2.4: Managing a Socially Responsible Business
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3. What is corporate social responsibility?
Acting in an ethical manner is one of the four components of the pyramid of corporate social responsibility (CSR) , which is the concern of businesses for the welfare of society as a whole. It consists of obligations beyond those required by law or union contract. This definition makes two important points. First, CSR is voluntary. Beneficial action required by law, such as cleaning up factories that are polluting air and water, is not voluntary. Second, the obligations of corporate social responsibility are broad. They extend beyond investors in the company to include workers, suppliers, consumers, communities, and society at large.
Exhibit 2.4 portrays economic responsibility as the foundation for the other three responsibilities. At the same time that a business pursues profits (economic responsibility), however, it is expected to obey the law (legal responsibility); to do what is right, just, and fair (ethical responsibility); and to be a good corporate citizen (philanthropic responsibility). These four components are distinct but together constitute the whole. Still, if the company doesn’t make a profit, then the other three responsibilities won’t matter.
Many companies continue to work hard to make the world a better place to live. Recent data suggests that Fortune 500 companies spend more than $15 billion annually on CSR activities. Consider the following examples:
- Starbucks has donated more than one million meals to local communities via its FoodShare program and alliance with Feeding America, giving 100 percent of leftover food from their seven thousand U.S. company-owned stores.
- Salesforce encourages its employees to volunteer in community activities and pays them for doing so, up to 56 paid hours every year. For employees who participate in seven days of volunteerism in one year, Salesforce also gives them a $1,000 grant to donate to the employee’s nonprofit of choice.
- Employees who work for Deloitte, a global audit, consulting, and financial services organization, can get paid for up to 48 hours of volunteer work each year. In a recent year, more than 27,000 Deloitte professionals contributed more than 353,000 volunteer hours to their communities around the world. 6
Understanding Social Responsibility
Peter Drucker, the late globally respected management expert, said that we should look first at what an organization does to society and second at what it can do for society. This idea suggests that social responsibility has two basic dimensions: legality and responsibility.
Illegal and Irresponsible Behavior
The idea of corporate social responsibility is so widespread today that it is hard to conceive of a company continually acting in illegal and irresponsible ways. Nevertheless, such actions do sometimes occur, which can create financial ruin for organizations, extreme financial hardships for many former employees, and general struggles for the communities in which they operate. Unfortunately, top executives still walk away with millions. Some, however, will ultimately pay large fines and spend time in prison for their actions. Federal, state, and local laws determine whether an activity is legal or not. The laws that regulate business are discussed later in this module.
Irresponsible but Legal Behavior
Sometimes companies act irresponsibly, yet their actions are legal. For example, the Minnesota-based company that makes MyPillow was recently fined $1 million by the state of California for making unsubstantiated claims that the “most comfortable pillow you’ll ever own” could help alleviate medical conditions such as snoring, fibromyalgia, migraines, and other disorders. The company’s CEO countered that the claims were actually made by customers; these testimonials were posted on the company’s website but later removed. In addition to the fine, the company faced several class-action lawsuits, and the Better Business Bureau has revoked MyPillow’s accreditation. 7
CATCHING THE ENTREPRENEURIAL SPIRIT
Badger Company Founder Walks the Walk
As a carpenter, Bill Whyte was always looking for a solution to his dry, cracked hands, especially in the harsh New Hampshire winters. After trying many commercial lotions that didn’t really work, Whyte experimented with olive oil and beeswax to come up with a soothing balm to help heal rough hands. Mixing up the concoction at home, Whyte came up with a product that seemed to work and was made from natural ingredients.
Originally called Bear Paw, the lotion became known as Badger Balm after a friend found a competing product already named Bear Paw. Whyte set up a production line at home to fill the tins. Soon he was pounding the pavement in the town of Gilsum, trying to sell the new product to hardware stores, lumber yards, and health food stores.
Fast-forward a little more than 20 years from his early days of experimentation, and Whyte (affectionately known as the “head badger”) runs W.S. Badger Company with the same goals and passions he started with back in the mid-1990s. The company uses only organic plant extracts, exotic oils, beeswax, and minerals to make the most effective products to soothe, heal, and protect the body. And the natural ingredients come from all over the world—for example, organic extra virgin olive oil from Spain, organic rose essential oil from Bulgaria, and bergamot oil from southern Italy.
Badger’s homey culture is no accident. In fact, in the early days, Whyte made soup every Friday for the small staff. Today, Whyte and family members, including his wife Kathy, chief operating officer; daughter Rebecca, head of sustainability and innovation; and daughter Emily, head of sales and marketing, all embrace the ethical and social principles of this family business that have made the company a success.
To reinforce the commitment of being socially responsible and demonstrating transparency, W.S. Badger Company became a Certified Benefit Corporation, or B Corp for short. This certification requires companies to meet rigorous standards for transparency, accountability, and social and environmental performance. (Benefit Corporations are discussed in more detail later in this module.)
Becoming a B Corp. has helped the company organize how it operates. For example, pay for the highest-paid full-time employee is capped at five times that of the lowest paid, which is now $15 an hour (more than double New Hampshire’s minimum wage); a portion of company profits flows to employees via profit sharing, and all employees participate in a bonus plan; and new parents are encouraged to bring their babies to work, a program that has helped foster a new style of teamwork for the entire organization, as well as increase employee morale. In addition, Badger donates 10 percent of its pre-tax profits annually to nonprofit organizations that focus on the health and welfare of children, matches employee contributions to charitable causes (up to $100 per employee), and donates an additional $50 to a nonprofit chosen by each employee on their birthday.
Badger staff, which now number more than 100, enjoy a living wage, great benefits, and a socially responsible work environment thanks to a visionary who found an eco-friendly way to soothe his rough hands and created an ethical business as part of his journey.
Questions for Discussion
- How does Badger’s approach to social responsibility help attract and retain employees?
- Does the company’s certification as a Benefit Corporation provide Badger with a competitive advantage? Explain your reasoning.
Sources: “Badger’s History & Legend,” “Babies at Work Policy,” and “2016 Annual Impact Report,” www.badgerbalm.com, accessed June 27, 2017; “About Badger,” https://www.bcorporation.net , accessed June 27, 2017; “Badger ‘Still In’ on Climate Action, Asks New Hampshire Businesses, State Officials, and Local Leaders to Join Forces in Honoring Paris Agreement,” http://www.prweb.com , June 22, 2017; Amy Feldman, “Badger Balm Creator Once Dismissed Being a B Corp as ‘Just Marketing.’ Now He’s a True Believer,” Forbes, http://www.forbes.com , May 9, 2017.
Legal and Responsible Behavior
The vast majority of business activities fall into the category of behavior that is both legal and responsible. Most companies act legally, and most try to be socially responsible. Research shows that consumers, especially those under 30, are likely to buy brands that have excellent ethical track records and community involvement. Outdoor specialty retailer REI, for example, recently announced that it gave back nearly 70 percent of its profits to the outdoor community. A member cooperative, the company invested a record $9.3 million in its nonprofit partners in 2016. 8
CONCEPT CHECK
- What are the four components of social responsibility?
- Give an example of legal but irresponsible behavior.


3.2: What is WAI-ARIA?
W3C definition of WAI-ARIA
“WAI-ARIA provides a framework for adding attributes to identify features for user interaction, how they relate to each other, and their current state.”
Source: W3C
WAI-ARIA provides web authors with the following:
- Roles to describe the type of widget presented, such as “menu”, “treeitem”, “slider”, and “progressmeter”
- Roles to describe the structure of the web page, such as headings, regions, and tables (grids)
- Properties to describe the state widgets are in, such as “checked” for a check box, or “haspopup” for a menu.
- Properties to define live regions of a page that are likely to get updates (such as stock quotes), as well as an interruption policy for those updates — for example, critical updates may be presented in an alert dialog box and incidental updates occur within the page
- Properties for drag-and-drop that describe drag sources and drop targets
- A way to provide keyboard navigation for the web objects and events, such as those mentioned above
Source: W3C
Some elements of the framework can be used on their own to add accessibility to web content (e.g., landmarks). More often, they are combined with scripting that is used to dynamically add or remove WAI-ARIA attributes depending on the context.
WAI-ARIA provides semantics for custom widgets and web applications that can be understood by assistive technologies (ATs) and conveyed to users in a “human understandable” form. For example, HTML list markup might be used to create a navigation bar with menus and submenus. Without WAI-ARIA a screen reader would simply recognize the navigation bar as a collection of nested lists. Adding WAI-ARIA menu attributes (e.g., menubar, menu, menuitem, aria-haspopup, aria-expanded) can give the nested list a whole new meaning, more easily understood as a means of navigation than the list would be understood.
W3C definition of semantics
“The meaning of something as understood by a human, defined in a way that computers can process a representation of an object , such as elements and attributes , and reliably represent the object in a way that various humans will achieve a mutually consistent understanding of the object.”
Source: W3C
This definition of semantics in programming is much like the common definition of the word: “the meaning, or an interpretation of the meaning” (dictionary.com). Semantics in the context of web accessibility refers to the defining of meaning as it applies to functional elements of web content, and how that functionality is conveyed to assistive technology users, especially, screen reader users.
When and When Not to Use WAI-ARIA
WAI-ARIA is supposed to be used when semantics are required to make a web application or widget understandable. For example, if you are using a

to create a checkbox, along with some scripting you can assign the WAI-ARIA role “checkbox” to that

to make it appear as a checkbox.
That said though, when there is a native HTML element available, like a checkbox, it is almost always better to use the native version than creating your own. The native version will already have all the associated semantics by default. Since the native versions are standardized, they are more likely to be supported across browsers and assistive technologies.
For native HTML elements, it is not necessary to use WAI-ARIA. For an HTML
<form>
element for instance, there is no need to include
role="form"
with the element.  For some of the newer HTML5 elements, like

and

for instance, it does not hurt to include the WAI-ARIA equivalent
role="navigation"
and
role="main"
in these elements for the time being, to accommodate some of the inconsistent support for these elements across browsers and ATs. HTML validators will still give you warnings about the redundant roles, but you can safely ignore these.
You should also be careful when using WAI-ARIA with HTML elements that already have semantics. For example, if you use

something

, the semantics associated with the heading will be overridden, thus, potentially breaking the structure of a document. In a case like this, a better approach would be to wrap the heading in a

then assign
role="button"
to the

to preserve the structural semantics of the heading, as seen in the examples below.


