Code 1942, § 1437] and Code 1942, § 8072 do not violate the due process clause of the Constitution of the United States. Jarrard Motors, Inc. v. Jackson Auto & Supply Co., 237 Miss. 660, 115 So. 2d 309, 1959 Miss. LEXIS 517 (Miss. 1959).

If a nonresident is doing such business in the state as would subject him to the jurisdiction of the court and such business is of such nature that it is hazardous or subject to the police powers of the state to be regulated, and the cause of action grows out of such business so done, then the substituted service is good and the statute is constitutional. Davis v. Nugent, 90 F. Supp. 522, 1950 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 3816 (D. Miss. 1950).

There is no denial of due process under the 14th Amendment of the United States Constitution in extending this section [Code 1942, § 1437] to contract, as well as to tort actions, arising out of business or acts done within state. Davis-Wood Lumber Co. v. Ladner, 210 Miss. 863, 50 So. 2d 615, 1951 Miss. LEXIS 322 (Miss. 1951).

Nonresident who engages in business in this state which is subject to state control is subject to suit for damages in this state on cause of action accruing here out of business transacted in this state and is properly brought into court by service of process upon secretary of state in manner provided by Code 1942, § 1438, and statutes so providing do not violate due process or immunities and privileges clauses of federal constitution. Condon v. Snipes, 205 Miss. 306, 38 So. 2d 752, 1949 Miss. LEXIS 433 (Miss. 1949).

This statute, as applied to a corporate citizen of another state engaged in levy construction work of large proportions in Mississippi employing many men to operate trucks and other heavy and cumbersome machinery and equipment, is not unconstitutional as denying defendant equal protection of the law, due process of law, or privileges and immunities afforded to residents, or as burdening interstate commerce. Sugg v. Hendrix, 142 F.2d 740, 1944 U.S. App. LEXIS 3496 (5th Cir. Miss. 1944).

Power of state to confer jurisdiction on courts over individual nonresidents by substituted service depends upon whether such enabling statute is a reasonable exercise of the state’s police power to regulate the business of such nonresident, and if the regulation is one for the protection of health, safety and welfare of those within its borders, rather than a mere attempt to extend the jurisdiction of its courts over citizens beyond its borders, the state may properly legislate to that end. Sugg v. Hendrix, 142 F.2d 740, 1944 U.S. App. LEXIS 3496 (5th Cir. Miss. 1944).

2. Construction and application, generally.

After an employee was terminated, and his employers refused to reimburse his expenses, the court did not have personal jurisdiction over the individuals working for the employer as the employee alleged no facts supporting the individuals’ involvement in his tort claims. Smith v. Antler Insanity, LLC, 58 F. Supp. 3d 716, 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 152484 (S.D. Miss. 2014).

In a breach of contract and tortious inference with business relations case that was removed to federal court pursuant to 28 U.S.C.S. § 1446 and in which the court accepted as true a Mississippi company’s assertion that it and a foreign company contemplated that the contract would be performed in part in Mississippi and that the contract was in fact performed in part in Mississippi, the district court had no difficulty concluding that Mississippi’s long-arm statute, Miss. Code Ann. §13-3-57, was satisfied; since the district court also found that the requirements of due process were met, the foreign company’s Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(2) motion to dismiss was denied. Barbour Int'l, Inc. v. Permasteel, Inc., 507 F. Supp. 2d 602, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 56518 (S.D. Miss. 2007).

In a matter arising out of a high speed chase, which allegedly resulted in decedents’ deaths, neither an Alabama county or that county’s sheriff from Alabama entered upon the highways of Mississippi, involving themselves in efforts to stop the fleeing felons, or in any other way subjected themselves to jurisdiction under Miss. Code Ann. §13-3-63; therefore, the supreme court proceeded with a long-arm analysis to determine if jurisdiction could be conferred upon them under the Mississippi long-arm statute, Miss. Code Ann. §13-3-57, and the supreme court found no minimum contacts, so the county and the sheriff were not subject to personal jurisdiction in Mississippi. City of Cherokee v. Parsons, 944 So. 2d 886, 2006 Miss. LEXIS 583 (Miss. 2006).

To establish the “contract” prong of the Mississippi long-arm statute, Miss. Code Ann. §13-3-57, a plaintiff must show that a nonresident defendant entered into a contract with the plaintiff which has been, or is to be, performed, at least in part, in Mississippi. Durham v. Katzman, 375 F. Supp. 2d 495, 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 17847 (S.D. Miss. 2005).

Trial court erred in denying New York commuter van company’s motion to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction under Miss. R. Civ. P. 12(b) in the Mississippi residents’ wrongful death action that arose following an auto accident that occurred in New York because, although the van company was not qualified to do business in Mississippi and, therefore, met the threshold requirement for coverage by the long-arm statute, Miss. Rev. Stat. §13-3-57, there was no evidence in the record to demonstrate that the van company’s actions had brought it under either the contract, tort, or “doing business in” provisions of the long-arm statute. Rockaway Commuter Line, Inc. v. Denham, 897 So. 2d 156, 2004 Miss. LEXIS 1325 (Miss. 2004).

Defendants, by demonstrating that the individuals’ claims against the non-diverse defendants were time-barred, sustained their burden of showing that no reasonable possibility of recovery existed against the non-diverse defendants on the claims raised in the individuals’ original complaint; while the individuals argued that their claims were not time-barred because defendants’ fraudulent concealment tolled the statute of limitations, they were unable to support their fraudulent concealment claim. Thus, the individuals’ motion to remand was denied. White v. City Fin. Co., 277 F. Supp. 2d 646, 2003 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 14205 (S.D. Miss. 2003).

The contract prong of the long-arm statute was satisfied by the allegations of breach of implied warranty of merchantability and the breach of implied warranty of fitness for a particular purpose claims where at least part of the warranty work was performed in the forum state; the misrepresentation claim against the manufacturer was sufficient to support jurisdiction under the tort prong of the long-arm statute because the materials and a representative were sent to the forum state. Jones v. Tread Rubber Corp., 199 F. Supp. 2d 539, 2002 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 9102 (S.D. Miss. 2002).

In an action arising from a contract under which the plaintiff was to sell 80 percent of its oil and gas working interest in an oil and gas field, the plaintiff set out a prima facie case for personal jurisdiction under the contract prong of the statute and, therefore, the district court erred in dismissing the defendant for lack of personal jurisdiction where the plaintiff argued that a codefendant entered into a contract with the plaintiff on behalf of itself and the defendant, which financed and purchased 75 percent of the 80 percent working interest in the oil and gas field. Stripling v. Jordan Prod. Co., 234 F.3d 863, 2000 U.S. App. LEXIS 29871 (5th Cir. Miss. 2000).

The defendant was subject to personal jurisdiction within Mississippi in an action for libel and slander where the plaintiff alleged that the defendant published the alleged defamatory information complained of on the Internet and allowed access and publication within Mississippi and among Mississippi residents. Lofton v. Turbine Design, Inc., 100 F. Supp. 2d 404, 2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 4593 (N.D. Miss. 2000).

The defendants were subject to personal jurisdiction in an action for breach of a contract regarding a distribution agreement where part of the contract required the plaintiff to perform acts in Mississippi and where the plaintiff also alleged, with evidentiary support, that the defendants committed various torts at least in part in Mississippi which resulted in injury to the plaintiff and that the defendants were engaged in doing business in Mississippi. Genesis Press, Inc. v. Carol Publ. Group, Inc., 2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 4595 (N.D. Miss. Mar. 30, 2000).

The parties did not enter into a contract to be performed in whole or in part by any party in Mississippi where the defendant agreed to provide certain land accommodations in Greece and round-trip airfare from New York to Greece, but did not agree to deliver air tickets to the plaintiffs in Mississippi. Christian Tours, Inc. v. Homeric Tours, Inc., 2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 4594 (N.D. Miss. Mar. 30, 2000), aff'd, 239 F.3d 366, 2000 U.S. App. LEXIS 30099 (5th Cir. Miss. 2000).

A contract between the plaintiff Mississippi corporation and the defendant Tennessee corporation involving the purchase of the defendant’s assets required actions in Mississippi, and therefore, the defendant fell under the broad reach of the Mississippi long-arm statute. Willowbrook Found., Inc. v. Visiting Nurse Ass'n, 87 F. Supp. 2d 629, 2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 2105 (N.D. Miss. 2000).

Where resident plaintiffs alleged, with evidentiary support, that the defendants committed the torts of defamation and tortious interference with business relations, at least in part, through their activities in Mississippi, such was sufficient to establish a prima facie case of personal jurisdiction under the tort prong of the statute. Wells v. Taylor, 1999 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 17891 (N.D. Miss. Oct. 25, 1999).

The defendant Arkansas corporation was not subject to personal jurisdiction under the Mississippi long-arm statute where the defendant had limited contact with Mississippi, such contacts were sporadic, incidental and indirectly associated with the forum, and the defendant did not and had not conducted business in Mississippi. Thrash Aviation, Inc. v. Kelner Turbine, Inc., 72 F. Supp. 2d 709, 1999 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 17788 (S.D. Miss. 1999).

Under tort prong of Mississippi long-arm statute, personal jurisdiction is proper if any element of tort (or any part of any element) takes place in Mississippi. Allred v. Moore & Peterson, 117 F.3d 278, 1997 U.S. App. LEXIS 18148 (5th Cir. Miss. 1997), cert. denied, 522 U.S. 1048, 118 S. Ct. 691, 139 L. Ed. 2d 637, 1998 U.S. LEXIS 71 (U.S. 1998).

Under Mississippi law, malicious prosecution requires institution or continuation of original judicial proceedings, either criminal or civil; by, or at instance of defendants; termination of such proceedings in plaintiff’s favor; malice in instituting proceedings; want of probable cause in proceedings; and suffering of damages as result of action or prosecution complained of. Allred v. Moore & Peterson, 117 F.3d 278, 1997 U.S. App. LEXIS 18148 (5th Cir. Miss. 1997), cert. denied, 522 U.S. 1048, 118 S. Ct. 691, 139 L. Ed. 2d 637, 1998 U.S. LEXIS 71 (U.S. 1998).

Suffering of damages within state from alleged malicious prosecution was insufficient, without more, to support personal jurisdiction under tort prong of Mississippi long-arm statute. Allred v. Moore & Peterson, 117 F.3d 278, 1997 U.S. App. LEXIS 18148 (5th Cir. Miss. 1997), cert. denied, 522 U.S. 1048, 118 S. Ct. 691, 139 L. Ed. 2d 637, 1998 U.S. LEXIS 71 (U.S. 1998).

For purposes of Mississippi long-arm statute, injury suffered in malicious prosecution tort is institution of criminal or civil proceedings where institution ought not to have occurred (and occurred for an improper reason); Mississippi does not permit damages to serve as a proxy for injury in personal jurisdiction calculus. Allred v. Moore & Peterson, 117 F.3d 278, 1997 U.S. App. LEXIS 18148 (5th Cir. Miss. 1997), cert. denied, 522 U.S. 1048, 118 S. Ct. 691, 139 L. Ed. 2d 637, 1998 U.S. LEXIS 71 (U.S. 1998).

