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全球战争模拟推演
目录
Chapter nine Illustrative Postures
Illustrative Global Responsiveness and Engagement Posture
Illustrative Major Contingency Posture
Chapter ten Analysis of Illustrative Postures
Security Cooperation
Chapter nine Illustrative Postures
To understand the consequences of changing the United States’ current overseas
posture, we developed three illustrative alternate postures that served as inputs into
strategic benefit, cost, and risk models. Each posture emphasizes a different goal—
cost-reduction, global responsiveness and engagement, or preparation for major contingencies
(see Table 9.1). These illustrative postures are not actual policy proposals; rather
they are analytic tools that enabled us to evaluate the range of strategic benefits and
costs that would follow from revising U.S. overseas military presence. Because each
illustrative posture prioritizes a particular objective, the analyses allow us to estimate
the scope and type of effects that pursuing each objective would have in its purest form
(see Figure 9.1).
Table 9.1 Illustrative Postures
Figure 9.1 Illustrative Postures as Analytic Inputs
Future posture options would likely be hybrids of the cost-reduction, global
responsiveness and engagement, and major contingency postures, representing some
balance among the three objectives rather than emphasizing one exclusively. They are
not discrete, distinct choices; rather there is a continuum of possible posture choices
between the posture options represented by each goal. Additionally, the particular goal
or goals most emphasized may vary by region. In Europe, for example, the United
States may want to focus on engagement for security cooperation and cost, while in
Asia policymakers may emphasize preparing for MCOs on the Korean Peninsula or
assuring partners. In the Middle East, policymakers could equally weigh the ability to
rapidly respond to contingencies, including terrorist attacks, and preparing for MCOs
against a potential adversary, like Iran.
Parameters of All Illustrative Postures
The development of the illustrative postures was done with several guidelines. First,
these illustrative postures are force structure–neutral, meaning that they do not posit
any changes to planned forces of record. Therefore, with the exception of the currently
planned inactivation of some Army units in Germany, any proposed base closures result
in the forces at the base being relocated to another overseas facility or brought back to
the United States. However, we note that DoD is planning force structure reductions,
so there would likely be some opportunity to execute overseas base closures, if pursued,
through inactivations or by filling freed-up capacity in the United States.
Second, the illustrative postures protect the ability “to confront and defeat
aggression anywhere in the world” by maintaining global power-projection capabilities
called for in the 2012 Defense Strategic Guidance.1 Consequently, these postures
maintain global infrastructure that enables U.S. power projection, including key en
route ports and airfields as well as key communications facilities.
Third, the illustrative postures do not take into account current war plans, which
are in part designed based on current posture. Instead, the assumption is that war
plans would have to be modified and that in some situations the United States might
be incurring greater risk. In others, it may be possible to develop alternative courses of
action to meet national security objectives. The various analyses will identify the strategic
and operational trade-offs that the United States would be making if it were to
implement any changes that reflect these illustrative postures.
Fourth, these illustrative postures do not consider the current political situation
in proposed host nations, including whether U.S. basing rights are at risk or whether
it is feasible for the United States to obtain access to military facilities in a particular
country. These are important factors, but ones that will be assessed in other parts of the
report. These notional choices are made to broadly explore options and understand the
potential value to U.S. national security of securing such rights.
Finally, the illustrative postures are all intended to meet the intent of the Defense
Strategic Guidance, in particular the decision to rebalance toward Asia2 while also
ensuring that the United States upholds its current security commitments and alliances
and maintains presence in the Middle East. But, as called for in the guidance, the postures
explore different ways and new approaches by which DoD objectives might be
achieved. This is not to say that the illustrative postures eliminate risk or are equally
effective. On the contrary, each illustrative posture drives trade-offs among strategic
benefits, risk, and cost–trade-offs that can facilitate, but not replace, the deliberations
of decisionmakers.
Elements of Current U.S. Posture That Are Held Constant
A number of elements of the United States’ current global defense posture are not
changed in any of the alternate postures. First, TRANSCOM’s en route infrastructure
remains largely intact. Currently, it consists of three routes across the Atlantic and two
across the Pacific.3 Each alternate posture keeps in place the most important mobility hubs as well as enough mobility bases to maintain the three Atlantic routes and two
Pacific routes, although some postures accept more risk by closing some of the backup
en route bases.
In addition to the mobility infrastructure, the illustrative postures also maintain
other critical enabling capabilities. In particular, the illustrative postures do not change
any satellite stations or facilities or realign forces that joint forces rely on for intratheater
as well as intertheater communications, including RAF Croughton, USAF satellite
stations, Fifth Signal command at Wiesbaden, and Ramstein Air Base. Moreover,
none of the postures suggests removing the Army hospital at Landstuhl.4
Finally, given that the 2012 Strategic Guidance places the greatest emphasis on
the Asia-Pacific and the Middle East, all postures prioritize these regions, keeping
substantial bases and forces in Japan and South Korea and access and forces distributed
in the Middle East. The illustrative postures also take into account the fact that
the United States must fulfill its Article 5 commitment to NATO. Therefore, there
are certain capabilities that all of the illustrative postures retain in Europe, including
U.S. nuclear weapons, missile defenses, participation in NATO’s Heavy Airlift Wing
and AWACS component, and contribution to the NATO Response Force (NRF). The
United States currently stores nuclear weapons in several European countries.5 Several
of these bases are host-nation facilities and the only U.S. presence consists of a
munitions support squadron. Therefore, even if one of the illustrative postures suggests
removing the U.S. presence from a base currently containing nuclear weapons,
the weapons could be transferred to another base in the same host nation or another
NATO member’s base and stationed with a U.S. munitions support squadron.
In addition to the nuclear commitment, the illustrative postures do not vary the
European Phased Adaptive Approach (EPAA), the architecture to defend Europe from
Iranian ballistic missiles. Therefore, all of the illustrative postures contain Ramstein
Airbase, which is the command and control center, as well as all missile-defense radar
sites and planned Aegis-Ashore systems. Additionally, all of the illustrative postures
continue with the planned stationing of four BMD destroyers at Rota Spain.
Finally, the United States will uphold its commitment to important NATO initiatives
to improve the alliance’s combined capability, most notably the Heavy Airlift
Wing in Papa, Hungary, the AWACS component in Geilenkirchen, Germany, and the
commitment of a U.S. Army brigade to the NATO NRF. The United States will designate one brigade stationed in CONUS to contribute to the NRF and elements of the
unit will rotate to Europe annually for exercises.6
Illustrative Cost-Reduction Posture
The illustrative cost-reduction posture (CRP) aims to minimize the cost of the U.S.
global posture while simultaneously maintaining enough forward presence to achieve
national security goals, including enabling the United States to project power around
the world, tying it to key allies, and ensuring the freedom of the global commons. This
posture assumes that these two objectives are not mutually exclusive. In other words,
the CRP rests on the assumptions that (1) the United States can meet its national security
objectives with a smaller overseas presence because if the need arises, the United
States would be able to deploy its forces to and operate in distant theaters, and (2) it
can maintain alliances and pursue effective security-cooperation efforts through other
means with lower overseas permanent presence. Additionally, this posture is predicated
on the notion that closing bases and bringing troops back to the United States would
yield significant cost savings. The CRP does not simply close all overseas facilities and
bring all forces to U.S. territory. Instead, the illustrative CRP is intended to represent
the minimum forward military presence that the United States would need to remain
a globally responsive military power. Other specific choices could potentially achieve
similar strategic benefits at similar costs—this is just one representation.
In designing the illustrative CRP, we developed the following guidelines. The
United States would adopt a less-dispersed posture that would rely on larger bases,
and it would keep multipurpose bases over those that have only one function. Wherever
possible, within the bounds of the guidelines, the illustrative CRP would shrink
the size of the U.S. overseas military presence by consolidating its military footprint
and reducing the number of forces temporarily deployed, as well as permanently stationed
abroad. As a result, the United States would seek to maintain a military presence
within a region, rather than in a particular country. If there is room at large
multipurpose bases, the United States would consolidate its forces at these locations
or a number of facilities proximate to each other to achieve economies of scale. Global
transportation and support infrastructure, such as communications nodes and en route
locations, are largely retained, although the United States would accept greater risk by
closing some backup locations.
Notional Cost-Reduction Posture Changes
Based on the guidelines above, this study identified one set of specific changes that
could be made to the current U.S. posture if cost reduction were the primary objective,
while maintaining the en route basing infrastructure and the presence of U.S. forces in
Europe, the Middle East, and Asia. In general, this illustrative CRP is characterized by
fewer forces and bases overseas, although there are differences across the services and
regions. The CRP would make significant cuts to the U.S. overseas force posture in
Europe. To enable the United States to project power into Europe and other regions
in the future, critical en route airfields and ports, such as Rota, Mildenhall, Ramstein,
Spangdahlem, and Sigonella, would be retained. The USAF, however, would significantly
reduce the size of its combat forces in the theater—particularly those in the
UK, which are located far from likely contingencies—by closing RAF Lakenheath
and sending the 48th Fighter Wing’s three squadrons of F-15s to CONUS. Additionally,
all forces from RAF Mildenhall would return to the United States, but a
modestly sized air base wing would permanently remain at the base, which would be
kept as an expansible location due to its importance for mobility operations. To save
money, the USAF also would shutter many of its intelligence and support facilities
in the UK, planning instead to rely increasingly on NATO partners to fulfill these
missions. RAF Croughton and Fylingdales would be retained because they provide
critical communications and satellite capabilities that the United States needs to support
intra- and intertheater operations, and Fylingdales hosts the phased array missile
defense radar. The USAF would also close less vital en route locations in Lajes,
Azores, and Moron, Spain, and significantly downsize the size of its support units at
Incirlik Air Base in Turkey. Shrinking the global en route infrastructure, however,
would create increased risk. If the United States were to lose access to any of the primary
en route locations due, for instance, to bad weather or political denial, it may be
unable to quickly respond to all contingencies that might arise. But on the other hand,
if a contingency had strong international support, access to new bases might be quickly
granted. Aviano Air Base in Italy would be closed, but the two squadrons of F-16s that
are a part of the 31st FW would be moved to Spangdahlem, which currently has only
one F-16 squadron in the 52nd FW. As a result of these changes, the only permanently
stationed USAF forces would be located at the important mobility hubs of Ramstein
and Spangdahlem in Germany.
Currently, Germany is also home to the bulk of USAREUR.7 For the CRP, the
Army would withdraw most of its forces from Germany and close most of its garrisons.
In particular, the Army would close its facilities at Ansbach/Illesheim, Baumholder,
Grafenwoehr, Hohenfels, and Vilseck, in addition to the planned closures already in
progress at Heidelberg, Schweinfurt, and Bamberg. The 170th and 172nd brigades
would deactivate as planned, while elements of the 173rd Airborne BCT would proceed
with the planned consolidation in Vicenza, Italy. All additional forces at these
bases would return to CONUS. The Army’s presence at Kaiserslautern would also
shrink as the 21st Theater Sustainment Command, 30th Medical Command (Deployment
Support), would be withdrawn, but the Medical Center at Landstuhl and the
10th AAMDC would remain. Additionally, the Army would divest itself of excess
infrastructure but keep open the garrisons at Wiesbaden and Stuttgart, with Fifth
Signal Command remaining at the former and the EUCOM and component forces
headquarters and Special Forces units remaining at the latter. The Army would also
close its training locations in Bulgaria, while retaining Mihail Kogalniceanu (MK)
Air Base in Romania, which is also a TRANSCOM location, to house the Army units
rotating to Europe as a part of the NRF.