5.3: Balancing Chemical Equations
- Explain the roles of subscripts and coefficients in chemical equations.
- Balance a chemical equation when given the unbalanced equation.
Even though chemical compounds are broken up and new compounds are formed during a chemical reaction, atoms in the reactants do not disappear, nor do new atoms appear to form the products. In chemical reactions, atoms are never created or destroyed. The same atoms that were present in the reactants are present in the products—they are merely reorganized into different arrangements. In a complete chemical equation, the two sides of the equation must be present on the reactant and the product sides of the equation.
Coefficients and Subscripts
There are two types of numbers that appear in chemical equations. There are subscripts, which are part of the chemical formulas of the reactants and products; and there are coefficients that are placed in front of the formulas to indicate how many molecules of that substance is used or produced.
The subscripts are part of the formulas and once the formulas for the reactants and products are determined, the subscripts may not be changed. The coefficients indicate the number of each substance involved in the reaction and may be changed in order to balance the equation. The equation above indicates that one mole of solid copper is reacting with two moles of aqueous silver nitrate to produce one mole of aqueous copper (II) nitrate and two atoms of solid silver.
Balancing a Chemical Equation
Because the identities of the reactants and products are fixed, the equation cannot be balanced by changing the subscripts of the reactants or the products. To do so would change the chemical identity of the species being described, as illustrated in Figure \(\PageIndex{1}\).
The simplest and most generally useful method for balancing chemical equations is “inspection,” better known as trial and error. The following is an efficient approach to balancing a chemical equation using this method.
- Identify the most complex substance.
- Beginning with that substance, choose an element(s) that appears in only one reactant and one product, if possible. Adjust the coefficients to obtain the same number of atoms of this element(s) on both sides.
- Balance polyatomic ions (if present on both sides of the chemical equation) as a unit.
- Balance the remaining atoms, usually ending with the least complex substance and using fractional coefficients if necessary. If a fractional coefficient has been used, multiply both sides of the equation by the denominator to obtain whole numbers for the coefficients.
- Count the numbers of atoms of each kind on both sides of the equation to be sure that the chemical equation is balanced.
Balance the chemical equation for the combustion of Heptane (\(\ce{C_7H_{16}}\)).
\[\ce{C_7H_{16} (l) + O_2 (g) → CO_2 (g) + H_2O (g) } \nonumber\]
Solution
| Steps | Example |
|---|---|
| 1. Identify the most complex substance. | The most complex substance is the one with the largest number of different atoms, which is \(C_7H_{16}\). We will assume initially that the final balanced chemical equation contains 1 molecule or formula unit of this substance. |
| 2. Adjust the coefficients. |
a. Because one molecule of n-heptane contains 7 carbon atoms, we need 7 CO 2 molecules, each of which contains 1 carbon atom, on the right side: \[\ce{C7H16 (l) + O2 (g) → } \underline{7} \ce{CO2 (g) + H2O (g) } \nonumber \]
b. Because one molecule of n-heptane contains 16 hydrogen atoms, we need 8 H 2 O molecules, each of which contains 2 hydrogen atoms, on the right side: \[\ce{C7H16 (l) + O2 (g) → 7 CO2 (g) + } \underline{8} \ce{H2O (g) } \nonumber \]
|
| 3. Balance polyatomic ions as a unit. | There are no polyatomic ions to be considered in this reaction. |
| 4. Balance the remaining atoms. |
The carbon and hydrogen atoms are now balanced, but we have 22 oxygen atoms on the right side and only 2 oxygen atoms on the left. We can balance the oxygen atoms by adjusting the coefficient in front of the least complex substance, O 2 , on the reactant side: \[\ce{C7H16 (l) + }\underline{11} \ce{ O2 (g) → 7 CO2 (g) + 8H2O (g) } \nonumber\]
|
| 5. Check your work. | The equation is now balanced, and there are no fractional coefficients: there are 7 carbon atoms, 16 hydrogen atoms, and 22 oxygen atoms on each side. Always check to be sure that a chemical equation is balanced. |
Combustion of Isooctane (\(\ce{C_8H_{18}}\))
\[\ce{C8H18 (l) + O2 (g) -> CO_2 (g) + H_2O(g)} \nonumber\]
Solution
The assumption that the final balanced chemical equation contains only one molecule or formula unit of the most complex substance is not always valid, but it is a good place to start. The combustion of any hydrocarbon with oxygen produces carbon dioxide and water.
| Steps | Example |
|---|---|
| 1. Identify the most complex substance. | The most complex substance is the one with the largest number of different atoms, which is \(\ce{C8H18}\). We will assume initially that the final balanced chemical equation contains 1 molecule or formula unit of this substance. |
| 2. Adjust the coefficients. |
a. The first element that appears only once in the reactants is carbon: 8 carbon atoms in isooctane means that there must be 8 CO 2 molecules in the products: \[\ce{C8H18 (l) + O2 (g) -> }\underline{8} \ce{ CO2 (g) + H2O(g)}\nonumber\]
b. 18 hydrogen atoms in isooctane means that there must be 9 H 2 O molecules in the products: \[\ce{C8H18 (l) + O2 (g) -> 8CO2 (g) + }\underline{9} \ce{ H2O(g)} \nonumber\]
|
| 3. Balance polyatomic ions as a unit. | There are no polyatomic ions to be considered in this reaction. |
| 4. Balance the remaining atoms. |
The carbon and hydrogen atoms are now balanced, but we have 25 oxygen atoms on the right side and only 2 oxygen atoms on the left. We can balance the least complex substance, O 2 , but because there are 2 oxygen atoms per O 2 molecule, we must use a fractional coefficient (\(\dfrac{25}{2}\)) to balance the oxygen atoms: \[\ce{C8H18 (l) + } \underline{ \dfrac{25}{2} } \ce{O2 (g)→ 8CO2 (g) + 9H2O(g) }\nonumber\]
The equation is now balanced, but we usually write equations with whole number coefficients. We can eliminate the fractional coefficient by multiplying all coefficients on both sides of the chemical equation by 2 : \[ \underline{2} \ce{C8H18(l) + } \underline{25} \ce{O2(g) ->} \underline{16} \ce{CO2(g) + } \underline{18} \ce{H2O(g)} \nonumber\] |
| 5. Check your work. |
The balanced chemical equation has 16 carbon atoms, 36 hydrogen atoms, and 50 oxygen atoms on each side. Balancing equations requires some practice on your part as well as some common sense. If you find yourself using very large coefficients or if you have spent several minutes without success, go back and make sure that you have written the formulas of the reactants and products correctly. |
Aqueous solutions of lead (II) nitrate and sodium chloride are mixed. The products of the reaction are an aqueous solution of sodium nitrate and a solid precipitate of lead (II) chloride. Write the balanced chemical equation for this reaction.
Solution
| Steps | Example |
|---|---|
| 1. Identify the most complex substance. |
The most complex substance is lead (II) chloride. \[\ce{Pb(NO3)2(aq) + NaCl(aq) → NaNO3(aq) + PbCl2(s)} \nonumber\] |
| 2. Adjust the coefficients. |
There are twice as many chloride ions in the reactants than in the products. Place a 2 in front of the NaCl in order to balance the chloride ions. \[\ce{Pb(NO3)2(aq) + }\underline{ 2} \ce{NaCl(aq) → NaNO3(aq) + PbCl2(s)} \nonumber\]
|
| 3. Balance polyatomic ions as a unit. |
The nitrate ions are still unbalanced. Place a 2 in front of the NaNO 3 . The result is: \[\ce{Pb(NO3)2(aq) + 2NaCl(aq) → } \underline {2} \ce{NaNO3(aq) + PbCl2(s)} \nonumber \]
|
| 4. Balance the remaining atoms. | There is no need to balance the remaining atoms because they are already balanced. |
| 5. Check your work. |
\[\ce{Pb(NO3)2(aq) + 2NaCl(aq) → 2NaNO3(aq) + PbCl2(s)} \nonumber\]
|
Is each chemical equation balanced?
- \(\ce{2Hg(ℓ) + O_2(g) \rightarrow 2 Hg_O_(s)}\)
- \(\ce{C_2H_4(g) + 2O_2(g)→ 2CO_2(g) + 2H_2O(g)}\)
- \(\ce{Mg(NO_3)_2(s) + 2Li (s) \rightarrow Mg(s) + 2LiNO_3(s)}\)
- Answer a
- yes
- Answer b
- no
- Answer c
- yes
Balance the following chemical equations.
- \(\ce{N2 (g) + O2 (g) → NO2 (g) }\)
- \(\ce{Pb(NO3)2(aq) + FeCl3(aq) → Fe(NO3)3(aq) + PbCl2(s)}\)
- \(\ce{C6H14(l) + O2(g)→ CO2(g) + H2O(g)}\)
- Answer a
- N 2 (g) + 2O 2 (g) → 2NO 2 (g)
- Answer b
- 3Pb (NO 3 ) 2 (aq) + 2FeCl 3 (aq) → 2Fe(NO 3 ) 3 (aq) + 3PbCl 2 (s)
- Answer c
- 2C 6 H 14 (l) + 19O 2 (g)→ 12CO 2 (g) + 14H 2 O(g)
Summary
- To be useful, chemical equations must always be balanced. Balanced chemical equations have the same number and type of each atom on both sides of the equation.
- The coefficients in a balanced equation must be the simplest whole number ratio. Mass is always conserved in chemical reactions.
Vocabulary
- Chemical reaction: The process in which one or more substances are changed into one or more new substances.
- Reactants: The starting materials in a reaction.
- Products: Materials present at the end of a reaction.
- Balanced chemical equation: A chemical equation in which the number of each type of atom is equal on the two sides of the equation.
- Subscripts: Part of the chemical formulas of the reactants and products that indicate the number of atoms of the preceding element.

