BRITISH SETTLERS IN SOUTH AFRICA. (Hansard, 14 November 1906)
Hansard House of Commons House of Lords Parliament UK House of Lords sitting
BRITISH SETTLERS IN SOUTH AFRICA. (Hansard, 14 November 1906)
LORD LOVAT

My Lords, in accordance with the Notice in my name on the Paper, I beg to ask His Majesty's Government their intentions—(1) as to their policy in regard to land settlement in the Transvaal and Orange River Colonies; (2) as to the steps they are to take to safeguard the interests of British farmers and others who have recently taken up † See (4) Debates, cxliv., 288 et seq ; cxlvi., 28–30; cxlix., 527–529. 1383 land under the Land Settlement Ordinances in these Colonies; and, further, to ask that the Report of the Ridgeway Commission, so far as it relates to land settlement, should be laid on the Table of the House; and to move for Papers.

I regret to say that I have to take up the time of your Lordships' House to ask a simple, but, I think, important question. Are His Majesty's Government to take steps to safeguard the British settlers in the Transvaal and Orange River Colonies, or are they to abandon them to the tender mercies of a probable Boer majority in the Transvaal, and a certain and overwhelming majority in the Orange River Colony? Before considering the case of the settlers in detail I would like to point out to your Lordships two outstanding facts—first, that of the settlers 75 per cent. fought for the Empire in the War and are men of small capital who have invested their all in South African lands; secondly, that they will be totally without representation in the Government of either Colony, there being no prospect of one single settler representative being returned for either place. I trust that His Majesty's Government will see fit to give a direct Answer to the Question that I have put on the Paper.

Six months ago, when this subject was brought before the House, we were told that the matter was still sub judice. The Ridgeway Commission has now gone, seen, and reported, and the time would appear to have arrived when a definite answer should be vouchsafed in view of the very acute anxiety which exists amongst all the two thousand settlers in South Africa about their future existence. I do not believe for one moment that His Majesty's Government are going to desert the settler or the policy of land settlement; and, if that is so, why not say so? His Majesty's Government cannot get away from their responsibility and the responsibility of their predecessors for the placing of settlers on the land, settlers many of whom were placed by the actual British military authorities under a system of practically military land tenure, and who regard the land as actually given and guaranteed to them in return for services rendered. That this view is held by many soldiers 1384 and colonial settlers in the Colony can be proved by the Leeuw and Maroka District Petition, from which I should like to read the following:— Fourthly, we consider we have a strong claim, amounting almost to a demand, on your future consideration. The farms were allotted to your settlers immediately after the cessation of hostilities. A clause in the Land Settlement Ordinance grants certain preferences to those persons who have done most public service. Is it not only reasonable for us to feel we gained our land partly as a reward for our services in time of need to the Empire? If we have any grounds for this belief, we should also be able with full confidence to rely on the support of this same Empire in case our future existence on these farms might be threatened through no fault of our own. On the subject of responsibility I would further urge that this cannot be understood to end with the dumping down of soldier settlers in a colony. In all common fairness it must be accepted that before being left to their own devices such settlers so planted must be given a chance of success. That these settlers in South Africa have had a chance of success I must emphatically deny.

Now, my Lords, it is a curious fact that there appears to be a fatality attaching in initial stages to all planting of a foreign population on a new soil. Even in recent years the facts are still well known to all of us of the difficulties encountered by the Welsh settlers in Patagonia, the Algoa Bay Settlers in 1820, the Posen settlers of the last few decades, and the Scottish settlers in Canada, both recently and after the American War. There appears to be some fate, apart from hostility or the reverse of the indigene, which brings down on new settlers a series of climatic and other hardships beyond the experience of any former dwellers on the soil. In South Africa, not only have the settlers had three consecutive years of drought more severe than the oldest settler can remember, but the natural sequences of a war, increase of locusts (from lack of precautions taken) and cattle fever spread through the country from cut fences, have been more virulent than ever. In addition to these hardships the settlers have had to build their houses, kraals, fences, etc., de novo. Materials after the war have been at famine prices, and the failure 1385 of many successive crops has entirely depleted their resources. It is not exaggeration to say that, unless the friendly landlord in the shape of an Imperial landlord is guaranteed to the settlers for a period, many of the best will be ruined, and through no fault of their own.