The U.S. Navy would also reduce its presence in Europe, particularly in the Mediterranean,
by closing its bases at Souda Bay and Larissa, Greece, but retaining its
facilities in Naples and Sigonella, Italy. The Sixth Fleet, which is stationed at Naples
and Gaeta, would be reduced, as the facility at Gaeta would be closed and the command
ship USS Mount Whitney would be homeported in the United States. The Navy
would go forward with the current plans for the EPAA by stationing four BMD Aegis
destroyers in Rota, Spain, by 2015 and placing Aegis-Ashore units in Romania and
Poland by 2015 and 2018, respectively. In contrast with the other services, the Marine
Corps has a very small presence in EUCOM, consisting only of Marine Corps Forces,
Europe (MARFOREUR) HQ and Marine Corps Forces, Africa (MARFORAF) HQ
at Stuttgart, prepositioned equipment in caves in Norway, and the Special Purpose
MAGTF that deploys to Europe as a part of the Black Sea Rotational Force, primarily
in Romania. The only change to the USMC presence in Europe would be to remove
the prepositioned equipment from Norway, since it is far from prioritized regions, and
to relocate it to the United States.
PACOM is the other region where the United States has traditionally maintained
a significant permanent military presence. Given that DoD has identified this region
as its focus for the foreseeable future and there is considered to be some risk of major
war demanding some in-place forces at the outset, there are fewer reductions made in
this theater. U.S. forces would be removed from Misawa Air Base in Japan, recognizing
that this step would incur some additional risk. In particular, TRANSCOM would
lose an important en route node in the Pacific, while the USAF would reduce its ability
to rapidly reinforce its presence on the Korean Peninsula. Moreover, the government of Japan, which greatly values the presence of U.S. forces, may feel less assured. Despite
these concerns, the United States would seek to remove forces from Misawa because
the USAF has a significant number of forces stationed at other locations in Japan that
are more proximate to likely contingencies. The USN’s maritime surveillance aircraft
that rotate to Misawa would also be affected by this move, but naval maritime surveillance
aircraft would still be able to operate from Kadena Air Base, as they do now. In
addition, PACOM would relinquish its rights to some access bases, primarily in Southeast
Asia, and reduce its rotations to its remaining access bases in Darwin, Australia;
Singapore; and U-Tapao in Thailand. For its part, the Army would consolidate its presence
in Japan at Camp Zama by closing its facilities on Okinawa. The forces at these
locations would come back to the United States—with the exception of the Army’s
First Battalion, 1st Special Forces Group, which would move to Camp Zama.
USFK is in the process of consolidating its presence into two large hubs at
Pyeongtaek (Camp Humphreys and Osan Air base) and Daegu.8 Although this process
involves all of USFK, the effort centers on the relocation of the Army’s Second
Infantry Division from numerous dispersed camps along the demilitarized zone and
its primary garrison in Yongsan to large hubs located in less-populated areas in southwestern
and southeastern Korea. Unlike the consolidation processes in other countries,
such as Germany, the Army does not plan to remove any more forces from South
Korea, just move them away from the most heavily populated areas.9 Given the tense
security situation on the Korean Peninsula, and the fact that the Army is already consolidating
its footprint, the CRP would make no further changes to the U.S. presence
on the Korean peninsula beyond completing the planned changes.10
Because the Pacific has traditionally been a maritime theater, the Navy has a sizable
presence in this region and the Marine Corps has its only significant presence on foreign soil—in Japan, primarily on the island of Okinawa. In the CRP, the Navy
would keep most of the components of its current presence in place, including homeporting
the aircraft carrier USS George Washington and the Seventh Fleet at Yokosuka,
Japan. The Navy would also move ahead with its plan to rotationally deploy four LCSs
at Changi in Singapore. The Marine Corps would seek to relocate the majority of its
ground and logistics forces and the III MEF Headquarters Group from Okinawa to
CONUS, while also choosing not to proceed with two of the three concurrent battalion
landing team and aviation detachment UDP rotations of CONUS-based units
to Okinawa that are planned for temporary reinstitution. The marines removed from
Okinawa would be stationed in CONUS, with plans for increasing stationing in and
rotations to Hawaii and Guam eliminated and the size and frequency of planned rotations
to Robertson Barracks in Darwin, Australia, reduced. In addition to mitigating
Okinawan opposition to the U.S. military presence, this could also yield cost savings.
The force elements required to constitute the 31st MEU would remain in Okinawa,
supported by UDP deployments of battalion landing teams and aviation detachments,
and the four ships assigned to COMPHIBRON 11 that constitute the Bonhomme
Richard ARG would remain in Sasebo to maintain the responsive ARG/MEU capability.
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Air elements capable of early strike or self-deployment would also remain in Okinawa
and at MCAS Iwakuni. If required for contingency response, the Marine Corps
infantry realigned to CONUS would be either airlifted to marry up with prepositioned
shipping or embark in ATF shipping in CONUS for use in contingency phases beyond
immediate response. With the most mobile, self-deployable, and longer-range strike
assets retained in Okinawa, the III MEF and ground force relocation to CONUS
would likely not significantly affect contingency responsiveness.
The illustrative CRP would also seek to make some changes to the current U.S.
force posture in CENTCOM. In particular, while the Army and USAF would try
to keep most of their facilities in Kuwait as expansible bases because of the HNS,
they would not maintain a large, continuous rotational presence, but keep only small
supporting units at the bases.11 Therefore, the USAF would move the 386th AEW
to CONUS and the Army would reduce its presence to essential support personnel.
Similarly, the 380th AEW currently stationed at Al Dhafra Air Base would return to
the United States, but the base would retain essential supporting units so that forces
could quickly return, if necessary. The primary USAF presence in the region would be
the 379th AEW stationed at Al Udeid Air Base, which also contains CENTCOM’s
CAOC. After 2014, when combat forces will be withdrawn from Afghanistan, the
United States would seek to turn all of its current bases over to the Afghan government,
with the exception of Bagram Air Base, which it would aim to keep as an expansible
base. Removing some ground and air forces from CENTCOM could weaken the
U.S. ability to deter Iran and to respond rapidly to contingencies in the Persian Gulf.
Nevertheless, the rationale would be that the United States could save money while
mitigating risk by keeping a considerable naval presence in the region, in addition to
significant air capabilities, prepositioned equipment, and access to facilities.
The United States has a very small presence in AFRICOM, and would retain its
one base on the African continent—Camp Lemonier in Djibouti—as well as the en
route and communications node at Ascension Island. Nevertheless, the United States
would relinquish its other access bases.
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Illustrative Global Responsiveness and Engagement Posture
The global responsiveness and engagement posture (GREP) aims to create an overseas
military presence that maximizes the United States’ ability to respond rapidly to
smaller-scale contingencies in vital regions and to build the military capabilities of allies
and partners. U.S. force posture would resemble a regional hub-and-spoke network, in
which permanently stationed U.S. forces are consolidated at regional hubs (i.e., one or
more primary bases) that can support rotational forces that periodically deploy to the
spokes (i.e., access bases) for operations or exercises. This posture rests on the assumption
that U.S. forces will be well positioned to react quickly to small-scale contingencies,
including humanitarian assistance/disaster relief, peacekeeping operations (PKO),
counterterrorism, counterpiracy, limited strikes, counternarcotics, and no-fly zones.
Moreover, the GREP also assumes that a regionally focused hub-and-spokes posture
would enable U.S. forces to engage in sustained and diversified security force assistance
activities with partners in key regions of the world. A regional hub would allow partner
nations’ militaries to exercise with U.S. forces at advanced training facilities, thereby
improving their capacity to respond to contingencies on their own (or as a part of a
coalition). At the same time, spokes or access bases would be important because they
allow U.S. forces to work with a larger number of partners, some of whom may not
be proficient enough or have the funds to travel to the U.S. regional hubs. Rotating
American forces to spokes also has the added benefit of familiarizing U.S. forces with
partner facilities that the United States hopes to secure access to for future operations.
In most regions, hubs would comprise a mix of facilities, including garrisons,
airfields, ports, and ranges. The facilities selected as hubs would be proximate to potential
trouble areas where U.S. forces might have to operate (i.e., in Southern Europe,
the Middle East, Africa, and the Pacific) to reduce response time. Moreover, facilities
designated as hubs would contain or be near mobility infrastructure—such as ports,
airfields, and rail lines—to facilitate expeditionary operations. Spokes would be geographically
and politically distributed to increase the probability of securing permission
to use a facility for any particular operation and to increase the number of partner
nations that can train with U.S. forces. Moreover, because it is uncertain where small scale contingencies would develop, it is prudent for the United States to have access to
a number of geographically dispersed access bases in each region.
In the GREP, the United States would station a mixture of forces at each hub, so
that it has a wide range of capabilities at its disposal for rapid response and for engagement
activities. In other words, because the United States is not certain what type of contingencies
might arise or where and when they might occur, it would adopt a capabilitiesbased
approach to force planning that emphasizes versatile forces that can carry out an
array of different operations.12 In general, therefore, the permanently stationed forces
would be expeditionary in nature. The Army, for instance, would forward-base light
or medium units, such as airborne, infantry, or Stryker brigades, as response forces,
while the USMC would station units capable of constituting an MEU or a smaller
MAGTF, depending on the mission, at key hubs. The USAF would forward-base composite
wings that include a mix of fighters, tankers, ISR platforms, and airlifters at
each hub. Similarly, the USN would station a mixture of surface vessels, such as MCM
ships, LCSs, destroyers (DDGs), and carriers (CVNs), as well as SSNs and maritime
surveillance aircraft (e.g., P-3s, P-8s, or broad area maritime surveillance UAVs). The
United States would also want to tailor the forces that it rotates to a region to particular
partners’ capabilities. For instance, along with Special Forces, the Army would send
smaller infantry units to work with less-capable partner ground forces, while it would
deploy armored units to exercise with Western European partners because they have
heavy forces.
Notional Global Responsiveness and Engagement Posture Changes
In the illustrative GREP, the United States would reshape its current overseas presence
into a regional hub-and-spoke construct to facilitate rapid response and engagement.
Due to the existing infrastructure, hubs would typically consist of existing primary
bases that collectively could host a diverse set of capabilities.
Much of the existing posture in EUCOM is already oriented toward expeditionary
operations and engagement. Therefore, there would be fewer changes than in the
illustrative CRP. For instance, the Army would complete the consolidation process
that is already underway by deactivating the 170th and the 172nd brigades, moving
elements of the 173rd Airborne BCT to Vicenza, and closing the garrisons at Bamberg,
Heidelberg, and Schweinfurt. The 173rd, which is located in Italy, would serve as the
Army’s primary quick-response force, while the training facilities at Grafenwoehr and
Hohenfels would be used as the engagement hub. The Army would retain its remaining
BCT in Germany (2nd Stryker Cavalry Regiment), the 12th Aviation Brigade, and
its enabling forces to facilitate expeditionary operations and enable engagement with NATO countries. Additionally, the Army would rotate Stryker brigades to Novo Selo
in Bulgaria and MK in Romania to facilitate expeditionary operations into the Middle
East and improve allied capabilities through training activities. Because most of the
United States’ European allies have heavy armies, the U.S. Army would also regularly
rotate an ABCT from CONUS. Additionally, two Special Forces battalions would be
stationed at Baumholder to improve the U.S. capability to counter irregular threats,
such as terrorism, through rapid response and to build partner capabilities around the
periphery of Europe and in Africa.