Contributions & Attributions
This page was constructed from content via the following contributor(s) and edited (topically or extensively) by the LibreTexts development team to meet platform style, presentation, and quality:
-
Henry Agnew (UC Davis)


16.5: Financial Ratios
What you’ll learn to do: use financial statements to calculate basic financial ratios to measure the profitability and health of a business
Financial ratios allow consumers of financial information to compare how companies are doing relative to their industry or even how they are faring from one period (month, quarter, year) to another. For the purposes of this course, you will be working with just a couple of these ratios—namely liquidity and profitability. There are lots of other financial ratios, but you can save those for a time when you take full courses in finance and accounting.
Learning Objectives
- Calculate the current ratio using information from financial statements
- Calculate inventory turnover using information from financial statements
Financial Ratio Analysis
Financial ratios allow us to look at profitability, use of assets, inventories, and other assets, liabilities, and costs associated with the finances of the business. We can also use them to learn how quickly people pay their bills, how long it takes the company to recover its costs for new equipment, how much cash the company has relative to its debt, and its return (profit) on every dollar the company invests. Financial ratios also enable a company to compare itself to other firms in the same industry and answer questions like “Are the other dog biscuit companies doing about the same as ours?”
Sometimes it’s not enough to say that a company is in good or bad financial health, especially if you’re trying to compare that company with another one. To make comparisons easier, it helps to assign numbers to “health.” The following video explains how that can be done.
Logical relationships exist between certain accounts or items in a company’s financial statements. These accounts may appear on the same statement or on two different statements. We set up the dollar amounts of the related accounts or items in fraction form called ratios. These ratios include the following:
| Ratio | Use | Components |
| Liquidity ratio | indicate a company’s short-term debt-paying ability | current (or working capital) ratio; acid-test (quick) ratio; cash flow liquidity ratio; accounts receivable turnover; number of day’s sales in accounts receivable; inventory turnover ; and total assets turnover |
| Equity (long-term solvency) ratio | show the relationship between debt and equity financing in a company | equity (or stockholders’ equity) ratio; and stockholders’ equity to debt ratio |
| Profitability test | an important measure of a company’s operating success | rate of return on operating assets; net income to net sales; net income to average common stockholders’ equity; cash flow margin; earnings per share of common stock; times interest earned ratio; and times preferred dividends earned ratio |
| Market test | help investors and potential investors assess the relative merits of the various stocks in the marketplace | earnings yield on common stock; price-earnings ratio; dividend yield on common stock; payout ratio on common stock; dividend yield on preferred stock; and cash flow per share of common stock |
Many of these ratios are beyond the scope of this course; however, we will examine the ones in bold, above, which are key to evaluating any business.
Current (or Working Capital) Ratio
Working capital is the excess of current assets over current liabilities. The ratio that relates current assets to current liabilities is the current (or working capital) ratio . The current ratio indicates the ability of a company to pay its current liabilities from current assets, and thus shows the strength of the company’s working capital position.
You can compute the current ratio by dividing current assets by current liabilities, as follows:
\(Current\,ratio=\frac{Current\,assets}{Current\,liabilities}\)
The ratio is usually stated as a number of dollars of current assets to one dollar of current liabilities (although the dollar signs usually are omitted). Thus, for Synotech in 2010, when current assets totaled USD 2,846.7 million and current liabilities totaled USD 2,285.2 million, the ratio is 1.25:1, meaning that the company has USD 1.25 of current assets for each USD 1.00 of current liabilities.
The current ratio provides a better index of a company’s ability to pay current debts than does the absolute amount of working capital. To illustrate, assume that we are comparing Synotech to Company B. For this example, use the following totals for current assets and current liabilities:
| Synotech | Company B | |
| Current assets (a) | $ 2,846.7 | $120.0 |
| Current liabilities (b) | 2,285.2 | 53.2 |
| Working capital (a – b) | $ 561.5 | $ 66.8 |
| Current ratio (a/b) | 1.25:1 | 2.26:1 |
Synotech has eight times as much working capital as Company B. However, Company B has a superior debt-paying ability since it has USD 2.26 of current assets for each USD 1.00 of current liabilities.
Short-term creditors are particularly interested in the current ratio since the conversion of inventories and accounts receivable into cash is the primary source from which the company obtains the cash to pay short-term creditors. Long-term creditors are also interested in the current ratio because a company that is unable to pay short-term debts may be forced into bankruptcy. For this reason, many bond indentures, or contracts, contain a provision requiring that the borrower maintain at least a certain minimum current ratio. A company can increase its current ratio by issuing long-term debt or capital stock or by selling noncurrent assets.
A company must guard against a current ratio that is too high, especially if caused by idle cash, slow-paying customers, and/or slow-moving inventory. Decreased net income can result when too much capital that could be used profitably elsewhere is tied up in current assets.
Acid-Test (Quick) Ratio
The current ratio is not the only measure of a company’s short-term debt-paying ability. Another measure, called the acid-test (quick) ratio , is the ratio of quick assets (cash, marketable securities, and net receivables) to current liabilities. The formula for the acid-test ratio is the following:
\(Acid\,test\,ratio=\frac{Quick\,assets}{Current\,liabilities}\)
Short-term creditors are particularly interested in this ratio, which relates the pool of cash and immediate cash inflows to immediate cash outflows.
The acid-test ratios for 2010 and 2009 for Synotech follow:
| December 31 | |||
| (USD millions) | 2010 | 2009 | Amount of increase or (decrease) |
| Quick assets (a) | $1,646.6 | $1,648.3 | $ (1.7) |
| Current liabilities (b) | 2,285.6 | 2,103.8 | 181.8 |
| Net quick assets (a – b) | $ (639.0) | $ (455.5) | $(183.5) |
| Acid-test ratio (a/b) | .72:1 | .78:1 |
In deciding whether the acid-test ratio is satisfactory, investors consider the quality of the marketable securities and receivables. An accumulation of poor-quality marketable securities or receivables, or both, could cause an acid-test ratio to appear deceptively favorable. When referring to marketable securities, poor quality means securities likely to generate losses when sold. Poor-quality receivables may be uncollectible or not collectible until long past due. The quality of receivables depends primarily on their age, which can be assessed by preparing an aging schedule or by calculating the accounts receivable turnover.
Inventory Turnover
A company’s inventory turnover ratio shows the number of times its average inventory is sold during a period. You can calculate inventory turnover as follows:
\(Inventory\,turnover=\frac{Cost\,of\,goods\,sold}{Average\,inventory}\)
When comparing an income statement item and a balance sheet item, we measure both in comparable dollars. Notice that we measure the numerator and denominator in cost rather than sales dollars. Inventory turnover relates a measure of sales volume to the average amount of goods on hand to produce this sales volume.
Synotech’s inventory on 2009 January 1, was USD 856.7 million. The following schedule shows that the inventory turnover decreased slightly from 5.85 times per year in 2009 to 5.76 times per year in 2010. To convert these turnover ratios to the number of days it takes the company to sell its entire stock of inventory, divide 365 by the inventory turnover. Synotech’s average inventory sold in about 63 and 62 (365/5.76 and 365/5.85) in 2010 and 2009, respectively.
| December 31 | |||
| (USD millions) | 2010 | 2009 | Amount of increase or (decrease) |
| Cost of goods sold (a) | $5,341.3 | $5,223.7 | $117.6 |
| Merchandise inventory: | |||
| January 1 | $929.8 | $856.7 | $ 73.1 |
| December 31 | 924.8 | 929.8 | (5.0) |
| Total (b) | $1,854.6 | $1,786.5 | $ 68.1 |
| Average inventory (c) (b/2 = c) | $927.3 | $893.3 | |
| Turnover of inventory (a/c) | 5.76 | 5.85 |
Other things being equal, a manager who maintains the highest inventory turnover ratio is the most efficient. Yet, other things are not always equal. For example, a company that achieves a high inventory turnover ratio by keeping extremely small inventories on hand may incur larger ordering costs, lose quantity discounts, and lose sales due to lack of adequate inventory. In attempting to earn satisfactory income, management must balance the costs of inventory storage and obsolescence and the cost of tying up funds in inventory against possible losses of sales and other costs associated with keeping too little inventory on hand.
Standing alone, a single financial ratio may not be informative. Investors gain greater insight by computing and analyzing several related ratios for a company. Financial analysis relies heavily on informed judgment. As guides to aid comparison, percentages and ratios are useful in uncovering potential strengths and weaknesses. However, the financial analyst should seek the basic causes behind changes and established trends.
| Liquidity Ratios | Formula | Significance |
| Current (or working capital) ratio | Current assets / Current liabilities | Test of debt-paying ability |
| Acid-test (quick) ratio | Quick assets (cash + marketable securities + net receivables) / Current liabilities | Test of immediate debt-paying ability |
| Inventory turnover | Cost of goods sold / Average inventory | Test of whether or not a sufficient volume of business is being generated relative to inventory |
Interpretation and Use of Ratios
Analysts must be sure that their comparisons are valid—especially when the comparisons are of items for different periods or different companies. They must follow consistent accounting practices if valid interperiod comparisons are to be made.
Also, when comparing a company’s ratios to industry averages provided by an external source such as Dun & Bradstreet, the analyst should calculate the company’s ratios in the same manner as the reporting service. Thus, if Dun & Bradstreet uses net sales (rather than cost of goods sold) to compute inventory turnover, so should the analyst.
Facts and conditions not disclosed by the financial statements may, however, affect their interpretation. A single important event may have been largely responsible for a given relationship. For example, competitors may put a new product on the market, making it necessary for the company to reduce the selling price of a product suddenly rendered obsolete. Such an event would severely affect net sales or profitability, but there might be little chance that such an event would happen again.
Analysts must consider general business conditions within the industry of the company under study. A corporation’s downward trend in earnings, for example, is less alarming if the industry trend or the general economic trend is also downward.
Investors also need to consider the seasonal nature of some businesses. If the balance sheet date represents the seasonal peak in the volume of business, for example, the ratio of current assets to current liabilities may be much lower than if the balance sheet date is in a season of low activity.
Potential investors should consider the market risk associated with the prospective investment. They can determine market risk by comparing the changes in the price of a stock in relation to the changes in the average price of all stocks.
Potential investors should realize that acquiring the ability to make informed judgments is a long process and does not occur overnight. Using ratios and percentages without considering the underlying causes may lead to incorrect conclusions.
Even within an industry, variations may exist. Acceptable current ratios, gross margin percentages, debt to equity ratios, and other relationships vary widely depending on unique conditions within an industry. Therefore, it is important to know the industry to make comparisons that have real meaning.
Demonstration Problem
The balance sheet and supplementary data for Xerox Corporation follow:
| 20XX | |
| Assets | |
| Cash | $ 1,741 |
| Accounts receivable, net | 2,281 |
| Finance receivables, net | 5,097 |
| Inventories | 1,932 |
| Deferred taxes and other current assets | 1,971 |
| Total current assets | $ 13,022 |
| Finance receivables due after one year, net | 7,957 |
| Land, buildings, and equipment, net | 2,495 |
| Investments in affiliates, at equity | 1,362 |
| Goodwill | 1,578 |
| Other assets | 3,061 |
| Total assets | $ 29,475 |
| Liabilities and stockholders’ equity | |
| Short-term debt and current portion of long-term debt | $ 2,693 |
| Accounts payable | 1,033 |
| Accrued compensation and benefit costs | 662 |
| Unearned income | 250 |
| Other current liabilities | 1,630 |
| Total current liabilities | $ 6,268 |
| Long-term debt | 15,404 |
| Liabilities for post-retirement medical benefits | 1,197 |
| Deferred taxes and other liabilities | 1,876 |
| Discontinued policyholders’ deposits and other operations liabilities | 670 |
| Deferred ESOP benefits | (221) |
| Minorities’ interests in equity of subsidiaries | 141 |
| Preferred stock | 647 |
| Common shareholders’ equity (108.1 million) | 3,493 |
| Total liabilities and shareholders’ equity | $ 29,475 |
- Cost of goods sold, USD 6,197.
- Net sales, USD 18,701.
- Inventory, January 1, USD 2,290.
- Net interest expense, USD 1,031.
- Net income before interest and taxes, USD 647.
- Net accounts receivable on January 1, USD 2,633.
- Total assets on January 1, USD 28,531.
Compute the following ratios:
- Current ratio.
- Acid-test ratio.
- Inventory turnover.
Solution to Demonstration Problem
- Current ratio: \(\frac{Current\,Assets}{Current\,liabilities}=\frac{USD\,13,022,000,000}{USD\,6,268,000,000}=2.08:1\)
- Acid-test ratio: \(\frac{Quick\,Assets}{Quick\,liabilities}=\frac{USD\,9,119,000,000}{USD\,6,268,000,000}=1.45:1\)
- Inventory turnover: \(\frac{Net\,sales}{Average\,Inventory}=\frac{USD\,18,701,000,000}{USD\,2,111,000,000}=8.86\,times\)
2,111 million is the average of 2,290 and 1,932 mm, the inventories at the beginning and end of the year.