It must be clearly understood that the men who are now holding on to the farms are a very different class of individual from those misfits and "sundowners" who were dumped on the land in 1902. Those who are left represent the very pick of our Colony's pioneers, men who have fought against every obstacle and who believe in the undoubtedly great agricultural possibilities of the country, given a fair chance to make their way in it. The question I am asking to-day is, Are you going to give these colonists a fair chance? They will get it if they are given an Imperial Land Board on the lines which His Majesty's Government have twice stated they are favourable to. Under Boer control, as certain as anything can be predicted, these men will fail.

Now, my Lords, on the attitude of the Boors, Boer leaders and Boer farmers, I must take up our time for a very few minutes. As a general fact it may be stated that when the Boer farmer has come into touch with the British settler the relations are most cordial. The English settler, by his methods of agriculture, his keenness for marketing possibilities, and his pushing methods, supplies a want to the Boer; whilst, on the other hand, the Boer, by his knowledge of stock, local advantages and difficulties, and cleverness in pastoral pursuits, is an equal help to the settler. This is not at all the case with the Boer leader. He is prejudiced against the settlement of any Britisher on the land on general and political grounds, and, unfortunately for the peace of the land, it is only the Boer leader in politics who counts. About the attitude of the Boer leaders I do not think it is necessary to quote at any length. Steyn says— Boycott the English and guide your political action by the cries of the women and children done to death in the concentration camps. Louis Botha, in a more suave manner, enunciates the same views. The utter- 1386 ances of General Beyers, a fine out-spoken gentleman in the North of the Transvaal, are too well known to be worth quoting here. The Bloemfontein Friend, the official organ of the Hartzog-Fischer leaders of Orangia, shows in no uncertain way the attitude of the leaders of Orangia to the settlement policy.

Now, the importance of the question is this. If the settlers are backed and practically made secure by a Land Board the vapourings of the hostile portion of Boer leaders is of no importance. If the settler is left to stand alone in his present weak financial position, the Boer leaders will see that he can be squeezed from the land, and on the first non-payment of rent, etc., squeezed he will be. That this process is easy one has only to look at British settlers in the Orange River Colony. I am sorry to have taken up so much time in developing these points, but I wish very clearly to bring out that there is a real danger to the settler, as shown by petitions and letters forwarded to the Ridgeway Commission and to private individuals. The solution is a very easy one, and, as I have said already, has been twice accepted by His Majesty's Government as desirable. I think the proposal that has been most often put forward to remove anxiety with regard to the settlers has been the institution of a Land Board, and His Majesty's Government are not disposed to deny that a Land Board may supply the best machinery for administering these Colonies, but they are obliged to attach conditions. It seems to them it would be entirely contrary to the general principle of responsible government that an arrangement of that kind should be carried out except by general consent.

I do not think it will be necessary to read to your Lordships some remarks I have here on Lord Elgin's statement on the subject, but I think that perhaps an extract from a letter by Lord Selborne may not be without interest to your Lordships. Lord Selborne published this letter, we understand, as a feeler for a move that His Majesty's Government proposed to make— In respect of land settlement, His Majesty's Government feel that they have a special obligation to those who have become settlers during 1387 the period when they have been directly responsible for the government of the two Colonies, and it is a matter in which public opinion is the United Kingdom takes a deep interest. They would like, therefore, to see land settlement placed under a board appointed by themselves and altogether divorced from politics, and to that board they would like to see handed over the responsibility for all existing settlers, for the administration of all assets derived from the £2,500,000 of the guaranteed loan which has been devoted to land settlement, and for the expenditure of the further sum of £1,500,000 which His Majesty's Government suggest should be devoted to this purpose from the new loan. If that is carried out everyone will be satisfied. You will then have a board with a sufficient sum to minister to the wants of the colonists on the ground.

