The Observation Post
Peter Dickens
Posts about Louis Botha written by Peter Dickens
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The Observation Post
I’m currently researching the Torch Commando for an academic seminar I’m involved in on Sailor Malan to be held in Kimberley in September 2023, part of this is researching the ‘Nazification of the Afrikaner Right’ which triggered the returning South African WW2 veterans into mass protest when the National Party came to power in 1948. In doing this we uncover more “inconvenient history” and nothing more inconvenient to our general understanding is the sudden conversion of the much loved (in white South African circles at least) Prime Minister, General J.B.M. Hertzog … to Nazism.

What! No way, we’ve heard about all the ‘Pure’ Afrikaner Nationalists flirting with Nazim, how now General James Barry Munnik Hertzog? He was all about the South African ‘Union’ with Jan Smuts! This was no ‘Nazi ‘surely!

But I’m afraid here’s some more history that your Apartheid period schoolteacher either glossed over or had no clue about. But let’s cover a little of Hertzog’s background to this infamous U-turn first.

Hertzog’s political career in a nutshell

Much is written about General Barry Hertzog. A complex character, his popularity amongst Afrikaners was cemented when as a ‘Bittereinder’ Boer War General, he played a pivot role alongside Generals Louis Botha, Koos de la Rey and Jan Smuts in the Peace agreement that ended the Boer War. He joined Botha, and Smuts to form the South African Party (SAP) and was key to the establishment of ‘Union’ which saw a South African Union formed out of the two old Boer Republics and two primary British Colonies under the British family of nations, established in 1910, with Louis Botha as the country’s first Prime Minister.

Issues within the SAP would however start to come to head between Hertzog and Botha when Hertzog chose neutrality when the First World War broke out with Imperial Germany in 1914, Hertzog then joined a small minority of Ministers who voted against invading German South West Africa (the vote was 92: In Favour and 12: Against – going to war against Imperial Germany).

He would ultimately break away from the SAP later in 1914, found and head up the National Party after a disagreement with Prime Minister Botha, who favoured a ‘one-stream’ policy (English and Afrikaners together policy) as opposed to Hertzog’s ‘Two-Stream’ which sought a separate development of English and Afrikaans to protect Afrikaans culture (an early form of Apartheid). He would state of British Imperialism at this time, that he would remain committed to it, on the proviso that it benefited the white Afrikaner, the minute it did not, he would happily break with it.

After the Miner’s Strike (Rebellion) in 1922, Jan Smuts’ Prime Ministership and the reign of the SAP was lost, and Hertzog was able to come into power under the National Party banner by climbing into bed with the Labour Party (‘English’ white ‘Bolsheviks’ in effect) in a very uneasy coalition. Although clipped somewhat by the Labour Party as to the maintenance of Union under the British flag (Hertzog leaned to Republicanism) the ‘majority’ National Party was now able to pass extensive ‘segregation’ based legislation, and even change the national flag from the ‘Red Duster’ to the OBB (Orange, White and Blue) incorporating the old Boer Republic flags.

With respect to the South African Union, despite at times harbouring deep wishes for the re-establishment of Boer Republicanism and the possible unbundling of the Union. After the Belfour Declaration of 1926, of which Hertzog was the South African representative and signatory, he remained committed to Union, and to South Africa’s status as a British Dominion. Having played a key role in the agreement he believed that the Balfour Declaration of 1926 had granted sufficient autonomy to British dominions and negated any idea of any overt British Imperialism or influence playing any sort of significant role in South Africa’s future. South Africa (like Canada and Australia) had ‘figurehead’ British monarchist representation, but could crack on with its own laws and independence, completely free of Westminster.

The Balfour Declaration of 1926 would be Hertzog’s crowning achievement and personal pride. However dynamics within the electorate in by 1934, would see the Hertzog’s National Party out of its coalition with Labour and into “Fusion” with Jan Smuts’ opposition South African Party to maintain its authority and Hertzog’s Premiership over South Africa. The decision in this “Fusion” would see Hertzog and Smuts shelve their respective parties and form a new entity called The United Party (UP) – essentially to consolidate a white hegemony in South Africa with a better balance between white English and Afrikaans speakers.

By this stage Hertzog would become the longest serving South Africa Premier in history, presiding over no less than 4 governments. Hertzog’s mantra as Prime Minister revolved around the reconciliation of white Afrikaans and English speakers as the only viable path for South Africa, in this respect he became an intense supporter of “English Rights” and he continued his commitment to South Africa remaining a British Dominion. Hertzog and his Nationalist cabal within the UP are however still able to continue to with segregationist and race-based policies, albeit these were ‘softened’ significantly by the more liberal Smuts and his cabal.

Hertzog’s United Party cabinet, a curious mix of hard conservatives like Jan Kemp and democratic progressives like Jan Smuts and Patrick Duncan.

A small group of disgruntled nationalists ‘on the rump’ of the party would however break away from Hertzog’s nationalists and form the ‘Pure’ National Party or Herenigde Nasionale Party (Reunited National Party) – under the leadership of Dr. D.F. Malan. They would turn their vitriol against Hertzog, who they now regarded as traitorous as Smuts and a British puppet.

On the other hand, within The United Party, by the late 1930’s things had started to come to a head between Hertzog and Smuts. One issue was South West Africa (Namibia), now under South African Union mandate, and part of Smuts’ and the Union’s vision for ‘Greater South Africa’.

Hertzog’s right hand-man, Oswald Pirow – the National Party’s Minister of Defence and a devout Nazi supporter and admirer of Adolf Hitler had been sent by Hertzog to the Nazi German state on a number of ‘unofficial’ state visits – in doing so Pirow would meet Hitler and assure him of Afrikaner support of the Reich and that should there be war against the British – South Africa would remain neutral and should Germany win they could re-claim their old colony of South West Africa as German (something Hitler re-iterated to Pirow as a fait accompli).

Things would really come to a full head when Britain and France declared war against Nazi Germany in 1939. A Parliamentary three-way debate would take place at the beginning of September 1939 primarily between the two factions in the United Party and the Pure Nationalists now in opposition, as to whether South Africa should go to war against Germany or remain neutral. As the United Party was loaded with Hertzog’s Nationalists and there was also Malan’s Nationalists in opposition, Hertzog was very confident he had the majority to carry his motion of neutrality.

Prime Minister Hertzog would argue in his speech that Hitler’s invasion of Poland and annexations of Austria and Czechoslovakia was not an indication that Hitler aspired to world conquest, and Afrikaners well understood the Germans right to struggle for their own self-determination against the hostility of the outside world. Germany’s actions constituted no threat to South African security whatsoever and a policy of neutrality under these circumstances was the only logical policy to adopt.

General Smuts would reply in his speech that since the fate of South West Africa would depend on the outcome of the war, South Africa’s interests were virtually involved. Furthermore, South Africa was part of the Commonwealth whose fate now hung in the balance, to stand aside from the conflict would be to expose the whole civilised world to danger.

Smuts’ amendment to Hertzog’s Motion of Neutrality was carried by 80 votes to 67 votes on the 4th September 1939 and South Africa found itself at war against Nazi Germany. Surprised at the outcome, Hertzog promptly resigned, leaving the South African Premiership and the leadership of the United Party to General Jan Smuts and both he and some of his supporters left the United Party.

On the 23rd November 1939 the National Party’s “Malanites” and “Hertzognites” met and tried to reconcile their differences, they could not, the stumbling block was Republicanism – the ‘Pure’ Malanite Nationalists wanted a Republic regardless, Hertzog felt that a break from Union and the declaration of Republic could only take place if both Afrikaner and English whites were in agreement with the idea.

To the ‘Malanite’ Nationalists, the UP’s decision to go to war had vindicated their intensive segregationist policies which they had been following since 1934, and that Hertzog’s flirtation with English speakers ‘rights’ was delusional (the Malanites classified English speakers as secondary citizens, albeit they made up around 40% of the white population). Unable to reconcile, Dr. D.F. Malan seized the opportunity to take over leadership of all ‘Afrikanerdom’ and cast Hertzog out into the political wilderness. Hertzog tried again on 5th November 1940 at the National Party’s Convention to reaffirm his position on English-speakers rights, falling on deaf ears, he grabbed his hat and walked out of the National Party – forever.

In his retirement from politics, and in his private life, no longer walking ‘coalition’ and ‘fusion’ political tightropes and toeing UP party-political lines, Hertzog felt confident to reveal his true colours. He performed an especially remarkable volte-face (U-Turn) when, just after leaving the National Party over his defence of English-speakers’ rights, he suddenly became a champion of full-blown National Socialism (Nazism).

Angered by his treatment by Dr D.F. Malan and the endless machinations of National party politicians, General Hertzog issued a press statement in October 1941 in which he excoriated “liberal capitalism” and the democratic party system, while praising National Socialism, as in keeping with the traditions of the Afrikaner, and as a system National Socialism simply had to be adapted to South African needs under the oversight of a one-party state dictatorship.

General Hertzog’s press release led to frenzied activity as the various Afrikaner pro-Nazi and anti-war factions tried to reunite. In the months following Hertzog’s pro-Nazi declaration Germany was joined by Japan, and the Axis forces won victory after victory. This was the point where Smuts was at his most perilous and the Smuts Government really feared that all could easily be lost. The National Party at this point even gave Dr. D.F. Malan dictatorial powers over his party to meet the Hertzog induced “crisis.”

The United Party’s Secretary Louis Esselen even wrote to Sidney Waterson, the wartime Minister of Transport that General Hertzog was ready to be proclaimed saviour of the Afrikaner volk once the war was lost.

According to Hertzog’s officially appointed biographer C.M. van den Heever, in his ‘General J.B.M Hertzog’ published in 1944; the following on Hertzog’s volte-face towards Nazism over this period is noted:

“Hertzog became “bitterly disappointed in the democratic system, with its capitalist foundations and press influence, for he had cause to know that the voice of the majority is not only the voice of wisdom … he was convinced that a new world order was on its way … after his retirement … he became more inclined towards National Socialism, by which he meant the adaption of the old Free State model republic to modern conditions, using the best from recent European experiments. … He regarded National Socialism as suited to the moral and religious outlook of the Afrikaner; indeed, he considered that the constitution of the old Free State Republic was based on it.”

As it happened the Malan’s Nationalists were not able to reconcile with all the pro-Nazi Afrikaner factions – the Ossewabrandwag, the Greyshirts (and the other ‘shirt’ movements), the New Order and the Boerenasie. The ‘Greyshirts’ – The South African Christian National Socialist Movement (SANP) themselves were unable to convince anyone to accept their rather opportunistic leader Louis Weichardt to be appointed as Führer under Hertzog’s ceremonial patronage. Dr. D.F. Malan was certainly unwilling to be usurped by anybody as the leader of “Afrikanerdom” – he had fought very hard to get to this position and rid the party of Hertzog, and even the Ossewabrandwag leader Dr Hans van Rensberg, a man who also converted the idea of Führer for himself, would ultimately find himself on the wrong side of Malan.