Service of process by certified mail from out of state, apart from actual filing of suit, was not basis for malicious prosecution claim and could not support exercise of personal jurisdiction under tort prong of Mississippi long-arm statute. Allred v. Moore & Peterson, 117 F.3d 278, 1997 U.S. App. LEXIS 18148 (5th Cir. Miss. 1997), cert. denied, 522 U.S. 1048, 118 S. Ct. 691, 139 L. Ed. 2d 637, 1998 U.S. LEXIS 71 (U.S. 1998).

In a medical malpractice action against a Tennessee hospital and its emergency room personnel arising from the death of a patient who was to be transported from Mississippi to the hospital, neither the contract nor the doing business prong of the long-arm statute (§13-3-57) was available to the plaintiff as a means of acquiring jurisdiction over the hospital where the plaintiff was a nonresident of Mississippi. Cowart v. Shelby County Health Care Corp., 911 F. Supp. 248, 1996 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 579 (S.D. Miss. 1996).

In a medical malpractice action against a Tennessee hospital and its emergency room personnel arising from the death of a patient who was allegedly treated with inappropriate medication while being transported from a Mississippi hospital to the hospital in Tennessee, the plaintiff made a prima facie showing of jurisdiction over the Tennessee hospital pursuant to §13-3-57 for the alleged actions of an emergency room physician who agreed to accept the transfer. Cowart v. Shelby County Health Care Corp., 911 F. Supp. 248, 1996 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 579 (S.D. Miss. 1996).

In an action by a Mississippi plaintiff alleging various torts arising from a Missouri defendant’s repair and replacement of the plaintiff’s diesel engines, the defendant was not subject to personal jurisdiction in Mississippi, although the tort prong of Mississippi’s long arm statute (§13-3-57) applied because the engines malfunctioned in Mississippi, where, inter alia, the defendant was not qualified to do business in Mississippi, had never done business in Mississippi, owned no property in Mississippi, had no place of business in Mississippi, did not advertise or sell products in Mississippi, and was careful to protect its distribution agreement, which forbid it from providing any sales and services outside Kansas and part of Missouri; exercise of jurisdiction under the long-arm statute would not comport with the dictates of Fourteenth Amendment. Fava Custom Applicators v. Cummins Mid-America, 907 F. Supp. 224, 1995 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 18797 (N.D. Miss. 1995).

A foreign defendant was not amenable to suit under the “contract” provision of Mississippi’s long-arm statute (§13-3-57) where the final version of the contract was signed in Louisiana, the parties never contemplated that the contract would be performed in whole or in part in Mississippi, and the work under the contract was actually performed in Algeria; the fact that the plaintiff flew to the job site in Algeria from Mississippi did not render his travel from Mississippi equivalent to part performance in Mississippi. Peterson v. Test Int'l, E.C., 904 F. Supp. 574, 1995 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 17100 (S.D. Miss. 1995).

In an action for alleged interference with an employment contract, a foreign defendant was not amenable to suit under the “tort” provision of Mississippi’s long-arm statute (§13-3-57) where the plaintiff was hired to provide services in Algeria, and the alleged injury occurred in Algeria (where the plaintiff was terminated); the fact that the plaintiff, as a Mississippi resident, might have suffered adverse economic consequences in Mississippi from his termination in Algeria did not recategorize the tort as occurring “in whole or in part” in Mississippi. Peterson v. Test Int'l, E.C., 904 F. Supp. 574, 1995 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 17100 (S.D. Miss. 1995).

In a personal injury action by a Mississippi plaintiff arising from an automobile accident that occurred in Tennessee, the nonresident defendant’s consummation of an agreement to breed her dog in Mississippi, and her installation of a telephone line at a friend’s home in Mississippi when she briefly stayed there, were insufficient to meet the “contract” prong of the Mississippi long arm statute (§13-3-57) where the Tennessee automobile accident was unrelated to the contracts performed by the defendant in Mississippi. McLaurin v. Nazar, 883 F. Supp. 112, 1995 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 5550 (N.D. Miss.), aff'd, 71 F.3d 878, 1995 U.S. App. LEXIS 36819 (5th Cir. Miss. 1995).

In an action for an alleged breach of an agreement to purchase shares of stock in a coal mining company located in Kentucky, the requirements of the Mississippi long-arm statute (§13-3-57) were met as to the Kentucky defendants where all parties had duties of performance in Mississippi under the sale and escrow agreements, and negotiations conducted by one defendant by telephone or facsimile to Mississippi were made on behalf of both defendants. First Miss. Corp. v. Thunderbird Energy, 876 F. Supp. 840, 1995 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 1875 (S.D. Miss. 1995).

In an action by a Mississippi insurer against an Alabama resident and his Alabama attorney for breach of a settlement agreement arising out of a medical malpractice action, the defendants were subject to jurisdiction under Mississippi’s long-arm statute (§13-3-57), although the defendants received and cashed the settlement check in Alabama, and executed (and altered) the release document in Alabama, where the parties negotiated and ultimately entered the settlement agreement with the Mississippi insurance company in Mississippi, the settlement check was sent from Mississippi and ultimately paid by a Mississippi bank, and the release was sent to the defendants from Mississippi and was to be returned to Mississippi. Medical Assurance Co. v. Jackson, 864 F. Supp. 576, 1994 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 14703 (S.D. Miss. 1994).

A nonresident defendant must do more than merely place its product in the “stream of commerce” before its actions will be deemed “purposefully directed” at Mississippi for purposes of due process analysis. Sorrells v. R & R Custom Coach Works, 636 So. 2d 668, 1994 Miss. LEXIS 240 (Miss. 1994).

A nonresident manufacturer’s placement of its product into the stream of commerce did not constitute an act “purposefully directed” toward Mississippi where there was no evidence of any activity by the manufacturer indicative of an intent to serve the Mississippi market; thus, the limitations of the due process clause prevented utilization of §13-3-57 to gain personal jurisdiction over the manufacturer. Sorrells v. R & R Custom Coach Works, 636 So. 2d 668, 1994 Miss. LEXIS 240 (Miss. 1994).

In an action against a nonresident church and archdiocese, alleging that a priest engaged in homosexual activity with the plaintiff at homes in Mississippi and that church officials knew that the plaintiff was staying overnight with the priest, and should have known that homosexual activity would occur, personal jurisdiction did not exist over the church and archdiocese under the Mississippi long-arm statute (§13-3-57), since the plaintiff failed to prove a prima facie case on which jurisdiction was based predicated on theories of respondeat superior, negligent hiring, or negligent supervision. Tichenor v. Roman Catholic Church, 869 F. Supp. 429, 1993 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 20435 (E.D. La. 1993).

Long-arm statute could not be used as basis for obtaining personal jurisdiction in product liability action brought against non-resident defendants who were doing business in Mississippi and who were licensed as automobile manufacturers or dealers under Mississippi Motor Vehicle Commission Law, where defendants were not registered to do business in Mississippi, automobile accident which gave rise to action occurred in another state, and action was brought by non-resident plaintiffs. Herrley v. Volkswagen of America, Inc., 957 F.2d 216, 1992 U.S. App. LEXIS 6167 (5th Cir. Miss. 1992).

A Louisiana railroad corporation which was not qualified to do business in Mississippi was not amenable to suit in Mississippi under §13-3-57 where neither the plaintiff nor the accident giving rise to the action had any connection with Mississippi or with any business conducted by the railroad corporation in Mississippi. Southern Pacific Transp. Co. v. Fox, 609 So. 2d 357, 1992 Miss. LEXIS 421 (Miss. 1992).

Personal jurisdiction could be exercised over a nonresident putative father in a paternity and support action where the nonresident had been present in the state as a student at a state university, he had sexual relations with the mother in the state, and he had subsequently failed to support the child who resided in the state. Jones v. Chandler, 592 So. 2d 966, 1991 Miss. LEXIS 984 (Miss. 1991).

“Doing business” prong of long-arm statute may not be utilized by nonresident plaintiff. Madison v. Revlon, Inc., 789 F. Supp. 758, 1991 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 20080 (S.D. Miss. 1991).

In action, brought by truck driver who was injured when rubber strap broke as driver was attempting to attach it to tarp, against Ohio manufacturer of strap which sold strap to Alabama company which in turn sold it to plaintiff’s employee, evidence failed to establish that part of tort occurred in Mississippi for purposes of determining whether personal jurisdiction could be asserted there over Ohio manufacturer; although plaintiff made products liability allegation that he received box containing allegedly defective straps from his employer in Mississippi, plaintiff did not attempt to use strap until he reached Oklahoma, injury occurred in Oklahoma, none of manufacturer’s actions were directed towards Mississippi, and none of alleged acts took place in Mississippi. Yates v. Turzin, 786 F. Supp. 594, 1991 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 20499 (S.D. Miss. 1991).

In action, brought by truck driver injured when rubber strap broke as he attempted to attach it to tarp, against Ohio manufacturer of strap which sold strap to Alabama company which in turn sold it to plaintiff’s employer, evidence failed to establish sufficient basis to subject manufacturer to long-arm jurisdiction on theory of strict tort liability, notwithstanding that manufacturer was sufficiently engaged in business of selling rubber strap to be considered “seller,” as none of manufacturer’s sales activities or solicitations took place in or were directed towards Mississippi. Yates v. Turzin, 786 F. Supp. 594, 1991 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 20499 (S.D. Miss. 1991).

Non-resident plaintiff may not use “doing business” prong of long-arm statute to obtain in personam jurisdiction over non-resident defendant. Prince v. F. Hoffmann-La Roche & Co., 780 F. Supp. 417, 1991 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 18821 (S.D. Miss. 1991).

Assuming it was otherwise available to plaintiff, Mississippi statute providing that non-resident corporations found doing business in Mississippi would be subject to suit in state to same extent as domestic corporations, regardless of whether cause of action accrued within or outside of state, did not provide statutory basis for assertion of personal jurisdiction over nonresident corporation in personal injury action by nonresident plaintiff, where Mississippi long-arm statute would not allow that result. Prince v. F. Hoffmann-La Roche & Co., 780 F. Supp. 417, 1991 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 18821 (S.D. Miss. 1991).

Nonresident defendant is amenable to personal jurisdiction in federal diversity case to extent permitted by state court in state in which federal court sits. Falco Lime, Inc. v. Tide Towing Co., 779 F. Supp. 58, 1991 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 17756 (N.D. Miss. 1991).

Under particular facts, it would not be unfair or offend due process for Mississippi court to exercise jurisdiction in suit by Mississippi corporation against Illinois corporation which had agreed to move Mississippi corporation’s barges which had become stranded in river; defendant’s activities in Mississippi were such that it could reasonably foresee being hailed into court in Mississippi. Falco Lime, Inc. v. Tide Towing Co., 779 F. Supp. 58, 1991 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 17756 (N.D. Miss. 1991).

