catalog_id stringlengths 20 45 | record_layer stringclasses 3
values | record_type stringclasses 7
values | title stringlengths 43 86 | country stringlengths 5 27 | region stringclasses 11
values | election_name stringlengths 21 60 | election_date stringdate 2016-11-08 00:00:00 2026-11-03 00:00:00 ⌀ | case_status stringclasses 4
values | manipulation_assessment stringclasses 6
values | ai_role stringlengths 5 50 | generative_ai_status stringlengths 8 49 | evidence_maturity stringlengths 9 50 | incident_count_eligible bool 2
classes | research_status stringlengths 19 62 | source_count_or_links int64 1 12 | main_caveat stringlengths 93 335 | last_checked stringdate 2026-08-11 00:00:00 2026-08-12 00:00:00 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
ro-2024-presidential-annulment | claim_coded_core | election_wide_case | Romania 2024 presidential election: coordinated digital campaign and annulment | Romania | Europe | 2024 Romanian presidential election | 2024-11-24 | retrospective | mixed_documented_manipulation | material_amplification | not_established | occurrence_supported_agency_effect_not_established | true | included_claim_coded | 8 | The precise sponsor, foreign attribution, and causal contribution of platform dynamics remain contested; some reporting indicates a domestic party-financed campaign may have been repurposed. | 2026-08-11 |
ro-2025-presidential-repeat | claim_coded_core | observed_network | Romania 2025 repeat presidential election and cross-platform synthetic-persona network | Romania | Europe | 2025 Romanian presidential election repeat | 2025-05-04 | retrospective | manipulation_confirmed | mixed | confirmed | occurrence_supported_agency_effect_not_established | true | included_claim_coded | 3 | The 16 million figure is a sum of platform views, not unique Romanian voters or authenticated human exposure. DFRLab described the network as pro-Russia from its narratives, but could not identify the operator or prove Russian-state command. A completed repeat election does not resolve the disputed causal basis of the ... | 2026-08-11 |
md-2024-presidential-referendum | claim_coded_core | election_wide_case | Moldova 2024 presidential election and EU referendum: hybrid interference network | Moldova | Europe | 2024 presidential election and EU constitutional referendum | 2024-10-20 | retrospective | mixed_documented_manipulation | mixed | confirmed | occurrence_supported_agency_effect_not_established | true | included_claim_coded | 7 | Russia and Ilan Shor denied key allegations; official recipient counts do not establish how every payment affected voting; observers also identified incumbent advantage and misuse of public resources. | 2026-08-11 |
md-2025-parliamentary-linked-network | claim_coded_core | observed_network | Moldova 2025 parliamentary election: continuation of hybrid influence infrastructure | Moldova | Europe | 2025 Moldovan parliamentary election | 2025-09-28 | retrospective | manipulation_confirmed | mixed | confirmed | occurrence_supported_agency_effect_not_established | true | included_claim_coded | 2 | The platform totals are not unique people or authenticated Moldovan voters. Operational ties to Shor-affiliated or Russia-linked structures vary by component; direct Kremlin command is not proved for every asset. The presence of AI content and automated accounts does not establish decisive reach or electoral effect. | 2026-08-11 |
us-nh-2024-biden-robocall | claim_coded_core | observed_incident | New Hampshire 2024 AI-cloned Biden robocall | United States | North America | 2024 New Hampshire Democratic presidential primary | 2024-01-23 | retrospective | manipulation_confirmed | core_generation | confirmed | occurrence_supported_agency_effect_not_established | true | included_claim_coded | 12 | The jury acquitted Kramer of all 22 state criminal charges; the FCC finding, civil default, and acquittal are distinct proceedings. No credible evidence quantifies changed turnout or votes. | 2026-08-11 |
br-2026-election-preparedness | claim_coded_core | preparedness_file | Brazil 2026 general election: AI governance and integrity preparedness | Brazil | South America | 2026 Brazilian general election | 2026-10-04 | ongoing | preparedness_not_incident | mixed | confirmed | governance_context_not_incident | false | included_claim_coded | 9 | Brazil's 2024 municipal election research found far less high-impact AI abuse than feared; preparedness and incident counts do not imply electoral effect. | 2026-08-11 |