Also, according to C.M. van den Heever, Hertzog became increasingly private and isolated. Also noted is that Hertzog started to become seriously ill a year later in 1942 passing away on the 21st November 1942 aged 74. Some apologists to Hertzog’s volte-face and sojourn with Nazism point to his illness and him becoming ‘senile’ – however he was also considered by many to have been well within his faculties a year before in 1941 when he published his pro-National Socialist press release.

That said, his turn to Nazism, given his entire political career and his strong position on ‘Fusion’ and equality between English and Afrikaans speakers along with ‘Union’ – his turn to Nazism seems a little out of character – his illness and realisation that he was closing in on his twilight years may have played a role in that he may have wanted ‘to get it off his chest’, or he may have genuinely become completely mentally discombobulated.

Like father like son?

However, it’s in his private life and not in his public life that we find a more compelling clue, and in retirement especially he was very much focussed on his family. They say ‘the apple does not fall far from the tree’ and here we find General Hertzog’s son, Dr. Albert Hertzog who followed his fathers’ footsteps into politics.

Dr. Albert Hertzog was a key figure in the Afrikaner Broederbond, in 1948 he stood as a National Party candidate, becoming a Minister of Parliament. Dr. Albert Hertzog’s views were extreme, he wanted to nationalise the gold mines and as devout National Socialist he looked to reforming Afrikaner and white labour unions – especially the Afrikaner Bond of Mineworkers. He even advocated state control of the entire economy.

So extremely right wing in his views, Dr. Albert Hertzog eventually found the National Party too ‘liberal’ for his liking and came to loggerheads with them – he was removed from the party, and he moved to establish the Herstigte Nasionale Party (Reconstituted National Party) or HNP in 1969 and head it up as a breakaway to the extreme right of the NP. Joining him as his deputy was Jaap Marais, an ex-Ossewabrandwag stalwart and National Party Minister, who along with Dr Albert Hertzog harboured such extreme National Socialist views that he too was removed from the NP.

The HNP bordered on a Neo-Nazi party in its mandate, advocating complete racial segregation with ‘Pure’ white Afrikaners in full control, dictatorial government, ‘Blood and Land’ ideals and the only official language in South Africa was to be Afrikaans. The party would see the likes of Eugène Terre’Blanche emerge from it (forming the neo-Nazi – afrikaner weerstandsbeweging – AWB) and believe it or not the HNP still exists in modern South Africa today with a mandate to revert to Verwoerdian Apartheid – such is our free democracy, but how they realistically intend to do this is anyone’s guess.

Legacy

General Hertzog was a much-loved leader, and that’s attested by his oversight over 4 governments, he carefully balanced Smuts’ ‘liberals’ against the more conservative Nationalists and as a result had a tenure over South Africa that even exceeded Smuts’ – and this has not been matched by a South African premier since – even in the modern democratic era. His disposition to ‘reconciliation’ of Afrikaners and English with Smuts alongside him was his downfall in the face of the extreme Afrikaner Nationalists advocating a return to ‘Krugerism’, and an all-encompassing Afrikaner ‘white’ Republic, with the emerging Broederbond advocating a Weimar Eugenics and National Socialist infused definition of Afrikaner ‘Christian Nationalism’ in addition.

Had it remained there, history would have been kinder to General Barry Hertzog. Unfortunately, his volte-face to accept National Socialism (Nazism) at the very end of his career will forever tarnish his legacy, as there is literally no way it can be shaken off. In this respect he joins the likes of all the other National Party members who embraced National Socialism as an ideology prior to and during the war (some even after the war) – B.J. Vorster, Oswald Pirow, Hendrik van den Bergh, Johannes von Moltke, P.O. Sauer, Frans Erasmus, C.R. Swart, P.W. Botha, Eric Louw, General Manie Maritz, Jaap Marais, Louis Weichardt, The Rev. Koot Vorster, Dr. Hendrik Verwoerd, Henning Klopper, Dr. Nico Diedericks, Piet Meyer, General Rudolph Hiemstra, Dr. Eben Dönges, Dr. Hans van Rensberg and even his own son … Dr. Albert Hertzog.

The Springbok Legion and the Torch Commando, consisting of returning World War 2 veterans repeatedly warned that the under the thin veneer of Afrikaner Nationalism dwelt full blown National Socialism (Nazism), and they pointed repeatedly at the likes of Pirow, Vorster, Erasmus, Verwoerd and Swart. At the helm of the National Party during the 1950’s was Dr. D.F. Malan, and he was just about the only Afrikaner Nationalist in the NP’s leader element who had not either partly or fully embraced Nazism as a political ideology prior to and during World War 2.

The National Party spent years covering up its National Socialist affiliations, declaring they were just “anti-British” during WW2 and promoted “neutrality” and not war with Nazi Germany – a “no, Nazi to be seen here .. move on!” approach. But this argument starts to really fall about when you look at General Hertzog’s conversion to Nazism in addition to the rest, the National Party’s founder, its most successful premier and cornerstone for the party for over three decades.

Written and Researched by Peter Dickens

References:

Pro-Nazi Subversion in South Africa, 1939-1941: By Patrick J. Furlong.

General J.B.M Hertzog: Official biography published 1944: By C.M. van den Heever.

The Rise of the South African Reich: 1964: By Brian Bunting

The White Tribe of Africa: 1981: By David Harrison

National Socialism and Nazism in South Africa: The case of L.T. Weichardt and his Greyshirt movements, 1933-1946: By Werner Bouwer

The Final Prize: The Broederbond by Norman Levy: South African History On-line (SAHO) War and the formation of Afrikaner nationalism: By Anne Samson: Great War in Africa Association

Colourised photo of Smuts contract Photos Redux

Related work:

Robey Leibbrand’s National Socialist Rebels Blood Oaths on the Führer principle

Oswald Pirow’s New Order: South Africa’s Nazi ‘Neuordnung’ and Oswald Pirow

Ossewabrandwag: “Mein Kampf shows the way to greatness for South Africa” – The Ossewabrandwag

Greyshirts: South Africa’s Nazi Party; The ‘Gryshemde’

Manie Martiz Boerenasie : A differing outlook

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An opposing view, a massacre, a revolt, and a Nazi.

There is an old joke in Afrikaner politics, put two Afrikaners in a room and they will come up with three political parties!

It’s funny because throughout history it has always proven to be very true, As a nation from the get go, literally from the Great Trek serious schisms have occurred within the Afrikaner culture – from the Great Trek’s “Vlugkommando” where two trekking parties could NOT agree a overall Commando Commander for an assault on the Zulu on the 6th April 1838 and decided instead to have two equal Commanders in equal positions of authority – the result (if you’re a military vet – you guessed it) .. a Zulu victory and the death of 10 Voortrekkers including Piet and Dirkie Uys – the surviving “Vlug” Kommando (meaning “Flee” or ‘run-away’ commando) splitting ways after the battle, both accusing each other of been “Veraaiers” (traitors) and heading off on their respective treks.

So, as humorous as it is seriously tragic, nothing represents this dichotomy of views more so than this image of Jan Smut’s Commando during the South African War (1899-1902) a.k.a. The 2nd Boer War. In it are two leaders who have – right upfront – two massively differing opinions, two completely differing views of life and vastly differing outlooks on the objects of the war and the country as a whole going forward. So much so that it is a surprise that Smuts was even able to command this Commando, that his is arguably one of the most successful ‘Bittereinder’ Commanders of the war is even more surprising, and testament to Smuts’ abilities.

Image: General Jan Smuts’ Commando during the South African War 1899-1902. Smuts and Maritz are seated in the centre – photo colourised by Jennifer Bosch

So, what’s with this leadership battle – what’s with these vastly differing views? The two people in this famous photograph are Manie Maritz and Jan Smuts, and the composition of the shot by the photographer ironically betrays their future feelings towards one another as an intense dislike of one another would emerge – and even here, almost by purpose, Smuts is seated opposite Maritz for a group portrait and both of them have their backs to one another looking the other way.

This differing view and outlook of these two men would forever taint Smuts’ commando with a mass murder of civilians – something your school history book would have conveniently glanced over – this differing outlook on Afrikanerdom would result in a serious schism in Afrikaner cultural fabric after World War 1, a schism that still exists to this day believe it or not and it would it would even add to the “Nazification” of the Afrikaner far right-wing prior to World War 2 and as a result create a diametrically opposing view of Afrikaner identity itself.

What, Maritz, Smuts … mass murder and Nazism – you smoking your socks again right Mr. Dickens? Well, no – let me explain … and if you are a fan of the 1914 Boer Revolt and a Boer Romantic looking to this revolt as the bedrock of Boer stoicism and independence – now is the time to look away, as this next bit is going to sting a little.

Let’s get this out upfront. General Manie Maritz, as the leader of the 1914 Boer revolt does not end up a very redeemable figure in history bathed in glory, instead he ends up as a murderer, an antisemite, a racist and a devout Nazi … the bit your Nationalist inspired school history book did not want you to know about him … the inconvenient truth.

An opposing view

Let’s start with Boer War 2, and upfront Maritz and Smuts are already at different points of view in Smuts’ Commando. It starts with Maritz’ rank, role and appointment in the Commando. Maritz would maintain Smuts gave him the rank of ‘General’ as a field commission – in the Republican Armies this was known as a “veggeneraal” or ‘fighting-general’. Deneys Reitz, Smuts’ long-time right-hand man, confidant, and friend, has a different view and claimed Maritz was only a “leader of various rebel bands” and never given a Generalship – as Reitz was also on Smuts’ staff, Reitz would have known if Martiz was made a ‘veggeneraal’or not.

The two leaders upfront also differ on leadership style, experience and philosophy. Smuts is a skilled lawyer and academic, he is a ‘Philosopher General’ and takes a very holistic view to the fighting seeking a consolidation of ‘white civilisation’ in Southern Africa between Boer and Brit as its final object. Smuts also has an outward look, seeking through the ‘consolidation of the white races’ good neighbourliness with all South Africa’s peoples, including South Africa’s ‘coloureds’ and ‘blacks’. Maritz on the other hand is a ‘Soldier’s General’, he starts his military career as a guard at the Johannesburg Fort after the Jameson Raid and subsequently becomes a ZARP Policeman. Maritz has a reputation as a “thug” he’s a devout Boer Republican, he wants nothing to do with reconciliation with the ‘hated’ British, he is inwardly focussed and views ‘coloureds’ and ‘blacks’ very suspiciously.