In determining whether exercise of long arm jurisdiction under state statute comports with due process requirements, court must determine whether defendant has established sufficient contacts with forum state indicating purposeful availment of privilege of conducting activities within forum and thereby invoking benefits and protection of its laws, with focus of inquiry at this stage being upon nature of underlying litigation. Falco Lime, Inc. v. Tide Towing Co., 779 F. Supp. 58, 1991 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 17756 (N.D. Miss. 1991).

Extent of jurisdiction of federal court over nonresident defendant depends on whether defendant is amenable to service of process under forum state’s long arm statute and whether such exercise of jurisdiction would comport with dictates of due process. Falco Lime, Inc. v. Tide Towing Co., 779 F. Supp. 58, 1991 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 17756 (N.D. Miss. 1991).

In deciding whether federal court sitting in diversity has jurisdiction over nonresident defendant, reach of long arm statute should be determined before considering whether exercise of jurisdiction would comport with due process, for if service was defective under state statute, constitutional issue should not even be considered. Falco Lime, Inc. v. Tide Towing Co., 779 F. Supp. 58, 1991 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 17756 (N.D. Miss. 1991).

State’s long-arm statute relating to tort actions did not authorize jurisdiction over foreign corporation which had entered into charter agreement with Mississippi corporation seeking damages for loss of use of barges which allegedly went aground as result of Illinois corporation’s negligence in maintaining and operating tug. Falco Lime, Inc. v. Tide Towing Co., 779 F. Supp. 58, 1991 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 17756 (N.D. Miss. 1991).

Mississippi’s long arm statute’s contract provision served to confer personal jurisdiction over Illinois corporation which had entered into charter agreement with Mississippi corporation seeking damages for loss of use of barges which allegedly ran aground as result of Illinois corporation’s negligent maintenance and operation of tug. Falco Lime, Inc. v. Tide Towing Co., 779 F. Supp. 58, 1991 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 17756 (N.D. Miss. 1991).

In order for “tort” prong of long-arm statute to apply, at least some part of tort must have been committed within Mississippi. Murray v. Remington Arms Co., 795 F. Supp. 805, 1991 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 20550 (S.D. Miss. 1991).

In products liability action brought against defendant manufacturer of rifle, tort provision of long-arm statute would not form basis for jurisdiction over nonresident manufacturer where allegations are that injuries to various plaintiffs occurred in Texas, Washington, and Canada. Murray v. Remington Arms Co., 795 F. Supp. 805, 1991 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 20550 (S.D. Miss. 1991).

Nonresident plaintiffs may not utilize “doing business” provision of long-arm statute to obtain jurisdiction over nonresident defendant. Murray v. Remington Arms Co., 795 F. Supp. 805, 1991 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 20550 (S.D. Miss. 1991).

In products liability action, nonresident plaintiffs could not use “doing business” provision of long-arm statute to obtain personal jurisdiction over nonresident defendant manufacturer, even if court considered as true, for purposes of litigation, assertion that defendant manufacturer was alter ego of co-defendant, its parent corporation, which had registered agent in state and had not challenged personal jurisdiction; there was no Mississippi law to support intended use of alter ego theory to impute residency of parent corporation to subsidiary. Murray v. Remington Arms Co., 795 F. Supp. 805, 1991 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 20550 (S.D. Miss. 1991).

Nonresidents may not utilize “doing business” provision of long-arm statute to invoke jurisdiction in Mississippi over foreign corporation. Ferry v. Langston Corp., 792 F. Supp. 512, 1990 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 20053 (S.D. Miss. 1990).

For defendant to be amenable to process under “doing business” provision of long-arm statute, there must be nexus between defendant’s activities in Mississippi and plaintiff’s cause of action; however, there is no requirement that there be direct relation or nexus between the two, claim must merely be “incident to” such business. Ferry v. Langston Corp., 792 F. Supp. 512, 1990 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 20053 (S.D. Miss. 1990).

There was no sufficient connection, to form basis for long-arm jurisdiction, between defendant manufacturer’s business activity in Mississippi and injury sustained by plaintiffs’ deceased by machine manufactured by defendant, where defendant was New Jersey corporation which sold machine to deceased’s employer in Louisiana, deceased had lived and worked in Louisiana, and plaintiffs resided in Louisiana; all that appeared from submissions to court was that defendant sold equipment in interstate commerce and had sold equipment which was distributed to Mississippi purchasers. Ferry v. Langston Corp., 792 F. Supp. 512, 1990 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 20053 (S.D. Miss. 1990).

Nonresident of state of Mississippi may not utilize “doing business” provision of long-arm statute as basis for jurisdiction over foreign corporation in Mississippi. Bailiff v. Manville Forest Products Corp., 792 F. Supp. 509, 1990 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 20052 (S.D. Miss. 1990).

Personal jurisdiction would not lie, over nonresident manufacturer, under long-arm statute or under due process clause, where manufacturer was organized or existed under laws of Federal Republic of Germany, was not qualified to do business in Mississippi, had no real estate, personal property, bank accounts, or other property in state, had never entered into contract to be performed within state, and had never performed any act which had or could have had effect within state. Bailiff v. Manville Forest Products Corp., 792 F. Supp. 509, 1990 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 20052 (S.D. Miss. 1990).

Mississippi long-arm statute allows for assertion of jurisdiction over person of nonresident defendant who makes contract with resident of Mississippi to be performed in whole or in part, by either party, within Mississippi; or who commits tort in whole or in part in Mississippi; or who does any business or performs any character of work or service in state. Bailiff v. Manville Forest Products Corp., 792 F. Supp. 509, 1990 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 20052 (S.D. Miss. 1990).

In action brought by California residents against asbestos products manufacturers alleging damages as result of presence of asbestos-containing materials in buildings located outside Mississippi, claims for fraud and conspiracy accrued at time of sale of products, which was before 1980 when §13-3-57 was amended, thus District Court in Mississippi lacked jurisdiction under tort prong of statute. Black v. Carey Canada, Inc., 791 F. Supp. 1120, 1990 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 20087 (S.D. Miss. 1990).

Sale of asbestos-containing products in Mississippi and alleged misrepresentation by defendant manufacturers as to consequences of exposure of such products did not subject defendants to service of process under tort provisions of §13-3-57; otherwise all manufacturers who commit mass torts would be subject to service of process under tort provisions of statute, which would swallow all restrictions placed on long-arm statute. Black v. Carey Canada, Inc., 791 F. Supp. 1120, 1990 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 20087 (S.D. Miss. 1990).

In order for jurisdiction to have been proper as to defendants who owned a weekend home in Mississippi but whose “usual place of abode” was in Louisiana, service of process should have been made pursuant to Mississippi’s long-arm statute, since the defendants owned real property in Mississippi, and thus had taken advantage of the laws of Mississippi and the protections afforded under such laws. Alpaugh v. Moore, 568 So. 2d 291, 1990 Miss. LEXIS 606 (Miss. 1990).

A court had personal jurisdiction over a former Mississippi resident in an action brought by his former wife who alleged that she incurred $5,000 in debts by reason of his desertion, where the allegations included a debt incurred in Mississippi by reason of the former husband’s conduct in Mississippi. Petters v. Petters, 560 So. 2d 722, 1990 Miss. LEXIS 201 (Miss. 1990).

By virtue of the supremacy clause, the Federal Uniformed Services Former Spouses’ Protection Act overrides Mississippi’s long-arm statutes to the extent that Mississippi law would exceed the limitations of the federal enactment. Thus, a former husband’s absence from Mississippi for 15 continuous years precluded personal jurisdiction by reason of residence or domicile since the language of the federal Act makes it clear that only current domicile or residence may suffice to confer authority upon a court to adjudge rights in a former service person’s military retirement pension. Petters v. Petters, 560 So. 2d 722, 1990 Miss. LEXIS 201 (Miss. 1990).

Mississippi long-arm statute could not bring owners of trucking company located and primarily doing business in Nevada and Colorado into court in Mississippi where only contacts between defendants and Mississippi were permit to carry property through the state and purchase of operating authorities permitting shipment into Mississippi. Cycles, Ltd. v. W.J. Digby, Inc., 889 F.2d 612, 1989 U.S. App. LEXIS 18373 (5th Cir. Miss. 1989).

The “doing-business” provision of Mississippi’s long-arm statute may not be used by nonresident plaintiffs to bring nonresident defendants into court in the state; even residents must establish a nexus between plaintiff’s cause of action and defendant’s in-state business contacts to use such long-arm provision. Mills v. Dieco, Inc., 722 F. Supp. 296, 1989 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 12349 (N.D. Miss. 1989).

Section 13-3-57 requires no direct nexus to the non-resident’s business done in Mississippi, but requires only that the claim be incident thereto. The statute thus requires far less than that the liability generating conduct have occurred in Mississippi. There is no constitutional imperative that the action arise out of the non-resident defendant’s contacts/activities in this state. All that is required is that the non-resident defendant have continuous and systematic general contacts with Mississippi. These contacts must amount to something more than occasional “fortuitous” instances where the defendant had in the past come into some casual, isolated contact with an in-state resident. McDaniel v. Ritter, 556 So. 2d 303, 1989 Miss. LEXIS 501 (Miss. 1989).

An airline passenger’s personal representatives’ claim against the estate of an airline pilot arose out of facts sufficiently incident to business done by the pilot in Mississippi that the pilot’s estate was amenable to suit in Mississippi under §13-3-57 where the pilot and the passenger were employees of a Mississippi corporation which had an office in Mississippi, and the airplane crash which gave rise to the passenger’s claim occurred during a trip made on behalf of the corporation. McDaniel v. Ritter, 556 So. 2d 303, 1989 Miss. LEXIS 501 (Miss. 1989).

The use of the word “representative” in §13-3-57 encompasses executors and administrators of an estate and contemplates that the actions of a decedent during his or her lifetime which would have rendered him or her amenable to suit will similarly subject his or her administrator or executor (i.e. his or her personal “representative”) to in personam jurisdiction in Mississippi. McDaniel v. Ritter, 556 So. 2d 303, 1989 Miss. LEXIS 501 (Miss. 1989).

Writers of book “published” or “communicated” allegedly defamatory writing to publisher, which republished book on widespread basis, and therefore writers are subject to in personam jurisdiction by virtue of fact that they committed tort within state. Mitchell v. Random House, Inc., 703 F. Supp. 1250, 1988 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 15738 (S.D. Miss. 1988), aff'd, 865 F.2d 664, 1989 U.S. App. LEXIS 1670 (5th Cir. Miss. 1989).

Negotiations conducted telephonically and through use of mails by out of state business do not evidence “purposeful availment” of benefits of forum state so as to permit in personam jurisdiction over business, where no representative of business ever visited state during negotiation process or at anytime, and where contract in question calls for performance and interpretation of contract under Pennsylvania law. General Equipment Mfrs. v. Coco Bros., Inc., 702 F. Supp. 608, 1988 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 15313 (S.D. Miss. 1988).

