Daily Papers

Large Language Models (LLMs) face threats from jailbreak prompts. Existing methods for detecting jailbreak prompts are primarily online moderation APIs or finetuned LLMs. These strategies, however, often require extensive and resource-intensive data collection and training processes. In this study, we propose GradSafe, which effectively detects jailbreak prompts by scrutinizing the gradients of safety-critical parameters in LLMs. Our method is grounded in a pivotal observation: the gradients of an LLM's loss for jailbreak prompts paired with compliance response exhibit similar patterns on certain safety-critical parameters. In contrast, safe prompts lead to different gradient patterns. Building on this observation, GradSafe analyzes the gradients from prompts (paired with compliance responses) to accurately detect jailbreak prompts. We show that GradSafe, applied to Llama-2 without further training, outperforms Llama Guard, despite its extensive finetuning with a large dataset, in detecting jailbreak prompts. This superior performance is consistent across both zero-shot and adaptation scenarios, as evidenced by our evaluations on ToxicChat and XSTest. The source code is available at https://github.com/xyq7/GradSafe.

Vision Large Language Models (VLLMs) have demonstrated impressive capabilities in general visual tasks such as image captioning and visual question answering. However, their effectiveness in specialized, safety-critical domains like autonomous driving remains largely unexplored. Autonomous driving systems require sophisticated scene understanding in complex environments, yet existing multimodal benchmarks primarily focus on normal driving conditions, failing to adequately assess VLLMs' performance in safety-critical scenarios. To address this, we introduce DVBench, a pioneering benchmark designed to evaluate the performance of VLLMs in understanding safety-critical driving videos. Built around a hierarchical ability taxonomy that aligns with widely adopted frameworks for describing driving scenarios used in assessing highly automated driving systems, DVBench features 10,000 multiple-choice questions with human-annotated ground-truth answers, enabling a comprehensive evaluation of VLLMs' capabilities in perception and reasoning. Experiments on 14 SOTA VLLMs, ranging from 0.5B to 72B parameters, reveal significant performance gaps, with no model achieving over 40% accuracy, highlighting critical limitations in understanding complex driving scenarios. To probe adaptability, we fine-tuned selected models using domain-specific data from DVBench, achieving accuracy gains ranging from 5.24 to 10.94 percentage points, with relative improvements of up to 43.59%. This improvement underscores the necessity of targeted adaptation to bridge the gap between general-purpose VLLMs and mission-critical driving applications. DVBench establishes an essential evaluation framework and research roadmap for developing VLLMs that meet the safety and robustness requirements for real-world autonomous systems. We released the benchmark toolbox and the fine-tuned model at: https://github.com/tong-zeng/DVBench.git.

Large Language Models (LLMs) have become indispensable in real-world applications. However, their widespread adoption raises significant safety concerns, particularly in responding to socially harmful questions. Despite substantial efforts to improve model safety through alignment, aligned models can still have their safety protections undermined by subsequent fine-tuning - even when the additional training data appears benign. In this paper, we empirically demonstrate that this vulnerability stems from the sensitivity of safety-critical low-rank subspaces in LLM parameters to fine-tuning. Building on this insight, we propose a novel training-free method, termed Low-Rank Extrapolation (LoX), to enhance safety robustness by extrapolating the safety subspace of an aligned LLM. Our experimental results confirm the effectiveness of LoX, demonstrating significant improvements in robustness against both benign and malicious fine-tuning attacks while preserving the model's adaptability to new tasks. For instance, LoX leads to 11% to 54% absolute reductions in attack success rates (ASR) facing benign or malicious fine-tuning attacks. By investigating the ASR landscape of parameters, we attribute the success of LoX to that the extrapolation moves LLM parameters to a flatter zone, thereby less sensitive to perturbations. The code is available at github.com/VITA-Group/LoX.

Ensuring the safe alignment of large language models (LLMs) with human values is critical as they become integral to applications like translation and question answering. Current alignment methods struggle with dynamic user intentions and complex objectives, making models vulnerable to generating harmful content. We propose Safety Arithmetic, a training-free framework enhancing LLM safety across different scenarios: Base models, Supervised fine-tuned models (SFT), and Edited models. Safety Arithmetic involves Harm Direction Removal to avoid harmful content and Safety Alignment to promote safe responses. Additionally, we present NoIntentEdit, a dataset highlighting edit instances that could compromise model safety if used unintentionally. Our experiments show that Safety Arithmetic significantly improves safety measures, reduces over-safety, and maintains model utility, outperforming existing methods in ensuring safe content generation.