So, Smuts and Maritz are fundamentally different in their leadership styles, outlooks and personalities and it would come to a head towards the end of Boer War 2 in what was to become known as the ‘Leliefontein massacre’. For those who have an abiding admiration for Smuts, now is also the time to also look away, as some historians have tarnished Smuts with the title of “mass murderer” as it took place ‘under his watch’ so to speak, but the culprit is really Maritz – so what happened?

A Massacre

Over two days, starting on the 31st January 1902, the ‘noble’ Boer bittereinder effort of the Boer War, and even Jan Smuts, would emerge forever tarnished by what is considered by some as the first massacre of innocents of the 20th Century.

A rather dishonourable title and achievement not often emphasised by Boer War ‘Republican’ historians, journalists and commentators – rather conveniently ignored by them is the nature of this phase of the war really – the repeated targeting, pillaging and ransacking of mission stations, ‘hensopper’ farms (farms belonging to Boers who surrendered prematurely during the amnesty), ‘Joiner’ farms (farms belonging to Boers who joined the British) and even tribal villages by marauding Bittereinder groupings. This period also sees many Black and Coloureds executed by Bittereinder Boer firing squads and hangman nooses, mainly charged with “spying” for or “working” with the British. It is not such a ‘glorious’ end to a noble fight to the end, as romantic Boer war novelists would have you believe – its harsh war – bloody and revengeful, and nobody in the ‘Guerrilla’ phase of the Boer War comes out smelling of roses – not the British with their tactic of Scorched Earth and certainly not the Boers with their tactic of Marauding.

Many of these actions were of little real tangible military value in the war against the British and have more to do with retribution than anything else, and front and centre in this controversial phase is Manie Maritz, who whilst he is under Jan Smuts’ command, rides into the ‘Nama’ missionary town of Leliefontein in the far north west Cape – deep inside the British Cape Colony. Here Maritz immediately detains the Methodist missionary – Barnabas Links – who was acting in place of the absent Rev J.G. Locke. Maritz subsequently reads out a proclamation threatening death to both residents and the town’s missionaries alike if they are found guilty of aiding or abetting the British.

The Nama people (the local people made up of a mix of KhoiKhoi, Namibian and Tswana) and their missionaries are British subjects living in a British colony and fearing for their lives don’t take lightly to the proclamation threat and become steadily agitated. From here out there is a lot of conflicting account, in detaining Barnabas Links a rather strong verbal exchange over jurisdiction and authority takes place and some say Links strikes Maritz with his stick, others say Maritz strikes Links with his sjambok. Either way, a ‘fists and knives” scuffle breaks between a group of citizens and Maritz’ men, one Republican is injured, Links is also injured, and Maritz and his men manage to disentangle themselves from the melee, leaving 8 Leliefonteiners dead, and ride back to their rendezvous camp.

That night, Maritz and his men become indignant at their treatment at the hands of the Leliefonteiners and elect to exact revenge by wiping the missionary off the face of the earth. So, the next morning the Commando detachment numbering about 100 mounted Boers attacks the missionary in full force. The Nama and their missionaries are no match for a fully armed Boer commando, having some antiquated muskets they try and hold off the assault and most take refuge in the mission building. A further 27 Leliefonteiners are killed (some accounts say a total of 43) and approximately 100 are injured.

Image: Modern day image of the Methodist Mission Church, Leliefontein (erected in 1855, it was the third church built at the mission station).

Maritz then directs all the surviving women and children, male survivors, and the wounded (including Links) be taken away in chains to the Boer positions surrounding Okiep, one account points to the local blacksmith been instructed to fashion iron shackles for this purpose. Some accounts also point to general violence been meted out by the Boers against surviving Leliefonteiners after the skirmish and ‘refugees’ been hunted down and killed.

Maritz instructs that the mission station be pillaged and then burned down – all the captured sheep and grain are to be forwarded to a Boer supply depot. The mission station is completely destroyed and the dead Leliefonteiners are left where they died – and here they remained unburied for months.

So, how does Smuts and his General Staff react to the news that a detachment of his Commando had ransacked a mission station and killed over 30 poorly armed or unarmed British civilians in a revenge attack? Deneys Reitz on arriving at the destroyed mission station described the scene as follows:

“We found the place sacked and gutted and among the rocks beyond the buried houses lay 20 or 30 dead Hottentots, still clutching their antiquated muzzleloaders. This was Maritz’s handiwork. He had ridden into the station with a few men to interview the European missionaries, when he was set upon by armed Hottentots, he and his escorts narrowly escaping with their lives. To avenge the insult, he returned the next morning with a stronger force and wiped out the settlement, which seemed to many of us a ruthless and unjustifiable act. General Smuts said nothing but I saw him walk past the boulders where the dead lay, and on his return he was moody and curt… we lived in an atmosphere of rotting corpses for some days.”

Deneys Reitz

Smuts, although clearly unimpressed with Maritz, actually comes through for Maritz in accounting the massacre in his letter to General de la Rey, he down-plays the instance as a “close shave” for Maritz and somewhat covers up the incident, citing that Maritz was attacked by a knobkerrie whilst acting as a peace envoy, it was taken as a sign of attack and only “8 hottentots” were killed due “to misunderstanding and ignorance” (Nel, Eben: Kaapse rebelle van die Hantam-karoo, p 461).

Some commentators point to this as collusion, as Maritz is completely exonerated and never held to account for the massacre – whereas similar instances of ‘murdering’ civilians in the cases of the Australian officer Lt. Harry ‘Breaker’ Morant and the Boer Commandant Gideon Scheepers landed them both in front of their respective firing squads.

To further demonstrate just how off the hinge Maritz was, the last real Boer action of the Boer War was when Jan Smuts’ Commando laid siege to the mining town of Okiep in the British Cape Colony in April, 1902. On hearing the news of the Peace Conference, Reitz writes “General Smuts set to work at once. Next morning a messenger was sent into O’Okiep, to advise the garrison that both sides were to refrain front active military operations while the Congress lasted”.

Jan Smuts then left the siege of O’okiep to take part in the final Peace talks at Vereeniging at the end of April 1902. With Smuts away Manie Maritz decided to attack Okiep with the idea of literally wiping the entire town off the map, using the commandeered Namaqua United Copper Company locomotive ‘Pioneer’ – which was used to propel a mobile bomb in the form of a wagonload of dynamite into the besieged town. The attack failed when the train derailed, snagged upon a barbed wire fence which wrapped around the points, spilling the dynamite upon the ground which burnt out harmlessly.

The exercise could have resulted in killing large numbers of women and children (mainly coloured) who sheltered behind the defences, the failure of the operation was a blessing at a time when deliberations at the Vereeniging peace talks potentially heralded the end of the conflict. Smuts would again gloss over the incident and cover for Maritz when he stated that the railway was still intact after the incident anyway, and since there were women and children in Okiep town, all the commando was allowed to do was to give the good citizens of Okiep a “tremendous fright with a harmless explosion.”

Images: General Jan Smuts and General Christiaan Beyers at the Vereeniging Peace negotiations (left), and the locomotive ‘Pioneer’ used by Maritz to try and blow up the town of Okiep in Smuts’ absence (right).

Smuts’ disposition to treating treasonous, rebellious and insubordinate Boer commanders with ‘kid gloves’ in the hopes of placating and consolidating their views to see his way on things would be Smuts’ greatest ‘Achilles heel’ – as there would be no such quarter given in the way they would view or treat him in future. Which brings us to the next instance – The Boer revolt of 1914.

A Revolt

Much has been written on the Boer Revolt of 1914, but let’s understand the ‘differing’ view between Smuts and Maritz in the lead up and then the instigation of the revolt itself. Where Smuts was involved in negotiating the Peace at Vereeniging to end the Boer War in 1902, Maritz as part of his leader element would have none of it. When peace was made, the burghers of the erstwhile Republics were obliged to lay down their arms and sign an oath of allegiance to the British monarch – Maritz refused and instead he slipped over the border into German South West Africa (modern Namibia).

In German South West Africa (GSWA), Maritz would become embroiled in another massacre, this time the Hereto and Namaqua genocide – which as irony goes it is the first recorded case of Germans using the concentration camp system along with the resultant mass death (something ignored by both Hermann Göring and Adolf Hitler when they solely laid the blame on the British for “inventing” concentration camps and the “Genocide” of the Boers – in their book white deaths count, black deaths don’t seem to count – and these two criminals were are also happy to try and deflect Germany’s real crimes of genocide).

Returning to South Africa by sneaking back over the border, Maritz is briefly arrested in the British Colony of the Transvaal for not signing the oath of allegiance (and therefore still a combatant) – it’s a forewarning of a general dislike of his deep-seated dislike of the British. He is ultimately released and joins up again as a Transvaal Policeman.

Smuts on the other hand at this time in 1909 is concerning himself with Union, the Union conference on the back of the Peace of Vereeniging specifies an expanded Union border to incorporate Britain’s Southern Rhodesia colony as a 5th Province along with the incorporation of the British protectorates of Bechuanaland (Botswana), Lesotho and Swaziland. By doing this the Boer and the Brits agreed ‘Union’ negotiations are hoping to gain balance and reconciliation between Boer and Brit interests in the region, although now all under the “British family of nations” as specified in the Vereeniging Peace Treaty – Jan Smuts, Louis Botha and all the other significant Boer Generals – De la Rey, Hertzog etc are all consolidating to ensure this new ‘Union’ is managed by the Boers and not the Brits, which is in fact the subsequent outcome when The Union of South Africa is formed in 1910 – the South African Party, consisting of Botha, Smuts, De la Rey, Hertzog etc. win the majority seats.

Image: The borders of ‘Greater South Africa’ as outlined in the Union conference in 1909 – phase one – the Limpopo River marks the border of South Africa, phase two – Zambezi River marks the border and phase three – the Ruvuma River marks the border, this is Smuts’ map, note his personal notations ‘A’ and ‘B’.

The arrival of World War 1 in 1914 is both a blessing and a curse for the Boer led government of the newly formed Union of South Africa. Both Botha as Prime Minister and Smuts as his ‘right hand man’ were walking a tight rope – as Boer commanders they represented a faction of the new “Union”, balancing the two small old Boer Republic’s politics and laws with those of all the British colonies and protectorates surrounding them (six large British territories and their interests in them in effect) – so they are obliged to support Britain as the major player in the region, and honour their word to them, the oath that brought about peace – that’s the ‘curse’.

The ‘blessing’ to the Union government is that the war presents them with an ideal opportunity to realise the expansive border of ‘Greater South Africa’ as envisioned and concluded in the Union conference in 1909 – as this border also specifies the eventual inclusion of German South West Africa into South Africa in the first phase of the ‘Greater’ South Arica Union and eventually even German East Africa would be included in the second phase of South Africa’s territorial advancement.