The USAF would retain the critical mobility hubs of Ramstein and Spangdahlem
air bases in Germany, but it would seek to move the 52nd Fighter Wing to Aviano Air
Base in Italy, leaving only a small air base wing at Spangdahlem. The United States
would seek to move the fighter squadron from Germany to Italy so that it would be
closer to areas where small-scale contingencies are likely to arise. In short, the USAF
hub would consist of Ramstein and Aviano, with Spangdahlem as an en route base
instead of a fighter base. Due to the UK’s distance from likely hotspots, the 48th
Fighter Wing would return to CONUS, but the USAF would keep open its intelligence
and communications facilities to enhance responsiveness and interoperability
with NATO partners. Moreover, RAF Mildenhall and its current tenants would
remain unchanged due to the fact that the aerial refueling wing and special operations
group would provide critical capabilities needed to respond rapidly to contingencies.
With the Sixth Fleet stationed at Naples and Gaeta in Italy, the Navy is fairly
well positioned to respond to smaller-scale contingencies in North Africa and the
Levant. In the illustrative GREP, the USN would rotate a CSG to the Mediterranean
for six months (reducing its CSG presence in CENTCOM), so that it would have an
enhanced ability to respond to potential situations, but also could engage with more
European partners. For its part, the USMC would keep its prepositioned equipment in
Norway, which it would use for its training activities and rapid response. The USMC
would increase its rotations as a part of the Black Sea Rotational Force by sending a
Special Purpose MAGTF twice a year for six-month deployments.
In the illustrative GREP, the United States would seek to make some adjustments
to its forces in PACOM, largely by adding additional access bases or spokes in Southeast
Asia and more frequently rotating forces to these locations. The Army would continue
with the ongoing consolidation of its presence in South Korea into two hubs, and
would retain its current force levels so that it could continue to engage with all levels
of the Korean Army. By contrast, because of the limitations on using forces in South
Korea for operations beyond the Korean Peninsula, the USAF would return the 8th
Fighter Wing to CONUS, but it would keep the 51st Fighter Wing at Osan Air Base
to engage with South Korea. The USMC, which does not have a large permanent presence
in South Korea, would rotate forces from Japan to Camp Mujuk.
Bases in Japan, therefore, would serve as the regional hub for the Navy, the
Marine Corps, the Army, and the Air Force. The USAF would designate Yokota and Kadena air bases as its regional hubs. Kadena would be used because of its proximity
to the South China Sea, a potential flash point, and Yokota is a critical en route location.
Because the 18th Wing and the 374th Airlift Wing provide sufficient capability to
engage with partners and respond to smaller-scale contingencies, and because Misawa
is distant from many trouble spots, Misawa Air Base would be closed and the 35th
Fighter Wing would be returned to the United States. Closing Misawa and Kadena,
however, could increase U.S. risk if a conflict broke out on the Korean peninsula.
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Moreover, TRANSCOM would lose an important en route node at Misawa, and the
governments of Japan and South Korea may feel less assured of the U.S. commitment
to their security. The USMC would increase its capacity to respond to contingencies
and to engage partners by fully reinstituting the UDP as planned for the near term,
rotating three battalion landing teams and three aviation combat element detachments
to Okinawa. Additionally, the USMC would rotate a MAGTF and station elements
necessary for rotating and constituting an MEU at Robertson Barracks in Australia.
From these hubs in Japan and Australia, all of the services would strive to gain agreement
to rotate forces to access bases located in Thailand, the Philippines, Indonesia,
and Vietnam. Moreover, the United States would seek to gain an agreement to permanently
station small supporting Marine Corps, Navy, and Air Force units at Subic
Bay in the Philippines so that the base could frequently host rotational forces. Doing
so, however, would require the Philippine Senate to pass legislation authorizing such a
move.13
In CENTCOM, the USAF bases at Al Udeid and Al Dhafra would become the
regional hub, while the Army would seek to rotate Air Defense Artillery battalions to
train with the UAE. Moreover, the Army would aim to transform Camp Buehring in
Kuwait into a regional training center by having a continuous—although rotational—
ABCT presence and improving training ranges and capabilities. CENTCOM would
downsize to one access base per country but seek to maximize the number of nations
that it could engage with. After combat forces withdraw from Afghanistan, the United
States would strive to rotate forces as a part of a modestly sized training mission to
Kabul and Bagram. The USN would aim to expand the size of its presence at Bahrain
and deploy MCM ships and LCSs from the Fifth Fleet to train with Persian Gulf
partners.
In the illustrative GREP, the United States would seek a significant increase its
presence in AFRICOM by transforming Camp Lemonier into a joint regional hub.
Djibouti would host Army infantry battalion rotations, an expanded composite AEW,
and Marine Corps and Navy Special Operations units. The USAF would diversify the
capabilities currently stationed in Djibouti by transforming the AEG into an AEW
that would include the continuous presence of F-15E Strike Eagles and MQ-9s. These
forces would engage in counterterrorism and counterpiracy operations and would
rotate to access bases throughout the continent in an effort to improve partner nations’
capabilities. The Army would seek to rotate small units to Burkina Faso and Uganda,
while the USAF would engage in training activities in South Sudan, Ethiopia, Kenya,
Senegal, Mauritania, and Morocco. The USAF would use the base on the Seychelles
for UAV operations. Most of the Navy’s engagement activities would be conducted
through rotations of the Africa Partnership Station around the continent.
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Illustrative Major Contingency Posture
In the illustrative major contingency posture (MCP), the United States positions its
forces overseas so that they would be situated to deter and, if deterrence fails, conduct
large-scale operations against potential adversaries, in particular Iran, North Korea,
and China. The United States would place greater forces forward that are capable of
conducting major operations against these three potential adversaries.
Because the MCP is focused on three potential adversaries, the character of the
U.S. military presence would vary by region. In general, however, the United States
would divest itself of bases and forces that would not be useful against one of these
three adversaries. Consequently, the United States would retain only the bases in Africa
and Europe that provide critical enabling capabilities for intertheater operations or that
could be used for operations in the Middle East. European air and naval bases have
significant throughput capacity, which would be necessary to transport forces and supplies
to the Middle East. Moreover, because of the proximity of some bases in Southern
and Eastern Europe to the Middle East, ground forces at these facilities could be
rapidly deployed to the Middle East, while aircraft could fly combat missions directly
from the air bases. In short, Europe either would support or directly enable power projection
into the Middle East. By contrast, the United States would strive to increase the
resiliency of its forces in the Middle East and Asia because they could be held at risk by
the three potential adversaries’ capabilities. Improving the survivability of its forces in
these theaters would entail hardening bases and critical infrastructure and dispersing
U.S. forces to a greater number of forward operating locations.
The types of forces that the United States should station would also vary by
region. In EUCOM and Western Africa, the United States would forward-base light,
rapidly deployable ground forces and supporting units. In PACOM and CENTCOM, the United States would need to add combat forces and preposition additional equipment
and munitions.
Notional Major Contingency Posture Changes
Because the illustrative major contingency posture is focused on preparing for combat
operations against three particular countries, the United States would strive to significantly
revise its existing posture by closing bases not useful for these particular scenarios,
bolstering the number of forward-stationed combat forces proximate to the likely
adversaries, and securing additional forward operating locations.
In EUCOM, there would be notable changes to the current Army and USAF postures.
In particular, the Army would close many of its bases in Germany, which would
not significantly improve deployment responsiveness for contingencies against Iran
compared with deployment from CONUS. Consequently, the Army would retain only
its garrisons at Wiesbaden, Stuttgart, and Kaiserslautern because the units (e.g., Fifth
Signal Command, hospital) at these locations would directly support operations in the
Middle East. With the closure of the bases at Ansbach and Illesheim, the Army would
seek to relocate the 12th Combat Aviation Brigade to Camp Buehring in Kuwait. To
improve the Army’s ability to be prepared for operations in the Middle East, MK Air
Base, which is located on the Black Sea in Romania, would be targeted for transformation
into a primary base. Vilseck, Grafenwoehr, Hohenfels, and Baumholder would be
closed, and the Army would aim to move the Second Cavalry Regiment and key supporting
units from Germany to MK.
In contrast, the USAF would seek to augment the 52nd Fighter Wing at Spangdahlem
by adding one F-16 squadron from the United States. The expanded 52nd
Fighter Wing could quickly respond to crises with Iran by deploying its forces to access
bases in the Persian Gulf. The USAF would keep the 31st Fighter Wing at Aviano Air
Base for the same reason. Moreover, fighter squadrons from these bases would regularly
rotate to airbases in Bulgaria and Romania as a signal to Iran and to improve
USAF operators’ familiarity with these facilities, which could be used in a contingency
against Iran. In the UK, however, the USAF would close RAF Lakenheath, which is
far from the Persian Gulf, and seek to relocate the 48th Fighter Wing to PACOM to
expand USAF capabilities in that critical theater. The USN and USMC presence in
Europe would remain essentially unchanged. In particular, the Navy would continue
with the plans for the EPAA by stationing BMD units in Spain, Romania, and Poland.
In PACOM, the United States would seek to posture its forces for major contingencies
against two potential adversaries, North Korea and China. As a result, the
United States would aim to add combat units to South Korea, in particular capabilities
that the South Koreans have limited quantities of, namely airpower and precisionguided
missiles. Therefore, the Army would seek to station a second fires brigade to
Camp Casey and a combat aviation battalion to Camp Red Cloud. The USAF would
also aim to increase its presence on the peninsula by permanently stationing a fighter wing at Suwon Air Base. Finally, marines would regularly rotate from Japan to Camp
Mujuk.
On Okinawa, the Army would aim to improve the air defenses at Kadena Air
Base by adding an additional Air Defense Artillery battalion (PAC-3). To signal continued
U.S. commitment to defend the Philippines and to deter Chinese adventurism,
the Army would strive to obtain an agreement to rotate infantry brigades and SF battalions
to the islands.14 The Army would also seek to rotate an Army infantry brigade
to Thailand to participate in multinational training exercises.
The USAF would aim to bolster significantly its combat capabilities in the region
by adding the three squadrons of F-15s from RAF Lakenheath to Andersen Air Force
Base in Guam. Fighter squadrons from Japan and Guam would regularly rotate to air
bases, which would be improved, in the Northern Marianas. In addition, the USAF
would aim to obtain access to and make infrastructural improvements at air bases in
Malaysia, Vietnam, northern Australia, and the Philippines. It would seek to rotate
fighter squadrons from CONUS to these Southeast Asian facilities, while bombers and
tankers would rotate to Darwin and Tindal in Australia. This network of access bases
and rotations would help the USAF to operate in a dispersed manner in the event of a
major contingency and would enable larger aircraft to operate from bases beyond the
most severe missile threat. Additionally, the USAF would seek to station a detachment
of RQ-4s on Australia’s Cocos Islands to enhance situational awareness in the Indian
Ocean and Southeast Asia.
The USN and USMC would also significantly increase their permanent presence
in PACOM by seeking to station the ships assigned to a PHIBRON currently
homeported in CONUS with the force elements required to constitute an MEU
(which would be supplemented by a UDP deployment of a battalion landing team) at
Subic Bay/Cubi Point in the Philippines. In addition, the USMC would aim to base
a Marine Special Operations Battalion at Puerto Princesa Palawan to deter a conflict
in the South China Sea over the disputed Spratly or Paracel islands. The Navy and
the Marine Corps would also increase the number of combat forces that are stationed
on U.S. territories in the Pacific, in particular in Hawaii and Guam, while seeking to
retain more marines in Okinawa than currently agreed. The Navy would move a CSG
from CONUS to Hawaii, while the Marine Corps would station the force elements
required to constitute an MEU from CONUS in Guam, with its units filled out by
UDP rotations, while seeking to keep its current force levels on Okinawa. In Australia,
the USN would seek to homeport an SSN at Perth, while the USMC would aim
to station an MEU-sized MAGTF at Robertson Barracks in Australia, with the units
provided through UDP rotations. Finally, the Navy would strive to station a detachment
of broad area maritime surveillance UAVs at Port Blair airport in the Andaman
Islands, to increase surveillance over the Straits of Malacca.