What are the arguments against having an Imperial Land Board? There is the argument of interference. Is that a fair argument to put forward? We have interfered in the question of the labour on the Rand. Surely we ought to be able to interfere in the cause of our own people who are settled in the country. Then, on the question of precedence, I do not think that is very much of an argument. If you can show any instance of abandoning 2,000 settlers to their fate then we talk can about the question of precedent. In conclusion, might I venture to submit that if patriotism is still considered one of the civic virtues, we owe something to these settlers in a far off land? They are the people who fought for us for years in the war, who have struggled for years against a series of fortuitous chances outside their control. Is the question of the doubtful privilege of the British status, as pointed out by Lord Elgin in May, 1906, to be their only heritage? My Lords, in South Africa, since the date which Englishmen of all kinds look upon with shame, the status of a British subject is not a very definable asset. I cannot believe that His Majesty's Government are going to desert men for such a flimsy gift. Services have been rendered, help has been given; if help is taken away, is betrayal too strong a term? With the proposed Constitution imminent I have considered it my duty to bring this matter forward. I think the opportunity has arrived when a statement might be made that these settlers are not going to be abandoned, and the answer of the Government will show whether it is 1388 true, as is often said in South Africa, that it depends upon which Party is in power at home whether it is worth while to be a Britisher or not.

§ *VISCOUNT MILNER

My Lords, it was with extreme regret that I listened to the remarks of the noble Earl the Secretary of State for the Colonies. I do not think that he appreciates, or that the Government at all appreciate, the strength of the feeling which exists on this subject among all those who are interested in British South Africa, or the deep feeling which exists, and the still deeper feeling which, I believe, will exist, throughout the country when the danger to which these settlers are at present exposed becomes a realised fact. On the other hand, I am greatly encouraged by the speech which has been delivered by the noble Earl who has just sat down, who, I think, on this question voices a large amount of opinion on the part of the supporters of the 1395 Government and of the population of the country generally.

I really deeply deplore the total inadequacy of the statement the Secretary for the Colonies has seen fit to make to-night. He referred to former expressions of sympathy of his with these settlers, which he said I had acknowledged. I fully acknowledge them. I have never had any doubt as to the sympathy of the noble Earl, but what we want is to see his sympathy converted into acts, and the last moment is approaching when that can be done. I realise as much as any one the extreme inconvenience to which your Lordships are put by this question having to be brought forward on the present occasion. I apologise for intruding at this time, but what I wish your Lordships to realise is that we are making this intrusion because it is a matter of practical and vital urgency. The provision of special protection for the settlers for which we are appealing must be made while the matter stands as it does at present, or it cannot be made at all. Let the Letters Patent issue without any reference to land settlement and the settlers will pass automatically under the control of the responsible Government which is to be set up. You may say that these Letters Patent are for the Transvaal, and that in the Transvaal, after all, British settlers will have advocates to stand up for them. It is true, I fully admit, that the risks in the Transvaal are less than in the Orange River Colony. But even in the Transvaal there are risks, owing to the fact that there is no provision for the representation of minorities. These settlers will have no direct representation in the Transvaal Parliament at all. But a point which is of far greater importance is this, that the position of the settlers, if it is precarious in the Transvaal, is more than precarious, it is a position of almost certain ruin, unless something is done for them, in the Orange River Colony. If these Letters Patent issue without any provision for their protection in the Transvaal, then I say it is a moral certainty that, when it comes to the Orange River Colony, the fact that nothing has been done for settlers in the Transvaal will be quoted as a precedent for leav- 1396 ing them in the lurch in the sister Colony. And so we are being drawn step by step down the slope which leads to the abyss of another disgraceful desertion of those who have served us in South Africa. This is my excuse for having intruded on your Lordships' time.