So it’s really no surprise, that when the decision to go to war is put to the vote in the Boer led and very independent Union of South Africa parliament (at Union, Britain takes a figurehead role, the South African Union’s Parliament and legal construct is not governed by Westminster, its fee to make its own laws) – and the result is not what your school history teacher plugged – it’s a staggering vote of confidence by nearly all the Boer MP’s favouring going to war alongside Britain (and France) against Germany, by a landslide – literally. Consider the result.

92 = For invasion of German South West Africa by the Union of South Africa

12 = Against

So, as to the ‘majority’ of Afrikaners NOT wanting war with Germany, that is simply untrue, the Afrikaner community’s representatives in Parliament were overwhelmingly in favour of war against Germany. This is also where some ‘Boer Romantic’ commentators on the 1914 Revolt make a fundamental mistake, the Union of South Africa’s decision to conquer German South West Africa (Namibia) was NOT just a service to the ‘British Empire’ – it was largely in service to the objects of The Union of South Africa and its own territorial expansion ambitions and the prescribed ‘sphere of influence’ over the Southern African region as a whole (as agreed by all Boer and British leaders involved in the Union conference in 1909).

Image: Political cartoon of the day captures the Union’s territorial ambitions

Smuts, as the Minister of Defence at this time had also been busy amalgamating the armed forces of the republics with those of the colonial citizen force regiments to form the Union Defence Force i.e. the UDF (in much the same way as the SADF was amalgamated with other forces in 1994 to form the SANDF – with the same challenges).

The UDF had taken shape to consist of a small contingent of permanent force, but the backbone would remain voluntarily forces in a two-stream approach, the voluntary ‘English’ colonial citizen force regiments – Transvaal Scottish, Royal Natal Carbineers, Royal Durban Light Infantry etc and the voluntary ‘Afrikaans’ citizen force “skiet” Commandos known as the ‘Rifle Association Mounted Infantry’ in parallel to them (the old Republic’s commando system in effect). It was a careful construct to keep everyone happy, but the point is this, it was NOT “British” – Imperial British troops had returned to the United Kingdom, any engagement the Union of South Africa was going to fight in World War 1 in Africa, whether foreign or domestic, was going to be made up of ‘South Africans’ and led by ‘South Africans’ – and commanded by the old Republic’s ‘Bittereinder’ Boer Generals – primarily Botha (as Prime Minister was Commander in Chief) and Smuts (as Botha’s Minister of Defence).

Smuts was sensitive to the fact that many Afrikaners shared German heritage and they (falsely) believed that Germany extensively supported the Boer cause during Boer War 2 – ‘falsely’ because in fact, Germany was happy to ‘sell’ them arms (as did the British arms manufacturers) at a premium and send some medical assistance later on, however Germany withdrew their support officially – they provided no troops and no substantial funding to the Republican Boer War effort whatsoever.

Kaiser Wilhelm II, although sending a letter to Kruger congratulating him on the Jameson Raid victory (given the Boer nation their false sense of ‘support’), in fact refused point blank to receive any Boer representations and after the ‘Black Week’ British defeats to the Boers in late 1899, he and his Generals compiled a military strategy, not to help the Boers, but to help the British win the war (he was after all related to the British monarchy – part of the family so to speak) and shared it with them instead – Kaiser Wilhelm II even proudly proclaiming at the end of the Boer War that the British had followed his plan precisely as he had outlined it to them and it was the German plan that won the war for the British – not Field Marshal Frederick Robert’s plan and as inconvenient truths go the Kaiser’s plan involved scorched earth policies and concentration camps. (see: John C.G. Röhl: The Kaiser and England during the Boer War). Now, I bet none of this was in your Nationalistic inspired history teachings.

Ethnic Germans (local and foreign) volunteering to join Boer Commandos also qualified very few (550 odd) – far more Anglo-Irish, Dutch and Flemish joined the Boers (5,500 odd). A Boer leader delegation, including Botha and de Wet visited Germany after the war in 1902, and although they received a royal welcome and ovations, they were not officially received – they did raise a little money from private donators and a Boer help fund, but that’s it. However, all this still did not resonate with many in the Boer community who almost illogically saw Germany as an Ally.

Smuts would argue the case for war, not on the basis of warring against Germany on the side of ‘Britain’, but for supporting the other old Boer Republic’s supporters – France, Belgium and the Netherlands in their war against a hostile and aggressive Germany busy de-stabilising western and eastern Europe, and Smuts was very aware of the vast majority of Boers had Dutch, Belgian and French roots, as opposed to the ones with German roots. He would use the same argument again for his declaration of war against Germany in World War 2.

Smuts however anticipated that the decision to go to war, although largely supported by the Afrikaner political elite and leadership, would have with it a handful of resignations from the Union’s Defence Force from those strongly in favour of Germany and whose sheer hatred of the British superseded everything, and the Union government received exactly that – a “handful” – nothing that would fundamentally compromise the UDF’s fighting ability or construct.

Of the handful of resignations which were received, a rather long-winded one came from General Christiaan Beyers, the UDF’s Commandant General in charge of the Active Citizen Force and his was the most important resignation. Prior to the decision to go to war, Smuts and Botha’s old friend and highly respected comrade, General Koos de la Rey had been one of the handful of Parliamentary Ministers vocally against the decision to invade GSWA and advocated neutrality, and because of his popularity his opinion held massive sway over the old Boer Republic’s Afrikaner electorate – nevertheless he was persuaded by Louis Botha and Jan Smuts not to take actions which may arouse the Boers, he then held a political rally for 800 Boers and took a reconciliatory approach – contrary to what the attendees expected of him.

Images: General Christiaan Frederik Beyers (left) and General Jacobus Herculaas de la Rey (right)

De la Rey seemed torn over his decision, and he was then targeted by General Beyers to join him for meeting with Major Jan Kemp, a mid-line UDF officer who had also resigned – the purpose of the meeting; Beyers and Kemp wanted to persuade de la Rey to take a stronger stand and initiate more Union Defence Force resignations to compromise its fighting capability. Joining the conspiracy was another heavyweight – the significant Boer General and Parliamentary Minister, Christiaan de Wet.

What follows next is well documented, however the generally accepted and investigated history concludes; General De la Rey and General Beyers were travelling in a soft top sedan car to their meeting with Major Kemp and did not stop at a Police blockade set up to capture a notorious gang of robbers and murderers called The Foster Gang. One of the Policeman fired a warning shot into the road to get them to stop, the bullet ricocheted and hit De la Rey, killing him.

It was tragedy – plain and simple, and both Botha and Smuts were devasted at the loss of their friend, as a signal to the inevitable accusations of ‘political assassination’ both Botha and Smuts attended De la Rey’s funeral in front of thousands of mourning Boers, they appeared without any bodyguard at the mercy of the assembly – a token of no malice intended, and there were no protests or accusations from the mourners.

Regardless, despite sound and tested enquiries and court cases, and the Nationalists having full scope and the resources at hand for 40 years to uncover a ‘plot’ – no concrete proof has emerged of a plot by Smuts to kill De la Rey whatsoever – ‘conspiracy theory’ nevertheless grew out of the incident which would plague Smuts in future years, and it still does.

It is also generally understood that with the death of De La Rey, that would probably have been the extent of Boer resistance to the war, and it would have devolved into simple political protest and peaceful demonstrations, had it not been for one man … the subject of the differing view – none other than Lt. Colonel Manie Maritz, who by now had joined the UDF and commanded a small UDF force at Upington, near the border with German South West Africa (GSWA).

The day after de la Rey’s funeral, Kemp, Beyers and de Wet addressed a large crowd at Lichtenberg, calling on protest meetings against the decision to invade GSWA. Manie Maritz however took a more robust position than Kemp, Beyers and de Wet, he instead went into open sedition and started ignoring Smuts’ and his other Commander’s orders been sent to him. Intel told Smuts that Maritz had joined the Germans, however contradictory to Smuts’ usual manner of decisiveness, he vacillated instead hoping to persuade Maritz not to revolt and get him to see reason.

Images: General Christiaan Rudolf de Wet (left) and Major Jan Christoffel Greyling Kemp (right) in his UDF dress uniform.

Not dissuaded by Smuts and bent on a sedition, Maritz resigned his commission from the Union Defence Force and openly rebelled on 9 October, taking 300 odd of his UDF soldiers with him when he went over to the Germans.

Major Barend ‘Ben’ Bouwer was sent to deal with Maritz’ sedition and insubordination (Bouwer had also been a ‘Veggeneraal’ in Smuts’ commando during the Boer War and as irony goes was alongside Maritz when he sent the dynamite train into O’okiep). Maritz took Bouwer prisoner along with his fellow officers, he was subsequently released and sent back with the ultimatum from Maritz to the Union Government to the effect that:

That unless the Union Government guaranteed safe passage of his fellow plotting Generals (De Wet, Beyers, Kemp et al), to his position on the GSWA border by the 11th October he would immediately attack General Brits’s UDF forces preparing to invade GSWA and then he would invade the Union of South Africa.

Major Ben Bouwer reported that Maritz was in possession of some guns belonging to the Germans, and that he held the rank of General commanding the German troops. He also had a force of Germans under him in addition to his own rebel commando. Maritz arrested all the UDF officers and men under his command who were unwilling to join the Germans, and then sent them forward as prisoners into German South West Africa.

To drive Maritz’ point home, Major Bouwer was shown an agreement between Maritz and the Governor of German South West Africa guaranteeing the independence of the Union as a Republic, ceding Walfish Bay and certain other portions of the Union to the Germans, and undertaking that the Germans would only invade the Union on the invitation of Maritz.

Major Bouwer was shown numerous telegrams and helio messages dating back to the beginning of September. Maritz boasted that he had ample guns, rifles, ammunition, and money from the Germans, and that he would overrun the whole of South Africa.

Image: Rare image of Lt. Col Maritz, front and centre in his South African Union uniform and his staff behind him – his ‘Agterryer’ (man-servant) is at his heels (It’s the man-servant’s expression and position that is most interesting as in many ways it gives away the complete disregard Maritz felt for people of colour).

In response to Maritz’ action and ultimatum, on 12 October, the Union government imposed martial law across the whole of South Africa. On proclaiming martial law, Smuts, the eternal reconciler, immediately called again for “reason” and urged the rebels not to be swayed by “foreign agents influencing them”.

The ‘Maritz Revolt’ as it would now become known was underway, and with their sedition hand now played by Maritz in the Cape Colony, his fellow conspirators – Beyers, Kemp and de Wet had no choice, now ‘in for a penny and in for a pound’ they all broke their ties with the Union Defence Force, resigned their commissions and went into open revolt against their lawfully elected government – raising Commando’s in the Transvaal and Orange Free State to come to Maritz’ aid

The revolt is well documented and carries with it a number of consequences for Jan Smuts, and we will cover these in future Observation Post articles called “Boer War 3 and Beyond” and “What about Jopie?” (look out for them). However, the long and short of it from a military historian’s perspective let’s look briefly look at the objective, the capability and strategy to achieve the objective and the outcome.