In CENTCOM, the United States would seek to increase its military presence
in the Persian Gulf to deter Iran. In particular, the Army would aim to establish a
continuous rotational presence of an armored brigade at Camp Buehring, in addition
to relocating the combat aviation brigade from Germany. The Army would also try to
preposition a second set of ABCT equipment at Camp Arifjan, Kuwait. The USAF
would maintain the airlift AEW stationed at Ali Al Salem Air Base and strive to add
a continuous fighter squadron presence at Al Jaber Air Base in Kuwait. In Qatar, the
USAF would maintain the 379th AEW and the Army would endeavor to preposition
a high mobility artillery rocket system battalion set at Camp As Sayliyah.
The USAF would maintain its continuous rotational presence of tankers and ISR
aircraft at Al Dhafra Air Base. Meanwhile, the Army would aim to add a Terminal
High Altitude Area Defense (THAAD) battery and a fires brigade to the Fujariah
port and air base. Air bases in Afghanistan could potentially be useful for scenarios
against Iran, but given the logistical burdens and post-2014 overflight requirements of
these land-locked bases, the USAF would seek to turn all air bases over to the Afghan
government except for Bagram Air Base, which would be maintained by an air base
wing. Finally, the USAF would try to increase fighter and bomber squadron rotations
to forward operating locations in Oman.
Summary of Posture Changes
Table 9.2 provides an overview of the notional changes made in the illustrative postures.
The next chapter turns to an assessment of how these illustrative postures affect
strategic benefits, risks, and costs.
Table 9.2 Notional Changes Made in Illustrative Postures
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Chapter ten Analysis of Illustrative Postures
One of the objectives of this work is to assess the advisability of the retention, closure,
realignment, or establishment of facilities overseas in light of fiscal constraints and
evolving requirements. To inform this assessment, Chapter Nine presented three illustrative
overseas postures that posit various changes in facilities and other aspects of
posture. These were designed to explore a range of reasonable changes to the U.S. military
posture. The illustrative postures serve as an analytic framework for examining
the costs and benefits of changes in the U.S. overseas posture. As such, they are tools
for evaluating and illuminating the effects of changes in basing structures across the
criteria. Collectively, the three posture types represent significant differences in emphasis,
while also sharing common features needed to support the 2012 Defense Strategic
Guidance. They are designed to capture a considerable range of the “option space” for
exploration within that guidance. The three are not intended as discrete alternatives for
decisionmakers to choose from. As noted in Chapter Nine, their function is analytic,
not prescriptive.
This chapter applies the qualitative and quantitative analyses from the previous
chapters to evaluate the relative performance and ascertain the implications of the
three postures. The purpose is to draw out the trade-offs associated with the respective
posture priorities and the choices made in the postures designs. The evaluation
employs the following criteria:
deployment responsiveness to contingencies
operational support responsiveness to contingencies
contributions to deterrence and assurance
contributions to security cooperation
risks to use of installations (political and operational)
financial costs.
The approach is shown graphically in Figure 10.1.
Figure 10.1 Assessment of Illustrative Postures
Recap of the Common Features of the Illustrative Postures
We begin with a brief recap of the common elements of the three postures. All three
postures were designed to ensure the United States retains global power-projection
capabilities, as stipulated in the Defense Strategic Guidance. Therefore, as noted in
Chapter Nine, these postures all maintain global infrastructure that enables this power
projection, including key en route ports and airfields as well as key communications
facilities. Accordingly, the en route infrastructure remains largely intact, although
some postures close some of the less-vital en route bases. In addition to the mobility
infrastructure, the postures also maintain other critical enabling capabilities, such as
satellite stations that joint forces rely on for communications. In addition, all of the
postures prioritize PACOM and CENTCOM. That said, the illustrative postures also
take into account the fact that the United States needs to fulfill its Article 5 commitment
to NATO, so all three postures retain some capabilities in Europe for this purpose.
Taken together, these shared common elements represent “core” capabilities to
meet the requirements of the Defense Strategic Guidance.
Beyond these shared features, each posture has a different emphasis—cost reduction,
global responsiveness and engagement, or major contingency preparation. These
differences in emphasis can be thought of as representing alternative ways to consider
valuable but “discretionary” posture elements, all of which pose cost-benefit trade-offs.
Figure 10.2 depicts the resulting level of commonality and uniqueness of the
postures based on the degree of overlap in locations with airfields. All three postures “share” 36 operational locations with airfields. The CRP features the largest overseas
posture reductions in this study, and the other two postures build on it pursuant to
their respective objectives. With 52 shared facilities, the GREP and the MCP have
significant commonality in terms of structure that facilitates both postures’ objectives.
The MCP, however, contains the most distinct set of facilities with airfields because it
focuses on enhancing capabilities for potential conflicts with China, Iran, and North
Korea.
Figure 10.2 Shared Operational Locations with Airfields
Deployment Responsiveness
In Chapter Two, the parameters of deployment and force closure were evaluated across
24 illustrative smaller-scale scenarios taking into account a number of factors: force
packages needed for the mission, the geographic location of the mission, availability
of airlift and other transportation assets, and deployment distances. The scenarios
provided a considerable degree of variation between them in terms of mission types,
associated force packages for deployment, geographic diversity, and a wide range of en
route infrastructure. Additionally, separate analyses to explore the value of forwardbased
forces, but not at the point of conflict, for the initial phase of MCOs were conducted.
Based on these analyses, the following observations are made regarding the
responsiveness of the three postures to force closure.
A key conclusion is that without a robust en route infrastructure and lift fleet,
rapid global response is not possible. Moreover, that infrastructure needs to have broad geographic coverage with multiple routes for resiliency in the face of the numerous
risks that an en route basing structure faces. The advantage of forward-stationed
ground forces is mainly for those contingencies where an immediate response capability
is needed in a high-threat area to avoid rapid defeat before reinforcements arrive.
To provide this advantage, such forces need to be at the specific point of conflict, be
able to fly in to marry up with prepositioned equipment, or be nearby with dedicated
sealift, such as MEUs/ARGs. They, along with air assets that can utilize regional bases
and naval forces deployed to the region, will have to provide the preponderance of the
initial defense forces, with large-scale deliberate reinforcement from the United States
employed as necessary to meet contingency objectives. Regionally based ground forces
without dedicated lift or not specifically in the location of the conflict will provide limited
benefit relative to U.S.-based forces. However, there are also some contingencies
in which hours or a few days could make the difference to mission success and benefit
from forward-stationed forces. These quick-response missions are likely to involve relatively
small and light conventional (battalion or smaller) or special operations forces.
Otherwise, if a situation is critical—meriting a high strategic airlift allocation—
overseas presence of forces does not necessarily have a significant influence on deployment
times for smaller-scale contingencies. A third advantage of forward-stationed
forces is that if they are in close proximity to the conflict, they could reduce demands
on the airlift fleet, freeing up air assets for other force deployments or missions, which
would be valuable in the rare situation in which there are concurrent events with high
airlift demands.
Cost-Reduction Posture
Since it largely sustains the en route infrastructure, the CRP would likely only have a
minimal effect on deployment responsiveness and flexibility. The closing of Lajes and
Moron would incur a small level of deployment risk by reducing backup en route bases,
but otherwise, the effects should be limited.
Taking U.S. planning assumptions regarding current threat levels into consideration,
the reduction of U.S. presence in Europe would have only a minor effect on
out-of-area responsiveness, as USAF squadrons have a relatively low deployment footprint
and bases from which they can operate will be maintained. Additionally, the
movement and time advantages for moving light and medium BCTs from overseas
compared with CONUS by air is minor. The primary effect would be an increase
in the number of C-17s required to move an equivalent unit from the United States,
which would somewhat increase risk due to the possibility of multiple parallel events
that require heavy airlift support. However, should a significant contingency in Europe
arise outside current planning assumptions, the reduced presence would have a negative
impact on responsiveness within Europe. Were the situation with respect to threats
intensify, though, stationing in Europe could be considered in consultation with allies.
In the Pacific, the relocation of most of the logistics, ground, and HQ elements
of III MEF to CONUS would have only a minor effect on deployment responsiveness.
In the cost-reduction posture, the 31st MEU and its associated ARG would remain
based in Japan, as would Marine Corps aviation assets. These forces would maintain
similar presence and response capabilities to those currently available. The realigned
units would require transport from CONUS, either by air to marry up with MPSRON
Three and the onboard equipment or by sea by means of amphibious lift. This is nearly
the same as in the existing posture, with forces positioned in Okinawa, the main difference
being flight time from CONUS in the illustrative posture as opposed to flight
time from Okinawa. Fixed-wing aircraft would still be in place to provide regional
capability and rotary-wing aircraft would retain an in-theater self-deployment advantage
as compared with being U.S.-based.
In CENTCOM, by maintaining most prepositioned equipment and several bases
in “warm” expansible status, the effects on deployment of removing the airlift AEW
would be limited. Not maintaining access to as many bases in Africa could, however,
reduce AFRICOM’s ability to respond rapidly to humanitarian crises and could
hamper efforts to support rotational security cooperation and counterterrorism deployments.
Maintaining Camp Lemonier as the sole U.S. facility in AFRICOM would
maintain the U.S. military’s ability to deploy to the Horn of Africa, but would provide
little benefit to the rest of the continent.
Global Responsiveness and Engagement Posture
The GREP would have only a small positive effect on deployment responsiveness, given
the ability of U.S. airlift to move initial forces rapidly from CONUS. Its value on this
dimension would most come into play if there were multiple and simultaneous large
demands on the airlift fleet, since shorter deployments require fewer aircraft to achieve
fast response times. The European posture changes are relatively modest and would
have little effect on conventional ground force and air force responsiveness compared
with the current posture. However, increased Special Operations Forces based overseas
could enable faster response to time-sensitive events in the surrounding region that can
be handled with these types of forces. Committing to CSG rotational presence in the
Mediterranean would reduce the time required to begin conducting air operations in
the region, but could have important rotational implications and reduce the availability
of CSGs elsewhere. In Asia, changes in the Air Force posture would increase the
need to redeploy units in a Korean crisis but would not affect its ability to respond to a
crisis in the South China Sea. The increased regional presence of the USMC would not
significantly increase deployment responsiveness unless there was also an increase in
forward-deployed amphibious lift assets. A rotational ABCT in Kuwait would provide
regional responsiveness, but not substantially beyond what the current prepositioned
equipment provides. In Africa, the small unit rotations could increase responsiveness
for small contingencies.
Major Contingency Posture
Forward-deployed forces are critical for major contingency scenarios, particularly those
involving a surprise or short-notice attack by a strong adversary. South Korea is a potential
example of this, given Seoul’s close proximity to North Korea’s heavy artillery and
rocket forces, which are often hidden in underground shelters. In addition, the close
proximity of Seoul to the demilitarized zone does not allow defending forces to trade
space for time. In-place forces allow for an immediate response to a North Korean
provocation. The ARG and MEU assigned to the Pacific, fighters at Misawa Air Base,
and prepositioned equipment on the Korean Peninsula and in Guam are also in place
for rapid deployment. Other USMC units would also be able to meet up relatively rapidly
with their afloat equipment, but the advantage of these units being in the Pacific—
as opposed to being in United States—is limited given the ability to fly in and marry
up with equipment. It is also not clear what benefit deploying the 48th Fighter Wing
to Guam would have since the increased responsiveness to regional crises would be
marginal because the aircraft would still need to deploy forward to conduct operations.