Large-scale Vision-Language Models (VLMs) have transformed general-purpose visual recognition through strong zero-shot capabilities. However, their performance degrades significantly in niche, safety-critical domains such as industrial spill detection, where hazardous events are rare, sensitive, and difficult to annotate. This scarcity -- driven by privacy concerns, data sensitivity, and the infrequency of real incidents -- renders conventional fine-tuning of detectors infeasible for most industrial settings. We address this challenge by introducing a scalable framework centered on a high-quality synthetic data generation pipeline. We demonstrate that this synthetic corpus enables effective Parameter-Efficient Fine-Tuning (PEFT) of VLMs and substantially boosts the performance of state-of-the-art object detectors such as YOLO and DETR. Notably, in the absence of synthetic data (SynSpill dataset), VLMs still generalize better to unseen spill scenarios than these detectors. When SynSpill is used, both VLMs and detectors achieve marked improvements, with their performance becoming comparable. Our results underscore that high-fidelity synthetic data is a powerful means to bridge the domain gap in safety-critical applications. The combination of synthetic generation and lightweight adaptation offers a cost-effective, scalable pathway for deploying vision systems in industrial environments where real data is scarce/impractical to obtain. Project Page: https://synspill.vercel.app

Existing neural active learning algorithms have aimed to optimize the predictive performance of neural networks (NNs) by selecting data for labelling. However, other than a good predictive performance, being robust against random parameter initializations is also a crucial requirement in safety-critical applications. To this end, we introduce our expected variance with Gaussian processes (EV-GP) criterion for neural active learning, which is theoretically guaranteed to select data points which lead to trained NNs with both (a) good predictive performances and (b) initialization robustness. Importantly, our EV-GP criterion is training-free, i.e., it does not require any training of the NN during data selection, which makes it computationally efficient. We empirically demonstrate that our EV-GP criterion is highly correlated with both initialization robustness and generalization performance, and show that it consistently outperforms baseline methods in terms of both desiderata, especially in situations with limited initial data or large batch sizes.

Aligned LLMs are secure, capable of recognizing and refusing to answer malicious questions. However, the role of internal parameters in maintaining such security is not well understood yet, further these models can be vulnerable to security degradation when subjected to fine-tuning attacks. To address these challenges, our work uncovers the mechanism behind security in aligned LLMs at the parameter level, identifying a small set of contiguous layers in the middle of the model that are crucial for distinguishing malicious queries from normal ones, referred to as ``safety layers". We first confirm the existence of these safety layers by analyzing variations in input vectors within the model's internal layers. Additionally, we leverage the over-rejection phenomenon and parameters scaling analysis to precisely locate the safety layers. Building on these findings, we propose a novel fine-tuning approach, Safely Partial-Parameter Fine-Tuning (SPPFT), that fixes the gradient of the safety layers during fine-tuning to address the security degradation. Our experiments demonstrate that the proposed approach can significantly preserve LLM security while maintaining performance and reducing computational resources compared to full fine-tuning.

The deployment of deep neural networks on resource-constrained devices necessitates effective model com- pression strategies that judiciously balance the reduction of model size with the preservation of performance. This study introduces a novel safety-driven quantization framework that leverages preservation sets to systematically prune and quantize neural network weights, thereby optimizing model complexity without compromising accuracy. The proposed methodology is rigorously evaluated on both a convolutional neural network (CNN) and an attention-based language model, demonstrating its applicability across diverse architectural paradigms. Experimental results reveal that our framework achieves up to a 2.5% enhancement in test accuracy relative to the original unquantized models while maintaining 60% of the initial model size. In comparison to conventional quantization techniques, our approach not only augments generalization by eliminating parameter noise and retaining essential weights but also reduces variance, thereby ensuring the retention of critical model features. These findings underscore the efficacy of safety-driven quantization as a robust and reliable strategy for the efficient optimization of deep learn- ing models. The implementation and comprehensive experimental evaluations of our framework are publicly accessible at GitHub.