4.3: Wolf v. Colorado 338 U.S. 25 (1949)
U.S. Supreme Court
Wolf v. Colorado, 338 U.S. 25 (1949)
Wolf v. Colorado
Nos. 17 and 18
Argued October 19, 1948
Decided June 27, 1949
338 U.S. 25
CERTIORARI TO THE SUPREME COURT OF COLORADO
Syllabus
In a prosecution in a state court for a state crime, the Fourteenth Amendment of the Federal Constitution does not forbid the admission of relevant evidence even though obtained by an unreasonable search and seizure. Pp. 338 U. S. 25 -33.
(a) Arbitrary intrusion into privacy by the police is prohibited by the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Pp. 338 U. S. 27 -28.
(b) While the doctrine of Weeks v. United States, 232 U. S. 383 , making evidence secured in violation of the Fourth Amendment inadmissible in federal courts, is adhered to, it is not imposed on the States by the Fourteenth Amendment. Pp. 338 U. S. 28 -33.
117 Colo. 279, 321, 187 P.2d 926, 928, affirmed.
Judgments of conviction in two criminal prosecutions in a state court were sustained by the State Supreme Court against claims of denial of rights under the Federal Constitution. 117 Colo. 279, 321, 187 P.2d 926, 928. This Court granted certiorari. 333 U.S. 879. Affirmed, p. 338 U. S. 33 .
MR. JUSTICE FRANKFURTER delivered the opinion of the Court.
The precise question for consideration is this: does a conviction by a State court for a State offense deny the “due process of law” required by the Fourteenth Amendment, solely because evidence that was admitted at the trial was obtained under circumstances which would have rendered it inadmissible in a prosecution for violation of a federal law in a court of the United States because there deemed to be an infraction of the Fourth Amendment as applied in Weeks v. United States, 232 U. S. 383 ? The Supreme Court of Colorado has sustained convictions in which such evidence was admitted, 117 Col. 279, 187 P.2d 926; 117 Col. 321, 187 P.2d 928, and we brought the cases here. 333 U.S. 879.
Unlike the specific requirements and restrictions placed by the Bill of Rights (Amendments I to VIII) upon the administration of criminal justice by federal authority, the Fourteenth Amendment did not subject criminal justice in the States to specific limitations. The notion that the “due process of law” guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment is shorthand for the first eight amendments of the Constitution, and thereby incorporates them, has been rejected by this Court again and again, after impressive consideration. See, e.g., Hurtado v. California, 110 U. S. 516 ; Twining v. New Jersey, 211 U. S. 78 ; Brown v. Mississippi, 297 U. S. 278 ; Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U. S. 319 . Only the other day, the Court reaffirmed this rejection after thorough reexamination of the scope and function of the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Adamson v. California, 332 U. S. 46 . The issue is closed.
For purposes of ascertaining the restrictions which the Due Process Clause imposed upon the States in the enforcement of their criminal law, we adhere to the views expressed in Palko v. Connecticut, supra, 302 U. S. 319 . That decision speaks to us with the great weight of the authority, particularly in matters of civil liberty, of a court that included Mr. Chief Justice Hughes, Mr. Justice Brandeis, Mr. Justice Stone and Mr. Justice Cardozo, to name only the dead. In rejecting the suggestion that the Due Process Clause incorporated the original Bill of Rights, Mr. Justice Cardozo reaffirmed on behalf of that Court a different but deeper and more pervasive conception of the Due Process Clause. This Clause exacts from the States for the lowliest and the most outcast all that is “implicit in the concept of ordered liberty.” 302 U.S. at 302 U. S. 325 .
Due process of law thus conveys neither formal nor fixed nor narrow requirements. It is the compendious expression for all those rights which the courts must enforce because they are basic to our free society. But basic rights do not become petrified as of any one time, even though, as a matter of human experience, some may not too rhetorically be called eternal verities. It is of the very nature of a free society to advance in its standards of what is deemed reasonable and right. Representing as it does a living principle, due process is not confined within a permanent catalogue of what may at a given time be deemed the limits or the essentials of fundamental rights.
To rely on a tidy formula for the easy determination of what is a fundamental right for purposes of legal enforcement may satisfy a longing for certainty, but ignores the movements of a free society. It belittles the scale of the conception of due process. The real clue to the problem confronting the judiciary in the application of the Due Process Clause is not to ask where the line is once and for all to be drawn, but to recognize that it is for the Court to draw it by the gradual and empiric process of “inclusion and exclusion.” Davidson v. New Orleans, 96 U. S. 97 , 96 U. S. 104 . This was the Court’s insight when first called upon to consider the problem; to this insight, the Court has, on the whole, been faithful as case after case has come before it since Davidson v. New Orleans was decided.
The security of one’s privacy against arbitrary intrusion by the police — which is at the core of the Fourth Amendment — is basic to a free society. It is therefore implicit in “the concept of ordered liberty,” and, as such, enforceable against the States through the Due Process Clause. The knock at the door, whether by day or by night, as a prelude to a search, without authority of law but solely on the authority of the police, did not need the commentary of recent history to be condemned as inconsistent with the conception of human rights enshrined in the history and the basic constitutional documents of English-speaking peoples.
Accordingly, we have no hesitation in saying that, were a State affirmatively to sanction such police incursion into privacy, it would run counter to the guaranty of the Fourteenth Amendment. But the ways of enforcing such a basic right raise questions of a different order. How such arbitrary conduct should be checked, what remedies against it should be afforded, the means by which the right should be made effective, are all questions that are not to be so dogmatically answered as to preclude the varying solutions which spring from an allowable range of judgment on issues not susceptible of quantitative solution.
In Weeks v. United States, supra, this Court held that, in a federal prosecution the Fourth Amendment barred the use of evidence secured through an illegal search and seizure. This ruling was made for the first time in 1914. It was not derived from the explicit requirements of the Fourth Amendment; it was not based on legislation expressing Congressional policy in the enforcement of the Constitution. The decision was a matter of judicial implication. Since then, it has been frequently applied, and we stoutly adhere to it. But the immediate question is whether the basic right to protection against arbitrary intrusion by the police demands the exclusion of logically relevant evidence obtained by an unreasonable search and seizure because, in a federal prosecution for a federal crime, it would be excluded. As a matter of inherent reason, one would suppose this to be an issue as to which men with complete devotion to the protection of the right of privacy might give different answers. When we find that, in fact, most of the English-speaking world does not regard as vital to such protection the exclusion of evidence thus obtained, we must hesitate to treat this remedy as an essential ingredient of the right. The contrariety of views of the States is particularly impressive in view of the careful reconsideration which they have given the problem in the light of the Weeks decision.
“I. Before the Weeks decision, 27 States had passed on the admissibility of evidence obtained by unlawful search and seizure.”
” (a) Of these, 26 States opposed the Weeks doctrine. ( See Appendix, Table A.)”
” (b) Of these, 1 State anticipated the Weeks doctrine. (Table B.)”
“II. Since the Weeks decision, 47 States all told have passed on the Weeks doctrine. (Table C.)”
” (a) Of these, 20 passed on it for the first time.”
“~ (1) Of the foregoing States, 6 followed the Weeks doctrine. (Table D.)”
“~ (2) Of the foregoing States, 14 rejected the Weeks doctrine. (Table E.)”
” (b) Of these, 26 States reviewed prior decisions contrary to the Weeks doctrine.”
“~ (1) Of these, 10 States have followed Weeks , overruling or distinguishing their prior decisions. (Table F.)”
“~ (2) Of these, 16 States adhered to their prior decisions against Weeks. (Table G.)”
” (c) Of these, 1 State repudiated its prior formulation of the Weeks doctrine. (Table H.)”
“III. As of today, 31 States reject the Weeks doctrine, 16 States are in agreement with it. (Table I.) ”
“IV. Of 10 jurisdictions within the United Kingdom and the British Commonwealth of Nations which have passed on the question, none has held evidence obtained by illegal search and seizure inadmissible. (Table J.)”
The jurisdictions which have rejected the Weeks doctrine have not left the right to privacy without other means of protection. [ Footnote 1 ] Indeed, the exclusion of evidence is a remedy which directly serves only to protect those upon whose person or premises something incriminating has been found. We cannot, therefore, regard it as a departure from basic standards to remand such persons, together with those who emerge scatheless from a search, to the remedies of private action and such protection as the internal discipline of the police, under the eyes of an alert public opinion, may afford. Granting that, in practice the exclusion of evidence may be an effective way of deterring unreasonable searches, it is not for this Court to condemn as falling below the minimal standards assured by the Due Process Clause a State’s reliance upon other methods which, if consistently enforced, would be equally effective. Weighty testimony against such an insistence on our own view is furnished by the opinion of Mr. Justice (then Judge) Cardozo in People v. Defore, 242 N.Y. 13, 150 N.E. 585. [ Footnote 2 ] We cannot brush aside the experience of States which deem the incidence of such conduct by the police too slight to call for a deterrent remedy not by way of disciplinary measures, but by overriding the relevant rules of evidence. There are, moreover, reasons for excluding evidence unreasonably obtained by the federal police which are less compelling in the case of police under State or local authority. The public opinion of a community can far more effectively be exerted against oppressive conduct on the part of police directly responsible to the community itself than can local opinion, sporadically aroused, be brought to bear upon remote authority pervasively exerted throughout the country.
We hold, therefore, that, in a prosecution in a State court for a State crime, the Fourteenth Amendment does not forbid the admission of evidence obtained by an unreasonable search and seizure. And though we have interpreted the Fourth Amendment to forbid the admission of such evidence, a different question would be presented if Congress, under its legislative powers, were to pass a statute purporting to negate the Weeks doctrine. We would then be faced with the problem of the respect to be accorded the legislative judgment on an issue as to which, in default of that judgment, we have been forced to depend upon our own. Problems of a converse character, also not before us, would be presented should Congress, under § 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment, undertake to enforce the rights there guaranteed by attempting to make the Weeks doctrine binding upon the States.
Affirmed.
[ Footnote 1 ]
The common law provides actions for damages against the searching officer, e.g., Entick v. Carrington, 2 Wils. 275, 19 How.St.Tr. 1029; Grumon v. Raymond, 1 Conn. 40; Sandford v. Nichols, 13 Mass. 286; Halsted v. Brice, 13 Mo. 171; Hussey v. Davis, 58 N.H. 317; Reed v. Lucas, 42 Texas 529; against one who procures the issuance of a warrant maliciously and without probable cause, e.g., Gulsby v. Louisville & N. R. Co., 167 Ala. 122, 52 So. 392; Whitson v. May, 71 Ind. 269; Kretabiel v. Henkle, 152 Iowa 604, 129 N.W. 945; Olson v. Tvete, 46 Minn. 225, 48 N.W. 914; Boeger v. Langenberg, 97 Mo. 390, 11 S.W. 223; Doane v. Anderson, 60 Hun 586, 15 N.Y.S. 459; Shall v. Minneapolis, St. P. & S.S. M. R. Co., 156 Wis.195, 145 N.W. 649; against a magistrate who has acted without jurisdiction in issuing a warrant, e.g., Williams v. Kozak, 280 F. 373 (C.A.4th Cir.); Grumon v. Raymond, 1 Conn. 40; Kennedy v. Terrill, Hardin (Ky.) 490; Shaw v. Moon, 117 Ore. 558, 245 P. 318, and against persons assisting in the execution of an illegal search, e.g., Hebrew v. Pulis, 73 N.J.L. 621, 625, 64 A. 121, 122; Cartwright v. Canode, 138 S.W. 792 (Tex.Civ.App.), aff’d, 106 Texas 502, 171 S.W. 696. One may also without liability use force to resist an unlawful search. E.g., Commonwealth v. Martin, 105 Mass. 178; State v. Mann, 27 N.C. 45.
Statutory sanctions in the main provide for the punishment of one maliciously procuring a search warrant or willfully exceeding his authority in exercising it. E.g., 18 U.S.C. (1946 ed.) §§ 630, 631; Ala.Code, Tit. 15, § 99 (1940); Ariz.Code Ann. § 44-3513 (1939); Fla.Stat.Ann. §§ 933.16, 933.17 (1944); Iowa Code §§ 751.38, 751.39 (1946); Mont.Rev.Code Ann. §§ 10948, 10952 (1935); Nev.Comp.Laws §§ 10425, 10426 (1929); N.Y.Crim.Code §§ 811, 812, N.Y.Penal Law §§ 1786, 1847; N.D.Rev.Code §§ 12-1707, 12-1708 (1943); Okla.Stat.Ann., Tit. 21, §§ 536, 585, Tit. 22, §§ 1239, 1240 (1937); Ore.Comp.Laws Ann. § 26-1717 (1940); S.D.Code §§ 13.1213, 13.1234, 34.9904, 34.9905 (1939); Tenn.Code Ann. § 1 1905 (1934). Some statutes more broadly penalize unlawful searches. E.g., 18 U.S.C. (1946 ed.) § 53a; Idaho Code Ann. §§ 17-1004, 17-1024 (1932); Minn.Stat. §§ 613.54, 621.17 (1945); Va.Code Ann. § 4822d (Michie, 1942); Wash.Rev.Stat.Ann. §§ 2240-1, 2240-2. Virginia also makes punishable one who issues a general search warrant or a warrant unsupported by affidavit. Va.Code Ann. § 4822e (Michie, 1942). A few States have provided statutory civil remedies. See, e.g., Ga.Code Ann. § 27-301 (1935); Ill.Rev.Stat., c. 38, § 698 (Smith-Hurd, 1935); Miss.Code Ann. § 1592 (1942). And in one State, misuse of a search warrant may be an. abuse of process punishable as contempt of court. See Mich.Stat.Ann. § 27.511 (1938).
[ Footnote 2 ]
“We hold, then, with the defendant that the evidence against him was the outcome of a trespass. The officer might have been resisted, or sued for damages, or even prosecuted for oppression (Penal Law, §§ 1846, 1847). He was subject to removal or other discipline at the hands of his superiors. These consequences are undisputed. The defendant would add another. We must determine whether evidence of criminality, procured by an act of trespass, is to be rejected as incompetent for the misconduct of the trespasser. . . .”