The stated objective: Maritz issued a proclamation by way of objective – “the former South African Republic and Orange Free State as well as the Cape Province and Natal are proclaimed free from British control and independent, and every White inhabitant of the mentioned areas, of whatever nationality, are hereby called upon to take their weapons in their hands and realize the long-cherished ideal of a Free and Independent South Africa.”

In other words, to take by force, the former British Colonies and re-start the Boer War, resistance to the declaration by any “white” in the entire Union of South Africa would be treated by Maritz’ Provisional Government as treasonous.

Capability: To attain this objective, the Rebels raised 11,476 Boers. Union Defence Force strength was around 32,000 troops (so in essence the Rebels were outnumbered 3 to 1). Important to note here that of the 32,000 UDF troops, 20,000 were Afrikaners – mainly ex-Commando and most of them in the UDF’s mounted infantry ‘Rifle Associations’ (the old Commandos). General Louis Botha would primarily use the Rifle Associations to counteract the rebellion, insistent that the British ‘stay out of it’, this was going to be the Boer leaders sorting their differences out between themselves – so ‘Brother against Brother’ and in effect the UDF’s Afrikaners outnumbered the rebel Afrikaners 2 to 1.

Images: General Smuts (left) and General Botha (right) as depicted on cigarette cards during WW1.

Important also to note here as to capability, the Rebel force was not made up entirely of first rate ex-UDF soldiers going against their counterparts, the rebel force was made up primarily of destitute Orange Free State Boers having come through a drought and agricultural reforms on the back of the devastation of their farms during Boer War 2.

Many of these Free State Boers as has been pointed out by historians like Sandra Swart (Desperate Men: The 1914 Rebellion and the Polities of Poverty’ in South African Historical Journal, Vol 42) and John Bottomly (The Orange Free State and the Rebellion of 1914: the influence of industrialisation, poverty and poor whitism: pages 29-73), were simply desperate ‘Bywoners’ (landless farmers or share-croppers) promised a better life if the rebellion was successful.

Consider the statistics of the Boer rebels and from where they came, and you’ll see how the above statement holds true. 7,123 (62%) of the Boer Rebels came from the Orange Free State – the least populace, most rural and economically worse off province in the Union. As an aside, to gauge the extent of success of Maritz’ proclamation and its resonance across the broader Afrikaner community across the whole of South Africa, he was only able to motivate 1,215 (12%) of the Boer Rebels from the Cape province – the biggest province in the Union. The balance coming from the Transvaal, and no real support from Natal.

The Potchefstroom Herald at the time best tried to explain why there was no traction behind the revolt from Cape Afrikaners and the black/brown African communities in this quote – and not surprisingly it boils down to the lack of suffrage and plain racism in the old Republics;

“When these high officers of the Defence Force in Transvaal and Orange “Free” State rebelled and joined the Germans with their commandos, the Dutchmen of the Cape (presumably because “they vote side by side with the Kafirs”) denounced the treachery in unmistakable terms. The South African party at the Cape beat up its followers to the support of the Government, and the voice of the Cape section of the Dutch Reformed Church rang from pulpit and platform in denunciation of disloyalty and treason. But in the Northern Provinces, where white men are pampered and guarded by the Government against the so-called humiliation of allowing native taxpayers to vote, there the rebellion, having been regarded with seeming approval, gained a marvellous impetus.

Plaatjie: The Boer Rebellion – snippet from the Potchefstroom Herald

As a unified, coherent, trained and fully armed force, the Rebel Boers were not. Desperate and landless farmers in the main up against fully trained, motivated, even mechanised in some instances, and properly armed UDF soldiers on a 3:1 numerical advantage – the Rebels were no match and it quickly showed. The long and short the rebellion was almost immediately repelled and then very quickly crushed as Botha’s UDF Rifle Associations with some Regiment elements in support hunted the Rebel Commandos down as they tried to make their way to assist Maritz on the GSWA border.

Image: The last pursuit of Major Kemp. A South African Union ‘Flying column’ crossing the Orange River after him.

As Dr David Katz in his work ‘General Jan Smuts and his First World War in Africa 1914 -1917) points out. Jan Smuts, eternally the one Boer General keeping a level head and seeking reconciliation and understanding, and when it was clear the rebellion had failed, Smuts called for a ‘Blanket Amnesty’ across the board for the Boer Rebel leaders and their troops if they laid down their arms. General Louis Botha, the Commander in Chief, on the other hand took a much harder and less reconciliatory line than his colleague Smuts – Botha agreed to an Amnesty, but for the rank and file only, the Boer Rebel leaders would have to be prosecuted. The amnesty, excluding the Rebel leadership, was in put place from 12th to 21st November 1914, and with it the 1914 Boer Rebellion was effectively over, by the end of November General de Wet’s force alone was down to only 40 men. Rear actions and isolated and desperate battles continued to be fought for a couple of months by woefully under-strength hard liners refusing surrender and amnesty, but by the end of January 1915 the rebellion was over.

Of the Rebel leadership now having surrendered, Botha and Smuts would again be especially magnanimous, considering the Union was in a state of war externally and in a state of martial law internally – and this was 1914 ‘World War 1’ – people were put in front of firing squads for ‘cowardice’ and being AWOL (absent without leave) – let alone ‘sedition’ and ‘treason’. Smuts would treat the Rebels in general very kindly, literally with kid gloves, all the time urging reason, understanding and reconciliation.

Of the main rebel leaders, General Christiaan Beyers tragically drowned in the Vaal River whilst attempting to desperately evade capture on 8th December 1914.

General Christiaan de Wet was captured during the amnesty and sentenced to six years imprisonment, with a fine of £2000, he was released by Botha and Smuts after one year’s imprisonment, after giving a written promise to take no further part in politics.

Major Jan Kemp was captured on the 2nd of February 1915 and sentenced to 7 years imprisonment, with a fine of £1000. However, a mere 10 months into his sentence Botha and Smuts agreed to release him – also on the condition that he may not participate in any politics (a promise Kemp almost immediately broke entering politics as a National Party MP under Hertzog in 1920 and again under Malan’s ‘Reformed’ National Party after 1948).

Lt. Colonel Manie Maritz would evade capture and escape into German South West Africa, at the conclusion of the GSWA campaign and the Union Defence Force’s victory and annexation of the territory (the first real victory for the Allies against Imperial Germany in WW1), Maritz would again evade capture, going into self-imposed exile in Angola, Spain, Portugal and then Mozambique.

Of all the other leaders – junior and mid-level rebel officers who were also captured. All were sentenced to short imprisonments and fines, almost all of them walking free within a year … except for just one man … Captain Jopie Fourie was executed for ‘High Treason’ having not resigned his UDF officers commission, captured still wearing his UDF officer’s uniform and opening fire on his fellow UDF troops whilst under a ‘white flag’ of truce (this was WW1 after all and there was no way anyone could get him out of this one with a no-nonsense leader like Botha as Prime Minister, not in a month of Sundays – more on him in a later article “What about Jopie?”).

To pay for all their fines the Bloemfontein newspaper ‘Het Volksblad’ established the ‘Halfkroonfonds’ (Half-a-Crown Fund). Shop owners and other people whose property had been damaged during the rebellion were able to claim compensation, leading to the establishment of the Helpmekaar Beweging (the Help-One-Another Movement). By the end of 1917, all the debts were paid.

Of the handling of the 1914 Maritz Revolt, Louis Botha would summarise Smuts role and leadership, when he said of him;

“Nobody can appreciate sufficiently the great work General Smuts has done – greater than any man throughout this unhappy period. At his post day and night, his brilliant intellect, his calm judgement, his amazing energy and his undaunted courage have been assets of inestimable value to the Union in her hour of trial.”

Prime Minister Louis Botha

As a rebellion with any chance of success consider just what a small minority they represented – no Cape Province or Natal Afrikaner would really come near it, of the Afrikaners in the Transvaal and OFS they were unable to raise an effective fighting force, the vast majority of Afrikaners in the armed forces remained in the UDF, the vast majority of Afrikaner political leaders remained behind Botha and Smuts and they gained no traction whatsoever to raise anything from the Black and Coloured communities (the real ‘vast’ majority) – no “Askari” troops whatsoever, and they got no support whatsoever from the white South Africans of British decent – who by way of ‘white’ population were not insignificant in size, commanding massive swathes of white population groups in the Transvaal (most of Johannesburg and the reef), Natal (most of Durban) and the Cape Colony (especially in Cape Town and the Eastern Cape) .

In the end the Maritz revolt did little in terms of its military objectives, it managed to delay the invasion plans of GSWA for a couple of months only whilst the UDF dealt with it, however in the end the GSWA campaign was a decisive victory for the Union and the territory successfully annexed under ‘Greater South Africa’ in a trusteeship – as was the Union’s expressed casus belli.

Image: General Botha (right) accepts the surrender of German South-West Africa from Lt Col Francke, (left) at Kilo, 9 July 1915.

What the Rebellion did however do was plant the seeds for political division and is one of the key propaganda tools used by the Nationalists to create the deep split in Afrikaner outlooks. Louis Botha would look at the Rebellion as complete folly, a waste of time and an utter waste of life, his opponents would look at it rather romantically instead – a sort of – ‘Boer Last Stand’. It stands today in some Afrikaner communities, precisely because of its ‘Romanticism’ and ‘political currency’ and not because of its military prowess or even its unattainable objectives.

Now, back to Maritz and Smuts, the subjects of this vastly differing outlook on Afrikanerdom, because it would manifest itself again just prior to the Second World War.

A Nazi

Manie Maritz decided to end his self-imposed exile after the 1st World War ended and returned to the Union of South Africa in 1923. The Smuts government treating him very kindly by way of reconciliation, and all things considered for a crime as serious as treason he received a short imprisonment of three years. Luckily for Maritz, Hertzog’s National party won the 1924 election and Maritz was granted full amnesty and walked free having only served three months.