Fine-tuning pre-trained Large Language Models (LLMs) for specialized tasks incurs substantial computational and data costs. While model merging offers a training-free solution to integrate multiple task-specific models, existing methods suffer from safety-utility conflicts where enhanced general capabilities degrade safety safeguards. We identify two root causes: neuron misidentification due to simplistic parameter magnitude-based selection, and cross-task neuron interference during merging. To address these challenges, we propose LED-Merging, a three-stage framework that Locates task-specific neurons via gradient-based attribution, dynamically Elects critical neurons through multi-model importance fusion, and Disjoints conflicting updates through parameter isolation. Extensive experiments on Llama-3-8B, Mistral-7B, and Llama2-13B demonstrate that LED-Merging effectively reduces harmful response rates, showing a 31.4\% decrease on Llama-3-8B-Instruct on HarmBench, while simultaneously preserving 95\% of utility performance, such as achieving 52.39\% accuracy on GSM8K. LED-Merging resolves safety-utility conflicts and provides a lightweight, training-free paradigm for constructing reliable multi-task LLMs. Code is available at https://github.com/MqLeet/LED-Merging{GitHub}.

Increasingly sophisticated mathematical modelling processes from Machine Learning are being used to analyse complex data. However, the performance and explainability of these models within practical critical systems requires a rigorous and continuous verification of their safe utilisation. Working towards addressing this challenge, this paper presents a principled novel safety argument framework for critical systems that utilise deep neural networks. The approach allows various forms of predictions, e.g., future reliability of passing some demands, or confidence on a required reliability level. It is supported by a Bayesian analysis using operational data and the recent verification and validation techniques for deep learning. The prediction is conservative -- it starts with partial prior knowledge obtained from lifecycle activities and then determines the worst-case prediction. Open challenges are also identified.

Large language models (LLMs) show inherent brittleness in their safety mechanisms, as evidenced by their susceptibility to jailbreaking and even non-malicious fine-tuning. This study explores this brittleness of safety alignment by leveraging pruning and low-rank modifications. We develop methods to identify critical regions that are vital for safety guardrails, and that are disentangled from utility-relevant regions at both the neuron and rank levels. Surprisingly, the isolated regions we find are sparse, comprising about 3% at the parameter level and 2.5% at the rank level. Removing these regions compromises safety without significantly impacting utility, corroborating the inherent brittleness of the model's safety mechanisms. Moreover, we show that LLMs remain vulnerable to low-cost fine-tuning attacks even when modifications to the safety-critical regions are restricted. These findings underscore the urgent need for more robust safety strategies in LLMs.

Although AI systems have been applied in various fields and achieved impressive performance, their safety and reliability are still a big concern. This is especially important for safety-critical tasks. One shared characteristic of these critical tasks is their risk sensitivity, where small mistakes can cause big consequences and even endanger life. There are several factors that could be guidelines for the successful deployment of AI systems in sensitive tasks: (i) failure detection and out-of-distribution (OOD) detection; (ii) overfitting identification; (iii) uncertainty quantification for predictions; (iv) robustness to data perturbations. These factors are also challenges of current AI systems, which are major blocks for building safe and reliable AI. Specifically, the current AI algorithms are unable to identify common causes for failure detection. Furthermore, additional techniques are required to quantify the quality of predictions. All these contribute to inaccurate uncertainty quantification, which lowers trust in predictions. Hence obtaining accurate model uncertainty quantification and its further improvement are challenging. To address these issues, many techniques have been proposed, such as regularization methods and learning strategies. As vision and language are the most typical data type and have many open source benchmark datasets, this thesis will focus on vision-language data processing for tasks like classification, image captioning, and vision question answering. In this thesis, we aim to build a safeguard by further developing current techniques to ensure the accurate model uncertainty for safety-critical tasks.

Laboratory accidents pose significant risks to human life and property, underscoring the importance of robust safety protocols. Despite advancements in safety training, laboratory personnel may still unknowingly engage in unsafe practices. With the increasing reliance on large language models (LLMs) for guidance in various fields, including laboratory settings, there is a growing concern about their reliability in critical safety-related decision-making. Unlike trained human researchers, LLMs lack formal lab safety education, raising questions about their ability to provide safe and accurate guidance. Existing research on LLM trustworthiness primarily focuses on issues such as ethical compliance, truthfulness, and fairness but fails to fully cover safety-critical real-world applications, like lab safety. To address this gap, we propose the Laboratory Safety Benchmark (LabSafety Bench), a comprehensive evaluation framework based on a new taxonomy aligned with Occupational Safety and Health Administration (OSHA) protocols. This benchmark includes 765 multiple-choice questions verified by human experts, assessing LLMs and vision language models (VLMs) performance in lab safety contexts. Our evaluations demonstrate that while GPT-4o outperforms human participants, it is still prone to critical errors, highlighting the risks of relying on LLMs in safety-critical environments. Our findings emphasize the need for specialized benchmarks to accurately assess the trustworthiness of LLMs in real-world safety applications.