When nonresident defendant moves to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction, plaintiffs need not make full showing on merits that jurisdiction is proper, but must make prima facie showing of facts upon which in personam jurisdiction is predicated; plaintiffs failed to come forward with proof in acceptable form to controvert defendant’s unrebutted affidavit, which conclusively established that defendant was not doing business and had never done business in Mississippi. Strong v. RG Industries, Inc., 691 F. Supp. 1017, 1988 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 9037 (S.D. Miss. 1988).

Jurisdiction under Mississippi Long-Arm statute based on contract with nonresident to be performed in whole or in part in Mississippi does not apply where patient alleging medical malpractice for acts that had taken place in Tennessee had not identified any act that she, doctor, or professional corporation had performed, or were to be performed, in Mississippi, pursuant to either explicit or implicit contract. Rittenhouse v. Mabry, 832 F.2d 1380, 1987 U.S. App. LEXIS 15605 (5th Cir. Miss. 1987), but see, Gross v. Chevrolet Country, 655 So. 2d 873, 1995 Miss. LEXIS 226 (Miss. 1995), cert. denied, 516 U.S. 1094, 116 S. Ct. 817, 133 L. Ed. 2d 761, 1996 U.S. LEXIS 776 (U.S. 1996).

Physician and professional corporation were not amenable to jurisdiction under tort prong of long-arm statute because act of alleged negligence was committed and completed in Tennessee. Rittenhouse v. Mabry, 832 F.2d 1380, 1987 U.S. App. LEXIS 15605 (5th Cir. Miss. 1987), but see, Gross v. Chevrolet Country, 655 So. 2d 873, 1995 Miss. LEXIS 226 (Miss. 1995), cert. denied, 516 U.S. 1094, 116 S. Ct. 817, 133 L. Ed. 2d 761, 1996 U.S. LEXIS 776 (U.S. 1996).

Non-resident defendant who initiated contractual relationship out of which litigation arose with resident plaintiff, was subject to exercise of personal jurisdiction of court pursuant to Miss Code §13-3-57 where language of contract itself and defendant’s subsequent correspondence with plaintiff clearly reflected defendant’s intent and understanding that critical and meaningful work in furtherance of contract was to be performed, and in fact was performed, in Mississippi. Owen v. Woods, 661 F. Supp. 15, 1986 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 16354 (S.D. Miss. 1986).

Individual defendants’ motions for dismissal are properly denied, where motions are apparently based on plaintiff’s failure to specifically designate in both his original and his first amended complaints the provision of §13-3-57 upon which jurisdiction is based, where plaintiff’s second amended complaint, filed subsequent to defendants’ motions, premises long-arm jurisdiction on tort prong of statute, and where plaintiff has sufficiently alleged tortious acts committed in whole or in part in Mississippi to support long-arm jurisdiction against individual defendants in their individual capacities. White v. Franklin, 637 F. Supp. 601, 1986 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 25121 (N.D. Miss. 1986).

Tests for determining whether foreign corporation is “doing business” includes purposeful commission of act which consummates in transaction in Mississippi with cause of action arising from or being connected with such acts or transactions and consistency of assumption of personal jurisdiction with traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice; foreign corporation’s mailing of royalty checks to Mississippi residents for oil and gas production of out of state properties is not sufficient for jurisdictional purposes; execution of employment contracts and power of attorney in foreign state concerning administration of estate located in foreign state does not support Mississippi jurisdiction over claim by Mississippi law firm concerning work performed in Alabama for Alabama residents. Martin & Martin v. Jones, 616 F. Supp. 339, 1985 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 17567 (S.D. Miss. 1985).

Sections 13-3-57 and 79-1-27[Repealed] must be harmonized to support state’s valid policy of opening doors of Mississippi courts to foreign corporations found doing business in state to sue and be sued from all bona fide causes of action; merely doing business in Mississippi is not sufficient to support exercise of personal jurisdiction, and business in Mississippi of non-resident defendant must be of systematic and ongoing nature, cause of action must be incident to business activity, and assertion of jurisdiction must not offend notions of fairness and substantial justice; busline which does not maintain ticket agents, representatives, employees, offices, or property in Mississippi and which does not advertise or solicit business or negotiate or execute contracts in Mississippi but whose charter service has merely passed through state is not subject to jurisdiction for cause of action which does not arise out of activities of busline in state. Allen v. Jefferson Lines, Inc., 610 F. Supp. 236, 1985 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 19139 (S.D. Miss. 1985).

Despite fact that none of the plaintiffs in wrongful death action is resident of Mississippi, long-arm statute is available to plaintiffs where decedents, in whose shoes plaintiffs stand, were residents of Mississippi. Thompson v. Chrysler Motors Corp., 755 F.2d 1162, 1985 U.S. App. LEXIS 28452 (5th Cir. Miss. 1985).

If plaintiffs in wrongful death action amend pleadings to specifically allege that automobile accident giving rise to suit was caused by defect in master cylinder, plaintiffs will have satisfied minimum contacts test for determining whether personal jurisdiction over defendant satisfies federal due process requirements, where, although vehicle in question was sold and delivered by defendant dealer, who is Alabama Corporation, to decedents in Alabama, dealer aided Mississippi dealership in latter’s attempt to repair brakes by selling and shipping master cylinder to Mississippi dealership. Thompson v. Chrysler Motors Corp., 755 F.2d 1162, 1985 U.S. App. LEXIS 28452 (5th Cir. Miss. 1985).

Provision of §13-3-57 giving Mississippi courts jurisdiction over nonresident who commits tort in whole or in part in Mississippi potentially confers jurisdiction over Alabama car dealership in action arising from Mississippi automobile accident notwithstanding that dealer sold car involved in accident to decedent in Alabama, since tort is not complete until injury occurs and thus at least part of tort allegedly committed by dealer was committed in Mississippi. Thompson v. Chrysler Motors Corp., 755 F.2d 1162, 1985 U.S. App. LEXIS 28452 (5th Cir. Miss. 1985).

Subjecting Alabama car dealership to jurisdiction of Mississippi court in wrongful death action arising from automobile accident occurring in Mississippi but allegedly resulting from dealer’s sale and shipment to Mississippi dealership of master cylinder for use in attempting to repair vehicle’s brakes would not offend traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice so as to violate federal due process requirements, where (1) most of witnesses reside in Mississippi, (2) two or three defendants reside in Mississippi, (3) only Mississippi court can resolve matter in single action, and (4) Alabama dealer is not inconvenienced unreasonably since distance between Alabama and Mississippi is not great; moreover, Mississippi has exceptionally strong interest in providing forum for redress of injuries to its residents occurring within its borders and caused by allegedly defective product shipped from outside state. Thompson v. Chrysler Motors Corp., 755 F.2d 1162, 1985 U.S. App. LEXIS 28452 (5th Cir. Miss. 1985).

Tripartite test, under which applicability of long-arm statute is determined on basis of whether nonresident defendant has purposefully done act or consummated transaction in forum state, whether cause of action has arisen from or is connected with such act of transaction, and whether assumption of jurisdiction by forum state offends traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice, applies only to “doing business” category of statute. Thompson v. Chrysler Motors Corp., 755 F.2d 1162, 1985 U.S. App. LEXIS 28452 (5th Cir. Miss. 1985).

1980 amendment to §13-3-57 allowing nonresident plaintiff to obtain service of process upon nonresident defendant who has committed tort in whole or in part in Mississippi against nonresident plaintiff applies so as to permit nonresident plaintiff injured in automobile accident to obtain service upon Alabama car dealership to extent that dealership is subject to in personam jurisdiction of Mississippi Court where accident occurred after effective date of amendment. Thompson v. Chrysler Motors Corp., 755 F.2d 1162, 1985 U.S. App. LEXIS 28452 (5th Cir. Miss. 1985).

Where a New York resident brought an action against a nonresident for alienation of affection and criminal conversation with his wife, and where the complaint contained sufficient allegations that the defendant committed a tort at least in part within Mississippi, the trial court had in personam jurisdiction over defendant by virtue of §13-3-57. Camp v. Roberts, 462 So. 2d 726, 1985 Miss. LEXIS 1858 (Miss. 1985).

Mississippi Code §79-1-27[Repealed], providing that any corporation doing business in Mississippi is subject to suit there, must be construed and harmonized with §13-3-57 “doing business” clause, which cannot be used by non-resident plaintiff; to extend jurisdiction over nonresident corporation in suit by non-resident plaintiff on authority of §79-1-27[Repealed] would be contrary to intention of Mississippi legislature. Smith v. De Walt Products Corp., 743 F.2d 277, 1984 U.S. App. LEXIS 17911 (5th Cir. Miss. 1984).

Plaintiff in products liability action against Pennsylvania corporation cannot avoid requirements of Mississippi long-arm statute on ground that “equality of treatment” requires that Pennsylvania corporation, which would not be precluded from bringing suit in Mississippi, should also be subject to suit in Mississippi as defendant. Smith v. De Walt Products Corp., 743 F.2d 277, 1984 U.S. App. LEXIS 17911 (5th Cir. Miss. 1984).

“Doing-business” provision of §13-3-57 is not available to non-resident plaintiffs. Smith v. De Walt Products Corp., 743 F.2d 277, 1984 U.S. App. LEXIS 17911 (5th Cir. Miss. 1984).

Nonresident plaintiff who serves process on registered agent of nonresident defendant, qualified to do business in Mississippi, acquires in personam jurisdiction over defendant, even though cause of action arose outside of Mississippi. Herrley v. Volkswagen of America, Inc., 598 F. Supp. 690, 1984 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 21686 (S.D. Miss. 1984), aff'd, 957 F.2d 216, 1992 U.S. App. LEXIS 6167 (5th Cir. Miss. 1992).

Mississippi long-arm statute applies in product liability action against foreign corporation where Mississippi resident employed as truckdriver died in Mississippi as result of accident caused by defective design and manufacture of hauler-container being transported by deceased at time of accident. Cannon v. Tokyu Car Corp., 580 F. Supp. 1451, 1984 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 19082 (S.D. Miss. 1984).

In a diversity action one long-distance telephone call that was alleged to constitute a tort committed “in whole or in part” in Mississippi was a proper basis on which to predicate federal diversity jurisdiction under Code §13-3-57, since the statute includes in its reach defendants who commit a single tort, an alleged tortfeasor need not have been present in the state, and if the alleged tortfeasor causes injury in Mississippi he is covered by the statute. Brown v. Flowers Industries, Inc., 688 F.2d 328, 1982 U.S. App. LEXIS 25419 (5th Cir. Miss. 1982), cert. denied, 460 U.S. 1023, 103 S. Ct. 1275, 75 L. Ed. 2d 496, 1983 U.S. LEXIS 4089 (U.S. 1983).

Service of process in an action for personal injuries sustained in an automobile accident was improperly made pursuant to §13-3-57, where although the plaintiff was a Mississippi resident when the accident occurred, she was not a resident when suit was filed and, at that time, the Mississippi statute could be used against nonresident defendants only by a plaintiff who was a resident when the suit was filed. Golden v. Cox Furniture Mfg. Co., 683 F.2d 115, 1982 U.S. App. LEXIS 17055 (5th Cir. Miss. 1982).