I do not think the historical retrospect in which the noble Earl has indulged makes his case any stronger. That retrospect, on the other hand, will show that we have exercised the extremest patience and the greatest possible desire not unduly to press or hurry the Government in this matter. And if I press them at all to-day it is simply because I feel that, having been the agent of the British Government in putting these people on to the land, and having induced them to put themselves in the position in which they are, I should be the basest of deserters if I did not do all that lies in my power to save them, while there is yet time.

Let me follow, as briefly as possible, the retrospect of the noble Earl. He said that on March 27th he expressed his sympathy with these settlers. I quite agree. He did make a very sympathetic speech, which filled me, at any rate, with considerable hope. But what was his reason then for not going more into detail about this matter—because it is to be observed that, although the noble Earl has several times expressed his sympathy, he has always given the vital question the go-by? On that occasion he said it would be premature to discuss the matter before we had the Report of the Commission which was going out to South Africa to study the question of the Constitution. The Commissioners have been home, how many months? Three or four. I should like to know, it is one of the things we want to know, what did the Commissioners tell the noble Earl and His Majesty's Government about the settlers? It would be a great satisfaction to us to near that the Commissioners reported that they thought our anxiety was all moonshine and that the settlers in the Orange River Colony would be perfectly safe if they were handed over to the tender mercies of a Boer majority. Is the noble Earl prepared to tell us that the Report of the Commission has allayed all fears on this 1397 subject? I think we are entitled to know what the Report of the Commission is.

Then the noble Earl went on to refer to the next occasion on which this matter was brought up, in July. At that date he foreshadowed an attempt, which, as a matter of fact, was subsequently made by His Majesty's Government, to do something for the protection of these settlers. He said that his Majesty's Government were in favour generally of the principle of a Land Board, but that they expressed their approval subject to certain reservations, and one of these was that there must be general consent. It seemed to me, and I said so at the time, a most preposterous thing to admit that these people needed the protection of a special Land Board because they were not safe in the hands of the majority of the inhabitants of the Orange River Colony or of the Government responsible to that majority, and yet to appeal to that very majority to say whether they were to be protected or not.

You ask the people against whom they are to be protected, "Will you approve of our making special provision for their protection? "The thing is a perfect farce. And the truly farcical nature of it came out in the proceedings initiated by Lord Selborne, as the noble Earl said, on the instructions of His Majesty's Government, with regard to this matter. I should like to refer once more to the terms of Lord Selborne's letter, which was issued with the approval of the Government. It contains a remarkable admission— His Majesty's Government, it says, feel that they have a special obligation to those who have become settlers during the period when they have been directly responsible for the Government of the two Colonies, and it is a matter in which public opinion in the United Kingdom takes a deep interest. They would like, therefore, to see land settlement placed under a Board appointed by themselves and altogether divorced from politics, and to that Board they would like to see handed over the responsibility for all existing settlers. That was the proposal which Lord Selborne was authorised to make to various representative people in these Colonies. But then this suggestion 1398 was coupled with a proposal to raise an additional £4,000,000, partly for the relief of the settlers, but partly for further compensation to the Boers and partly for some other objects, and in that form it seems to have met with no particular favour anywhere. I never expected that it would. I cannot conceive how the Government could have supposed, that, with elections just impending, with these Colonies about to be endowed with the supreme blessing of party government—that is to say, with the population marshalled into two brigades, each looking out with hawk-like keenness for some reproach to throw in the face of the other—I say I cannot conceive how anyone could have supposed that under these circumstances any party in the Transvaal or the Orange River Colony would make themselves responsible for an additional burden of £4,000,000 being placed on the shoulders of the Colonies in order to get His Majesty's Government out of a difficulty. It was, in my judgment, quite unreasonable to expect that any result would follow from that proposal. I do not comment on the absurdity of going cap in hand to the Boers and asking them whether they would like to pay another million and a half for British land settlement. Of course they would not like it. But then it was anticipated that the sop which was to be offered to them of another million and a quarter for compensation to themselves would induce them to swallow the pill. Really it is difficult not to smile at the simplicity of those who were seized with that idea. The Boers expect that they are going shortly to be in power. They know they will be in power in the Orange River Colony. Whether they will be in power in the Transvaal Colony or not, they are aware that any Government there will be more or less at their mercy. They look forward, as a matter of fact, to the time when they will be able to provide themselves with this million and a quarter, or any other sum which they may feel desirous of devoting to compensation to themselves, without the accompaniment of any disagreeable concession to the British settlers. The whole plan of saving these settlers by means of this 1399 appeal to the various parties in the Transvaal and the Orange River Colony was doomed to failure from the very first.