Machine learning (ML) systems are rapidly increasing in size, are acquiring new capabilities, and are increasingly deployed in high-stakes settings. As with other powerful technologies, safety for ML should be a leading research priority. In response to emerging safety challenges in ML, such as those introduced by recent large-scale models, we provide a new roadmap for ML Safety and refine the technical problems that the field needs to address. We present four problems ready for research, namely withstanding hazards ("Robustness"), identifying hazards ("Monitoring"), reducing inherent model hazards ("Alignment"), and reducing systemic hazards ("Systemic Safety"). Throughout, we clarify each problem's motivation and provide concrete research directions.

Current approaches to building general-purpose AI systems tend to produce systems with both beneficial and harmful capabilities. Further progress in AI development could lead to capabilities that pose extreme risks, such as offensive cyber capabilities or strong manipulation skills. We explain why model evaluation is critical for addressing extreme risks. Developers must be able to identify dangerous capabilities (through "dangerous capability evaluations") and the propensity of models to apply their capabilities for harm (through "alignment evaluations"). These evaluations will become critical for keeping policymakers and other stakeholders informed, and for making responsible decisions about model training, deployment, and security.

The realization of scalable fault-tolerant quantum computing is expected to hinge on quantum error-correcting codes. In the quest for more efficient quantum fault tolerance, a critical code parameter is the weight of measurements that extract information about errors to enable error correction: as higher measurement weights require higher implementation costs and introduce more errors, it is important in code design to optimize measurement weight. This underlies the surging interest in quantum low-density parity-check (qLDPC) codes, the study of which has primarily focused on the asymptotic (large-code-limit) properties. In this work, we introduce a versatile and computationally efficient approach to stabilizer code weight reduction based on reinforcement learning (RL), which produces new low-weight codes that substantially outperform the state of the art in practically relevant parameter regimes, extending significantly beyond previously accessible small distances. For example, our approach demonstrates savings in physical qubit overhead compared to existing results by 1 to 2 orders of magnitude for weight 6 codes and brings the overhead into a feasible range for near-future experiments. We also investigate the interplay between code parameters using our RL framework, offering new insights into the potential efficiency and power of practically viable coding strategies. Overall, our results demonstrate how RL can effectively advance the crucial yet challenging problem of quantum code discovery and thereby facilitate a faster path to the practical implementation of fault-tolerant quantum technologies.

The ideal LLM content moderation system would be both structurally interpretable (so its decisions can be explained to users) and steerable (to reflect a community's values or align to safety standards). However, current systems fall short on both of these dimensions. To address this gap, we present SafetyAnalyst, a novel LLM safety moderation framework. Given a prompt, SafetyAnalyst creates a structured "harm-benefit tree," which identifies 1) the actions that could be taken if a compliant response were provided, 2) the harmful and beneficial effects of those actions (along with their likelihood, severity, and immediacy), and 3) the stakeholders that would be impacted by those effects. It then aggregates this structured representation into a harmfulness score based on a parameterized set of safety preferences, which can be transparently aligned to particular values. Using extensive harm-benefit features generated by SOTA LLMs on 19k prompts, we fine-tuned an open-weight LM to specialize in generating harm-benefit trees through symbolic knowledge distillation. On a comprehensive set of prompt safety benchmarks, we show that our system (average F1=0.75) outperforms existing LLM safety moderation systems (average F1<0.72) on prompt harmfulness classification, while offering the additional advantages of interpretability and steerability.

The development of robust safety benchmarks for large language models requires open, reproducible datasets that can measure both appropriate refusal of harmful content and potential over-restriction of legitimate scientific discourse. We present an open-source dataset and testing framework for evaluating LLM safety mechanisms across mainly controlled substance queries, analyzing four major models' responses to systematically varied prompts. Our results reveal distinct safety profiles: Claude-3.5-sonnet demonstrated the most conservative approach with 73% refusals and 27% allowances, while Mistral attempted to answer 100% of queries. GPT-3.5-turbo showed moderate restriction with 10% refusals and 90% allowances, and Grok-2 registered 20% refusals and 80% allowances. Testing prompt variation strategies revealed decreasing response consistency, from 85% with single prompts to 65% with five variations. This publicly available benchmark enables systematic evaluation of the critical balance between necessary safety restrictions and potential over-censorship of legitimate scientific inquiry, while providing a foundation for measuring progress in AI safety implementation. Chain-of-thought analysis reveals potential vulnerabilities in safety mechanisms, highlighting the complexity of implementing robust safeguards without unduly restricting desirable and valid scientific discourse.