The 1980 amendment to §13-3-57 merely creates a right in nonresidents to make use of the statute where the tort is committed in whole or in part in the state; otherwise the statute remains the same and the amendment strengthens the view that a nonresident may not use the statute as a vehicle to bring suit in the courts of the state against nonresidents or foreign corporations not qualified under the constitution or state law to do business in the state when incidents giving rise to the cause of action occur outside of Mississippi. Thompson v. F. W. Woolworth Co., 508 F. Supp. 522, 1981 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 10531 (N.D. Miss. 1981).

In an action arising out of the sale of a grinding machine, service of summons on the nonresident defendants pursuant to the state long-arm statute was improper, notwithstanding plaintiff buyers’ allegations that defendants, the company’s owner and sales director, had committed a tort in part in Mississippi against a resident and that the owner had also made a contract to be performed by a party in Mississippi, where the sales had been made through a Tennessee corporation doing business in Tennessee, where the contacts leading up to the sales at issue had been made in Tennessee, and where the transactions had been closed in that state and the machines delivered to plaintiffs at their place of business in Tennessee; thus, the court did not possess in personam jurisdiction over defendants. Blanton v. American Tool & Grinding Co., 472 F. Supp. 257, 1979 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 12938 (N.D. Miss. 1979).

In an action against a nonresident corporate landowner for personal injuries sustained by plaintiff’s minor child in the waters surrounding defendant’s land, the trial court committed reversible error in sustaining a motion to dismiss for lack of in personam jurisdiction where allegations of negligence and of knowledge of a dangerous condition in such waters were sufficient for the trial court to acquire jurisdiction under the long-arm statute. Mandel v. James Graham Brown Foundation, Inc., 375 So. 2d 1017, 1979 Miss. LEXIS 2444 (Miss. 1979).

If a plaintiff can obtain process on a non-resident defendant, in a suit filed under the long arm statute, he will not be excused for his failure to sue and will not be entitled to claim that the statute of limitations is tolled during the absence of the defendant from the state; if a plaintiff makes such a claim, the burden is on him to show the duration of the defendant’s absence from the state and to show that defendant cannot be served with process under any of the ways provided by the long arm statute. Gulf Nat'l Bank v. King, 362 So. 2d 1253, 1978 Miss. LEXIS 2162 (Miss. 1978).

The application of the long-arm statute did not deny defendants due process of law where, inter alia, the execution of the contract at issue occurred largely in Mississippi, following telephone negotiations initiated in the state, and where defendant partially performed its part of the contract in Mississippi. Sheridan, Inc. v. C. K. Marshall & Co., 360 So. 2d 1223, 1978 Miss. LEXIS 2322 (Miss. 1978).

In an action to collect an amount allegedly due on a sale of products manufactured in Mississippi and sold to a Maine buyer on open account, the court lacked in personam jurisdiction over defendant buyer where the sale of the system at issue, for use on an egg farm, had been negotiated by telephone and correspondence, where defendant had not been present in Mississippi at any time and where he had no other business connections in the state; the only fact that could arguably justify in personam jurisdiction was that the system had been fabricated in Mississippi according to plans and specifications especially prepared in the state by plaintiff, but this activity was performed by plaintiff in order to place itself in a position to make the sale to its Maine customer. Reed-Joseph Co. v. De Coster, 461 F. Supp. 748, 1978 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 16847 (N.D. Miss. 1978).

In an action arising when a Tennessee auctioneer sold certain livestock over which the Mississippi plaintiff had a security interest, defendant’s motion to dismiss for lack of in personam jurisdiction would be granted, in accordance with the state long arm statute, where the contract between defendant and the plaintiff’s debtor was wholly performed in Tennessee and where, if treated as a tort action, the action in its entirety occurred in Tennessee; although defendant’s contacts with the state would satisfy the mandate of due process, the presence of one representative within the state and the act of advertising within the state would not constitute doing business within the meaning of the statute where there was no causal relationship between the cause of action alleged and the activities of the defendant within the forum state. Indianola Production Credit Asso. v. Burnette-Carter Co., 450 F. Supp. 303, 1977 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 12823 (N.D. Miss. 1977).

Defendants’ motion to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction would be granted where, according to their uncontradicted affidavits, neither defendant was qualified to do business, was doing business, or had ever done business in the state, where neither had committed a tort in the state, and where neither had entered into a contract with a resident of the state to be performed in whole or in part in the state. Haire v. Miller, 447 F. Supp. 57, 1977 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 13680 (N.D. Miss. 1977).

In an action for breach of contract brought by a New York corporation qualified to do and doing business in Mississippi against a Belgian corporation not otherwise connected with the state, in personam jurisdiction would be exercised pursuant to the long-arm statute and in accordance with the requirements of due process where the contract was partly performed in the state. Chromcraft Corp. v. Mirox, S. A., 446 F. Supp. 342, 1977 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 14242 (N.D. Miss. 1977).

A Louisiana shipping corporation was subject to personal jurisdiction in Mississippi in an action for breach of contract where, inter alia, the shipper either loaded or unloaded petroleum products at a port in Mississippi on 8 different occasions and where it submitted reports concerning the movement of petroleum products to proper state officials. Smego Marine Transport, Inc. v. International Trading & Transport, Ltd., 446 F. Supp. 21, 1977 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 14966 (N.D. Miss. 1977).

In personam jurisdiction over a third-party nonresident defendant was not available under the long-arm statute in an action concerning certain defective goods which it shipped to a Mississippi retailer and which were, in turn, delivered to a Mississippi buyer where the nonresident’s only contact with the state consisted of the isolated acts of receiving a telephone call and supplying goods from a point outside Mississippi; the exercise of personal jurisdiction under such circumstances would also be a violation of due process. R. Clinton Constr. Co. v. Bryant & Reaves, Inc., 442 F. Supp. 838, 1977 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 12222 (N.D. Miss. 1977).

Service of process under this section was available to a non-resident plaintiff in an action against a non-resident corporate defendant arising from an injury arising in Mississippi. Daniels v. McDonough Power Equipment, Inc., 430 F. Supp. 1203, 1977 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 16159 (S.D. Miss. 1977).

In an action against a foreign corporation alleging that the corporation interfered in a business relationship between its Mississippi subsidiary and a Mississippi resident, a foreign merger agreement involving the subsidiary was not a contract with a Mississippi resident within the meaning of this section; The corporation’s exercise of its legitimate business interest in selling its subsidiary did not constitute a tort against a Mississippi resident within the meaning of this section; The corporation was not doing business in Mississippi within the meaning of this section, even though its Mississippi subsidiary was wholly owned, the subsidiary’s financing had to be obtained through the corporation, the subsidiary’s long range plans were submitted to the corporation for approval, the boards of directors of the two corporations were nearly identical and board meetings of the subsidiary were held at the corporate offices of the corporation, where the formal legal requirements dividing the two corporations were scrupulously observed, where the subsidiary was recognized as a corporate entity legally distinct from its parent, where the subsidiary was adequately financed, where the subsidiary paid all of the salaries of its employees and its own expenses, including payment for services rendered by its parent, where there was no commingling of funds, and where the subsidiary maintained its own books, records, and a balance sheet. Johnson v. Warnaco, Inc., 426 F. Supp. 44, 1976 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 13363 (S.D. Miss. 1976).

Nonresident limited partners of a nonresident limited partnership doing business in the state could not be made subject to jurisdiction of the state’s courts in an action against the partnership where they had done none of the acts specified by the long arm statute (§13-3-57) as prerequisites to jurisdiction, and had paid their indebtedness to the partnership in full, thus, under the statute governing circumstances in which limited partners are proper parties to a suit against the partnership (§§79-13-3,79-13-51), not being subject to being made parties. Ga-Pak Lumber Co. v. Nalley, 337 So. 2d 1270, 1976 Miss. LEXIS 1615 (Miss. 1976).

Where the notice of service of a non-resident corporation was delivered to the president of the corporation in accord with statutory requirements, and an interlocutory default judgment was entered upon failure of the defendant to answer, the default judgment could not be set aside on the grounds that the president of the corporation mislaid the notice due to anxiety over his wife’s recent death. Western Chain Co. v. Brownlee, 317 So. 2d 418, 1975 Miss. LEXIS 1758 (Miss. 1975).

Where the consideration for a contract was the agreement between the plaintiff and the nonresident defendant to cause a merger of Mississippi and Arkansas corporations, which would require a partial performance of the contract by both plaintiff and defendant in Mississippi, the defendant was within the reach of this statute. Pierce v. Alleluia Cushion Co., 397 F. Supp. 338, 1975 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 11329 (N.D. Miss. 1975).

The Mississippi long-arm statute could be utilized in an action for the wrongful death, pursuant to Code 1972, §11-7-13, of a nonresident decedent, where the plaintiff was a Mississippi resident suing as administrator of the decedent’s estate pursuant to letters of administration granted by a Mississippi chancery court. McAlpin v. James McKoane Enterprises, Inc., 395 F. Supp. 937, 1975 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 12161 (N.D. Miss. 1975), disapproved, Estate of Portnoy v. Cessna Aircraft Co., 730 F.2d 286, 1984 U.S. App. LEXIS 23318 (5th Cir. Miss. 1984).

This statute (formerly § 1437, Mississippi Code (1942)) does not require the attachment of the complaint to the summons. Western Chain Co. v. American Mut. Liability Ins. Co., 527 F.2d 986, 1975 U.S. App. LEXIS 11213 (7th Cir. Ill. 1975).

Where the Associated Press sent a dispatch from Louisiana to its Mississippi members incorrectly indicating that plaintiff, a Mississippi resident, had been convicted of marijuana possession, the district court had jurisdiction of plaintiff’s libel action under the terms of the amended Mississippi long-arm statute; the AP’s contacts with Mississippi were sufficient to justify, under the due process clause, Mississippi’s exercise of its jurisdiction. Edwards v. Associated Press, 512 F.2d 258, 1975 U.S. App. LEXIS 14945 (5th Cir. Miss. 1975).

A nonresident executor administering an estate in and under the supervision of the Tennessee courts, whose only contact with Mississippi touching upon the court administration of the estate had been the probation of the foreign will and the recording of a certified copy of the record of his appointment and qualification in Tennessee, had such minimal and tenuous contact with Mississippi as to be outside the coverage of this section [Code 1972, §13-3-57]. Riley v. Communications Consultants, Inc., 385 F. Supp. 296, 1974 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 11784 (N.D. Miss. 1974).

The long-arm statute was clearly enacted for the benefit of residents only, and it has not been expanded through the process of judicial interpretation to include nonresident plaintiffs not qualified to do business within the state; there is no defect under federal constitutional standards for limiting the long-arm statute to resident plaintiffs, since the state is not obligated to make its courts available to nonresidents, who themselves are not doing business in the state, to sue other nonresidents. American International Pictures, Inc. v. Morgan, 371 F. Supp. 528, 1974 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 12866 (N.D. Miss. 1974).