br-2026-bolsonaro-ai-avatar | claim_coded_core | observed_incident | Brazil 2026 Bolsonaro AI avatar at Flávio Bolsonaro campaign launch | Brazil | South America | 2026 Brazilian presidential election | 2026-10-04 | ongoing | transparent_contested_use | core_generation | confirmed | occurrence_supported_agency_effect_not_established | true | included_claim_coded | 7 | The avatar disclosed that it was AI-generated; disclosure weakens a simple covert-deception theory and the campaign denied that the item was an unlawful deepfake. Jair Bolsonaro's authorisation was denied by his lawyers and remains unknown. | 2026-08-11 |
us-2026-midterms-preparedness | claim_coded_core | preparedness_file | United States 2026 midterm election: fragmented AI governance and preparedness | United States | North America | 2026 United States midterm election | 2026-11-03 | ongoing | preparedness_not_incident | mixed | confirmed | governance_context_not_incident | false | included_claim_coded | 9 | Generative AI amplified existing risks more often than creating wholly new ones in prior cycles; observed synthetic ads do not establish electoral effects. | 2026-08-11 |
us-2026-campaign-deepfake-ads | claim_coded_core | observed_campaign_set | United States 2026 campaign-produced synthetic candidate ads | United States | North America | 2026 United States midterm campaigns | 2026-11-03 | ongoing | mixed_documented_manipulation | core_generation | confirmed | occurrence_supported_agency_effect_not_established | true | included_claim_coded | 6 | Some ads reproduce genuine prior words, contain disclosures, or are framed as satire; these features complicate classification as deception. | 2026-08-11 |
us-ca11-2026-wiener-conniechan-chatbot | claim_coded_core | observed_incident | California 11th District: campaign-controlled Connie Chan parody chatbot | United States | North America | 2026 California 11th congressional district general election | 2026-11-03 | ongoing | transparent_contested_use | core_generation | confirmed | occurrence_supported_agency_effect_not_established | true | included_claim_coded | 4 | The site openly described itself as AI and parody, disclosed that it was unaffiliated with Chan and paid for by Wiener, and did not purport to be Chan's authentic service. The campaign said adversarial prompts drove the controversial exchanges and that safeguards were tightened. | 2026-08-12 |
cand-usa-2016-ira-social-influence | screening_register | candidate_lead | Internet Research Agency social influence operation | United States | North America | 2016 presidential election | 2016-11-08 | screening | not_yet_claim_coded | material_amplification | not_applicable | confirmed | false | promote_after_claim_coding | 2 | Platform reach figures cover different denominators and time windows; official investigations did not causally estimate votes or turnout changed. | 2026-08-11 |
cand-usa-2016-cambridge-analytica | screening_register | candidate_lead | Cambridge Analytica voter profiling and deceptive Facebook data collection | United States | North America | 2016 presidential election | 2016-11-08 | screening | not_yet_claim_coded | supporting_tool | not_applicable | confirmed | false | promote_after_claim_coding | 2 | FTC findings establish collection and profiling, not that psychographic targeting outperformed ordinary targeting or changed the election. | 2026-08-11 |
cand-usa-2020-iran-proud-boys-emails | screening_register | candidate_lead | Iran-attributed Proud Boys voter-threat emails | United States | North America | 2020 presidential election | 2020-11-03 | screening | not_yet_claim_coded | supporting_tool | not_established | confirmed | false | promote_after_claim_coding | 2 | State attribution is stronger than unadjudicated charges against named individuals; no public-opinion or election effect was assessed. | 2026-08-11 |
cand-usa-2024-russia-doppelganger | screening_register | candidate_lead | Russia-attributed Doppelganger cloned-media and targeted influence operation | United States | North America | 2024 presidential election | 2024-11-05 | screening | not_yet_claim_coded | supporting_tool | confirmed_for_some_assets | partly_confirmed | false | promote_after_claim_coding | 2 | The seizure affidavit contains allegations; individual content views are not operation-wide unique reach. | 2026-08-11 |