I wish briefly to sum up the position as it strikes me. Is it, or is it not, a right thing to continue to offer opportunities for British colonists whether coming from this country or from the other colonies, who, remember, are interested in this matter, too—is it, or is it not a right thing to keep the door open for them to settle in the new colonies which have come under the British flag by the exertions of this country and of those colonies also? If it is right to keep that door open, ought not His Majesty's Government to keep it open without asking anyone whether they are to be allowed to do so or not? But there is a stronger point even than that. Granted that the policy of land settlement was a mistake, that the policy ought to be abandoned, as I hope it will not be abandoned. Even so you cannot abandon the obligations you have already incurred under it, and surely it is strange for a British Government to go to any body of men anywhere and ask their consent to its fulfilling its own obligations of honour.

I have felt bound to speak strongly on this subject because I feel it is a vital and urgent matter. Let me say that I still have hope, a strong hope, and especially after the words we have heard from the Ministerial Benches, that His Majesty's Government may see fit to convert the sympathy which I have no doubt they, or some of them, feel, into action, and not only to do that, but to do it promptly, and let us know where we stand.

I plead, in the first instance, for a continuance of the policy of land settlement as a policy. Remember, it was not lightly adopted. It was adopted on the recommendation of a Royal Commission sent out expressly to study this question at the time of the war, who reported as follows— Dealing with the question as a whole, we desire to express our firm conviction that a well-considered scheme of settlement in South Africa by men of British origin is of the most vital importance to the future prosperity of British South Africa. We find among those who wish to to see British rule in South Africa maintained 1400 and its influence for good extended but one opinion upon this subject. There even seems reason to fear lest the vast expenditure of blood and treasure which has marked the war should be absolutely wasted, unless some strenuous effort be made to establish in the country, at the close of the war, a thoroughly British population large enough to make a recurrence of division and disorder impossible. It was that policy which was initiated, not by me as one noble Lord, I think, said—I was only the. agent—but on the Report of the Royal Commission by the British Government, with, I believe, the full concurrence of the nation, for, whatever differences of opinion there may be on other questions, I have not yet heard that a policy of land settlement is disapproved of except by a few extremists.

Here then is this policy, adopted on the recommendation of a Royal Commission, instituted for the maintenance of our future power in South Africa, a policy the progress of which has been steadily satisfactory, and which has been continued to a stage at which we have gained experience and have learned, by such experience, how it may be carried on with greater advantage than it could be in the first necessary stage of experiment. Here, I say, is this policy in absolute jeopardy, and its future depends entirely on its being taken out of the hands of the new Government of the two colonies, and placed under independent management. The whole of our past efforts in that direction appear to my mind to be imperilled. But there is a higher obligation even than the maintenance of policy, and that is the obligation of honour. You may abandon that policy—though I should deeply regret it, and I know the nation would ultimately regret it—but you cannot abandon honour. After all the melancholy instances in South African history of vacillation on the part of this country and the desertion of those who have staked their lives and fortunes on the continuance of a particular course, you cannot, surely, add another and one of the most disgraceful pages to the dark annals of our chopping and changing in South African policy.