Other major contingencies often allow for more deliberate buildup of forces. In
the case of the first Gulf War, no in-place U.S. forces existed, and it is arguable whether
the rapid airlift of the ready brigade of the 82nd Airborne Division deterred Iraq from
continuing its offensive into Saudi Arabia. In the second Gulf War, a U.S. Army brigade,
as well as Army prepositioned materiel, both afloat and ashore, were in place,
though a substantial and deliberate buildup of forces also supported the effort. The
Army and Navy/Marine Corps prepositioning programs are also available to support
Persian Gulf scenarios on short notice in this posture.
In Europe, moving bases to the Black Sea region would have only a very minor
effect on responsiveness for potential conflict with Iran, compared with keeping them
in Germany. It is unclear whether the mobility infrastructure in the Black Sea region
exists to support rapid-deployment operations for major units.
Increased levels of prepositioned equipment could be an important component
of this posture. Added afloat prepositioning of Army, USMC, and USAF equipment
would increase flexibility and allow material to swing to where it would be needed in
an Asian crisis. The additional prepositioned sets and rotational presence in the Gulf
region would enable the rapid buildup of a sizable force in the region.
Availability of Basing for Direct Operational Support
A related responsiveness analysis examined the illustrative postures based on their ability
to support requirements and military operations through the basing of air assets in
safe havens in each of the scenarios. This analysis assesses the three postures in terms of
the degree to which retained bases affect the ability of the postures to enable effective
direct fighter, ISR, and sustainment support. This was done using the illustrative, geographically distributed scenarios depicting deterrence, FID/counterinsurgency, peacekeeping
(including one WMD-elimination scenario), and humanitarian mission sets
that are described in Chapter Two.
The representative basing postures were evaluated based on their ability to support
the requirements in each of the scenarios. Candidate bases within each posture
were selected to test posture performance. To do so, the analysis chose a package of
representative air asset platforms and tasks for each scenario category, as described in
Chapter Two. Using the platforms’ maximum ranges and human factor considerations,
feasibility thresholds for each scenario category helped identify candidate facilities
within each posture for the different scenarios. The facilities were evaluated in
terms of the number of air assets required by the scenario’s platform/task packages
or the number of additional support assets required to conduct the scenario’s mission
based on distances from the contingency event. The assessment areas included the
sustainment of forces by intratheater airlift, operations of fixed-wing fighters, and ISR
operations (manned and unmanned).1
Table 10.1 shows the comparison of the three illustrative postures (and the current
posture), as well as each posture’s performance across 21 of the 24 scenarios.2
Table 10.1 Posture Performances in Air Asset Contribution Across Scenarios
Overall, one can see that the postures perform comparably across the majority of
scenarios, though several important distinctions arise. In the aggregate, as designed,
the GREP performed best across the majority of scenarios, but was only slightly better
when compared with the MCP.3 While the CRP does not perform quite as well as the
other two, it still maintains moderate to high performance scores across most regions
and scenario types and performs only slightly worse than the current posture. All
of the scenarios face challenges in providing immediate strong support from existing
bases in FID/counterinsurgency scenarios in the center of AFRICOM’s AOR,
although humanitarian operations can be well supported there. Where the CRP poses
additional challenges is in FID/counterinsurgency scenarios in PACOM, but this is
due to fewer access bases that could be sought for limited additional expense but would
require more security-cooperation oriented rotations to secure than provided for in
this posture. More generally, even in the most-expansive GREP, immediate basing
available to support operations is limited in a range of geographically dispersed FID/
counterinsurgency scenarios.
Figure 10.3 summarizes the performance of the three postures in the aggregate
relative to the 21 scenarios. The performance scores are indicated by color, ranging
from dark green, representing better performance, to red, representing increased difficulty and time associated with performing the missions. Note that even the lowestperforming
options do not indicate an operational failure, but rather signal increased
difficulty and time associated with performing the missions examined in the scenario
analysis.
Figure 10.3 Contingency Responsiveness Scores for Each Posture
The most interesting observation from this is that the CRP performs moderately
well overall, with around 60 percent of scores in the top two categories, whereas the
other postures, including the baseline, have around 80 percent of their scores in the
top two categories.
The reason for this observed outcome is that all four postures maintain a core set
of bases that support the en route structures and sets of bases that are most relevant
to areas key to U.S. national security interests. The primary driver of the difference
between the top-performing posture (GREP) and bottom-performing posture (CRP)
is the removal of a relatively small number of operating locations—mostly access
bases—from the menu of potential operating locations. It is important to note that in a developing crisis the United States would most likely undertake the necessary diplomatic
measures to secure access bases. Diplomatic efforts could take some time, so the
differences in performance across the postures would be further reduced if access bases
were secured in advance. The access base issue should be viewed as dynamic and not
set in any given posture. This suggests that, depending on the range of scenarios that
a policymaker considers plausible and likely to require U.S. intervention, access bases
and potentially expansible bases in key regions would provide utility to support a broad
range of scenarios and missions promptly.4
If the emphasis was on efficiency instead of cost reduction, the United States
could consider expanding, rather than reducing, the number of access bases as a means
of mitigating risk. Given a limited U.S. footprint, many partner-nation access bases are relatively inexpensive to sustain, sometimes with limited up-front investment to
enable U.S. operations when required and agreed to by the host nation.5 Besides being
relatively inexpensive, these bases may increase—but do not guarantee—the chance
that access will be granted when the United States requires it. While an inferior substitute
for primary and expansible bases, they are an inexpensive way to mitigate risk
as the United States withdraws other parts of its basing structure, and they help maintain
access to regions that the United States might otherwise have difficulty reaching.
Access bases can also increase posture flexibility because they do not involve a significant
political or financial commitment to a host nation, and if they are no longer
required, they can be easily relinquished.
One should note that this analysis examines the deployment of platforms to scenario
destinations; it does not evaluate the U.S. military’s effectiveness at completing
the mission upon arrival.
Deterrence and Assurance
As described in Chapter Three, foreign bases and presence contribute to deterrence,
signaling both a willingness and capability to respond to adversary actions. Overseas
facilities are a costly demonstration of willingness to defend interests and allies abroad.
Also, an overseas presence can contribute to an adversary’s perceptions of the U.S.
military’s ability to quickly project power and to sustain it over time, thus decreasing
the likelihood of an opportunistic adversary’s attempt to execute a cheap, quick victory.
Also relying on perceptions of credibility and capability, the assurance of allies
and friends is another goal of U.S. forward presence, though it is complicated by considerations
of burden sharing and host-nation public opinion. Many military experts
widely regard the presence of U.S. forces, especially if closely tied to security cooperation
of allied and friendly forces, as providing a solid basis for assuring those in the
region that the United States is committed to defending its interests in the context
cooperative security. It also improves the ability of the United States and its partners to
respond to threats. U.S. and allied forces that are in the region, or that can deploy to
the region on short notice, will likely have the greatest deterrent effect on opportunistic
adversaries, provided that their forward presence does not leave them substantially
vulnerable to attack.
In addition to enhancing response capabilities, overseas presence also provides
greater degrees of contact with important actors in a region and thus a greater depth
of understanding of regional political factors. This can contribute to deterrence and
assurance in that devising successful strategies requires a nuanced understanding of
the values and interests of a potential adversary, as well as those of partners and allies.
The CRP, with its emphasis on consolidating the U.S. military footprint through
reduction of forces both temporarily deployed and permanently stationed abroad, may
contribute to erosion of remaining forces’ assurance and deterrence capabilities. If one
excludes the en route and other critical enabling infrastructure common to all three
postures, the effect on forward presence may be fairly significant in the signaling of
credibility and capability. The reduction of costly demonstrations of intent could affect
adversaries’ calculations of U.S. deterrent commitments, leading them to conclude that
the United States was less committed to preventing aggression. Also, the reduction of
forward presence in turn contributes to adversaries’ perceptions, even if not the reality,
that the United States has less capacity to prevent aggression. This perceived reduction
in intent and capability could lead an adversary to calculate that a quick initial victory
at relatively low cost was possible.
However, given that many of the overall reductions occur in Europe, with fewer
in higher-risk areas such as the Persian Gulf, South Korea, and the Pacific, the overall
effects on deterrence should be limited. An adversary could still be deterred by the U.S.
ability to project power rapidly from a distance, especially since even the CRP retains
the critical overseas enabling infrastructure for transporting and sustaining U.S. forces
overseas. Additionally, adversaries are aware of the broader array of U.S. capabilities
that can strike from afar, deploy rapidly (e.g., air units), and remain present through
maritime presence.
The CRP could have some cost benefits if it led to greater investment by partners
in their own defense capabilities to compensate for the change; but the reduced opportunities
for ongoing security cooperation may diminish the ability of the United States
to shape those decisions. As noted in Chapter Four, reduced presence could also undermine
the close military cooperation and willingness of local partners to commit to
military operations, heightening the risk of an adversary’s calculation of reduced willingness
of allies to collectively respond to aggression, although the evidence on this is
unclear. The lack of engagement within the region will also decrease U.S. understanding
of regional dynamics and make it more challenging to develop close working relationships
with local militaries, leading to more uncertainty inherent in deterrence and
assurance. Therefore, among the three illustrative posture options, the CRP performs
least well based on the estimated deterrence and assurance value of forward presence.
The GREP and MCP both provide a more robust overseas presence, albeit oriented
differently. The GREP provides flexibility in responding to a number of contingencies
by utilizing a diverse network of facilities—placed within range of potential
trouble areas—and mobility infrastructure to reduce response time. Spokes are geographically
and politically distributed to reduce the risk of overdependence on a small
number of bases that could be denied for a variety of political and operational reasons.
Also, with its diverse basing construct, the GREP enables security cooperation
in various regions, at least increasing the prospects of partner participation in response
to local aggression and U.S. understanding of local political and military dynamics.
While estimating the deterrent value of this is difficult to quantify, adversaries would
have to take into account the flexibility and responsiveness of the distributed posture,
again increasing the potential risk and uncertainties faced in any planned aggression.
The MCP places heavy emphasis on an overseas presence oriented to countering
specific high-level threats: Iran, North Korea, and China. Changes in this posture
emphasize the importance of positioning forces to deter major aggression and
to assure regional neighbors and security partners. It does so while still retaining the
ability—if less so than in the GREP—of responding to smaller-scale contingencies.
But the focused emphasis on major contingencies involving these states is designed to
maximize deterrence. U.S. overseas presence would continue to be a significant factor
in increasing the prospects of partner participation (the most powerful case of course
being South Korea, for a North Korean contingency). The MCP performs much more
strongly than the CRP along the deterrence criteria, and performs more strongly than
the GREP with respect to the three identified countries. However, in implementing
such a strategy, the increased vulnerabilities of forward forces to anti-access threats
needs to remain a top consideration. Relative to the GREP, there is also an additional
risk that U.S. forces will be positioned less favorably for rapid-response contingencies
elsewhere that involve significant forces. This could undermine deterrence in
these other regions if adversaries there conclude that U.S. force availability and responsiveness
is limited as a result of the increased focus on specific threats. However, for
smaller-scale contingencies or slowly evolving situations, this is less likely to be a major
concern. Finally, the heightened presence for major contingencies could risk increasing
tensions and bring negative political pressure on host-nation governments for allowing
an expanded, sustained U.S. presence. In this instance, U.S. presence could undermine
assurance rather than reinforce it. Political dynamics and context are key, and engagement
through presence may help to provide the understanding necessary to craft the
proper balance.