cand-usa-2024-iran-hack-and-leak | screening_register | candidate_lead | Iran-attributed Trump campaign hack-and-leak operation | United States | North America | 2024 presidential election | 2024-11-05 | screening | not_yet_claim_coded | none_established | not_applicable | confirmed | false | reserve_election_adjacent | 2 | Major nonresponse and nonpublication are counterevidence to a successful leak-amplification claim. | 2026-08-11 |
cand-bra-2018-whatsapp-mass-messaging | screening_register | candidate_lead | Brazil 2018 WhatsApp mass-messaging ecosystem | Brazil | South America | 2018 presidential election | 2018-10-28 | screening | not_yet_claim_coded | material_amplification | not_applicable | partly_confirmed | false | promote_with_adjudication_caveat | 2 | TSE rejected the cases because content, reach, repercussion, candidate link, financing, and gravity were not adequately proved. | 2026-08-11 |
cand-bra-2022-ambassadors-meeting | screening_register | candidate_lead | Bolsonaro ambassadors meeting attacking Brazil's voting system | Brazil | South America | 2022 general election | 2022-10-30 | screening | not_yet_claim_coded | material_amplification | not_applicable | confirmed | false | promote_after_claim_coding | 2 | A judicial finding of grave abuse is not a causal estimate of votes, turnout, or result changed. | 2026-08-11 |
cand-bra-2022-election-denial-network | screening_register | candidate_lead | Brazil 2022 cross-platform election-denial messaging network | Brazil | South America | 2022 general election and post-election mobilisation | 2022-10-30 | screening | not_yet_claim_coded | material_amplification | not_material | confirmed_in_sampled_traces | false | promote_after_claim_coding | 2 | Content volume is not people reached; survey authors did not claim causation; the entire network lacked a single established command actor. | 2026-08-11 |
cand-mex-2024-genai-cluster | screening_register | candidate_lead | Mexico 2024 fact-checked generative-AI election-content cluster | Mexico | North America | 2024 general election | 2024-06-02 | screening | not_yet_claim_coded | core_generation | confirmed_for_documented_examples | confirmed_for_examples | false | boundary_aggregate_disaggregate_first | 2 | The source corpus is 101 fact-check posts, not necessarily 101 unique incidents or an electorate-wide prevalence estimate. | 2026-08-11 |
cand-col-2022-coordinated-facebook-pages | screening_register | candidate_lead | Colombia 2022 coordinated negative-ad Facebook pages | Colombia | South America | 2022 presidential election | 2022-06-19 | screening | not_yet_claim_coded | material_amplification | not_established | confirmed | false | promote_after_claim_coding | 2 | Ad spend and 538 paid items are not unique reach or persuasion, and investigators could not establish the ultimate operator or funder. | 2026-08-11 |
cand-arg-2023-campaign-genai | screening_register | candidate_lead | Argentina 2023 official-campaign generative-AI arms race | Argentina | South America | 2023 presidential runoff | 2023-11-19 | screening | not_yet_claim_coded | core_generation | confirmed | confirmed | false | boundary_comparison | 2 | Much content was labelled or visibly fabricated and contemporary assessments found relatively minor information-space impact. | 2026-08-11 |
cand-arg-2025-false-withdrawal-deepfakes | screening_register | candidate_lead | Argentina 2025 Buenos Aires City false-withdrawal and endorsement deepfakes | Argentina | South America | 2025 Buenos Aires City legislative election | 2025-05-18 | screening | not_yet_claim_coded | core_generation | confirmed | confirmed | false | reserve_needs_second_source | 1 | Narrowed to the Buenos Aires City case; it still needs an independent second source. National October complaints belong in a separate future candidate and are not merged here. | 2026-08-11 |
cand-ind-2024-bollywood-deepfakes | screening_register | candidate_lead | India 2024 unauthorised Bollywood celebrity endorsement deepfakes | India | South Asia | 2024 general election | 2024-06-01 | screening | not_yet_claim_coded | core_generation | confirmed_for_focal_assets | confirmed | false | promote_after_claim_coding | 4 | More than 500,000 views establish exposure, not belief or persuasion; amplification by a Congress spokesperson does not prove party commissioning, and post-election work found no deepfake doomsday. | 2026-08-11 |