Process served pursuant to §13-3-57 is not valid or effective to subject the nonresident defendant to in personam jurisdiction unless the cause of action arises from, or is connected with, the consummation of some transaction or performance of some act within the state by such nonresident defendant. Holvitz v. Norfleet--Ashley, Inc., 369 F. Supp. 394, 1973 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 10631 (N.D. Miss. 1973).

Code 1942, § 1437 could not be used to sustain in personam jurisdiction over individual defendants on grounds that the activities of the individual defendants in connection with the contract performed, or to be performed in Mississippi by the defendant corporation, created a situation under which this section would reach the individual defendants’ in personam jurisdiction, since jurisdiction over individual officers and employees of a corporation cannot be predicated merely upon the jurisdiction over the corporation itself. Webb v. Culberson, Heller & Norton, Inc., 357 F. Supp. 923, 1973 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 13866 (N.D. Miss. 1973).

A “single contract” is sufficient to confer jurisdiction of a nonresident under Code 1942, § 1437. Kaydee Metal Products Corp. v. Sintex Machine Tool Mfg. Corp., 342 F. Supp. 902, 1972 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 13806 (N.D. Miss. 1972).

An administratrix, residing outside and being a nonresident of the state of Mississippi has, by her actions in administering an estate in Mississippi, subjected herself to process under Code 1942, § 1437, on a cause of action arising out of an automobile accident which occurred in Alabama. Galloway v. Korcekwa, 339 F. Supp. 801, 1972 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 14938 (N.D. Miss. 1972).

The statutory purpose is to afford to Mississippi residents a right of action locally against the nonresident who commits a tort, in whole or in part, in this state against a resident of this state, and to limit the reach of this section [Code 1942, § 1437] and products liability cases “to injuries in this state” unduly restricts the clear meaning of the statute. Breedlove v. Beech Aircraft Corp., 334 F. Supp. 1361, 1971 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 11662 (N.D. Miss. 1971).

There is no statutory requirement that the part of the tort which causes the injury be committed in Mississippi; the words require only that a part of the tort be committed in this state. Breedlove v. Beech Aircraft Corp., 334 F. Supp. 1361, 1971 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 11662 (N.D. Miss. 1971).

Through the enactment of Code 1942, § 1438, actions brought pursuant to this section [Code 1942, § 1437] shall be issued and served in the same manner and with the same effect as process issued and served pursuant to Code 1942, § 9352-61. McKnight v. Dyer, 331 F. Supp. 343, 1971 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 12274 (N.D. Miss. 1971).

Under Code 1942, § 1438, providing that service of process made upon the secretary of state shall be made in the same manner and by the same procedure and with the same force and effect as is provided by the nonresident motorist statute as amended and supplemented, service can be made pursuant to a subsequently inserted provision of the nonresident motorist statute, Code 1942, § 9352-61, so as to permit service upon any person who is a nonresident at the time the action is filed, even though at the time of the incident giving rise to the action, such person was a resident of Mississippi. McKnight v. Dyer, 331 F. Supp. 343, 1971 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 12274 (N.D. Miss. 1971).

In a malpractice action against a nonresident doctor who resided in Mississippi at the time of the alleged tort, the court held that the addition in this section [Code 1942, § 1438] of the words “as amended and supplemented” indicate that the legislature intended to give those suing nonresidents under Code 1942, § 1437 the same rights to service and effect of process as are given to those suing nonresident motorists under Code 1942, § 9352-61. McKnight v. Dyer, 331 F. Supp. 343, 1971 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 12274 (N.D. Miss. 1971).

It is well settled that the Mississippi “long arm” statute applies to individual as well as to corporate defendants. Alford v. Whitsel, 322 F. Supp. 358, 1971 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 14729 (N.D. Miss. 1971).

For amenability of a nonresident individual defendant to process served pursuant to the Mississippi “long arm” statute, the nonresident must purposefully do some act or consummate some transaction in Mississippi, the cause of action must arise from or be connected with such act or transaction, and the assumption of jurisdiction by the state must not offend traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice, consideration being given to the quality, nature, and extent of the activity in Mississippi, the relative convenience of the parties, the benefits and protection of the laws of the state afforded the respective parties, and the basic equities of the situation. Alford v. Whitsel, 322 F. Supp. 358, 1971 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 14729 (N.D. Miss. 1971).

The personal appearance of the defendant before a Mississippi grand jury, and his alleged malicious and willful withholding of facts which would have exonerated the plaintiff, a Mississippi resident, from criminal charges relating to a check given the defendant by the plaintiff, constituted the commission of a tort within Mississippi against a resident of the state, within the meaning of the Mississippi “long arm” statute. Alford v. Whitsel, 322 F. Supp. 358, 1971 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 14729 (N.D. Miss. 1971).

In applying the so-called long-arm statute the courts should be sensitive to any conflict between the letter of the law and traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice, and if the latter is offended, the former may have to yield. Beacham v. Beacham, 243 So. 2d 62, 1971 Miss. LEXIS 1505 (Miss. 1971).

Where a nonresident corporation signed a sales representative agreement with a resident of Mississippi, which resident fully performed the contract in the state by making sales of the corporation’s products and furnishing other information to the corporation as well as supervising the installation of the product, which installation required representatives of the corporation to make numerous trips to the facility site to assist in the installation, the corporation was amenable to the process and jurisdiction of the courts of Mississippi in a suit by the Mississippi resident to recover commissions allegedly due under the agreement. Beacham v. Beacham, 243 So. 2d 62, 1971 Miss. LEXIS 1505 (Miss. 1971).

In a suit to recover commissions allegedly due under a sales representative agreement between the plaintiff and the defendant, a nonresident corporate manufacturer, where the defendant made a special appearance and moved for dismissal of the suit on the ground that it was not subject to process of the court, which motion was overruled, the corporate defendant’s action in answering the bill of complaint and in participating in defending the suit did not estop it from making a further attack on the court’s jurisdiction on appeal. Beacham v. Beacham, 243 So. 2d 62, 1971 Miss. LEXIS 1505 (Miss. 1971).

The Mississippi statutes providing for the method of service on a resident or a qualified foreign corporation, the “doing business” statute, and the statute providing for substituted service on any corporation doing business in the state, must be read together, and such reading leads to the inescapable conclusion that effective process under these statutes presupposes a factual determination that the foreign corporation is doing business in the state of Mississippi. Hyde Constr. Co. v. Koehring Co., 321 F. Supp. 1193, 1969 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 13680 (D. Miss. 1969).

A foreign corporation qualified to do business in Mississippi is a resident within the meaning of subd (a) of this section [Code 1942, § 1437] so that it may bring a suit under the terms of the section. C. H. Leavell & Co. v. Doster, 211 So. 2d 813, 1968 Miss. LEXIS 1276 (Miss. 1968).

Nonresident plaintiff corporations qualified to do business in Mississippi are residents of the state within the meaning of the first category mentioned in subd (a) of this section [Code 1942, § 1437]. C. H. Leavell & Co. v. Doster, 211 So. 2d 813, 1968 Miss. LEXIS 1276 (Miss. 1968).

A foreign corporation qualified to do business under the laws of Mississippi should have the same privileges and advantages of invoking the aid of the courts of this state under this section [Code 1942, § 1437] as resident corporations if they are to have equal protection of the laws. C. H. Leavell & Co. v. Doster, 211 So. 2d 813, 1968 Miss. LEXIS 1276 (Miss. 1968).

A foreign corporation qualified to do business in Mississippi may not be sued under the terms of this section [Code 1942, § 1437] because a foreign corporation, to be reached by the section, must not be qualified as doing business in the state. C. H. Leavell & Co. v. Doster, 211 So. 2d 813, 1968 Miss. LEXIS 1276 (Miss. 1968).

It is now settled that there is little reason to distinguish between nonresident individuals and foreign corporations with respect to obtaining jurisdiction over them under this section [Code 1942, § 1437]. Smith v. Barker, 306 F. Supp. 1173, 1968 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 7727 (N.D. Miss. 1968).

The “long arm” amendment to this section [Code 1942, § 1437] which became effective July 1, 1964 does not apply retrospectively to torts committed prior to its effective date. Mladinich v. Kohn, 186 So. 2d 481, 1966 Miss. LEXIS 1321 (Miss. 1966).

The three basic factors which must coincide if jurisdiction is to be entertained by courts of this state over nonresident individuals and foreign corporations are (1) the nonresident defendant or foreign corporation must purposely do some act or consummate some transaction in the state, (2) the cause of action must arise from, or be connected with, such act or transaction, and (3) the assumption of jurisdiction by the state must not offend traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice, consideration being given to the quality, nature and extent of activity in this state, the relative convenience of the parties, the benefits and protection of the laws of this state afforded the respective parties, and the basic equities of the situation. Mladinich v. Kohn, 250 Miss. 138, 164 So. 2d 785, 1964 Miss. LEXIS 451 (Miss. 1964); Republic-Transcon Industries, Inc. v. Templeton, 253 Miss. 132, 175 So. 2d 185, 1965 Miss. LEXIS 975 (Miss. 1965); Breckenridge v. Time, Inc., 253 Miss. 835, 179 So. 2d 781, 1965 Miss. LEXIS 1059 (Miss. 1965).

This is a remedial statute to be liberally construed and applied without enlarging upon its provisions. Mississippi Chemical Corp. v. Vulcan-Cincinnati, Inc., 224 F. Supp. 11, 1963 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 6402 (S.D. Miss. 1963), aff'd, 338 F.2d 662, 1964 U.S. App. LEXIS 3743 (5th Cir. Miss. 1964).

In the absence of motion attacking the service of process under this section [Code 1942, § 1438], the court, although informed that the secretary of state had failed to mail a copy of the summons to defendant, may properly proceed with the trial. Aerial Agricultural Service v. Richard, 264 F.2d 341, 1959 U.S. App. LEXIS 4250 (5th Cir. Miss. 1959).

While the statute forbidding access by foreign corporations to the courts of the state because of their failure to comply with statutory provisions for doing business is strictly construed so that exclusion from access to the courts of the state requires a strong showing that the statute has been violated, the statute providing for services on a designated agent where, without a compliance with the statute, a corporation has undertaken to do business in state is liberally construed since otherwise citizens of a state would be forced to resort to another jurisdiction in order to maintain suits against foreign corporations as to matters arising out of transactions had within the statute. Mississippi Wood Preserving Co. v. Rothschild, 201 F.2d 233, 1953 U.S. App. LEXIS 2290 (5th Cir. Miss. 1953).

This section [Code 1942, §§ 1437, 1438] applies to contract, as well as to tort actions, growing out of business or acts done within the state. Davis-Wood Lumber Co. v. Ladner, 210 Miss. 863, 50 So. 2d 615, 1951 Miss. LEXIS 322 (Miss. 1951).

Change of status of defendant from that of resident of this state at time of entering into contract on which suit is brought to that of nonresident at time suit is filed does not affect validity of service of process under this section [Code 1942, § 1438] when defendant is still engaged in same business within state. Condon v. Snipes, 205 Miss. 306, 38 So. 2d 752, 1949 Miss. LEXIS 433 (Miss. 1949).