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Security Cooperation
U.S. government strategic guidance documents maintain that overseas posture
improves security cooperation between the United States and partner countries. The
2012 Defense Strategic Guidance emphasizes security cooperation as a means to
improve U.S. military capabilities and to build partnership capacity. The analysis in
Chapter Four highlights the likely impacts of overseas posture on security cooperation
to qualitatively evaluate the effects of posture changes. The two most significant effects
are on training to increase partner capabilities and improving U.S. capabilities to operate
with partners. Chapter Four also analyzes the value of rotational forces to execute
security cooperation activities.
In general, we conclude that almost all of the effects on security cooperation
would stem from reductions of permanently stationed forces as opposed to consolidations,
force repositioning, or closures of minimally manned access sites. However,
where the postures replace these with rotational deployments, the effects would be
somewhat mitigated. None of the posture changes would produce meaningful changes
in security cooperation benefits produced by the Navy and Marine Corps, given their
continued emphasis on maintaining forward presence, engagement, and expeditionary
activities.
Effect on Training to Improve Partner Capabilities
The CRP would significantly reduce the U.S. ability to improve partner capabilities
and interoperability. In particular, fewer forces in Europe would lead to less security
cooperation. For the USAF, the loss of the 48th Fighter Wing and forces from the UK
would have moderate to significant impact on USAFE’s ability to conduct security
cooperation in both Europe and Africa.6 The U.S. Army would face even more serious
constraints on security cooperation under this posture, given the reductions in its footprint
in Europe. In addition to the loss of several brigades in Europe, leaving just one
BCT and minimal enablers, the CRP eliminates USAREUR’s JMTC, which has been
the primary training venue for multinational training. Most European partners would
receive far less training with U.S. forces without the facilities in Europe, since most
partners pay their own way for this training but would not likely pay to go to training
sites in the United States. Therefore, closing the JMTC would have a large influence on
security cooperation training with European partners.
The GREP would have a positive effect on improving the training of new or
developing partners. For example, increased Air Force presence in the Philippines may
slightly improve training efforts, while reductions in South Korea and Japan may have
a slightly negative effect. Increased rotations in new regions such as Southeast Asia and
Africa would result in modest improvements in training. The GREP also retains the
JMTC, a cornerstone for multinational training in Europe.
The MCP would have a mixed impact on security cooperation–oriented training.
For the Air Force, this posture would improve opportunities for security cooperation,
with greater fighter presence in Europe, the Middle East, and Asia. For the Army, the
closure of access sites would complicate security cooperation but not exceedingly so,
whereas the loss of JMTC and some combat and supporting units would significantly
reduce the ability of the Army to conduct extensive training with partners in Europe
and Africa. The negative effect on training due to the loss of the JMTC would be similar
in scope to those described in the CRP.
Improving U.S. Force Capabilities
Compared with those based in the United States, U.S. forces based overseas often
benefit from more frequent training with foreign partners. In particular, U.S. forces
learn to operate more effectively in a coalition and adapt to foreign, oftentimes austere,
environments. If the United States continues to emphasize the importance of coalitions
for future conflicts, especially for complex conventional military operations, interoperability
with modern European militaries will remain important. The presence of U.S.
forces abroad also provides the exposure time and direct contact for the U.S. military
to better understand regional dynamics. By their sustained presence, U.S. forces gain
in-depth knowledge of the local conditions that could be invaluable in a contingency.
The CRP, with its more constrained permanent operational locations, will result
in reduced exposure of U.S. forces to various operating environments, particularly in
Europe and its periphery, where extended engagements with partners in their own
regional surroundings would be reduced. By contrast, the MCP provides more enduring
presence and the associated operational benefits from in-depth familiarity, but is
heavily focused on specific regions pegged to the three states of concern. So while it is
superior to the CRP along this dimension, it does have a narrow focus, driven by its
emphasis on major contingencies. The GREP provides the most diverse set of operating
locations and associated security cooperation venues, and provides the greatest overall
range of operational exposure for a much wider array of contingencies.
The Value of Rotational Forces for Security Cooperation
Rotational forces are a component of posture that provides opportunities for security
cooperation and, in some cases, can mitigate the consequences of reductions in permanently
stationed forces. The Navy’s continuous operations at sea mean that much of its
force conducting security cooperation overseas is, in effect, rotational or on temporary
deployment. Under all three of the illustrative postures we analyzed, the Navy could
continue to conduct large, multinational security cooperation events in international
waters almost anywhere in the world. The Marine Corps also conducts the majority
of its security cooperation outside of PACOM using rotational forces, with some in
PACOM also done by forces on UDP rotations.
By avoiding the high fixed costs of overseas bases, rotational forces can cost less
than permanent presence, have the flexibility to train partners wherever the need is
greatest, and strengthen the expeditionary capabilities of the rotating forces. On the
other hand, these forces tend to focus on tactical training, with less ability to build and
maintain high-level relationships, and rely on the infrastructure of other countries.
This type of rotational approach to security cooperation could prove an effective partial
substitute for permanently stationed forces. However, as Chapter Four notes, direct
substitution is likely to be most effective with potential partners in preparing for contingencies
that will not involve highly complex conventional operations and systems
(e.g., FID, counterterrorism, humanitarian assistance and disaster relief). For South Korea and many countries in Europe that are envisioned as contributors to major contingencies
and that have highly capable militaries, rotational forces could only partially
mitigate the loss of security cooperation capability that would come from reductions in
permanently stationed forces.
As noted in Chapter Eight, any savings realized from using rotational forces will
depend on the scale, frequency, and level of host-nation infrastructure for rotating
forces to fall in on. Additionally, greatly expanded use of rotational forces could also
require significant investments in additional personnel and equipment to ensure that
the strain on the force that comes with more frequent deployments stays within personnel
tempo goals. We did not determine the limits on rotational presence, given the
force structure as of 2012, or how costs would change if additional units had to be
added to the force structure to support rotational presence.
Risks to U.S. Installations
Political and Operational Access Risk Comparison
The United States is most likely to gain access to bases within countries that perceive
an increasing level of threat from a mutual adversary. In the absence of shared threat,
the United States may have to offer incentives to secure access, but many nations that
are sensitive to a foreign military presence may not be willing to grant those rights
simply for material benefits. Nevertheless, the analysis attempted to identify, at the
broadest level, the relative degree of access risk associated with each illustrative posture,
as well as to note those factors that made basing in each particular notional posture
more or less reliable.
To do so, the following analysis uses two complementary analytic frameworks.
The first analysis develops rough metrics to assess each of the key variables—regime
type, size of U.S. military presence, and the type of access relationship—that influence
peacetime access risk, and then compares them across the illustrative postures. Using
the 24 illustrative scenarios from Chapter Two, the second analysis measures the diversity
of host nations making operating locations available in each of the three postures
to determine access risks.
Analyzing Political Risk: Regime Type, Presence Size, and Shared Threat
Relationships
In the first set of analyses, developing metrics to measure the variables that influence
basing access was relatively simple for two of the factors. For regime type, we considered
the percentage of bases located in authoritarian states compared with consolidated
democracies in each of the illustrative postures.7 To measure the size of the U.S. military presence, we compared the percentage of primary bases (which ostensibly increase
the risk of access denial) with the percentage of smaller expansible bases and access
bases in each posture.
However, there are no easily observable and quantifiable metrics that can accurately
identify whether U.S. military presence is based primarily on a shared threat or
a transactional dynamic, as noted in Chapter Five. Although the United States frequently
provides significant economic and security assistance to countries that face a
shared threat, this is not necessarily the reason that a nation provides the United States
with access. Rather, the presence of economic assistance and arms sales is an additional
symptom to the existence of a common threat.8 In short, there is no reliable means
by which to measure the type of access relationship with great accuracy, but we can
assume that a posture focused more on deterrence will have a higher share of relationships
based on common interests than one that seeks more regional diversity.
Table 10.2 displays the level of access risk across the illustrative postures based on
the identified metrics. When designing the illustrative postures, we did not consider
political access-risk indicators. Interestingly, however, at the aggregate level, as shown
in Table 10.2, none of the illustrative postures entail significantly different mixes of
regime types or base sizes. While there is no significant difference across the illustrative
postures in terms of host-nation regime type or portion of primary bases, we assume
that the design of the illustrative postures will yield different access relationship profiles—
that is, whether the United States obtained basing rights due to a shared perception
of threat or in return for some sort of material compensation.
Table 10.2 Measures of Political Risk to Base Access, by Posture
Of course, this observation does not apply to specific bases or specific nations:
In individual cases, the possibility of access denial might indeed depend on a country’s
regime, the size of a particular base, or its location within a host nation. It is also
likely that the level of risk associated with regime type and contact varies by region.
For instance, most host nations in the Middle East are ruled by hereditary monarchies, which may be less reliable than democracies, yet most bases in this region are smaller
facilities that are less likely to generate local resentment. By contrast, in Europe the
United States has bases only in consolidated democracies and these facilities are often
much larger primary bases.
As noted, access relationships in terms of shared threat are fluid and not easily
measurable. Nevertheless, it is reasonable to argue that the illustrative MCP would
contain the most threat-based relationships, while threat-based access would be less
prevalent in the GREP and the CRP. Specifically, the MCP emphasizes deterring and,
if necessary, countering unambiguous security threats such as Iran and North Korea as
well as militarily powerful nations such as China. North Korea and Iran, for example,
are clear threats to their neighbors; while the former repeatedly threatens South Korea
and Japan, the latter also has a long history of bellicose actions against Arabian Peninsula
states. In addition, China has not resolved several territorial disputes. By contrast,
in the illustrative GREP posture, the United States would be seeking to use bases to
counter unspecified threats and may therefore have to rely on incentives to secure
access, diminishing reliability, although the increased geographic diversity of this posture
mitigates the consequences of any single access restriction.
Analyzing Access Risk: Diversity of Operating Locations
This assessment focused on the dispersion of the operating locations across states.
Access to multiple states in support of operations is a potentially significant aspect of
posture, depending on the scenario. All things being equal, the more countries where
the United States has access to military facilities, the more likely the United States will
gain access to a sufficient number of bases to effectively conduct a particular military
operation. Therefore, we measured the level of contingency access risk by tallying the
number of different nations where the United States had basing rights in each of the
illustrative postures. A posture with a large number of cases where a single country
might be necessary to support an operation would be more fragile than one with a large
number of countries that could, in theory, support an operation.
To provide this important context, we assessed each posture’s operating-location
diversity in terms of bases that could be used for support in the 24 scenarios used
in Chapter Two—building on that chapter’s analysis of operational-support effectiveness.
Within each scenario and illustrative posture, all operating locations that met
the appropriate range and human factor thresholds for the necessary air assets were
aggregated to determine how many countries had installations capable of supporting
the scenario’s air mobility needs. Figure 10.4 displays the number of scenarios that had
bases in one, two, three, and four or more countries capable of supporting the necessary
air mobility assets.
Figure 10.4 Number of Partner Countries with U.S. Bases Capable of Supporting U.S. Air Operations Needs
Using this approach, all of the force postures had fairly good coverage and, at a
gross level, little to distinguish themselves from one another. Indeed, the most striking
aspect of the cases was that despite a different orientation for each posture, they preserved relatively similar degrees of state diversity. In part, combined with air asset
ranges and human factor considerations, this is because many of the scenarios have
fairly relaxed demands in terms of distance from the operation. However, for the deterrence
scenarios, which entail the need for more combat air assets, the range thresholds
become shorter, therefore decreasing the number of capable operating locations.