cand-ind-2024-authorised-ai-calls | screening_register | candidate_lead | India 2024 candidate-authorised AI voice calls and personalised outreach | India | South Asia | 2024 general election | 2024-06-01 | screening | not_yet_claim_coded | core_generation|delivery_personalisation | confirmed | confirmed | false | boundary_comparison | 2 | The reported 50 million-plus calls and 25 million personalised calls are unaudited vendor figures, may overlap, and do not establish listening, persuasion, turnout, or vote effects. | 2026-08-11 |
cand-twn-2024-storm1376-gou-audio | screening_register | candidate_lead | Taiwan 2024 Storm-1376 false Terry Gou endorsement operation | Taiwan | East Asia | 2024 presidential and legislative elections | 2024-01-13 | screening | not_yet_claim_coded | core_generation|supporting_tool | likely_for_focal_audio|confirmed_for_actor_assets | confirmed | false | promote_with_attribution_caveat | 4 | Microsoft's CCP linkage is a threat-intelligence attribution rather than an adjudicated state-command finding; YouTube removed the focal audio before significant reach and no vote effect is established. | 2026-08-11 |
cand-pak-2024-pti-authorised-clones | screening_register | candidate_lead | Pakistan 2024 PTI-authorised synthetic Imran Khan campaign speeches | Pakistan | South Asia | 2024 general election | 2024-02-08 | screening | not_yet_claim_coded | core_generation | confirmed | confirmed | false | boundary_comparison | 5 | More than 1.4 million YouTube views document exposure, not persuasion; the success of PTI-backed independents cannot be causally attributed to synthetic speeches. | 2026-08-11 |
cand-pak-2024-fake-boycott-clones | screening_register | candidate_lead | Pakistan 2024 fake PTI election-boycott voice clones | Pakistan | South Asia | 2024 general election | 2024-02-08 | screening | not_yet_claim_coded | core_generation | confirmed_for_documented_examples | confirmed | false | promote_after_claim_coding | 3 | Fact-checks establish the fabrication, but the operator, commissioning chain, unique reach, belief, participation response, and electoral effect are unknown. | 2026-08-11 |
cand-idn-2024-official-synthetic-campaigning | screening_register | candidate_lead | Indonesia 2024 official synthetic campaigning and Suharto resurrection | Indonesia | Southeast Asia | 2024 presidential and legislative elections | 2024-02-14 | screening | not_yet_claim_coded | core_generation|campaign_personalisation | confirmed | confirmed | false | boundary_comparison | 4 | The 4.7 million Suharto-view figure is provisional secondary reporting, while 19 billion #Prabowo TikTok views cover all hashtag content rather than AI assets; neither measures persuasion or vote causation. | 2026-08-11 |
cand-bgd-2024-progovernment-ai-disinformation | screening_register | candidate_lead | Bangladesh 2024 pro-government AI pseudo-news and opposition deepfakes | Bangladesh | South Asia | 2024 parliamentary election | 2024-01-07 | screening | not_yet_claim_coded | core_generation | confirmed_for_documented_examples | confirmed | false | promote_with_attribution_caveat | 3 | Pro-government promotion does not prove Awami League or government commissioning; focal reach and voter effects are unknown, and the opposition boycott and noncompetitive environment preclude election-result inference. | 2026-08-11 |
cand-kor-2024-deepfake-enforcement-set | screening_register | candidate_lead | South Korea 2024 election deepfake enforcement set | South Korea | East Asia | 2024 National Assembly election | 2024-04-10 | screening | not_yet_claim_coded | core_generation_for_counted_items | confirmed_at_aggregate_level | officially_reported_aggregate | false | boundary_aggregate_disaggregate_first | 3 | The 129 detected items are not 129 unique operations, do not establish deception or views, and should be disaggregated before promotion to incident-level cases. | 2026-08-11 |
cand-zaf-2024-trump-mk-deepfake | screening_register | candidate_lead | South Africa 2024 false Trump endorsement of MK | South Africa | Southern Africa | 2024 general election | 2024-05-29 | screening | not_yet_claim_coded | core_generation | confirmed_for_focal_asset | confirmed | false | promote_after_claim_coding | 5 | The creator and focal reach are unknown; replies are not a belief survey, and post-election research found GenAI and deepfake use was limited overall. | 2026-08-11 |