Maritz took to farming, but came under the influence of National Socialism (Nazism) in 1936 and founded a ‘anti-parliamentary’(dictatorship led) party called the Volksparty (People’s Party) in 1940. Maritz also took control of another ultra-right, national socialist, pro-Nazi movement initially set up by Colonel J.C. Laas (the first Commandant-General of the Ossewabrandwag) called “Die Boerenasie” (The Boer Nation), he then merged the Volksparty with Die Boerenasie and continued under the “Die Boerenasie” banner. He became known as a very outspoken proponent of The Third Reich and admirer of Adolf Hitler. During this time, he had also developed a theory about the alleged Jewish conspiracy and interference in South African and world politics and became a fanatical Antisemite. He would detail his Antisemitic and National Socialist views in his autobiography ‘My Lewe en Strewe’ (My life and Aspiration) which he published in 1939, a book regarded as lacking in objectivity, inciting racial hatred and like his hero Adolf Hitler’s book ‘Mein Kampf’ (My Struggle) Maritz’ book was full of emotional and racially driven rhetoric. He was even taken to court over all the anti-Semitic statements he made in his book, found guilty of fomenting racial hatred and he was fined £75.

Images: Maritz’ book ‘My Lewe an Sterwe’, later political portrait and the ‘Die Dappere Bloodskapper’ second world war mouthpiece for The Ossewabrandwag and Maritz’ Boerenasie.

Die Boerenasie rose to prominence under Manie Maritz, in September 1939 Jan Smuts declared war against Nazi Germany and once again you could not find a more vastly differing view than that of Smuts and Maritz. Smuts was extremely wary of the dangers of Nazism and Adolf Hitler, who he accused of being a “false messiah” and whose Nazi symbology of the Swastika Smuts called “the crooked cross” in reference to it being a corruption of true Christianity. Smuts was so anti-Nazism that he would take the Union of South Africa to war again to fight it, and once again at ‘war’ with Maritz.

On antisemitism, here again Smuts held a polarising opposite view to Maritz. Smuts was a devout Zionist, he believed in the establishment of Israel as nation state, supported Jewish immigration and refugees (even controversially as Prime Minister he was involved in rescuing 200 Jewish orphans from the ‘Pogroms’ in the Ukraine in 1921, bringing them to safety in South Africa). Smuts supported the ‘Balfour Agreement’ which gave rise to Israel, he was also a personal friend of Chaim Weizmann, the President of the Zionist Organization. Weizmann went on to become the first President of Israel. Smuts is so loved and honoured in Israel that even today a kibbutz in Ramat Yohanan is named in his honour.

It is however difficult to say if Smuts would have interned Maritz again for his Nazi sympathies along with the other strong proponents of Nazism during the 2nd World War as Maritz’ life ended tragically and very early on in the war, he died in a car accident in Pretoria on the 20th December 1940. Probably, had he lived, Smuts and Maritz would have been at extreme loggerheads and Maritz back on the warpath with the Union – and very possibly back in jail.

A completely differing outlook

So, back to the image of Smuts and Maritz on Commando during the South African War (1899-1902) a.k.a. The 2nd Boer War on the masthead. It is hard to think how Smuts and Maritz could find anything in common, and to think they are fighting side by side in common cause against the British, living hard in the bush on horseback and up to their necks in the blood and gore of war – brothers in arms in effect.

Both saw South Africa – from the “Limpopo to the Cape” – even incorporating all the surrounding British protectorates and German South West Africa in addition. Both saw ‘white civilization’ as the steward to develop the region – this was the era of ‘Empire’ after all. Both put their ‘Afrikanerdom’ front and centre and both believe sincerely that only an Afrikaner hegemony in Southern Africa would successfully unlock the region’s potential, and both were prepared to fight for it.

That’s where the similarity ends. Smuts believed the ‘Afrikaner’ led hegemony would only work with an outward, embracing and reconciliatory disposition – and with all the British protectorates, British colonies and British subjects living in ‘Greater South Africa’ in partnership … so, he saw that the future lay only with the co-operation of the British super-power as a steward protecting the region as part of Britain’s family of nations. Progress for Smuts would only lie in establishing peace and co-operation with Britain.

Maritz on the other hand believed in a similar hegemony, only he believed that South Africa would fall under the stewardship of white Afrikaners with Germany as the super-power providing the glue to keep the region stable and prosperous. He believed that the only way the troublesome ‘British’ subjects in the colonies and protectorates would be brought into line was with jack-boot authority – and Germany would provide the Afrikaners with the protection, money, military backing and arms to do so.

Maritz’s political disposition had its roots in “Krugerism” – a philosophy whereby White Afrikaners were ‘pure’ with an orthodox Calvinist ‘dopper’s’ approach to religion, through God and a theocracy styled republic they had an ordained right to rule over non-Afrikaners and Africans alike – they would have limited or no basic suffrage rights whatsoever in Kruger’s Republic. Maritz’ view so inwardly directed that he demonstrated a deep seated racist and violent response to anything “non-Aryan” (non pure). By 1939 Maritz’ Afrikaner cabal consisted of far-right wing Afrikaner nationalists with Nazi leanings – all of whom adopted or supported Nazism prior to, including and some even after the war – the likes of H.F Verwoerd, F.C Erasmus, Jaap Marais, B.J. Vorster, F.C. Erasmus, Oswald Pirow, Hendrik van den Bergh, Johannes von Moltke, P.O. Sauer, C.R. Swart, P.W. Botha, Eric Louw, Louis Weichardt, Rev. Koot Vorster, Henning Klopper, Albert Hertzog, Dr Nico Diedericks, Piet Meyer, Dr Eben Dönges, Dr Hans van Rensberg etc., etc. All of whom were infusing Afrikanerdom with a heady mix of Christian Nationalism, Oligarchy Republicanism and National Socialism (Nazism).

Smuts’ political disposition on the on the other hand had it roots in “Holism” – a philosophy whereby White Afrikaners lived in an interdependent state with all the cultures and societies surrounding it, he cherished the Cape Franchise, acknowledged Black South African medieval history and although a segregationist for much of his early life, his political philosophy would focus on consolidation, reconciliation and mutual recognition. By 1939 Smuts had abandoned segregationist thinking altogether famously stating that “segregation had fallen on evil days” in 1941 – his thinking had turned to universal suffrage and human rights and his Afrikaner cabal consisted of ‘left’-leaning Afrikaners with liberal suffrage and democratic leanings in the main – they were known as “Smuts-men” and they consisted of people like Deneys Reitz , Kmdt Dolf ‘Oom’ de la Rey, Group Captain ‘Sailor’ Malan, General Dan Pienaar, Group Captain ‘Dutch’ Hugo, Uys Krige, General Kenneth van der Spuy, General George Brink, Jacob Pretorius, Jan Steytler, Captain De Villiers-Graaff, Pieter van der Byl, Dr Ernst Malherbe, Jan Hendrik Hofmeyr etc., etc.

A more vastly different and polarising view of Afrikanerdom you could not find – one inward and one outward.

In conclusion

So how does it all work out for these two vastly different views of Afrikanerdom? Well, unfortunately we all know the history, and after Smuts’ shock electoral defeat of the Nationalist Afrikaners in 1948, these Afrikaners had a free-reign with complete control of education channels and media channels coupled with ‘gagging’ powers over opposition voices – for 40 long years – in which they also took the opportunity to resurrect Manie Maritz and the ‘Boer Rebels of 1914’ as the true Afrikaner ‘heroes’ of Afrikanerdom and paint Smuts and his Smuts-men as the ‘traitors’.

The net result, sad to say, is Maritz’ view won out, Maritz would be directly responsible in his rebellion in creating a schism that would break the Afrikaner camp into two distinctive groups and continue to drive a schism through it all the way to the on-set of World War 2 and then Apartheid and beyond.

Thanks largely to leaders like Maritz and advent of the Broederbond’s ‘Centenary Trek’ in 1938 the modern Afrikaner is still seen in South Africa by most other societies in the context of a whites-only ‘Voortrekker’ (pioneer), ‘Boer’ (farmer) hegemony, sometimes with conservative and ‘racist’ leanings – which, as it happened in Maritz’ beloved Nazi Germany put the Afrikaner on the same footing as Nazi Germans in many people’s eyes after the Afrikaner nationalists formally gazetted their eugenically driven ideology of Apartheid in 1948.

The small difference, modern Germany goes to great extent to re-dress, re-educate, reconcile and consolidate their military history and political ideologies from both the 1st World War and the 2nd World War … so as to overcome the tremendous impact of propaganda and conditioning initiated by the National Socialists and ‘open’ minds to the truth. Whereas in South Africa no real deep-seated action of reconciliation, re-education and understanding has taken place to counteract the old Christian Nationalism conditioning and propaganda initiated by the Nationalists, and in many circles the likes of General Christiaan de Wet, General Christian Beyers, Major Jan Kemp, Captain Jopie Fourie, Lt. Col Manie Maritz in active sedition with Germany and eventually the likes of the other Afrikaners flirting with Germany and its ideologies, D.F. Malan, H.F. Verwoerd, B.J. Vorster and P.W. Botha are still held up fervently and sometimes illogically by some as the ‘true’ heroes of Afrikanerdom – as certainly is the case with Maritz.

In all honesty, the challenge for ‘white’ South Africans especially in reviewing, redressing, and balancing their history – and this massively different outlook initiated by the likes of Maritz and Smuts – is to better resurrect the ‘redeemable’ Afrikaners – the iconoclasts, the ones who held the opposing view to Apartheid, the ones who went to war against Imperial Germany and then again against Nazi Germany – Smuts and his ‘Smuts-men’ – NOT the ones who joined hands with Germany and its ideologies. Hold up the true ‘heroes’ to account Afrikanerdom, the ones who demanded suffrage and fought against racist oppression – and believe it or not, there is a very big pool to choose from. Their histories and ‘differing’ views where savagely repressed by the Nationalists and literally scrubbed from our national consciousness – and they need to come to light in order to affect a more balanced outlook on Afrikanerdom – as in truth when we look at it with the hindsight of history, they are really the true ‘ysters’ (heroes) and not the ‘veraaiers’ (traitors). Krugerism, National Socialism, Christian Nationalism, Apartheid and a ‘keep South Africa white’ Verwoerd Republicanism are an abhorrent testament to Afrikaner nationalism as an ideology and an anathema to Afrikanerdom itself.

Written and researched by Peter Dickens

References:

Eben Nel; ‘Kaapse rebelle van die Hantam-karoo’

Dr David Katz; ‘General Jan Smuts and his First World War in Africa 1914 -1917’

Sandra Swart; ‘Desperate Men: The 1914 Rebellion and the Polities of Poverty’

John Bottomly; ‘The Orange Free State and the Rebellion of 1914: the influence of industrialisation, poverty and poor whitism’

André Wessels; Afrikaner (Boer) Rebellion (Union of South Africa) 2018.

Brian Bunting; ‘The Rise of the Afrikaner Reich’

John C.G. Röhl: ‘The Kaiser and England during the Boer War’

Plaatje: Chapter XXIII The Boer Rebellion

Colourised images with greatest thanks and appreciation to Jennifer Bosch – Jenny B Colourised on line:

Related Work:

Union to Republic: From Union to Banana Republic!