A breakout of the three major deterrence contingencies (China, Iran, North Korea) is
displayed in Figure 10.5. Despite fewer available bases than the aggregate, the postures
performed in a comparable fashion, with only the GREP somewhat underperforming
compared with the MCP in the Iran case. The CRP and MCP performed the best
in the Iran scenario, and the GREP performed comparably across the three, with its
lowest performance in the North Korea scenario. Using this type of analysis, though,
such gaps could be identified and addressed by seeking access agreements or expansible
bases when considered critical.
Figure 10.5 Number of Partner Countries with U.S. Bases Capable of Supporting U.S. Air Operations Needs in Potential MCO Scenarios
Risks from Adversary Actions
In addition to political risk to access within host nations, one must also focus on the
access risk posed by an adversary’s anti-access strategies. In particular, decisionmakers
must critically assess U.S. presence in close proximity to high-threat countries not only
for the combat power it can deliver, but also for its resilience to anti-access capabilities.9
The implication of the growing anti-access threats for U.S. forward presence could
be substantial. Facilities and operational locations that have served the United States
well in past years may now leave U.S. forces too vulnerable. U.S. forward forces will
have to consider much more substantial defensive protection than has been the case in
recent years in areas where adversaries may employ anti-access capabilities. A combination
of active defenses, such as missile-defense capabilities; passive defenses, such as
hardening and concealment; and dispersal all can limit exposure to anti access-threats.
To assess the level of threat the three postures face from adversary missile forces,
the number, accuracy, and range of Iranian, North Korean, and Chinese ballistic missiles
served as inputs for an assessment of the bases within each posture.10 First, we
identified bases within a nominal refueled fighter range of the scenario point for use in the assessment. For each particular potential adversary, we divided threat bands into
four colors, with red being the most severe and green being the least.11
To increase resilience to an adversary’s attack, an ideal posture would have a large
number of bases available in the least-stressing threat band for the particular adversary, and U.S. deployments should also be of sufficient size to absorb attack. Geography,
resource constraints, and political access limitations, however, can severely constrain
the space of feasible postures. Figure 10.6 shows how the three postures, created
with these constraints in mind, performed against potential adversary missile threats.
Figure 10.6 Posture Performance Against Potential Adversary Missile Threats
Despite differing goals and numbers of bases, each of the three postures has a similar
level of exposure across the scenarios. For example, the percentage of bases in each posture
that are residing in the threat band most exposed to missile threats (by potential
adversary) is similar in both the North Korean and Iranian cases. Also, the China case
has a much higher level of exposure to a serious potential threat in all three postures.
Without a large number of relatively secure bases from which to operate, there
are two broad options, each with its own strengths and weaknesses. The first approach
would be to minimize the number of bases in the most-severe threat band and, therefore,
reduce the exposure of U.S. forces to attack. For example, the CRP has the fewest
number of bases in the most-severe threat band across the three scenarios, with China
and North Korea representing the greatest threats. This approach, however, has three
major challenges. Within a given threat band, an adversary has a finite inventory of
missiles. If a posture has a small number of bases within the most-severe threat band,
then an adversary could allocate more missiles for each base in that threat band. Also,
depending on the width of the threat bands, operating from outside the worst threat
band might cause serious operational challenges, as tactical aircraft are forced to rely
on multiple tankers for each sortie. Finally, host nations that fall within the worst
threat band might demand large U.S. force deployments as a condition for access.
The second approach is to maximize the number of bases in the most-severe threat
band, which would force the adversary to dilute its missile inventory among a larger
number of targets (assuming that all the bases are utilized and the adversary attacks all
of the bases). This could motivate one to choose the posture with the most exposure; in
this case, the MCP has the most bases in the most-severe threat band across the three
scenarios. This approach could result in the adversary’s missile inventory being drawn
down quickly, setting the conditions for U.S. reinforcements to flow into the newly
safe space. This approach faces a major challenge, however, because it might require
U.S. forces to operate in small unit deployments at each base to present a diffuse target
array for the adversary. The U.S. military would have to develop new techniques, tactics,
and procedures to operate in this manner. This approach also requires a new perspective
on risk because it accepts that the adversary will launch its missiles at U.S.
bases and, thus, focuses on minimizing the effect of those missiles.
Cost Comparisons of Illustrative Postures
In this section, we provide estimated aggregate cost impacts of each illustrative posture
and explain the key drivers (e.g., service or region) for each. We first describe the effect
of each posture option on the cost of operating and maintaining forces and installations overseas. Second, we describe the investment cost that would be necessary to
transition to each posture.
One set of investment costs that is not included in the baseline, nor in any of the
illustrative postures, is associated with hardening facilities that are under heavy threat
from precision-guided weapons. As is discussed in this and other chapters, hardening
is one possible response to the threat of highly accurate precision-guided weapons,
but there are other options as well. While it is likely that some investments in hardening
will be made in the future, presently we are not able to estimate the scope of such
funding.
Effects on Annual Costs
The baseline posture for the cost analysis includes planned, programmed changes.
About two-thirds of these changes are to the Army’s posture in Europe: three bases
closed, three brigades realigned, and two brigades inactivated. The remaining third is
split between Army consolidations in PACOM and USAF reductions in CENTCOM.
Because the Marine Corps moves in PACOM have been announced but not fully
finalized and programmed, we did not include them in our baseline calculation.12 We
did include several rotational missions in our baseline calculation, including three battalion
landing team and aviation detachment UDP rotations to Okinawa; an Army
ABCT to Camp Buehring, Kuwait, for 12-month rotations; Army deployments in
support of the NRF; and Marine Corps rotations to the Black Sea and Australia.
Table 10.3 shows the aggregate net-cost effects compared with the baseline posture for
the three illustrative posture options for four broad categories:
Table 10.3 Estimated Changes in Annual Recurring Costs ($ billions)
Bases. This entails closing and completely vacating an overseas installation. The
cost savings is the fixed-cost component from our cost analysis in Chapter Eight.
Forces. This includes the variable cost effects of realigning forces, driven by
personnel-related costs. Most realignments moved forces from overseas back to
the United States, a few increased the U.S. overseas presence, and few involved
shifts from one overseas location to another.
Training. This includes the training-cost effect of realigning forces based on unit
training costs for different types of units in different regions.
Rotations. This includes the costs associated with providing rotational presence,
assuming no changes in force structure.
In the rest of this section, we describe the costs and savings of each posture
beyond the baseline posture. The CRP would save an estimated $2.8 to $2.9 billion per
year beyond the baseline posture. As seen in Table 10.4, about 70 percent—roughly
$2.0 billion—of these savings would be due to reductions in Europe. About 55 percent
of that is from Army changes, including the realignment of 11,000 soldiers beyond the
baseline and the closure of over half of the planned remaining bases in Germany; the
rest is from reductions in the USAF presence in Europe. About another 20 percent of
the savings for this posture is from reductions in PACOM, split among reductions in
marines stationed on Okinawa (which would return to CONUS instead of being distributed
elsewhere in the Pacific, as part of the long-term plan agreed to with Japan),
reductions in Marine Corps UDP rotations to Okinawa (which would be eliminated
rather than being distributed to other Pacific locations as per the long-term plan), and
one Air Force base closure in Japan with the realignment of a wing. The remainder of
the savings is from reductions in Army and Air Force rotations in CENTCOM.
Table 10.4 Estimated Annual Recurring Cost Changes for the CRP, by Region and Service ($ millions)
The GREP could cost about the same as the baseline, or up to $200 million per
year, depending on how rotations would be implemented. It produces savings of about
$400 million dollars in reductions to forces permanently stationed overseas and base
closures, but these are reinvested in increased rotational operations. The largest savings
are produced by USAF force reductions (but not base closures) in EUCOM and
PACOM (see Table 10.5). There are increased rotational costs for the Army to Eastern
Europe, Africa, and Asia, as well as some increases in Air Force rotations.
Table 10.5 Estimated Annual Recurring Cost Changes for the GREP, by Region and Service ($ millions)
Finally, the MCP increases costs between $300 million and $500 million per
year. This posture does produce savings of about $750 million from reductions in permanent presence—mostly from reductions in the Army posture in Europe, as well
as from some smaller reductions in the Air Force in Europe (see Table 10.6). But this
posture entails significant increases in permanent presence and rotations. Much of
the increased costs are from a buildup in the Pacific across all four services, including
increased FDNF and increased rotational deployments by the Army, Air Force, and
Marine Corps to the region. The remainder of the cost increases are mostly driven
by Army rotations to Kuwait, followed by a variety of rotational deployments spread among the services in EUCOM and CENTCOM, with some Army forces increases in South Korea.
Investment Costs to Transition to Posture Options
We now discuss the investment costs necessary to implement the changes proposed in
these three postures. These costs are shown in Table 10.7.
Table 10.7 Range of Posture Option Investment Costs ($ millions)
Table 10.7 shows the aggregate upper bound of costs for the baseline posture and
the three illustrative posture options for three categories:
Move forces. This includes one-time moves to relocate units from overseas bases to
the United States or vice versa.
Close bases. This includes a range of one-time costs to close military installations
overseas, such as contract termination, and mothball/shutdown of facilities.
MILCON. This includes the one-time construction costs to expand U.S. or overseas
facilities to accommodate realigned forces. To the extent there would be
existing capacity that could be used, this spending would be unnecessary. In particular,
this cost could be offset by the freeing of capacity from the planned downsizing
of the Army and the Marine Corps. For example, the Army has announced
a reduction of eight BCTs, including the two inactivating in Europe, plus there
will be a reduction in support brigades as it reduces its size by 80,000.13
For all options, costs scale linearly with the number of forces realigned and bases
closed, and MILCON makes up about 90 percent of the costs. The CRP could cost
between $3.9 billion and $7.1 billion over the baseline to implement, but more likely
toward the lower end given the planned force structure reductions, which would limit
the need for realignment from overseas or free up sufficient CONUS capacity. This
posture realigns nearly 50,000 personnel from all four services. At steady-state savings,
this produces a payback in the range of from about 1.5 to three years. Note, though,
that the paybacks for the individual changes within the posture vary substantially. For
example, the payback period for the changes in EUCOM in the CRP is estimated at
one to 2.5 years, depending on the availability of infrastructure for the Army forces
that would be realigned. For the restationing of Marine Corps units from Okinawa to
CONUS, the payback would be six to seven years because the variable cost differential
between marines in Japan and CONUS is lower, and, without a full base closure, there
are no fixed-cost savings. The Army and Air Force changes in the Pacific would have
paybacks of about one year, given higher incremental variable costs per person and base
closures.
The GREP realigns over 21,000 personnel beyond the baseline changes, but
about 12,000 are returning to the United States and over 9,000 are moving from the
United States to overseas locations, mostly in PACOM. This posture could cost about $2.3–3.2 billion above the baseline for these trades, which, combined with increased
rotations, would not produce recurring savings. Finally, the MCP could cost $2.8–
4.7 billion to implement in addition to the increased annual recurring costs. These
costs are driven by two factors: a reduction in Army and Air Force forces and bases in
Europe, and an increase in Air Force, Navy, and Marine Corps forces in the Pacific.