cand-nga-2023-atiku-spliced-audio | screening_register | candidate_lead | Nigeria 2023 spliced Atiku election-rigging audio | Nigeria | West Africa | 2023 presidential election | 2023-02-25 | screening | not_yet_claim_coded | not_required_for_focal_asset|material_distribution | not_established|likely_conventional_edit | confirmed | false | boundary_synthetic_non_genai | 4 | Splice analysis supports conventional compositing, not generative voice synthesis; thousands of listens and platform persistence do not establish belief, turnout, votes, or the responsible actor. | 2026-08-11 |
cand-gha-2024-llm-bot-network | screening_register | candidate_lead | Ghana 2024 likely LLM-assisted pro-NPP account network | Ghana | West Africa | 2024 general election | 2024-12-07 | screening | not_yet_claim_coded | core_content_generation|material_amplification | likely_by_detector_and_behavioural_signals | confirmed_as_research_sample | false | promote_with_detection_caveat | 2 | AI-text detection and coordination indicators do not prove ChatGPT use, automation, common control, NPP sponsorship, external reach, or electoral effect; most measured engagement was internal. | 2026-08-11 |
cand-ken-2022-platform-amplification | screening_register | candidate_lead | Kenya 2022 recommender amplification, bots, and influence-for-hire | Kenya | East Africa | 2022 general election | 2022-08-09 | screening | not_yet_claim_coded | material_amplification | not_material|conventional_manipulation | confirmed_in_sampled_traces | false | promote_after_claim_coding | 4 | The purposive sample's four million views are not electorate-wide prevalence or unique users; recommender lift lacks internal logs, and no causal study links the ecosystem to votes or the result. | 2026-08-11 |
cand-sk-2023-parl-simecka-todova-audio | screening_register | candidate_lead | Synthetic Simecka and Todova vote-rigging audio | Slovakia | Europe | 2023 parliamentary election | 2023-09-30 | screening | not_yet_claim_coded | core_generation | confirmed | confirmed | false | promote_after_claim_coding | 4 | Amplifiers are known but the creator and state sponsor are not; SMER's victory is not evidence that the audio changed votes. | 2026-08-11 |
cand-fr-2017-pres-macronleaks | screening_register | candidate_lead | MacronLeaks hack-and-leak and automated amplification | France | Europe | 2017 presidential election | 2017-05-07 | screening | not_yet_claim_coded | material_amplification | not_applicable | confirmed | false | promote_after_claim_coding | 4 | France's later GRU attribution is stronger at the cyber-campaign level than attribution of every forged item and amplifier; no individual causal vote estimate exists. | 2026-08-11 |
cand-fr-2024-eu-lepen-nieces | screening_register | candidate_lead | Fake Le Pen family personas using face swaps and stolen influencer videos | France | Europe | 2024 European Parliament election | 2024-06-09 | screening | not_yet_claim_coded | core_generation | confirmed | confirmed | false | promote_after_claim_coding | 4 | The operator is unknown, party involvement was denied and follower/view figures do not establish voter persuasion. | 2026-08-11 |
cand-fr-2024-leg-macron-bonus-copycop | screening_register | candidate_lead | CopyCop fake Macron voting-bonus site and LLM content laundering | France | Europe | 2024 snap legislative election | 2024-06-30 | screening | not_yet_claim_coded | supporting_tool | confirmed | confirmed | false | promote_with_reach_caveat | 3 | The corpus measures production, not audience; Russia-link is a strong research inference rather than final state attribution. | 2026-08-11 |
cand-uk-2024-ge-x-botlike-network | screening_register | candidate_lead | High-volume bot-like X accounts amplifying Reform and pro-Kremlin themes | United Kingdom | Europe | 2024 general election | 2024-07-04 | screening | not_yet_claim_coded | material_amplification | not_established | partly_confirmed | false | promote_with_platform_corroboration | 3 | Bot-like is a behavioral classification, not X-confirmed automation; 150 million displays are non-unique modeled impressions and no party link was shown. | 2026-08-11 |
cand-uk-2024-ge-nigeria-facebook-network | screening_register | candidate_lead | Nigeria-administered Facebook network using AI anti-immigration images | United Kingdom | Europe | 2024 general election | 2024-07-04 | screening | not_yet_claim_coded | mixed | confirmed | confirmed | false | promote_with_reach_caveat | 3 | Most followers were outside the UK and likely fake engagement; pro-Kremlin content does not establish Russian control and no Reform involvement was shown. | 2026-08-11 |