Boer War Myths: Debunking the myth that the British invented the ‘concentration camp’ and Stealing Republics, gold, diamonds and other myths!

Jan Smuts and Israeli: 200 Jewish orphans saved, the story of Jan Smuts and Issac Ochberg

Jan Smuts and Balfour: A Kibbutz called Jan Smuts

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So here’s an old chestnut that keeps coming up on South African history social forums and it’s this:

“The British, using war (The South African war 1899-1902 aka The Boer War), stole two independent Boer Republics – the ZAR and the OFS – from the Boers.”

Then they stole the gold and the diamonds from the Boers – Britain the bully, the Boers the victims. It’s wonderfully simple – see?

Small problem with this statement – its utter bunk, compete rubbish, a historic mistruth and this is where understanding history in South Africa gets wonderfully fascinating.

Not surprising really, many in South Africa are still the product of a ‘Christian Nationalism’ inspired education. It’s not their fault, it’s just that propaganda has been drilled into them, so much so they believe it’s a fact .. and that’s why ‘debunking’ these myths and popping up with ‘inconvenient truths’ is both fun and educational – you learn something new.

So, lets understand why this statement is utter rubbish – complete bunk, and I’m going to start with my statement;

“The British could not steal what was already legally theirs to take!”

WHAT! … you’re smoking your socks right?

Afraid not, .. here’s a truism and it’s a fact – at the start of the South African War (1899-1902) aka The Boer War – the Boer Republics of the ZAR and the OFS were NOT ‘Independent’ Republics at all, in fact they were both British vassal states, each known as a British ‘Suzerainty’ – and by law (the two Republic’s laws themselves and those of Britain), Britain had every right to meddle in the affairs of these two Republics. The hard truth is that these two Republics only existed at the behest of the British and were both accountable to mutually agreed British oversight. If you think I’m talking bunk – google it now, type in (Republic name) and the word ‘Suzerainty’.

What – NOT “independent” Republics at all! What the hell is a Suzerainty anyway, and how did that come about – those devilish British stealing again, well, erm – no, they did not. So, here’s what actually happened (and if you’re a romantic fan of fierce independent, pioneering Boere forging their own independence – now is the time to pour yourself a stiff Klippies and Coke).

The Orange Free State

Let’s start with the Orange Free state. Now, this Republic had never in its entire history seen ‘full independence’ not even from the get go, it was and remained a British vassal state from beginning to end. In fact as a governed territory it was established as British colony first, even the capital city – Bloemfontein, was established by the British. It only became a Boer Republic when the British peaceably handed the territory to the Boers to administrate as a Republic for practical reasons – on the PROVISO that it remained a British Tributary State or British Suzerainty.

Huh .. WTF .. etc. Let me explain. Prior to the ‘Great Trek’ in September 1835, ‘Trek Boers’ from the Cape Colony (nomadic farmers) had already started to venture across the Orange River border. In the territory between Orange and Vaal rivers, these early Trek Boers were then joined by small groups of Voortrekkers in 1835/6 and they had two ways of settling down to farm land – negotiate it with the local inhabitants (and there were many inhabitants – the idea that the land was ‘empty’ is bunk) or, as was sometimes the case, take the land by gunpoint.

So, very understandably these early trekkers almost immediately came into conflict with the local inhabitants – notably the Basuto and Griquas. This almost immediately came back to the British to resolve, as these people were after all coming from their colony. So, as a first measure to resolve any marauding on behalf of their “subjects” now Trekking outside their border – the British in 1836 issued the ‘Cape of Good Hope Punishment Act’, which ensured that any ‘Trek Boer’ or ‘Voortrekker’ or any other Cape Colony subject now outside the Cape Colony’s border for that matter was liable for all crimes committed south of the 25-degree latitude (which falls just below the old Warmbaths in the old Northern Transvaal).

So, inconvenient truth – number 1, the ‘Trekkers’ (Voortrekker and Trek Boers) were never really ‘independent’ of British law at any time in any event. Bet you didn’t learn that in your school history book.

Conflict however persisted with Trekkers and local black inhabitants in ‘Transorangia’ as the territory was known then, and not just between white and black – the black tribes in the area were also in conflict with one another – and all this conflict was over land/territory. So, the British on the 8th December 1845 appointed Captain William Sutton as “British Resident” among the tribes living beyond the Cape Colony Frontier (black and white) to resolve all the conflicts. He was succeeded in 1846 Captain Henry Douglas Warden who bought the farm ‘Bloemfontein’ from a Griqua farmer and established– you guessed it – the capital.

On the 3rd February 1848, to bring governance to the region, Sir Harry Smith declared the area of ‘Transorangia’ i.e. the area between the Orange and Vaal Rivers a ‘British Sovereignty’ (a colony) calling it the Orange River Sovereignty est. 1848 and went out dividing it up into districts for the Boere and the Griqua and land reservations for the Mantatee tribe, the Coranna (Koranna) tribe, the Bataung Tribe, Barolong Tribe, a tribe referred to as the Bastards tribe and a rather big swathe of territory to the Bassutos tribe. This was all overseen by a British High Court and British Governor based in Bloemfontein. The ‘Free State’ as we know it now was first a British colony and not a Boer Republic- inconvenient truth – number 2.

If you look at the map of the Orange River Sovereignty in 1850, you’ll see how these tribal lands and districts were divided – note, about a third of the landmass of what would become The Orange Free State is tribal territory – so much for the old Broederbond inspired education who said it was ‘empty’ for the Boere taking it, that’s the inconvenient truth – number 3.

Image: Map of the Orange River Sovereignty

However, all was not well as a small grouping of Voortrekkers under the leadership of Andries Pretorius became aggrieved at land concessions made by the British to the Griqua leaders and Basotho leaders. He raised a Commando, declared a Republic around Winburg and a skirmish was fought on Boomplaats farm between a British column raised to deal with the insurrection and Pretorius’ commando on the 29th August 1848. The Boer Commando lost the battle and Pretorius fled across the Vaal river into safety. The “battle” would be celebrated as a significant encounter, proof positive of the bad blood between Brit and Boer by Boer romantics in future years, to the British it was nothing but a small insurrection and an isolated footnote of history.

As to the claim of land north of the Vaal River for the Voortrekkers (what was to become the Transvaal), a convention was held called the Sand River Convention on the 17th January 1852 between Boer and Brit – and the British basically agreed that they had no interest in this territory and the Boere could declare it a independent country of their own, on the proviso (written into the agreement) that the Boere were not to practice slavery. Another inconvenient truth to those who say the Voortrekkers voluntarily left the idea of slavery behind them and did not intend to practice it – they did not practice it as they were warned by Britain not to, and then they agreed not to – inconvenient truth number 4.

Later in the year of 1852, with slavery already outlawed by the British in their Orange River Sovereignty. The British found that the remoteness, resources needed and distance of their Orange River Sovereignty difficult to manage and would have to abandon it – which would have happened had it not been for an erstwhile meeting to resolve the matter in Bloemfontein in June 1852 when all enfranchised voters in the territory – mainly the Boere and some Brits – all had a vote and declared in favour of the retention of British rule of the territory (so much for Andries Pretorius and his commando).

However, this did not really deter the British government’s resolve in the UK to finding a solution on the management of their colony in such a remote and difficult place and as a ‘minority’ people there – something had to give. So, they held another convention with the Boers called the Orange River Convention, at the Convention it was mutually agreed that the Boers take over the Colony, declare the Orange Free State as a Republic and be recognised as a self-governing state – But, and this is a BIG but – only on the PROVISO that it became a British Suzerainty – a tributary state with British oversight.

The Republic of the Orange Free State was declared (without a shot been fired mind) on the 23 February 1854, however it remained a British Suzerainty from that day forward, up to and including the South African War (1899-1902) a tad less than half a decade later – and never in that time was it ‘fully’ independent, inconvenient truth – number 5.

As to the ‘stealing of diamonds’ – the Diamond Rush in Kimberley took place in 1871 – the ‘rush’ proper – 23 years AFTER the British had already declared the region under their control and then under their Suzerainty, Kimberley did not even exist as town when the British first took control of the territory – not a single diamond had yet to be found. In any event – in 1871 a diamond rush happened and EVERYONE – the Cape Colony, the ZAR, Griqualand and the OFS all claimed the diamond fields as theirs – the matter was put to arbitration and the Griquas won it (not the Boere and not the Brits), the Griquas in turn declared their territory a British Protectorate (fearing Boer aggression) and they later resolved that their territory be absorbed into the Cape Colony – and, no – the British did not ‘invade’ an ‘independent’ Boer republic to steal diamonds, inconvenient truth – number 6.

The Zuid Afrikaansche Republiek (ZAR)

Now, let’s turn to the Transvaal, as here the British conceded, the Voortrekkers could form a full, self-governing and whole-fully independent Republic – a Republic proper – free of British meddling. Preceding the Sand River convention – all the voortekker groupings who had settled the area of the Transvaal had established no fewer than 6 separate ‘Republics’ – so at the Sand River convention the Zuid Afrikaansche Republiek (South African Republic) or ZAR came into existence – officially on 17 January 1852 as an agreement to merge all these small republican declarations and make a proper state of them.

If you’re the Boer romantic still holding onto the idea that the Boers were an independent nation with a long history of self-governance – now is the time to refill that branders and coke.

Because, and this is the BIG kicker, the ZAR as a fully independent Republic didn’t last very long, a mere 25 years only. What the heck – the Boers only really enjoyed 25 years of full freedom in one Boer Republic only – that’s it? What the flip, what happened?

The British up to their devilish ways again? Well, here’s a great Afrikaans term “Ja/Nee” – yes and no, but to be fair to the British, this one is a Boer ‘own goal’.

The ZAR had a rocky start from the get go – the Voortrekkers were in conflict with just about every tribe initially occupying large parts of the ZAR territory (again, the territory was not ‘empty’ as the Broederbond would have you believe) – conflicts with indigenous tribes starting with all their small isolated republics and building up to their big singular republic.

The ZAR, far from being a pastoral little settlement just wanting to ‘farm’ in peace was a highly aggressive and expansionist state – a ‘coloniser’ in effect, to exist in a hostile environment they also had to either negotiate land or shoot their way in, and they did both – on conflict there is a reason Botswana exists as a state today (the Tswana asking Britain for ‘Protection’ against Boer expansion and aggression). Also, the ZAR was much bigger than you might imagine, its borders extended well into ‘Zululand’ as we know it now (massive swaths of ‘Kwa-Zulu Natal’ were part of the ZAR)– and herein lay a major problem for the ZAR .. the Zulu.

Map of the ZAR in 1899 after the Republic annexed Swaziland – note the borders, especially in ‘Natal’ – achingly close to St Lucia and access to the ocean.

