problems. While the $\mathcal{IB}$ approach has limitations in terms of
cryptographic functionalities and lacks a viable candidate for PQ-secure KEM
standardization, it possesses unique characteristics, elegance, and perfect
correctness. Encouragingly, researchers continue to propose new mathematical
countermeasures to address the structural weaknesses of isogenies while
considering tighter security considerations. It is important to recognize that
overcoming the design issues associated with $\mathcal{IB}$ schemes, which are
based on Elliptic Curve Cryptography, could potentially alter the trajectory
of this approach and facilitate the transition to PQC.

Miscellaneous Methods:  Many of the schemes falling within this category lack
a well-established historical track record and necessitate additional
cryptanalysis and evaluation, even when they boast adequate security
assurances. Furthermore, a majority of these schemes encounter implementation
challenges, and there is a shortage of parameter sets for certain security
levels, or they are already subjected to intensive cryptanalysis, as evident
from the formal comments submitted to NIST’s website regarding additional
digital signatures (NIS, 2023). Consequently, these methods are relatively
novel, and their prospects for the future warrant further investigation.

Side-Channel Analysis:  As previously discussed, all standardized PQC schemes
still suffer from SCAs. Since side-channel resistance plays a crucial task in
many applications, various countermeasure techniques must be applied to their
implementation to secure these schemes against such attacks. However, note
that additional computational overhead, increased design complexity, and
potential impact on performance are some of the trade-offs associated with
implementing these countermeasures. For instance, masking, especially useful
in lattice-based cryptography, while effective in preventing power and timing
side-channel analysis, can impose a significant computational overhead on the
implementation. Thus, careful consideration is required to strike a balance
(Chowdhury et al., 2021). To address this issue, instead of securing the
implementation after proposing the scheme, some new approaches prioritize
incorporating side channel resiliency right from the beginning of the scheme
design process. As a result, they can propose side-channel resistant schemes
which are more efficient than the schemes that their implementations have
become side channel proved afterward. An example of such work is Raccoon (Rac,
2023), a novel $\mathcal{LB}$ signature inspired by Dilithium.

Transition to PQC:  Crypto-agility, which refers to the ability to smoothly
transition to PQC, should be our top priority. Given the vulnerability posed
by the SNDL attack, achieving confidentiality is of utmost importance in high-
risk applications. Thus, the initial focus should be the completion of a
general-purpose PKE/KEM development, followed by the development of a general-
purpose digital signature enabling the achievement of the CIA triad in major
applications. After conducting a comprehensive analysis of various evaluation
metrics considered in standardization processes and beyond, along with the
exploration of new hard problems and constructional countermeasures in each
approach, it is evident that standardizing a single scheme for general use
cases would not be practical for all real-world applications. The diversity of
metrics, the disparities between them, and the existing PQ secure approaches
contribute to this conclusion. Different real-world applications, such as IoT,
Blockchain, ML/AI, etc., have distinct primary and even secondary requirements
that often vary or even contradict one another. For instance, IoT prioritizes
cost and implementation considerations, while blockchain emphasizes sizes and
advanced features. Meanwhile, ML focuses on achieving higher security levels
to ensure privacy. These varying objectives and requirements make it
challenging to propose a standardized scheme that satisfies all application
domains uniformly.

Considering the nature of PQC and the fact that the realization of a quantum
computer is anticipated to be several years away, the viewpoint on IoT
platforms and implementation can be categorized into three perspectives:
short-term, mid-term, and long-term. The long-term perspective refers to a
future decade where quantum computers possess sufficient computational power
to break public key cryptosystems. Given this perspective, while the
transition to PQC is of utmost importance and should be expedited, determining
the ideal scheme or approach for IoT devices in the PQ era is not the
immediate priority. It requires substantial efforts in various technologies,
considering the potential implications of future quantum computing
advancements. Therefore, the focus should be on addressing the transition to
PQC promptly, while understanding that the specific scheme or approach for IoT
devices in the PQ era necessitates additional attention and efforts in the
long run. Furthermore, the clarity of exotic features and versatility metrics
is expected to improve once standardization is completed. Consequently, while
the development of application-specific $\mathcal{LB}$ schemes appears to be a
straightforward solution in the PQ era, it is important to acknowledge that
achieving all evaluation metrics simultaneously in a single PQ cryptosystem is
not feasible. In light of this, for instance, although the competition for
stateful HBSs has reached its conclusion, it is conceivable that a specialized
signature competition emerging after the finalized standardization of PQ
secure signatures is not unexpected.

##  5\. Conclusion

Extensive academic and industrial efforts have been devoted to the study of
PQC on a global scale. This paper presents a comprehensive survey encompassing
all potential cryptographic approaches that offer PQ security solutions. Our
analysis delves into worldwide standardization efforts, initiatives, and
projects related to PQC. By studying their evaluation metrics, their alignment
with real-world requirements, and the specific features necessary for major
applications, we provide a thorough examination of various PQC approaches,
including lattice-based, hash-based, code-based, isogeny-based, symmetric key-
based , and multivariate cryptography along with non-conventional methods. Our
assessment adopts an approach-specific methodology, covering mathematical hard
problems, security analysis, implementation considerations, and vulnerability
to attacks. Notably, we explore side-channel and fault injection attacks for
the standards and finalists of the NIST competition, accompanied by
comprehensive demonstrations of their implementation and performance costs.
Finally, we critically scrutinized each specific approach and offered our
insights, vision, and projections to guide future research and considerations.

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