cand-de-2025-bund-storm1516-rfbi | screening_register | candidate_lead | Storm-1516 and R-FBI synthetic witness and fake-news-site smears | Germany | Europe | 2025 Bundestag election | 2025-02-23 | screening | not_yet_claim_coded | mixed | confirmed | confirmed | false | promote_after_claim_coding | 4 | German attribution is strong at Storm-1516 campaign level, while exact responsibility for every R-FBI asset and domestic amplifier must stay scoped; no effect was measured. | 2026-08-11 |
cand-hu-2026-parl-proorban-tiktok-cio | screening_register | candidate_lead | Pro-Orban TikTok covert influence operation using generative-AI videos | Hungary | Europe | 2026 parliamentary election | 2026-04-12 | screening | not_yet_claim_coded | core_generation | confirmed | confirmed | false | promote_after_claim_coding | 4 | TikTok confirmed covert coordination but did not publicly identify the sponsor; the opposition landslide does not quantify or disprove attitudinal effects. | 2026-08-11 |
cand-sk-2024-pres-korcok-stb-hoax | screening_register | candidate_lead | Fabricated StB documents and fake-account amplification against Korcok | Slovakia | Europe | 2024 presidential election | 2024-04-06 | screening | not_yet_claim_coded | material_amplification | not_established | confirmed | false | reserve_needs_platform_source | 1 | Needs a platform or election-authority source and method review for fake-account classification; no foreign-state direction or vote effect established. | 2026-08-11 |
cand-fr-2024-leg-zelenska-bugatti | screening_register | candidate_lead | Synthetic Bugatti dealership witness and fake Zelenska invoice | France | Europe | 2024 snap legislative election | 2024-07-07 | screening | not_yet_claim_coded | core_generation | probable | confirmed | false | reserve_election_targeting_unproven | 3 | Direct French-election targeting is unproven and much of the eighteen-million-view reach may have been international; keep outside the core tier. | 2026-08-11 |
cand-de-2025-bund-fake-ballots | screening_register | candidate_lead | Fabricated Leipzig and Hamburg ballot-suppression evidence | Germany | Europe | 2025 Bundestag election | 2025-02-23 | screening | not_yet_claim_coded | supporting_tool | not_established | confirmed | false | reserve_needs_reach_and_attribution | 2 | Reach was limited or unreported and artifact-specific command attribution was not adjudicated; add platform metrics before promotion. | 2026-08-11 |
cand-hu-2026-parl-fidesz-execution-ad | screening_register | candidate_lead | Fidesz generative-AI execution-scene campaign advertisement | Hungary | Europe | 2026 parliamentary election | 2026-04-12 | screening | not_yet_claim_coded | core_generation | confirmed | confirmed | false | boundary_official_campaign_content | 2 | Reach, spend and ad-level effect are unresolved; broader survey belief in a war narrative cannot be attributed to this video. | 2026-08-11 |
cand-col-2026-pres-ai-media-family | screening_register | candidate_lead | Colombia 2026 presidential election AI-media family | Colombia | South America | 2026 Colombian presidential election | 2026-05-31 | screening | not_yet_claim_coded | mixed_generation_and_amplification | established_at_observer_aggregate | confirmed_at_aggregate_level | false | disaggregate_before_claim_coding | 2 | Aggregate observer reporting cannot establish a common operator, denominator, reach, or effect for each asset. | 2026-08-12 |
cand-nld-2025-ge-chatbot-voting-advice | screening_register | candidate_lead | Netherlands 2025 chatbot voting-advice audit | Netherlands | Europe | 2025 Dutch general election | 2025-10-29 | screening | not_yet_claim_coded | information_intermediary | confirmed | confirmed_evaluation | false | model_evaluation_not_incident | 2 | Evaluation outputs are not population exposure, real voter use, persuasion, or electoral effects. | 2026-08-12 |
cand-can-2025-fed-deepfake-prevalence | screening_register | candidate_lead | Canada 2025 deepfake prevalence and low-harm exposure sample | Canada | North America | 2025 Canadian federal election | 2025-04-28 | screening | not_yet_claim_coded | measurement_and_observed_content | detector_classified_in_sample | confirmed_research_sample | false | observational_null_comparator | 2 | Preprint, detector error, platform sampling and view denominators limit prevalence generalisation; null is study-scoped. | 2026-08-12 |