This statute is to be given a prospective rather than a retrospective operation and therefore does not apply to an action arising out of an automobile accident occurring prior to its enactment. Bouchillon v. Jordan, 40 F. Supp. 354, 1941 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 2937 (D. Miss. 1941).

3. What constitutes doing business within state.

Trial court erred in granting a limited liability company’s (LLC) motion to dismiss due to lack of personal jurisdiction because it was “doing business” within the State under the long-arm statute; the LLC collaborated with a corporation about creating a sports-training facility in the State, communicated and planned furthering its formation, participated in meetings in the State, substantially participated in the creation of a Mississippi company, and became members of that company. Joshua Props., LLC v. D1 Sports Holdings, LLC, 130 So.3d 1089, 2014 Miss. LEXIS 70 (Miss. 2014).

Personal jurisdiction over a parent corporation of an extended care facility was lacking under Miss. Code Ann. §13-3-57 in an action alleging negligence in the facility’s care of a decedent, since there was no showing of sufficient domination by the parent to impute the alleged negligence of the facility to the parent; although the facility was a wholly owned subsidiary of the parent and the entities shared common officers, the parent and the facility meticulously observed corporate formalities in that they did not commingle funds, did not pool insurance coverage, and did not share financial books, records, or bank accounts, and the facility independently operated its own daily activities and paid its own operating expenses. Samples v. Vanguard Healthcare, LLC, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 70822 (N.D. Miss. Sept. 18, 2008).

Where a pharmaceutical company sought a declaratory judgment regarding patent infringement, personal jurisdiction was lacking over a laboratory under a long-arm statute, Miss. Code Ann. §13-3-57, as the laboratory’s mere plan to reintroduce a drug, which might place it into the state’s stream of commerce, did not qualify as doing business there. Further, the laboratory’s correspondence and license negotiations with the company did not support a finding that it was doing business in Mississippi as such would be inconsistent with due process. Cypress Pharm., Inc. v. Tiber Labs., LLC, 504 F. Supp. 2d 129, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 52454 (S.D. Miss.), transferred, 527 F. Supp. 2d 1373, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 67381 (N.D. Ga. 2007).

Mobile home moving service licensed to do business in Mississippi, which had performed some moves into or out of Mississippi over the years, was not “doing business” in the state for purposes of personal judgment in an out-of-state collision case, unrelated to any business in Mississippi. Williams v. Bud Wilson's Mobile Home Serv., 887 So. 2d 830, 2004 Miss. App. LEXIS 670 (Miss. Ct. App.), cert. denied, 888 So. 2d 1177, 2004 Miss. LEXIS 1437 (Miss. 2004).

Summary judgment granted against two corporations licensed to do business in the State of Mississippi on the grounds that the State’s three-year statute of limitations did not apply to an incident that occurred in the State because the corporations were foreign corporations was reversed because the two corporations should have been considered residents for purposes of invocation of the State statute of limitations, in much the same way as the corporations would be able to invoke the use of the Mississippi long arm statute, Miss. Code Ann. §13-3-57. St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co. v. Paw Paw's Camper City, Inc., 346 F.3d 153, 2003 U.S. App. LEXIS 20081 (5th Cir. Miss. 2003).

An oral contract for goods to be manufactured in Mississippi for sale to the defendant in Florida was sufficient to support a finding that there was a contract to be performed in part in Mississippi. American Cable Corp. v. Trilogy Communs., Inc., 754 So. 2d 545, 2000 Miss. App. LEXIS 5 (Miss. Ct. App. 2000).

The parties’ agreement that an oral contract existed for goods to be manufactured in Mississippi for sale to the defendant was sufficient to support a finding that there was a contract to be performed in part in Mississippi, therefore, the defendant was amenable to suit under the long-arm statute. American Cable Corp. v. Trilogy Communs., Inc., 1999 Miss. App. LEXIS 566 (Miss. Ct. App. Sept. 14, 1999), op. withdrawn, sub. op., different results reached on reh'g, 754 So. 2d 545, 2000 Miss. App. LEXIS 5 (Miss. Ct. App. 2000).

A corporation which owned drug stores in Louisiana did not do business in Mississippi so as to be subject to long arm jurisdiction since there were no substantial, continuous, and deliberate contacts with Mississippi, no purposeful availment of the Mississippi market, and no invocation of the benefits and protections of Mississippi laws, notwithstanding that the corporation paid for advertising by a separate corporation in Mississippi and ran advertisements on Louisiana television stations which broadcasted into Mississippi. Kekko v. K & B La. Corp., 716 So. 2d 682, 1998 Miss. App. LEXIS 504 (Miss. Ct. App. 1998).

In an action for alleged interference with an employment contract, a foreign defendant was not amenable to suit under the “doing business” provision of Mississippi’s long-arm statute (§13-3-57) on the sole basis that the contract was mailed to the plaintiff at his home address in Mississippi. Peterson v. Test Int'l, E.C., 904 F. Supp. 574, 1995 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 17100 (S.D. Miss. 1995).

In a personal injury action by a Mississippi plaintiff arising from an automobile accident that occurred in Tennessee, the nonresident defendant’s consummation of an agreement to breed her dog in Mississippi, and her installation of a telephone line at a friend’s home in Mississippi when she briefly stayed there, were insufficient to meet the “doing business” prong of the Mississippi long arm statute (§13-3-57) where the Tennessee automobile accident was not incidental to the defendant’s activities in Mississippi. McLaurin v. Nazar, 883 F. Supp. 112, 1995 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 5550 (N.D. Miss.), aff'd, 71 F.3d 878, 1995 U.S. App. LEXIS 36819 (5th Cir. Miss. 1995).

Plaintiff failed to demonstrate nexus between defendant product manufacturer’s activities in Mississippi and plaintiff’s cause of action, as required for assertion of jurisdiction under “doing business” clause of §13-3-57, where only allegations contained in complaint were that defendant sells products nationwide and that these products have been purchased by Mississippians. Madison v. Revlon, Inc., 789 F. Supp. 758, 1991 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 20080 (S.D. Miss. 1991).

In action by truckdriver injured when rubber strap broke as he attempted to attach it to tarp, against Ohio manufacturer of strap which sold strap to Alabama company which in turn sold it to plaintiff’s employee, evidence failed to establish that manufacturer was “doing business” in Mississippi so as to bring it within personal jurisdiction under statute, where there was no evidence that manufacturer had systematic and continuous contact with Mississippi. Yates v. Turzin, 786 F. Supp. 594, 1991 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 20499 (S.D. Miss. 1991).

Federal Court in Mississippi properly exercised in personam jurisdiction over publishers of swinger magazines in action for defamation and invasion of privacy for publication of personal ad pertaining to plaintiff because such publication constituted commission of tort in the state which would be deemed to be doing business in the state. Mize v. Harvey Shapiro Enterprises, Inc., 714 F. Supp. 220, 1989 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 6078 (N.D. Miss. 1989).

The Mississippi court had personal jurisdiction over an out-of-state bank since the bank’s financing of a customer’s gas well operation in Mississippi was an action purposefully directed toward Mississippi. By perfecting its security interests in the customer’s assets in Mississippi through filing financing statements and deeds of trust, the bank purposefully availed itself of the protection of Mississippi law. Wilkinson v. Mercantile Nat'l Bank, 529 So. 2d 616, 1988 Miss. LEXIS 335 (Miss. 1988).

Test to determine jurisdiction under “doing business” prong of long-arm statute is: (1) nonresident defendant or foreign corporation must purposefully do some act or consummate some transaction in forum state; (2) cause of action must arise from, or be connected with, such action or transaction; and (3) assumption of jurisdiction by forum state must not offend traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice, consideration being given to quality, common nature, and extent of activity in forum state, relative convenience of parties, benefits and protection of laws of forum state afforded respective parties, and basic equities of situation. Rittenhouse v. Mabry, 832 F.2d 1380, 1987 U.S. App. LEXIS 15605 (5th Cir. Miss. 1987), but see, Gross v. Chevrolet Country, 655 So. 2d 873, 1995 Miss. LEXIS 226 (Miss. 1995), cert. denied, 516 U.S. 1094, 116 S. Ct. 817, 133 L. Ed. 2d 761, 1996 U.S. LEXIS 776 (U.S. 1996).

Physician and professional corporation were not amenable to jurisdiction under doing business prong of Mississippi’s Long-Arm statute because relevant facts did not satisfy tri-partite test established to determine jurisdiction. There was no evidence in record that professional corporation ever purposefully did some act or consummated some transaction in Mississippi, instead confining practice to hospitals in Memphis, and corporation did not solicit patients from Mississippi or advertise there; based on this, plaintiff had not even shown that professional corporation met first element of tri-partite test. Rittenhouse v. Mabry, 832 F.2d 1380, 1987 U.S. App. LEXIS 15605 (5th Cir. Miss. 1987), but see, Gross v. Chevrolet Country, 655 So. 2d 873, 1995 Miss. LEXIS 226 (Miss. 1995), cert. denied, 516 U.S. 1094, 116 S. Ct. 817, 133 L. Ed. 2d 761, 1996 U.S. LEXIS 776 (U.S. 1996).

Physician was not subject to jurisdiction, although physician had consummated transaction in Mississippi by purchasing property there, not related to lawsuit; therefore, nexus requirement was not satisfied. Rittenhouse v. Mabry, 832 F.2d 1380, 1987 U.S. App. LEXIS 15605 (5th Cir. Miss. 1987), but see, Gross v. Chevrolet Country, 655 So. 2d 873, 1995 Miss. LEXIS 226 (Miss. 1995), cert. denied, 516 U.S. 1094, 116 S. Ct. 817, 133 L. Ed. 2d 761, 1996 U.S. LEXIS 776 (U.S. 1996).

Out of state company which entered into contract with in-state company, which contract required at least partial performance within state, has purposefully availed itself of privileges of conducting activities within state and its connection with forum was such that it should reasonably have anticipated being brought into court within state, as certain elements of contract and subsequent agreements were to be performed by out of state company within state relating to specifications of work to be done and testing of completed work, all to be performed within state. Sorrels Steel Co. v. Great Southwest Corp., 651 F. Supp. 623, 1986 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 20575 (S.D. Miss. 1986).

Plaintiffs failed to make prima facie showing that corporate veil of subsidiary corporation should be preliminarily pierced for purposes of attaining long-arm jurisdiction over parent corporation or individual alleged to have been president of both corporations when cause of action arose, where, although there existed commonality of ownership or officers of both corporations, plaintiffs made no attempt to satisfy requirement of particularized factual allegations tending to show applicability of “piercing” doctrine, and they have not pled specific facts sufficient to establish that subsidiary corporation at anytime operated as alter ego of corporate officer. McCardle v. Arkansas Log Homes, Inc., 633 F. Supp. 897, 1986 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 28846 (S.D. Miss. 1986).

Mississippi court lacks jurisdiction over out-of-state corporate defendant where corporate defendant has no contract with resident of state to be performed in whole or in part by any party in state and the corporate defendant has no other contacts with state; Mississippi court lacks jurisdiction over corporate defendant in transaction arising over sale of out-of-state property which took place outside of Mississippi where only arguable contact with State of Mississippi is assembly and transfer of collateral to plaintiff in Mississippi which would transpire between plaintiff and trustee bank. Cappaert v. Preferred Equities Corp., 613 F. Supp. 264, 1985 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 17906 (S.D. Miss. 1985).