It is said that, if you were to place the land settlement fund, the lands which have been bought with it, and the tenants on those lands, under the control of a 1401 special board appointed by the Imperial Government, it would be an interference with responsible government. I think that is an absolute misapprehension. We do not propose to interfere with the freedom of the Legislatures of the new colonies or to put any restriction upon the action of their executive governments. I should be the last to suggest such a thing. I say you cannot both grant responsible government and not grant it. You cannot say to these colonies, "Now you are free to manage your own affairs, but in this or that particular you must manage them in accordance with our wishes." But what is there inconsistent with responsible government in retaining certain lands in the new colonies under a British board responsible to the British Government? There would he no interference with the law of the colonies. These lands would be administered under the ordinary law. There would be no interference with the executive power. The executive power could do, as regards these settlers, exactly whatever it could do with regard to any other occupiers of land. But it seems to me that an immense protection would nevertheless be afforded to these settlers, and it is the only protection they ask for— the protection of a sympathetic landlord. That is their point. It is not that they want any privilege. They are at present the tenants of a body which is doing all it can to help them and to give reasonable consideration to their difficulties, and they want to continue the tenants of a sympathetic landlord.

Does anybody say it is an interference with responsible government for the British Government to own land in a British Colony '? The Cape Colony has been under responsible government for thirty-four years, yet the British Admiralty is the owner of enormously valuable land in the Cape Colony, and the British War Office is the owner of valuable land in all the colonies of South Africa. Has it ever occurred to anybody to say that the ownership of land in a British Colony by the British Government, or by a board dependent on the British Government, is an interference with 1402 responsible government It is a misunderstanding of our proposal to suppose that we desire any interference with responsible government at all.

I hope the House will pardon me if I refer to one more point, because I am certain that it will be brought up. It may be said, "That is all very well. But this particular land is land which has been bought with money which the colonies have borrowed, and on which the colonies are paying interest; and that makes all the difference." I fully admit that this is the case, but I say that it does not in the least alter the fact that the Imperial Government would be perfectly justified in keeping that money and land under its own control. After all, these £3,000,000 are the only money out of all the millions that we have spent upon South Africa in which the people of this country, and the people of the British Colonies who have helped us, have any direct interest whatever.

We gave a free grant of £3,000,000 under the Treaty of Vereeniging. Directly afterwards there was a further grant of £2,000,000 to the so-called "protected" burghers, and there was another grant of £2,000,000 for compensation to British and neutral subjects who had suffered during he an That was a clear £7,000,000 out of the Imperial Exchequer. In addition to that, the whole of the £35,000,000 loan, out of which this £3,000,000 would, according to our proposal, be taken, has been guaranteed by the British Government. If it had not been for that guarantee, the two colonies could not have raised a penny of it. Whatever money they did raise would have cost them at least 4 per cent. The mere fact of our giving that guarantee has saved the colonies £350,000 a year in interest on that loan. Therefore, apart from the three grants, apart from our claim for many millions of war contribution from the Transvaal and our contingent claim on the Orange River Colony, if there had been no financial transaction at all except this guranteed loan of £35,000,000, we should still have afforded the colonies ample compensation for taking £3,000,000 out of that loan for Imperial purposes> which, moreover, are not purposes in which the colonies have no interest at 1403 all. If we took £3,000,000 to expend it in Great Britain, it would be a different matter; but we propose to take this £3,000,000, not to spend out of the colonies, but to spend in the colonies, and all we ask is that it should be kept under Imperial control. Indeed we are almost bound so to keep it owing to the fact that these £3,000,000 were allocated for land settlement in the new colonies in the Act of this Parliament confirming the guarantee of the loan, and it was one of the great inducements offered to this Parliament to give that guarantee at all. It would be a breach of that understanding, if we allowed any part of this money to be diverted from the purposes for which jt was ear-marked in the Guaranteed Loan Act, and how can we ensure its not being diverted, if it passes under the control of the two new colonial Governments, one of which at any rate is bound to be hostile to the policy of settlement? For these reasons I hold that, although there are no doubt difficulties standing in the way of any arrangement which would give the settlers protection by placing them under the control of an Imperial board, those difficulties are by no means insuperable. In the interests of the great policy of land settlement, or, even if you reject that entirely, then at least in the interests of British honour, I beg to make this last fervent appeal to His Majesty's Government to save us from a discreditable solution of this question.