cand-jpn-2024-tokyo-anno-ai-avatar | screening_register | candidate_lead | Tokyo 2024 authorised Takahiro Anno AI avatar | Japan | East Asia | 2024 Tokyo gubernatorial election | 2024-07-07 | screening | not_yet_claim_coded | candidate_access_substitution | confirmed | confirmed | false | positive_boundary_comparator | 2 | Campaign-reported response counts and vote totals do not identify votes caused by the avatar. | 2026-08-12 |
cand-aus-2025-fed-pravda-chatbot-poisoning | screening_register | candidate_lead | Australia 2025 Pravda network and chatbot knowledge poisoning | Australia | Oceania | 2025 Australian federal election | 2025-05-03 | screening | not_yet_claim_coded | content_scale_and_information_intermediary | confirmed_for_audit_outputs | confirmed_network_and_audit | false | promote_after_claim_coding_with_attribution_caveat | 3 | A chatbot-audit response rate is not voter exposure; intent and state attribution are investigative, not adjudicated. | 2026-08-12 |
cand-gbr-nir-2022-cara-hunter-sexual-deepfake | screening_register | candidate_lead | Northern Ireland 2022 Cara Hunter sexualised synthetic-video attack | United Kingdom | Europe | 2022 Northern Ireland Assembly election | 2022-05-05 | screening | not_yet_claim_coded | alleged_or_probable_content_generation | not_forensically_public | victim_and_parliamentary_record_confirmed | false | promote_with_technical_provenance_caveat | 3 | Origin, exact generation method, unique reach and vote effect remain unknown; do not redistribute the media. | 2026-08-12 |
cand-ecu-2025-pres-ai-disinformation-cluster | screening_register | candidate_lead | Ecuador 2025 AI-assisted viral disinformation cluster | Ecuador | South America | 2025 Ecuadorian presidential election runoff | 2025-04-13 | screening | not_yet_claim_coded | content_generation_in_sample | observer_reported_sample | confirmed_at_aggregate_level | false | reserve_disaggregate_observer_sample | 1 | Aggregate sample cannot identify a common actor or causal effect; sampling frame and item coding must be preserved. | 2026-08-12 |
cand-usa-2024-grok-ballot-deadline-error | screening_register | candidate_lead | Grok ballot-deadline misinformation and state correction request | United States | North America | 2024 United States general election | 2024-11-05 | screening | not_yet_claim_coded | interactive_election_information_intermediary | confirmed_deployed_closed_model | confirmed | false | promote_as_deployed_model_failure_after_claim_coding | 3 | The official statement that screenshots reached millions is not a deduplicated user or voter-exposure measure; exact Grok version, prompt distribution and behavioural effects are unknown. | 2026-08-12 |
cand-usa-2024-storm2035-openai-low-engagement | screening_register | candidate_lead | Storm-2035 use of ChatGPT with low observed audience engagement | United States | North America | 2024 United States general election | 2024-11-05 | screening | not_yet_claim_coded | supporting_content_generation | provider_confirmed_use | confirmed_by_provider_telemetry | false | promote_as_provider_telemetry_negative_case_after_claim_coding | 1 | Provider telemetry is interested primary evidence and cannot observe every off-platform exposure; the candidate needs independent corroboration before core promotion. | 2026-08-12 |
cand-bra-2024-municipal-ai-observatory | screening_register | candidate_lead | Brazil 2024 municipal-election GenAI observatory sample | Brazil | South America | 2024 Brazilian municipal elections | 2024-10-06 | screening | not_yet_claim_coded | mixed_generation_and_monitoring_context | confirmed_in_bounded_observations | confirmed_within_search_scope | false | promote_as_observational_null_and_boundary_sample | 2 | Civil-society monitoring is not a census and cannot support the claim that AI had no impact; artifact-level coding is required for specific harms. | 2026-08-12 |