“Those judgments [ Weeks v. United States and cases which followed it] do not bind us, for they construe provisions of the Federal Constitution, the Fourth and Fifth Amendments, not applicable to the States. Even though not binding, they merit our attentive scrutiny. . . .”
“In so holding [ i.e., that evidence procured by unlawful search is not incompetent], we are not unmindful of the argument that, unless the evidence is excluded, the statute becomes a form, and its protection an illusion. This has a strange sound when the immunity is viewed in the light of its origin and history. The rule now embodied in the statute was received into English law as the outcome of the prosecution of Wilkes and Entick. . . . Wilkes sued the messengers who had ransacked his papers, and recovered a verdict of � 4,000 against one and � 1,000 against the other. Entick, too, had a substantial verdict. . . . We do not know whether the public, represented by its juries, is today more indifferent to its liberties than it was when the immunity was born. If so, the change of sentiment without more does not work a change of remedy. Other sanctions, penal and disciplinary, supplementing the right to damages, have already been enumerated. No doubt the protection of the statute would be greater from the point of view of the individual whose privacy had been invaded if the government were required to ignore what it had learned through the invasion. The question is whether protection for the individual would not be gained at a disproportionate loss of protection for society. On the one side is the social need that crime shall be repressed. On the other, the social need that law shall not be flouted by the insolence of office. There are dangers in any choice. The rule of the Adams case [176 N.Y. 351, 68 N.E. 636] strikes a balance between opposing interests.”
242 N.Y. at 19, 20, 24-25, 150 N.E. at 586-87, 587, 588-89.
|338 U.S. 25apptaba|
APPENDIX
In the case of jurisdictions which have decided more than one case in point, the following Tables cite only the leading case.
TABLE A
STATES WHICH OPPOSED THE WEEKS DOCTRINE
BEFORE THE WEEKS CASE HAD BEEN DECIDED
ALA. Shields v. State, 104 Ala. 35, 16 So. 85.
ARK. Starchman v. State, 62 Ark. 538, 36 S.W. 940.
CONN. State v. Griswold, 67 Conn. 290, 34 A. 1046.
GA. Williams v. State, 100 Ga. 511, 28 S.E. 624.
IDAHO State v. Bond, 12 Idaho 424, 439, 86 P. 43, 47.
ILL. Siebert v. People, 143 Ill. 571, 583, 32 N.E. 431, 434.
KAN. State v. Miller, 63 Kan. 62, 64 P. 1033.
ME. See State v . Gorham, 65 Me. 270, 272.
MD. Lawrence v. State, 10.3 Id. 17,:35, 63 A. 96, 103.
Page 338 U. S. 34
MASS. Commonwealth v. Dana, 2 Metc. 329.
MICH. People v. Aldorfer, 164 Mich. 676, 130 N. w. 351.
MINN. State v. Strait, 94 Minn. 384, 102 N. w. 913.
MO. State v. Pomeroy, 130 Mo. 489, 32 S.W. 1002.
MONT. See State v. Fuller, 34 Mont. 12, 19, 85 P. 369, 373.
NEB. Geiger v. State, 6 Neb. 545.
N.H. State v. Flynn, 36 N.H. 64.
N.Y. People v. Adams, 176 N.Y. 351, 68 N.E. 636.
N.C. State v. Wallace, 162 N.C. 622, 78 S.E. l.
OKLA. Silva v. State, 6 Okla.Cr. 97, 116 P. 199.
ORE. State v. McDaniel, 39 Ore. 161, 169-70, 65 P. 520, 523.
S.C. State v. Atkinson, 40 S,C. 363, 371, 18 S.E. 1021, 1024.
S.D. State v. Madison, 23 S.D. 584, 591, 122 N.W. 647, 650.
TENN. Cohn v. State, 120 Tenn. 61, 109 S.W. 1149.
VT. State v. Mathers, 64 Vt. 101, 23 A. 590.
WASH. State v. Royce, 38 Wash. 111, 80 P. 268.
W.VA. See State v. Edwards, 51 W.Va. 220, 229, 41 S.E. 429, 432-33.
|338 U.S. 25apptabb|
TABLE B
STATE WHICH HAD FORMULATED THE WEEKS DOCTRINE
BEFORE THE WEEKS DECISION
IOWA State v. Sheridan, 121 Iowa 164, 96 N. w. 730.
|338 U.S. 25apptabc|
TABLE C
STATES WHICH HAVE PASSED ON THE WEEKS DOCTRINE
SINCE THE WEEKS CASE WAS DECIDED
Every state except Rhode Island. But see State v. Lorenzo, 72 R.I. 175 48 A.2d 407 (holding that defendant had consented to the search, but that, even if he had not, and even if the federal rule applied, the evidence was admissible because no timely motion to suppress had been made).
Page 338 U. S. 35
|338 U.S. 25apptabd|
TABLE D
STATES WHICH PASSED ON THE WEEKS DOCTRINE FOR THE FIRST TIME
AFTER THE WEEKS DECISION, AND, IN SO DOING, FOLLOWED IT
FLA. Atz v. Andrews, 84 Fla. 43, 94 SO. 329.
IND. Flum v. State, 193 Ind. 585, 141 N.E. 353.
KY. Youman v. Commonwealth, 189 Ky. 152, 224 S.W. 860.
MISS. Tucker v. State, 128 Miss. 211, 90 So. 845.
WIS. Hoyer v. State, 180 Wis. 407, 193 N.W. 89.
WYO. State v. George, 32 Wyo 223, 231 P. 683.
|338 U.S. 25apptabe|
TABLE E
STATES WHICH PASSED ON THE WEEKS DOCTRINE FOR THE FIRST TIME
AFTER THE WEEKS DECISION, AND, IN SO, DOING REJECTED IT.
ARIZ. Argetakis v. State, 24 Ariz. 599, 212 P. 372.
CALIF. People v. Mayen, 188 Calif.237, 205 P. 435 (adopting the
general rule but distinguishing the cases then decided by
this Court on the ground that they apply only when a
timely motion for return of the property seized has been
made).
COLO. Massantonio v. People, 77 Colo. 392, 236 P. 1019.
DEL. State v. Chuchola, 32 Del. 133, 120 A. 212 (distinguishing
this Court’s decisions).
LA. State v. Fleckinger, 152 La. 337, 93 So. 115. The consti-
tutional convention of 1921 refused to adopt an amendment
incorporating the federal rule. See State v. Eddins,
161 La. 240, 108 So. 468.
NEV. State v. Chin Gim, 47 Nev. 431, 224 P. 798.
N.J. State v. Black, 5 N.J.Misc. 48, 135 A. 685.
N.M. State v. Dillon, 34 N.M. 366, 281 P. 474.
N.D. State v. Fahn, 53 N.D. 203, 205 N.W. 67.
OHIO State v. Lindusay, 131 Ohio St. 166, 2 N.E.2d 490.
PA. Commonwealth v. Dabbierio, 290 Pa. 174, 138 A. 679.
TEX. Welchek v. State, 93 Tex.Cr.Rep. 271, 247 S.W. 524. In
1925, a statute changed the rule by providing that “No
evidence obtained by an officer or other person in violation
of any provisions of the Constitution or laws of the State
Page 338 U. S. 36
of Texas, or of the Constitution of the United States of
America, shall be admitted in evidence against the accused
on the trial of any criminal case.” Texas Laws 1925, c. 49,
as amended, 2 Vernon’s Tex.Stat., 1948 (Code of Crim.Proc.),
Art. 727a.
UTAH State v. Aime, 62 Utah 476, 220 P. 704.
VA. Hall v. Commonwealth, 138 Va. 727, 121 S.E. 154.
|338 U.S. 25apptabf|
TABLE F
STATES WHICH, AFTER THE WEEKS DECISION, OVERRULED OR
DISTINGUISHED PRIOR CONTRARY DECISIONS
IDAHO Idaho expressly refused to follow the Weeks decision in
State v. Myers, 36 Idaho 396, 211 P. 440, but repudiated
the Myers case and adopted the federal rule in State v.
Arregi, 44 Idaho 43, 254 P. 788.
ILL. After two cases following the former state rule, Illinois
adopted the federal rule in People v. Castree, 311 Ill. 392,
143 N.E. 112.
MICH. People v. Marchausen, 204 Mich. 559, 171 N.W. 557 (dis-
tinguishing earlier cases on the ground that, in them, no
preliminary motion to suppress had been made).
MO. State v. Graham, 295 Mo. 695, 247 S.W.194, supported
the old rule in a dictum, but the federal rule was adopted in
State v. Owens, 302 Mo. 348 259 S.W. 100 (distinguishing
earlier cases on the ground that, in them, no preliminary
motion to dismiss had been made).
MONT. State ex rel. King v. District Court, 70 Mont. 191, 224 P.862.
OKLA. Gore v. State, 24 Okla.Cr. 394, 218 P. 545.
S.D. State v. Gooder, 57 S.D. 619, 234 N.W. 610. But cf.
S.D.Laws 1935, c. 96, now S.D.Code § 34.1102 (1939), amending
Rev.Code 1919, § 4606 (all evidence admissible
Page 338 U. S. 37
under a valid search warrant is admissible notwithstanding
defects in the issuance of the warrant).
TENN. Hughes v. State, 145 Tenn. 544, 238 S.W. 588 (distinguishing
Cohn v. State, supra, Table A).
WASH. State v. Gibbons, 118 Wash. 171, 203 P. 390.
W.VA. State v. Andrews, 91 W.Va. 720 114 S.E. 257 (distinguish-
ing earlier cases).
|338 U.S. 25apptabg|
TABLE G
STATES WHICH, AFTER THE WEEKS DECISION, REVIEWED PRIOR CONTRARY
DECISIONS, AND, IN SO DOING, ADHERED TO THOSE DECISIONS.
ALA. Banks v. State, 207 Ala. 179, 93 SO. 293.
ARK. Benson v. State, 149 Ark. 633, 233 S.W. 758.
CONN. State v. Reynolds, 101 Conn. 224, 125 A. 636.
GA. Jackson v. State, 156 Ga. 647, 1 19 S.E. 525.
KAN. State v. Johnson, 116 Kan. 58, 226 P. 245.
ME. State v. Schoppe, 113 Me. 10, 16, 92 A. 867, 869 (alterna-
tive holding, not noticing Weeks ).
MD. Meisinger v. State, 155 Md.195, 141 A. 536, 142 A.190. But
cf. Md.Laws 1929, c.194, as amended, Md.Code Ann., Art. 35,
§ 5 (1947 Supp.) (in trial of misdemeanors, evidence obtained
by illegal search and seizure is inadmissible).
MASS. Commonwealth v. Wilkins, 243 Mass. 356, 138 N.E. 11.
MINN. State v. Pluth, 157 Minn. 145, 195 N.W. 789.
NEB. Billings v. State, 109 Neb. 596, 191 N.W. 721.
N.H. State v. Agalos, 79 N.H. 241, 242, 107 A. 314, 315 (not
noticing Weeks ).
N.Y. People v. Defore, 242 N.Y. 13, 150 N.E. 585; People v.
Richter’s Jewelers, 291 N.Y. 161, 169, 51 N.E.2d 690,
693 (holding that adoption of Amendment to State Con-
Page 338 U. S. 38
stitution in same language as Civil Rights Law construed
in the Defore case is not occasion for changing interpre-
tation, especially since proceedings of the convention
which framed the amendment show that no change was
intended).
N.C. State v. Simmons, 183 N.C. 684, 110 S.E. 591 (distinguish-
ing between evidentiary articles and corpus delicti ).
ORE. See State v. Folkes, 174 Ore. 568, 588-89, 150 P.2d 17, 25.
But see State v. Laundy, 103 Ore. 443, 493-95, 204 P.
958, 974-75.
S.C. After granting a motion to return illegally seized property
in Blacksburg v. Beam, 104 S.C. 146, 88 S.E. 441, South
Carolina reaffirmed its agreement with the general rule in
State v. Green, 121 S.C. 230, 114 S.E. 317.
VT. State v. Stacy, 104 Vt. 379, 401, 160 A. 257, 266.
|338 U.S. 25apptabh|
TABLE H
STATE WHICH HAS REPUDIATED ITS PRIOR FORMULATION
OF THE WEEKS DOCTRINE
IOWA State v. Rowley, 197 Iowa 977, 195 N.W. 881 (withdrawing
earlier opinion in 187 N.W. 7).
|338 U.S. 25apptabi|
TABLE I
SUMMARY OF PRESENT POSITION OF STATES WHICH HAVE
PASSED ON THE WEEKS DOCTRINE
(a) States that reject Weeks:
Ala. Ariz. Ark., Calif., Colo. Conn. Del., Ga. Iowa, Kan. La. Me., Md. Mass. Minn., Neb., Nev., N.H. N.J. N.M., N.Y. N.C. N.D., Ohio, Ore. Pa. S.C. Texas, Utah, Vt., Va.
(b) States that are in agreement with Weeks:
Fla., Idaho, Ill., Ind. Ky., Mich. Miss., Mo. Mont., Okla., S.D. Tenn. Wash., W.Va. Wis., Wyo.
Page 338 U. S. 39
|338 U.S. 25apptabj|
TABLE J
JURISDICTIONS OF THE UNITED KINGDOM AND THE BRITISH COMMONWEALTH
OF NATIONS WHICH HAVE HELD ADMISSIBLE EVIDENCE OBTAINED BY
I
LLEGAL SEARCH AND SEIZURE
AUSTRALIA Miller v. Noblet, [1927] S.A.S.R. 385.
CANADA
ALTA. Rex v. Nelson, [1922] 2 W.W.R. 381, 69 D.L.R. 180.
MAN. Rec v. Duroussel, 41 Man. 15, [1933] 2 D.L.R. 446.
ONT. Regina v. Doyle, 12 Ont. 347.
SASK. Rex v. Kostachuk, 24 Sask. 485, 54 Can. C.C. 189.
ENGLAND See Elias v. Pasmore, [1934] 2 K.B. 164.
INDIA
ALL. Ali Ahmad Khan v. Emperor, 81 I.C. 615(1).
CAL. Baldeo Bin v. Emperor, 142 I.C. 639.
RANG. Chwa Hum Htive v. Emperor, 143 I.C. 824.
SCOTLAND See Hodgson v. Macpherson, [1913] S.C.(J.) 68, 73.
MR. JUSTICE BLACK, concurring.
In this case, petitioner was convicted of a crime in a state court on evidence obtained by a search and seizure conducted in a manner that this Court has held “unreasonable,” and therefore in violation of the Fourth Amendment. And under a rule of evidence adopted by this Court, evidence so obtained by federal officers cannot be used against defendants in federal courts. For reasons stated in my dissenting opinion in Adamson v. California, 332 U. S. 46 , 332 U. S. 68 , I agree with the conclusion of the Court that the Fourth Amendment’s prohibition of “unreasonable searches and seizures” is enforceable against the states. Consequently, I should be for reversal of this case if I thought the Fourth Amendment not only prohibited “unreasonable searches and seizures,”, but also, of itself, barred the use of evidence so unlawfully obtained. But I agree with what appears to be a plain implication of the Court’s opinion that the federal exclusionary rule is not a command of the Fourth Amendment, but is a judicially created rule of evidence which Congress might negate. See McNabb v. United States, 318 U. S. 332 . This leads me to concur in the Court’s judgment of affirmance.
It is not amiss to repeat my belief that the Fourteenth Amendment was intended to make the Fourth Amendment in its entirety applicable to the states. The Fourth Amendment was designed to protect people against unrestrained searches and seizures by sheriffs, policemen and other law enforcement officers. Such protection is an essential in a free society. And I am unable to agree that the protection of people from over-zealous or ruthless state officers is any less essential in a country of “ordered liberty” than is the protection of people from over-zealous or ruthless federal officers. Certainly there are far more state than federal enforcement officers and their activities, up to now, have more frequently and closely touched the intimate daily lives of people than have the activities of federal officers. A state officer’s “knock at the door . . . as a prelude to a search, without authority of law,” may be, as our experience shows, just as ominous to “ordered liberty” as though the knock were made by a federal officer.
MR. JUSTICE DOUGLAS, dissenting.
I believe, for the reasons stated by MR. JUSTICE BLACK in his dissent in Adamson v. California, 332 U. S. 46 , 332 U. S. 68 , that the Fourth Amendment is applicable to the States. I agree with MR. JUSTICE MURPHY that the evidence obtained in violation of it must be excluded in state prosecutions as well as in federal prosecutions, since, in absence of that rule of evidence, the Amendment would have no effective sanction. I also agree with him that, under that test, this evidence was improperly admitted, and that the judgments of conviction must be reversed.
MR. JUSTICE MURPHY, with whom MR. JUSTICE RUTLEDGE joins, dissenting.
It is disheartening to find so much that is right in an opinion which seems to me so fundamentally wrong. Of course, I agree with the Court that the Fourteenth Amendment prohibits activities which are proscribed by the search and seizure clause of the Fourth Amendment. See my dissenting views, and those of MR. JUSTICE BLACK, in Adamson v. California, 332 U. S. 46 , 332 U. S. 68 , 123. Quite apart from the blanket application of the Bill of Rights to the States, a devotee of democracy would ill-suit his name were he to suggest that his home’s protection against unlicensed governmental invasion was not “of the very essence of a scheme of ordered liberty.” Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U. S. 319 , 302 U. S. 325 . It is difficult for me to understand how the Court can go this far and yet be unwilling to make the step which can give some meaning to the pronouncements it utters.