Aggressive expansion by the ZAR had also stirred up the Pedi, led by Sekhukune I and resulted in a war in 1876 which is recorded as a Boer defeat. Bolstered and confident, the very powerful Zulu kingdom was now also making some very threatening claims on ZAR territory. Added to this, the ZAR government was also struggling financially (remember that gold had not yet been discovered in any significant way), and it is recorded that the ZAR government faced bankruptcy – so they could not afford any more wars or defensive actions – literally. Feeling their small and vulnerable communities were about to be wiped out by the Zulu and unable to raise enough taxes – the ZAR government did the unthinkable and elected to dissolve their Republic – voluntarily and then they turned to the British for protection against the aggrieved and increasingly violent African tribes – yup, the British.

The various indigenous tribes inside and bordering the ZAR felt they had a case too, and they too called on the British to help them from what they saw as ZAR aggression, land grabbing and subjection. They too also invited the British to protect them.

All good then, invited by EVERYONE the British peaceably moved into the ZAR on the 12th April 1877 to settle the conflicts and with no resistance from the Boers whatsoever, not a shot being fired, took down the ZAR ‘Vier-Kleur’ and hoisted the Union Flag (Jack) over Pretoria and erected a British government there. In doing so the ex-Boer Republic also handed over their finances, tax from now out, of both Africans and Boers alike would now be collected by the British. With that the British now declared the Transvaal officially a British Colony – The British Colony of the Transvaal, established 1877.

So, here’s another staggering inconvenient truth – number 7, the ZAR became ‘British’ as early as 1877 – having existed for only 25 years. The British didn’t ‘steal’ it, nor did they ‘invade’ it – no they marched peacefully into the ZAR at the invitation of the Boers and strange as it may seem – they were welcomed as saviours by some Boers – fact.

Now, some modern day Boer Romantics point to being ‘duped’ by deceitful and greedy British officials or state that President Thomas Burgers was nothing but a madman, senile or drunk – when he agreed to the British taking over his Republic – but that’s all debatable, I like to look at the facts and what people at the time said – Burgers in fact blamed the ZAR ‘Raad’- Kruger and his cabal – and it really cuts to the point and the issues of the day – he said;

“I would rather be a policeman under a strong government (the British) than a President of such a State (the ZAR). It is you—you members of the Raad and the Boers—who have ruined the country, who have sold your independence for a drink. You have ill-treated the natives, you have shot them down, you have sold them into slavery, and now you have to pay the penalty.”

Incidentally (not to get too wide into this subject now as nobody comes out smelling of roses) – but the “slavery” bit Burgers refers to is the inboekselings system widely used by the Boers in the ZAR at the time – an old VOC/Dutch system of ‘indentured slavery’ – primarily of Black women and children captured and indentured to their Boer masters till 25 years of age, it also formed a lucrative trade for struggling farmers on the frontiers of the ZAR known as ‘Black Gold’ hence Burgers’ term “sold them” (and if you think I’m speaking rubbish – look it up).

Now, was everyone happy? Well, no, as you can imagine there was a bun fight amongst the Boers – some not happy with becoming British and others quite happy to crack on with the British – after all the Zulu threat had now abated – in fact the British had gone one step further and literally crushed the Zulu threat in the 1879 Anglo-Zulu War (ironically the Zulu thought the British column moving up was intended to deal with issues in their Transvaal colony, and were pretty surprised when they came under attack).

With the British crushing the Zulu threat, some Boers were pretty happy and felt they could now get on and farm safely. However, on the other hand, with Zulu threat now gone completely, it did not take long before the British policies, taxes and concessions for Black African land rights and their policies of taxation of Boer land to become an issue to some other sectors of the resident Boer population.

It all came to a head with the Boers when the British confiscated one Boer’s wagon in lieu of his backdated tax, which he refused to pay. This brought the British into direct conflict with a Boer Commando drafted to help the farmer .. the incident exploded, 10,000 Boers led by Paul Kruger demanding the return of their old Republic and removal of the British – then they attacked the British Garrisons around Pretoria, starting on the 20 December 1880 at Bronkhorstspruit (there were no British garrisons at Johannesburg – it didn’t exist).

This then kicked off the ‘Transvaal War’ in November 1880 (to Afrikaner historians it’s the 1st Anglo-Boer War and to the rest its simply known as ‘The Transvaal War’ – I’ll call it Boer War 1).

The long and short of the Transvaal War – it ended rather disingenuously. The British sighted a poor battlefield on top of Majuba mountain on which to hold their ‘waterloo’ and got their arses kicked (there is literally no other way to put it) on the 27 February 1881 and routed from the ZAR.

Image: Painting of Lance Corporal Joseph John Farmer, awarded the Victoria Cross for running the first aid station on the top of Majuba Hill during the battle. Farmer raised a white cloth over the wounded to indicate their presence to the Boers. His arm was shot through. He raised another cloth with his other arm which was also hit.

The Boers walked away victorious having seen the back of the ‘Rooinekke’ (red-necks) – done and dusted with British rule – back to an Independent Republic and Koeksusters and coffee (at least that’s how it was pitched). But, the truth of the matter, it was far from ‘done and dusted’ – and an ‘independent’ Republic did not materialise, as much as some would like to believe that it did.

The British, deeply aggrieved, decided against sending in a massive expeditionary force and flattening the insurrection in their colony, they sued for peace instead – they understood (as they had in the Orange River Sovereignty) that this was a difficult region, tough customers and they were at the end of the day the minority in it. So, they agreed to give the administration of it back to the Boers, to re-declare their Republic – and here’s the kicker bit – on the PROVISO that it be a British (and here’s the word again) – ‘Suzerainty’. In other words, a British tributary state or British vassal state, with no real ‘recognition’ internationally and one in which they were legally free to ‘meddle’ in at any point in time.

The Boers, over a barrel really, and happy to get back a semblance of a Republic – agreed. Two Conventions – the Pretoria convention, held on 3 August 1881 established the ZAR as a British Suzerainty and at a later convention, the London Convention, signed on 27 February 1884, in which some concessions were given to Kruger and his party as to borders, the word Suzerainty was also dropped from the pre-amble, but the the SAR still had to get permission from the British government for any treaty entered into with any other country other than the Orange Free State – Britain reserved the right to oversight and could still ‘meddle’ in the state’s affairs – a British “client” state if you will – in either event, the ZAR remained a state with mutually agreed British oversight – all the way from 1881 to ‘The South African War (1899-1902)’ a.k.a Boer War 2. It was theirs to legally intervene, a truly ‘free’ and ‘fully independent’ Republic it was not, inconvenient truth – number 8.

As to gold, the Johannesburg gold rush took place in earnest on the reef from July 1886 – 9 years AFTER the British had established interests and control of the ZAR in 1877, in fact when the ZAR became a British colony for the first time, Johannesburg had not even been established – it didn’t exist. So, no – the British did not ‘invade’ the ZAR to steal the gold, their interests were there long before significant deposits of gold were found on the Witwatersrand – inconvenient truth – number 9.

Understanding the true causes of the South African War 1899-1902

There’s usually lively debate on Boer war forums as to the casus belli (the case for war) of the ‘South African War’ (1899-1902) – incorrectly called ‘The Boer War’.- but for clarity I’ll call it Boer War 2. They look to the greed of British Imperialism or the fact that the Boers declared war on the British in the official declaration – not the other way round .. but that would be to COMPLETELY ignore the three casus belli that Paul Kruger upfront put on the table as Boer ZAR demands at Bloemfontein when ‘negotiations’ kicked off with Alfred Milner in 1899 .. the ZAR’s status as to British oversights specified by the London Convention (which Kruger wanted removed completely) and the qualification time for ZAR citizenship of the miners on the reef (a human rights issue – nothing to do with gold per se) – which Kruger wanted extended. Then there was also the issue of a seaport, and Kruger wanted the British to concede parts of ‘Zululand’ to allow an ‘Independent’ ZAR to expand its borders and secure a vital seaport (key to maintaining future ‘independence’).

Images – President Paul Kruger (left) and Alfred Milner (right) – colourised by Jennifer Bosch.

The British would agree to none of the above, Milner was dogmatic and unmoving – their sticking point, the Franchise – they wanted 5 years qualification – and things simply went south from there – war was on the cards – again! So, let’s understand the ‘belligerence’ of the British – what’s driving it – and it boils down to this niggly issue of both the ZAR and the OFS being British client states. If you understand that, the minds of Rhodes, Milner, Kruger and even Smuts become increasingly clear – so to the casus belli, and here’s how:

Jan Smuts would very famously state that the Jameson Raid 1895 was the ‘real’ start of the Boer War in 1899 (not the Boer invasions of the British colonies), the British had betrayed the Boers and an uneasy peace existed after it – this was the Boer interpretation of events and even Smuts was sticking to it.

The British on the other hand, viewed the start of the Boer War in 1899 somewhat differently, they viewed the Battle of Majuba back in 1881 as the ‘real’ start of the Boer War in 1899, the ‘peace’ struck with the ZAR was a ‘dishonourable’ one – the Boers had betrayed the British and retribution was coming – this was the British interpretation of events, and commentators at the time like Winston Churchill were sticking to it.

In truth, Boer War 2 is to Boer War 1, what World War 2 is to World War 1 – a progressive extension of the preceding issues which remained unresolved (and, as inconvenient as this is – these issues were not about stealing gold or diamonds). It would be interesting to see this debate in 1941 when Churchill and Smuts became friends, but I’m sure neither changed their minds – and as to the British position and what started the war, one can clearly see it in their wartime rally call in 1899 – which was “Avenge Majuba” not “let’s go get their gold”- inconvenient truth – number 11.

Image – Postcard of the time calling for the avenge of Majuba during Boer War 2 (1899-1902) note the phrase “wiping something off the slate” – old score.

So back to Cecil Rhodes and his pals, in their minds their actions in implementing the Jameson Raid in 1895 were perfectly justified – sorting out a British Suzerainty’s governance of British citizens on the reef – so confident was Rhodes and Starr Jameson in their right to meddle in the ZAR that they did not bother to get official British government backing in Westminster for the raid (in fact in their minds it was not a raid at all – but a ‘rescue mission’).

That the raid failed so dismally was an embarrassment to Rhodes, so much so it forced his resignation. But it did not stop Britain from sending their next ‘man’ in to replace Rhodes and ‘sort out’ their troublesome vassal state which was the ZAR – and that was Alfred Milner. Milner, very aware of the legal status of both the OFS and the ZAR as British Suzerainty States was a blunt, unabashed British Imperialist. Kruger, a Boer Imperialist (there is no hiding that fact either) was never going to get Britain to renege on its rights to the ZAR (or the OFS for that matter).

I