cand-sgp-2025-ge-ai-video-sample | screening_register | candidate_lead | Singapore 2025 election AI-video sample and no-breach review outcome | Singapore | Southeast Asia | 2025 Singapore general election | 2025-05-03 | screening | not_yet_claim_coded | content_generation_in_sample | confirmed_for_sampled_items | confirmed_within_keyword_monitoring_window | false | promote_as_observational_sample_after_item_coding | 3 | Do not call all 73 videos deepfakes or violations: 11 visually manipulated prospective candidates, only four were clearly labelled, and the official review found no breach in the reviewed set. | 2026-08-12 |
eval-us-aidp-english-2024 | empirical_model_study | model_evaluation_or_experiment | AI Democracy Projects English election-query pilot | United States | North America | 2024 U.S. election information | null | completed_study | not_an_incident | tested_system_capability | confirmed_tested_system | study_design_specific | false | included_empirical_study | 1 | Evaluation window: January 2024. Point-in-time domain safety test; not representative of users, all questions, consumer interfaces, future performance, or election effects. | 2026-08-12 |
eval-us-aidp-spanish-2024 | empirical_model_study | model_evaluation_or_experiment | AI Democracy Projects bilingual Arizona election-query evaluation | United States | North America | Arizona voter information | null | completed_study | not_an_incident | tested_system_capability | confirmed_tested_system | study_design_specific | false | included_empirical_study | 1 | Evaluation window: 2024. API responses may differ from consumer chatbots; one state and selected questions; no user or electoral-effect measurement. | 2026-08-12 |
eval-hu-voting-advice-2026 | empirical_model_study | model_evaluation_or_experiment | Hungary 2026 general-purpose AI voting-advice evaluation | Hungary | Europe | 2026 Hungarian parliamentary election | null | completed_study | not_an_incident | tested_system_capability | confirmed_tested_system | study_design_specific | false | included_empirical_study | 1 | Evaluation window: 23-24 March 2026. Structured audit during a live campaign; not a sample of real users and not evidence that outputs affected the decisive result. | 2026-08-12 |
eval-us-brennan-2026 | empirical_model_study | model_evaluation_or_experiment | Brennan Center election-disinformation capability and safeguard evaluation | United States | North America | 2026 U.S. midterm election-disinformation scenarios | null | completed_study | not_an_incident | tested_system_capability | confirmed_tested_system | study_design_specific | false | included_empirical_study | 1 | Evaluation window: February-August 2026. Capability and safeguard evidence under researcher tests; not deployment prevalence, audience exposure, or electoral effect. Harmful prompts are intentionally withheld. | 2026-08-12 |
eval-global-voter-dialogue-rct-2025 | empirical_model_study | model_evaluation_or_experiment | Persuading voters using human-artificial intelligence dialogues | United States|Canada|Poland | Cross-national | 2024 U.S., 2025 Canadian and 2025 Polish national elections | null | completed_study | not_an_incident | tested_system_capability | confirmed_tested_system | study_design_specific | false | included_empirical_study | 1 | Evaluation window: 2024-2025 election periods. Causal for the experimental conversations and measured self-reports; not observed campaign deployment, actual ballots, aggregate election outcomes, durable effects, or covert manipulation. | 2026-08-12 |
eval-uk-chatbot-voting-advice-rct-2025 | empirical_model_study | model_evaluation_or_experiment | Chatbot Voting Advice Applications inform but seldom sway young unaligned voters | United Kingdom | Europe | experimental voting-advice context | null | completed_study | not_an_incident | tested_system_capability | confirmed_tested_system | study_design_specific | false | included_empirical_study | 1 | Evaluation window: 2025. Causal within the experimental samples and interfaces; not a population prevalence estimate or proof that conversational political AI never persuades. | 2026-08-12 |
eval-eu-mistral-voting-assistant-2024 | empirical_model_study | model_evaluation_or_experiment | Mistral and Mixtral as European Parliament voting assistants | European Union | Europe | 2024 European Parliament election | null | completed_study | not_an_incident | tested_system_capability | confirmed_tested_system | study_design_specific | false | included_empirical_study | 1 | Evaluation window: 2024. Point-in-time model audit; not public deployment, user behavior or election effect. | 2026-08-12 |
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