Imagination and zeal may invent a dozen methods to give content to the commands of the Fourth Amendment. But this Court is limited to the remedies currently available. It cannot legislate the ideal system. If we would attempt the enforcement of the search and seizure clause in the ordinary case today, we are limited to three devices: judicial exclusion of the illegally obtained evidence; criminal prosecution of violators, and civil action against violators in the action of trespass.
Alternatives are deceptive. Their very statement conveys the impression that one possibility is as effective as the next. In this case, their statement is blinding. For there is but one alternative to the rule of exclusion. That is no sanction at all.
This has been perfectly clear since 1914, when a unanimous Court decided Weeks v. United States, 232 U. S. 383 , 232 U. S. 393 . “If letters and private documents can thus be seized and held and used in evidence against a citizen accused of an offense,” we said,
“the protection of the Fourth Amendment declaring his right to be secure against such searches and seizures is of no value, and, so far as those thus placed are concerned, might as well be stricken from the Constitution.”
“It reduces the Fourth Amendment to a form of words.” Holmes, J., for the Court, in Silverthorne Lumber Co. v. United States, 251 U. S. 385 , 251 U. S. 392 .
Today, the Court wipes those statements from the books with its bland citation of “other remedies.” Little need be said concerning the possibilities of criminal prosecution. Self-scrutiny is a lofty ideal, but its exaltation reaches new heights if we expect a District Attorney to prosecute himself or his associates for well meaning violations of the search and seizure clause during a raid the District Attorney or his associates have ordered. [ Footnote 2/1 ] But there is an appealing ring in another alternative. A trespass action for damages is a venerable means of securing reparation for unauthorized invasion of the home. Why not put the old writ to a new use? When the Court cites cases permitting the action, the remedy seems complete.
But what an illusory remedy this is if, by “remedy,” we mean a positive deterrent to police and prosecutors tempted to violate the Fourth Amendment. The appealing ring softens when we recall that, in a trespass action, the measure of damages is simply the extent of the injury to physical property. If the officer searches with care, he can avoid all but nominal damages — a penny, or a dollar. Are punitive damages possible? Perhaps. But a few states permit none, whatever the circumstances. [ Footnote 2/2 ] In those that do, the plaintiff must show the real ill will or malice of the defendant, [ Footnote 2/3 ] and surely it is not unreasonable to assume that one in honest pursuit of crime bears no malice toward the search victim. If that burden is carried, recovery may yet be defeated by the rule that there must be physical damages before punitive damages may be awarded. [ Footnote 2/4 ] In addition, some states limit punitive damages to the actual expenses of litigation. See 61 Harv.L.Rev. 113, 119-120. Others demand some arbitrary ratio between actual and punitive damages before a verdict may stand. See Morris, Punitive Damages in Tort Cases, 44 Harv.L.Rev. 1173, 1180-1181. Even assuming the ill will of the officer, his reasonable grounds for belief that the home he searched harbored evidence of crime is admissible in mitigation of punitive damages. Gamble v. Keyes, 35 S.D. 644, 153 N.W. 888; Simpson v. McCaffrey, 13 Ohio 508. The bad reputation of the plaintiff is likewise admissible. Banfill v. Byrd, 122 Miss. 288, 84 So. 227. If the evidence seized was actually used at a trial, that fact has been held a complete justification of the search, and a defense against the trespass action. Elias v. Pasmore [1934] 2 K.B. 164. And even if the plaintiff hurdles all these obstacles and gains a substantial verdict, the individual officer’s finances may well make the judgment useless — for the municipality, of course, is not liable without its consent. Is it surprising that there is so little in the books concerning trespass actions for violation of the search and seizure clause?
The conclusion is inescapable that but one remedy exists to deter violations of the search and seizure clause. That is the rule which excludes illegally obtained evidence. Only by exclusion can we impress upon the zealous prosecutor that violation of the Constitution will do him no good. And only when that point is driven home can the prosecutor be expected to emphasize the importance of observing constitutional demands in his instructions to the police.
If proof of the efficacy of the federal rule were needed, there is testimony in abundance in the recruit training programs and in service courses provided the police in states which follow the federal rule. [ Footnote 2/5 ] St. Louis, for example, demands extensive training in the rules of search and seizure, with emphasis upon the ease with which a case may collapse if it depends upon evidence obtained unlawfully. Current court decisions are digested and read at roll calls. The same general pattern prevails in Washington, D.C. [ Footnote 2/6 ] In Dallas, officers are thoroughly briefed and instructed that “the courts will follow the rules very closely, and will detect any frauds.” [ Footnote 2/7 ] In Milwaukee, a stout volume on the law of arrest and search and seizure is made the basis of extended instruction. [ Footnote 2/8 ] Officer preparation in the applicable rules in Jackson, Mississippi, has included the lectures of an Associate Justice of the Mississippi Supreme Court. The instructions on evidence and search and seizure given to trainees in San Antonio carefully note the rule of exclusion in Texas, and close with this statement:
“Every police officer should know the laws and the rules of evidence. Upon knowledge of these facts determines whether the . . . defendant will be convicted or acquitted. . . . When you investigate a case . . . , remember throughout your investigation that only admissible evidence can be used.”
But in New York City, we are informed simply that “copies of the State Penal Law and Code of Criminal Procedure” are given to officers, and that they are “kept advised” that illegally obtained evidence may be admitted in New York courts. In Baltimore, a “Digest of Laws” is distributed, and it is made clear that the statutory section excluding evidence
“is limited in its application to the trial of misdemeanors. . . . It would appear . . . that . . . evidence illegally obtained may still be admissible in the trial of felonies.”
In Cleveland, recruits and other officers are told of the rules of search and seizure, but
“instructed that it is admissible in the courts of Ohio. The Ohio Supreme Court has indicated very definitely and clearly that Ohio belongs to the ‘admissionist’ group of states when evidence obtained by an illegal search is presented to the court.”
A similar pattern emerges in Birmingham, Alabama.
The contrast between states with the federal rule and those without it is thus a positive demonstration of its efficacy. There are apparent exceptions to the contrast — Denver, for example, appears to provide as comprehensive a series of instructions as that in Chicago, although Colorado permits introduction of the evidence, and Illinois does not. And, so far as we can determine from letters, a fairly uniform standard of officer instruction appears in other cities, irrespective of the local rule of evidence. But the examples cited above serve to ground an assumption that has motivated this Court since the Weeks case: that this is an area in which judicial action has positive effect upon the breach of law, and that, without judicial action, there are simply no effective sanctions presently available.
I cannot believe that we should decide due process questions by simply taking a poll of the rules in various jurisdictions, even if we follow the Palko “test.” Today’s decision will do inestimable harm to the cause of fair police methods in our cities and states. Even more important, perhaps, it must have tragic effect upon public respect for our judiciary. For the Court now allows what is indeed shabby business: lawlessness by officers of the law.
Since the evidence admitted was secured in violation of the Fourth Amendment, the judgment should be reversed.
[ Footnote 2/1 ]
See Pound, Criminal Justice in America (New York, 1930):
“Under our legal system, the way of the prosecutor is hard, and the need of ‘getting results’ puts pressure upon prosecutors to . . . indulge in that lawless enforcement of law which produces a vicious circle of disrespect for law.”
P. 186.
And note the statement of the Wickersham Commission, with reference to arrests: “. . . in case of persons of no influence or little or no means, the legal restrictions are not likely to give an officer serious trouble.” II National Commission on Law Observance and Enforcement, Report on Criminal Procedure (1931), p. 19.
[ Footnote 2/2 ]
See McCormick, Damages, § 78. See Willis, Measure of Damages When Property is Wrongfully Taken by a Private Individual, 22 Harv.L.Rev. 419.
[ Footnote 2/3 ]
Id., § 79. See Fennemore v. Armstrong, 29 Del. 35, 96 A. 204.
[ Footnote 2/4 ]
“It is a well settled and almost universally accepted rule in the law of damages that a finding of exemplary damages must be predicated upon a finding of actual damages.”
17 Iowa L.Rev. 413, 414. This appears to be in overstatement. See McCormick, supra, § 83; Restatement IV, Torts, § 908, comment c.
[ Footnote 2/5 ]
The material which follows is gleaned from letters and other material from Commissioners of Police and Chiefs of Police in twenty-six cities. Thirty-eight large cities in the United States were selected at random, and inquiries directed concerning the instructions provided police on the rules of search and seizure. Twenty-six replies have been received to date. Those of any significance are mentioned in the text of this opinion. The sample is believed to be representative, but it cannot, of course, substitute for a thoroughgoing comparison of present-day police procedures by a completely objective observer. A study of this kind would be of inestimable value.
[ Footnote 2/6 ]
E.g., Assistant Superintendent Truscott’s letter to the Washington Police Force of January 3, 1949, concerning McDonald v. United States, 335 U. S. 451 .
[ Footnote 2/7 ]
Recently, lectures have included two pages of discussion of the opinions in Harris v. United States, 331 U. S. 145 .
[ Footnote 2/8 ]
Chief of Police John W. Polcyn notes, in a Foreword to the book, that officers were often not properly informed with respect to searches and seizures before thoroughgoing instruction was undertaken. One of their fears was that of
“losing their cases in court only because they neglected to do what they might have done with full legal sanction at the time of the arrest, or did what they had no legal right to do at such time.”
MR. JUSTICE RUTLEDGE, dissenting.
“Wisdom too often never comes, and so one ought not to reject it merely because it comes late.” Similarly, one should not reject a piecemeal wisdom, merely because it hobbles toward the truth with backward glances. Accordingly, although I think that all “the specific guarantees of the Bill of Rights should be carried over intact into the first section of the Fourteenth Amendment,” Adamson v. California, 332 U. S. 46 , dissenting opinion at 332 U. S. 124 , I welcome the fact that the Court, in its slower progress toward this goal, today finds the substance of the Fourth Amendment “to be implicit in the concept of ordered liberty, and thus, through the Fourteenth Amendment, . . . valid as against the states.” Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U. S. 319 , 302 U. S. 325 .
But I reject the Court’s simultaneous conclusion that the mandate embodied in the Fourth Amendment, although binding on the states, does not carry with it the one sanction — exclusion of evidence taken in violation of the Amendment’s terms — failure to observe which means that “the protection of the Fourth Amendment . . . might as well be stricken from the Constitution.” Weeks v. United States, 232 U. S. 383 , 232 U. S. 393 . For I agree with my brother MURPHY’s demonstration that the Amendment without the sanction is a dead letter. Twenty-nine years ago, this Court, speaking through Justice Holmes, refused to permit the Government to subpoena documentary evidence which it had stolen, copied and then returned, for the reason that such a procedure “reduces the Fourth Amendment to a form of words.” Silverthorne Lumber Co. v. United States, 251 U. S. 385 , 251 U. S. 392 . But the version of the Fourth Amendment today held applicable to the states hardly rises to the dignity of a form of words; at best, it is a pale and frayed carbon copy of the original, bearing little resemblance to the Amendment the fulfillment of whose command I had heretofore thought to be “an indispensable need for a democratic society.” Harris v. United States, 331 U. S. 145 , dissenting opinion at 331 U. S. 161 .
I also reject any intimation that Congress could validly enact legislation permitting the introduction in federal courts of evidence seized in violation of the Fourth Amendment. I had thought that issue settled by this Court’s invalidation on dual grounds, in Boyd v. United States, 116 U. S. 616 , of a federal statute which, in effect ,required the production of evidence thought probative by Government counsel — the Court there holding the statute to be “obnoxious to the prohibition of the Fourth Amendment of the Constitution, as well as of the Fifth.” Id. at 116 U. S. 632 . See Adams v. New York, 192 U. S. 585 , 192 U. S. 597 , 192 U. S. 598 . The view that the Fourth Amendment itself forbids the introduction of evidence illegally obtained in federal prosecutions is one of long standing and firmly established. See Olmstead v. United States, 277 U. S. 438 , 277 U. S. 462 . It is too late, in my judgment, to question it now. We apply it today in Lustig v. United States, post, p. 338 U. S. 74 .
As Congress and this Court are, in my judgment, powerless to permit the admission in federal courts of evidence seized in defiance of the Fourth Amendment, so I think state legislators and judges — if subject to the Amendment, as I believe them to be — may not lend their offices to the admission in state courts of evidence thus seized. Compliance with the Bill of Rights betokens more than lip service.
The Court makes the illegality of this search and seizure its inarticulate premise of decision. I acquiesce in that premise, and think the convictions should be reversed.
MR. JUSTICE MURPHY joins in this opinion.
Contributors and Attributions
- Authored by : US Government . Located at : https://supreme.justia.com/cases/federal/us/338/25/case.html . License : Public Domain: No Known Copyright