Comparing Marine Corps CRP Cost Changes to the Long-Term Plan
As discussed in Chapter One and reflected in the April 2012 Joint Statement between
the United States and Japan, the United States will be relocating about 9,000 marines
from Okinawa. It will also establish a 5,000-person presence in Guam, increase its
presence in Hawaii by a little more than 2,500, and establish a rotational presence in
Australia of about 2,500 personnel. The MEF command element and HQ Group, the
31st MEU, and elements of the MAW and MLG will remain in Okinawa, with one
UDP rotation to fully constitute the MEU remaining. Two other battalion landing
team and aviation detachment UDP sets in Okinawa that are reinstituting in the near
term will later cease rotating to Okinawa. Guam will have the 3rd MEB Headquarters;
the 4th Marine Regiment; and elements of aviation, ground, and support units
from III MEF, with roughly 60 percent of the marines to be assigned permanently and
the remainder maintaining presence through continuous UDP rotations. Increases in
Hawaii will be through permanent assignments, consisting of aviation, ground, and
logistics elements. Australia will have an MEU-sized MAGTF formed through UDP
rotations.14
The total reduction posited in the illustrative CRP is a little larger than the current
agreement and plan, at over 11,000 marines, consisting of about 7,400 permanently
assigned personnel and 3,700 UDP rotational personnel. In this illustrative
posture, however, they would return to CONUS, without establishing a presence in
Guam, increasing presence in Hawaii, and building rotations in Australia to envisioned
size. This is posited to save a little more than $200 million per year with an
investment cost of close to $1.5 billion, producing a six- to seven-year payback for less
of a relative financial return than many of the CRP changes. The limited return is due
the fact that Camp Butler and Futenma would remain open and the relatively low
cost of living and housing allowances for marines there, resulting in allowances just a
little higher per person than at Camp Pendleton, for example. For reference, closing
Okinawa and returning all forces to CONUS would produce roughly $300 million in
savings per year, with a required investment of roughly $2.5–5 billion.15
We did not directly compare the estimated costs of the CRP and the current
plan; nor did we develop models with sufficient precision to accurately compare very
specific options. For that, detailed, base-level analysis should be done. However, to
provide some insight into how the costs might compare and how different possible
options for the Marine Corps in the Pacific might impact costs, we provide rough estimates
of effects on annual variable cost and investment cost for different levels of force
increases in different locations, in comparison to Okinawa. We do note, however, that
the agreed-upon Marine Corps plan for the Pacific was not motivated by a desire to
reduce costs; rather, it was designed with the intent of improving deterrence and contingency
responsiveness while assuring Japan and other allies of the U.S. commitment
to regional stability and defense and to alleviate political pressures on U.S. stationing
in Japan.16 This section does not address how well the plan might meet these goals.
Instead, it only examines the potential cost impacts.
Table 10.8 provides estimates of the annual recurring costs for stationing varying
numbers of marines in Japan, CONUS, Hawaii, Guam (with low and high estimates),
Camp Pendleton, Camp Lejeune, and a combination of the last two. As per our cost
modeling, we estimate constant installation-support costs. MILCON for recapitalization
of facilities varies with the area cost factor (ACF), with Japan lower due to HNS
contributions. DoD schools are accounted for in places that have them or would need
to have them, as are overseas logistics costs. Allowances are based on actual averages
for marines by location, as explained in Chapter Eight, with the exception of Guam,
because of the lack of historical Marine Corps data for the location. The high Guam
rate (Guam-H) is the average of allowances for Air Force and Navy personnel stationed
there. The low Guam rate (Guam-L) is the product of the relative Air Force/Navy rates
for Japan versus Guam (Guam is 95 percent of the Japan level) and the Marine Corps
Japan rate, assuming the dependent and housing mix for marines in Guam would be
similar to those currently in Okinawa. PCS costs per person are estimated by service
for CONUS and OCONUS, as described in Chapter Eight. The table shows that
the total per-person rate would be lower in CONUS, slightly higher in Hawaii, and
slightly to moderately higher in Guam as compared with Japan. This translates into
the annual cost differences, based on varying force sizes, shown in the bottom table.
The relative differences between CONUS and the other locations can also be seen by
comparing the respective columns.
Increasing Marine Corps presence in each location in Table 10.8 would require
new facilities and infrastructure investment. Rough estimates of the costs are shown
in Table 10.9, which applies two different methodologies and resulting models. The
RAND columns reflect the one developed and employed for this study, and the USMC
columns reflect a Marine Corps methodology produced to translate detailed Guam and
Hawaii facility investment requirements, from the time when there was a plan to have 11,000 or more marines relocated there (mostly Guam), as per the 2006 agreement
with Japan, to estimate requirements for a more distributed laydown as planned in
the 2012 agreement. The Marine Corps model is extremely accurate for the Guam/
Hawaii 11,000-marine option, may underestimate for the lower Guam option in the
table, and may overestimate for additions at larger, more established bases, because it
does not have fixed- and variable-cost components, which we discuss in Chapter Eight.
Table 10.8 Comparison of Estimated Recurring Variable Costs for Marine Corps in Japan Versus Other Locations
Table 10.9 Comparison of Estimated MILCON Investment Costs for Different Locations ($ millions, except MILCON per person)
The RAND model employs fixed- and variable-cost components, with a fixed cost of
about $2.4 billion (at an ACF of 1) added to the Guam estimates only, because the
other locations already have substantial infrastructure, only some of which would have
to be expanded or duplicated. Since it employs fixed- and variable-cost components, we
believe the RAND model would more accurately estimate the MILCON requirements
for an expansion of an existing base and for a new, small base (the Marine Corps model
would be much more accurate for a situation analogous to the earlier Guam/Hawaii
plan), but we show the cost estimates produced by both models here. A more detailed
comparison of the two methodologies and the rationale for this conclusion is discussed
in Appendix A. All of the Guam estimates also subtract the agreed-upon $3.1 billion
Japanese contribution for facilities there.17 Finally, the last important element of the
comparison is the ACF, which varies significantly, with similarly high factors for Guam
and Hawaii.
Using both methods, stationing larger numbers of marines in Guam would be
estimated to require more investment than in CONUS, with the difference depending
on the CONUS location and estimating method. At the middle force level in the table,
whether investment in Guam would be similar to CONUS or higher depends upon
the cost estimating method. At lower force levels, the Marine Corps model estimates
that establishing a presence on Guam could require less investment than in CONUS
(due to the Japanese contribution), but the RAND model suggests otherwise because
of the fixed-cost component in the model. In all cases, costs would be higher for facility
expansion in Hawaii than in CONUS.
Overall, due to the higher operating costs in Hawaii and Guam, the CRP’s annual
recurring savings would likely be just a little higher, roughly $25 million more per year,
if compared with the agreed-upon plan, rather than comparing it with the status quo
on Okinawa. Using the same methods as for Table 10.8, investment for about 2,500
marines in Hawaii and 5,000 in Guam would come to $3–5 billion versus about $1.5–
3.5 billion for all being assigned in CONUS. Thus, the CRP’s annual savings roughly
hold, or would be a little larger, in comparison to the agreed-upon plan for the Marine
Corps in the Pacific, and would likely require less investment. The GREP and MCP
would not require the investments because they both seek to sustain status quo levels
on Okinawa, but are likely not politically feasible.
Implications for Determining Actual Postures
The three postures were used as analytic tools rather than prescriptive options to help
illuminate the types of major trade-offs that decisionmakers face in any real-world
choices on overseas posture. There is no “ideal” or “optimized” overseas posture, but
rather a set of preferences that decisionmakers must make, corresponding choices related
to those preferences, and recognized trade-offs or consequences of those choices. The
three illustrative postures share many features (most importantly the en route infrastructure),
and all are designed to meet core U.S. security and military objectives. The
primary difference is in emphasis (cost savings, global responsiveness and engagement,
major contingencies) and the varying levels of risk and cost associated with each. As
such, the postures can be useful in both making clear the essential minimum basing
arrangements needed to support U.S. objectives and in thinking through potentially
valuable but more “discretionary” options.
The insights from analyzing the three illustrative postures can be summarized as
follows:
The CRP is the only option that reduces overall costs, illustrating a rough limit
of about $3 billion per year in savings, with a majority coming in Europe, after
an initial investment. It does so through a reduced overseas presence (stationed
and rotational). This, in turn, reduces the level of security cooperation that could
be conducted, along with producing risk with respect to assurance of allies. It
also does not position forces forward for deterrence of major contingencies to the same degree as the MCP, although it does preserve them in key locations, relying
more on maritime presence and capabilities with global reach. However, given
the retention of en route infrastructure, the CRP would still provide responsiveness
for smaller-scale contingencies and the ability to reinforce in-place forces that
would be involved in major contingencies.
The GREP provides a more extensive network of access bases and rotations that
expands opportunities for security cooperation, preserves current efforts, and provides
improved responsiveness for many smaller-scale contingencies. Through its
more geographically diverse and distributed basing arrangement, the GREP also
provides the potential for more robust military and political access. Deterrence
with respect to potential threats from Iran, North Korea, and China would be
similar to current levels. Annual recurring costs for the GREP would be similar
to current levels, but there would be meaningful transition cost to realign a small
number of forces to provide the recurring savings to reinvest in rotations in new
areas.
The MCP provides the highest level of deterrence and assurance of allies and partners
for the three principal contingencies of concern. This comes at the expense of
reducing security cooperation with allies in Europe, while enhancing it elsewhere.
This could also result in some additional risk to assurance and deterrence in other
regions of concern. The MCP also risks increased levels of exposure for forwardstationed
forces to anti-access threats. The MCP would add annual recurring
costs as well as require significant investment.
Now let us examine benefits and costs across the three postures. Only by substantially
reducing forces and bases in one or more regions, with limited to moderate
replacement by rotations, could posture changes yield meaningful savings. This would
force one or more trade-offs in strategic benefits. Conversely, it appears infeasible to
substantially increase engagement with new partners while meeting other national
security goals and also reducing overall costs; rather, doing so is likely to require some
investment to realign forces to produce neutrality in longer-term recurring operating
cost. Similarly, efforts to increase presence for specific major threats could require substantial
investments.
The contrasts between the CRP and the other two postures suggest that implications
for security cooperation, deterrence, and assurance are likely to be greater than
for global responsiveness and access risk when considering posture options, as long as
they protect global en route infrastructure and the United States sustains emphasis on
maintaining geographically distributed access to bases.
The postures differ substantially in the level of effort that the United States would
put into building security cooperation, both with traditional allies and new partners,
with limits on both of these dimensions for the CRP and increases in the latter for
the GREP. Future interoperability levels with partners would differ among the postures, as would building the capabilities of new partners, although the implications
are not completely clear. The implications are even less clear for partner willingness to
work with the United States in future operations, which might still also be enabled by
mutual security interests.
While global capabilities might not result in substantial differences in warfighting
capabilities for major contingencies among the postures, differences in presence in
some regions could affect perceptions, influencing both deterrence and assurance, and
possibly influencing relationships with allies. A possible second-order effect of the relationship
aspects of security cooperation and assurance is whether there would be effects
on gaining peacetime access to bases. So while a cost-reduction–like posture does not
directly affect these dimensions, it is possible that they could be affected as well.
In short, our illustrative CRP offers an example that seeks to reduce costs while
retaining power-projection capabilities and maintaining some presence in Europe, the
Middle East, and Asia. However, the CRP involves more than simply finding efficiencies
but rather forces a significant trade-off in forgone strategic benefits in exchange for
cost savings. Therefore, one might view the CRP as essentially the foundation or “core”
of a U.S. global-response posture with options to build on this foundation in different
policy directions—represented by the GREP and MCP. Policymakers will need to
make those determinations based on the importance that they attach to various strategic
objectives and the level of risk—including that of financial cost—they are willing
to incur. Answers to some key questions will be needed to guide future posture decisions:
How much does U.S. presence in Europe assure allies, and how much security
cooperation in Europe is needed? How much is security cooperation and assurance in
the Asia-Pacific region valued, and how much are these two considerations affected by
posture? Will increased presence in the Pacific strengthen deterrence, and how should
posture address the missile threat? How should the needs for responsiveness and deterrence
in the Persian Gulf be weighed against the potential for political tensions and
risks? Informed value judgments bolstered by analysis will be required to address these
important questions. We focus on these questions in Chapter Eleven.
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