Miss. Code §13-3-57 does not confer jurisdiction over out-of-state corporate defendant in action for fraud, negligent misrepresentation, breach of fiduciary duties, and violations of federal commodities laws, notwithstanding plaintiff’s contentions (1) that his economic loss in Mississippi causes tort to have occurred in Mississippi, and (2) that defendant’s advertisement in Wall Street Journal circulated and read by plaintiff in Mississippi, telephone calls to and from Mississippi, and fact that plaintiff’s checks were drawn on his Mississippi account are sufficient bases for exercise of in personam jurisdiction. Paul v. International Precious Metals Corp., 613 F. Supp. 174, 1985 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 18214 (S.D. Miss. 1985).

When defendant in securities action took funds beyond borders of Mississippi in violation of injunction and in furtherance of his plan to secrete funds with knowledge and consent of its agents, such action satisfied in-state requirement of §13-3-57 as far as agents are concerned. Waffenschmidt v. Mackay, 763 F.2d 711, 1985 U.S. App. LEXIS 30619 (5th Cir. Miss. 1985), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 1056, 106 S. Ct. 794, 88 L. Ed. 2d 771, 1986 U.S. LEXIS 2324 (U.S. 1986).

Before personal jurisdiction may be exercised under “doing-business” provision of §13-3-57, there must be sufficient nexus between activities of defendant within state and plaintiff’s cause of action; mere fact that defendant power saw manufacturer markets its products nationally and that some of these goods find their way into Mississippi is not sufficient nexus to subject manufacturer, which is corporation domiciled in Pennsylvania and is division of Maryland corporation, to in-personam jurisdiction under “doing-business” provision. Smith v. De Walt Products Corp., 743 F.2d 277, 1984 U.S. App. LEXIS 17911 (5th Cir. Miss. 1984).

Contacts between defendant foreign corporation and forum state in wrongful death and negligence action were insufficient to assert in personam jurisdiction over defendant where contacts consisted of sending defendant’s chief executive officer to forum state for contract-negotiation session, accepting checks drawn on bank located in forum state, purchasing equipment and services from a manufacturer located in forum state, and sending personnel to manufacturer’s facilities for training in the state. Helicopteros Nacionales de Colombia, S. A. v. Hall, 466 U.S. 408, 104 S. Ct. 1868, 80 L. Ed. 2d 404, 1984 U.S. LEXIS 68 (U.S. 1984).

Publishing corporation’s regular circulation of magazines in forum state is sufficient to support assertion of jurisdiction in libel action based on contents of magazine, even where single publication rule is applied. Keeton v. Hustler Magazine, Inc., 465 U.S. 770, 104 S. Ct. 1473, 79 L. Ed. 2d 790, 1984 U.S. LEXIS 40 (U.S. 1984).

In an action brought by a bank to foreclose its deed of trust executed by a corporation and secured by the personal guarantees of five of the corporation’s stockholders, the chancery court had jurisdiction under §13-3-57 over a non-resident stockholder, even though the instruments had been executed out of state, since they were to be performed in Mississippi, were construed according to Mississippi law, and were also excepted in Mississippi. First Mississippi Nat'l Bank v. S & K Enterprises, Inc., 460 So. 2d 839, 1984 Miss. LEXIS 2008 (Miss. 1984).

In an action by a Mississippi citizen charging breach of contract and fraud against a Texas corporation arising out of an oral agreement for an exclusive dealership to sell the corporation’s product in Mississippi, the trial court erred in granting the corporation’s motion to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction where, by purposefully availing itself of the privilege of doing business with a Mississippi resident, accepting several orders made through the resident and shipping its product to the purchasers in Mississippi, the corporation subjected itself to the jurisdiction of the courts of Mississippi under the long arm statute. Murray v. Huggers Mfg., Inc., 398 So. 2d 1323, 1981 Miss. LEXIS 2026 (Miss. 1981).

Personal jurisdiction over Louisiana corporation existed in Mississippi under §13-3-57 where Louisiana corporation did business of a systematic and ongoing nature in Mississippi, plaintiffs’ cause of action was incident to that business activity, and assertion of jurisdiction over Louisiana corporation did not offend notions of fairness or substantial justice. Aycock v. Louisiana Aircraft, Inc., 617 F.2d 432, 1980 U.S. App. LEXIS 17435 (5th Cir. Miss. 1980), cert. denied, 450 U.S. 917, 101 S. Ct. 1361, 67 L. Ed. 2d 343, 1981 U.S. LEXIS 829 (U.S. 1981).

A nonresident manufacturer of grinding machines was not amenable to suit in Mississippi by a Louisiana resident who had worked in Mississippi as an operator of such machine and who had allegedly become permanently disabled as a result of the constant inhalation of dust particles at work, where, inter alia, defendant manufacturer did not have a single employee in the state when the cause of action accrued or when the complaint was filed, even though a single corporate employee subsequently moved to the state and was served with process, and where defendant had never paid state taxes or availed itself of the protection of any state laws; further, plaintiff had only availed himself of the protection of Mississippi’s law to the limited extent that he worked and traveled in the state. Washington v. Norton Mfg., Inc., 588 F.2d 441, 1979 U.S. App. LEXIS 17345 (5th Cir. Miss.), cert. denied, 442 U.S. 942, 99 S. Ct. 2886, 61 L. Ed. 2d 313, 1979 U.S. LEXIS 2186 (U.S. 1979).

The “doing business” provision of the Mississippi long-arm statute cannot be invoked by a nonresident plaintiff in a diversity action against a nonresident defendant and the statute, so construed, does not deny a nonresident plaintiff privileges and immunities secured under the federal constitution. Breeland v. Hide-A-Way Lake, Inc., 585 F.2d 716, 1978 U.S. App. LEXIS 7655 (5th Cir. Miss. 1978).

A Mississippi court had jurisdiction under §13-3-57 in a breach of contract action involving the sale of a tractor by a non-resident seller to a resident purchaser where the contract was made by phone, payment was sent from Mississippi to the non-resident seller, and the seller delivered the tractor through its agent to the purchaser in Mississippi. Miller v. Glendale Equipment & Supply, Inc., 344 So. 2d 736, 1977 Miss. LEXIS 2448 (Miss. 1977).

A foreign corporation which made advances by way of loans to a Mississippi corporation which were used by the latter corporation in its Mississippi operation was not doing business in Mississippi within the meaning of this section [Code 1972, §13-3-57]. Riley v. Communications Consultants, Inc., 385 F. Supp. 296, 1974 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 11784 (N.D. Miss. 1974).

It is no longer necessary, in a products liability claim, to determine whether the manufacturer is “doing business”, as interpreted by earlier Mississippi decisions, to render the nonresident manufacturer subject to suit and jurisdiction under the state’s “long-arm” statute. Breedlove v. Beech Aircraft Corp., 334 F. Supp. 1361, 1971 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 11662 (N.D. Miss. 1971).

A nonresident manufacturer, which had no representatives or any personal ties within the state, but which placed its manufactured heating unit in interstate commerce for distribution and sale to consumers, was subject to in personam jurisdiction within the state for purposes of a products liability action, when one of its heating units overheated and resulted in a fire which destroyed the plaintiffs’ home because of an alleged defect. Smith v. Temco, Inc., 252 So. 2d 212, 1971 Miss. LEXIS 1194 (Miss. 1971).

A New Orleans television broadcasting station whose programs were regularly heard by thousands of residents of the Mississippi Gulf coast area, which regularly reported news events in that area, solicited advertising there, and carried advertising by New Orleans stores directed especially toward Gulf coast residents, had sufficient minimum contacts in Mississippi to be amenable to process under this section [Code 1942, § 1437]. Casano v. WDSU--TV, Inc., 313 F. Supp. 1130, 1970 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 11516 (S.D. Miss. 1970), aff'd, 464 F.2d 3, 1972 U.S. App. LEXIS 8537 (5th Cir. Miss. 1972).

An action initiated in a Virginia federal district court by railroad companies against, among others, two car leasing companies for damages sustained as a result of a derailment occurring in Mississippi, would be transferred to a Mississippi federal court, where one of the companies leased cars with 6% of its lease revenue attributable to miles traveled over Mississippi tracks, and the other leasing company systematically solicited and did business within Mississippi and filed annual sales tax returns in Mississippi, and where, in both instances, such contacts were directly involved with the alleged cause of action; the contacts being sufficient to make the defendant leasing companies amenable, constitutionally, to service of process under the Mississippi “long arm” statute. Alabama G. S. R. Co. v. Allied Chemical Co., 312 F. Supp. 3, 1970 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 12090 (E.D. Va. 1970).

Where a Wisconsin corporate manufacturer had 10 distributors in Mississippi, made substantial sales to its distributors, sent an average of 17 employees into the state each year to give assistance to its distributors, had several pieces of equipment operating within the state, extended and secured credit within the state and made contracts with its distributors, giving it considerable control over their activities, the corporation was “doing business” in Mississippi within the “long-arm” and “doing business” statutes. Hyde Constr. Co. v. Koehring Co., 321 F. Supp. 1193, 1969 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 13680 (D. Miss. 1969).

Neither the fact that a manufacturer of equipment sold its products to Mississippi distributors or wholesalers, nor the fact that the manufacturer had employees on an average of 17 or 18 per year visiting within Mississippi to give assistance to the distributors in the sale of equipment manufactured by it and to help repair and adjust such equipment, standing alone, would compel a finding that the manufacturer is or was “doing business” within the state of Mississippi under the provisions of Code 1942, § 1437 or Code 1942, § 5345. Hyde Constr. Co. v. Koehring Co., 321 F. Supp. 1193, 1969 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 13680 (D. Miss. 1969).

Where a Wisconsin corporation had ten distributors within Mississippi, making substantial sales, had equipment in the state, and was a creditor secured by security instruments in the state, and where its employees frequently visited the state, the corporation had sufficient contacts within Mississippi to satisfy due process for the exercise of in personam jurisdiction. Hyde Constr. Co. v. Koehring Co., 321 F. Supp. 1193, 1969 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 13680 (D. Miss. 1969).

Where the contract between a nonresident distributor of foreign automobiles and a Mississippi dealer gave the distributor almost absolute control over the method and manner of doing business by the dealer, the distributor was doing business in Mississippi within the purview of this section [Code 1942, § 1437]. Easterling v. Volkswagen of America, Inc., 308 F. Supp. 966, 1969 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 13400 (S.D. Miss. 1969).

The importer of foreign automobiles located in another state which did not enter into any contract with anyone to perform any services or do any work within Mississippi, did no business and performed no acts within that state which would constitute its doing business there, did not deliver any automobiles to anyone within the state, entered into no contract with anyone therein, maintained no corporate records or corporate office, had no telephone listing, no agents or employees of any kind and no “minimum contact” with anyone 