2.2.3: Aufbau Principle
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Introduction
The Aufbau Principle (also called the building-up principle or the Aufbau rule ) states that, in the ground state of an atom or ion, electrons fill atomic orbitals of the lowest available energy level before occupying higher-energy levels. In general, an electron will occupy an atomic orbital with the lowest value of \(n, l, m_l\), in that order of priority. The value of \(m_s\) for an unpaired electron is conventionally assigned a value of \(+\frac{1}{2}\). Each electron in an atom/ion must have a unique set of values for all four quantum numbers.
The Ground State of Hydrogenic Atoms/Ions
In a hydrogenic atom/ion, there is only one electron. In this case, the only factor determining energy is the value of \(n\) . The ground state will always be the 1s orbital (\(n=1, l=0, m_l=0, m_s=+\frac{1}{2}\)).
The Ground State of Multi-electron Atoms/Ions
In atoms/ions with two or more electrons, the ground state electron configuration (1) minimizes the total energy of the electrons, (2) obeys the Pauli exclusion principle, (3) obeys Hunds rule of maximum multiplicity, and (4) considers the exchange interaction. These "rules" are described below.
| (1) Electrons will occupy the lowest energy orbitals in order to minimize the total energy. The two quantum numbers that are related to energy in multi-electron atoms are \(n\), and \(l\). Thus, orbitals with the lowest values of \(n\) and \(l\) will fill first. | |
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(2) Hund's rule of maximum multiplicity states that for a given electron configuration, the lowest energy arrangement of electrons in degenerate orbitals is the one with the greatest "multiplicity," where multiplicity is the number of unpaired electrons (n) plus 1 (multiplicity = n + 1). This rule is used to predict the ground state of an atom or molecule with one or more open electronic shells. Hund's rule is based on empirical observation of atomic spectra, and it is a consequence of the energy required to pair two electrons in the same orbital. This energy of repulsion between two electrons in the same orbitals is a Coulombic energy of repulsion, \(\Pi_c\), caused by two electrons with like charge sharing the same area of space (an orbital). When more than one electron occupies a set of degenerate orbitals, the most favorable arrangement is one where the number of paired electrons is minimized. A simplified definition of Hund's rule is that the lowest energy arrangement is the one with the greatest number of unpaired electrons . This implies that if two or more orbitals of equal energy are available, electrons will occupy them singly before filling them in pairs. Examples of ground state arrangements of electrons in three degenerate p-orbitals is given in the figure shown here. |
Figure \(\PageIndex{2}\). Hund's rule is that spin multiplicity must be maximized in the ground state. (Kathryn Haas; CC-NC-BY-SA) |
| (3) The Pauli exclusion principle states that it is impossible for two electrons of a multi-electron atom to have the same set of values for all four quantum numbers. Two electrons in different orbitals will have a different set of \(n, l\), and \(m_l\) values. When two electrons reside in the same orbital, they posses the same \(n, l\), and \(m_l\) values, therefore their m s must be different. Thus, two electrons in the same orbital must have opposite half-integer spin projections of \(+\frac{1}{2}\) and \(-\frac{1}{2}\). | Figure \(\PageIndex{3}\). Pauli's principle tells us that paired electrons must have opposite spin. (Kathryn Haas; CC-NC-BY-SA) |
| (4) The exchange interaction is sometimes called the exchange energy or exchange force. However, it is not a true energy or force. Rather, it is a quantum mechanical effect that takes place between identical particles. The exchange interaction results in a ground state electron configuration with unpaired electrons all being of the same spin. Unpaired electrons are conventionally written in the "spin up" direction. | Figure \(\PageIndex{4}\). Unpaired electrons should have identical spins due to the exchange interaction. (Kathryn Haas; CC-NC-BY-SA) |
Trends in Expected Electron Configuration
The four "rules" above can be used as guidelines to predict the ground state electron configuration of atoms, the filling of subshells, and the configuration of electrons in degenerate orbitals. However, the utility of these guidelines for predicting actual electron configurations requires more nuanced knowledge of the relative energy levels of orbitals.
Generally, orbital energy levels directly correspond to their shell number. Additionally, orbitals within a shell generally follow the energetic trend where s<p<d<f. Although these general trends for relative orbital energy levels hold true for most of the main block elements (the s - and p-blocks), there are important exceptions in the orbital energy levels of transition metal atoms and ions of the d- and f-blocks.
Elements that violate general trends in electron configuration are outlined with a dark line in Figure \(\PageIndex{5}\). All of the exceptions are within the d- and f- blocks, and the violations are caused by an unexpected order of the orbital energy levels.
In the next section you will learn why the orbital energy levels correlate with shell number and why subshells within a shell usually follow the trend that s<p<d<f. You will also learn why there are occasional exceptions to this trend and how these exceptions influence elemental properties.
References
- Miessler, Gary L., and Donald A. Tarr. Inorganic Chemistry . Upper Saddle River, NJ: Pearson Prentice Hall, 2010. Print.
-
Brown, Ian David. The Chemical Bond in Inorganic Chemistry the Bond Valence Model . Oxford: Oxford UP, 2006. Print.


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1.1: What is Electricity and Magnetism?
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This section provides broad definitions of electricity and magnetism and how they are related. It also provides some examples of modern technologies using electricity and magnetism.
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1.2: Wireless Technology and Amateur Radio - What and Why?
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This section defines wireless technology, provides some examples of its widespread use in our everyday world. It also describes Amateur Radio and provides some examples of the many aspects of its practice and its usefulness to society.
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1.3: Units
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The term “unit” refers to the measure used to express a physical quantity. This section lists units commonly used in electricity and magnetism along with commonly used unit prefixes.
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1.4: Electromagnetic Spectrum
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Electromagnetic fields exist at frequencies from 0 Hz to at least \(10^{20}\) Hz – that’s at least 20 orders of magnitude! This section describes some of the characteristics of the electromagnetic spectrum, including some of the conventional names given to electromagnetic waves over certain ranges of frequency.
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1.5: Amateur Radio Equipment Basics
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This section describes the basic components of equipment used for two-way communication in Amateur Radio, including transceivers and repeaters.
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1.6: Notation
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The section summarizes the notation used in this book.
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1.7: Coordinate Systems
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This section summarizes the key features of the Cartesian, cylindrical, and spherical coordinate systems.
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1.8: Where Do We Go from Here?
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This chapter provides an overview of the chapters of the book along with a rationale for the contents and their ordering.