The past year has seen rapid acceleration in the development of large language models (LLMs). However, without proper steering and safeguards, LLMs will readily follow malicious instructions, provide unsafe advice, and generate toxic content. We introduce SimpleSafetyTests (SST) as a new test suite for rapidly and systematically identifying such critical safety risks. The test suite comprises 100 test prompts across five harm areas that LLMs, for the vast majority of applications, should refuse to comply with. We test 11 open-access and open-source LLMs and four closed-source LLMs, and find critical safety weaknesses. While some of the models do not give a single unsafe response, most give unsafe responses to more than 20% of the prompts, with over 50% unsafe responses in the extreme. Prepending a safety-emphasising system prompt substantially reduces the occurrence of unsafe responses, but does not completely stop them from happening. Trained annotators labelled every model response to SST (n = 3,000). We use these annotations to evaluate five AI safety filters (which assess whether a models' response is unsafe given a prompt) as a way of automatically evaluating models' performance on SST. The filters' performance varies considerably. There are also differences across the five harm areas, and on the unsafe versus safe responses. The widely-used Perspective API has 72% accuracy and a newly-created zero-shot prompt to OpenAI's GPT-4 performs best with 89% accuracy. Content Warning: This paper contains prompts and responses that relate to child abuse, suicide, self-harm and eating disorders, scams and fraud, illegal items, and physical harm.

Safe offline RL is a promising way to bypass risky online interactions towards safe policy learning. Most existing methods only enforce soft constraints, i.e., constraining safety violations in expectation below thresholds predetermined. This can lead to potentially unsafe outcomes, thus unacceptable in safety-critical scenarios. An alternative is to enforce the hard constraint of zero violation. However, this can be challenging in offline setting, as it needs to strike the right balance among three highly intricate and correlated aspects: safety constraint satisfaction, reward maximization, and behavior regularization imposed by offline datasets. Interestingly, we discover that via reachability analysis of safe-control theory, the hard safety constraint can be equivalently translated to identifying the largest feasible region given the offline dataset. This seamlessly converts the original trilogy problem to a feasibility-dependent objective, i.e., maximizing reward value within the feasible region while minimizing safety risks in the infeasible region. Inspired by these, we propose FISOR (FeasIbility-guided Safe Offline RL), which allows safety constraint adherence, reward maximization, and offline policy learning to be realized via three decoupled processes, while offering strong safety performance and stability. In FISOR, the optimal policy for the translated optimization problem can be derived in a special form of weighted behavior cloning. Thus, we propose a novel energy-guided diffusion model that does not require training a complicated time-dependent classifier to extract the policy, greatly simplifying the training. We compare FISOR against baselines on DSRL benchmark for safe offline RL. Evaluation results show that FISOR is the only method that can guarantee safety satisfaction in all tasks, while achieving top returns in most tasks.

Large language models (LLMs) exhibit advancing capabilities in complex tasks, such as reasoning and graduate-level question answering, yet their resilience against misuse, particularly involving scientifically sophisticated risks, remains underexplored. Existing safety benchmarks typically focus either on instructions requiring minimal knowledge comprehension (e.g., ``tell me how to build a bomb") or utilize prompts that are relatively low-risk (e.g., multiple-choice or classification tasks about hazardous content). Consequently, they fail to adequately assess model safety when handling knowledge-intensive, hazardous scenarios. To address this critical gap, we introduce SOSBench, a regulation-grounded, hazard-focused benchmark encompassing six high-risk scientific domains: chemistry, biology, medicine, pharmacology, physics, and psychology. The benchmark comprises 3,000 prompts derived from real-world regulations and laws, systematically expanded via an LLM-assisted evolutionary pipeline that introduces diverse, realistic misuse scenarios (e.g., detailed explosive synthesis instructions involving advanced chemical formulas). We evaluate frontier models within a unified evaluation framework using our SOSBench. Despite their alignment claims, advanced models consistently disclose policy-violating content across all domains, demonstrating alarmingly high rates of harmful responses (e.g., 79.1% for Deepseek-R1 and 47.3% for GPT-4.1). These results highlight significant safety alignment deficiencies and underscore urgent concerns regarding the responsible deployment of powerful LLMs.

We propose patching for large language models (LLMs) like software versions, a lightweight and modular approach for addressing safety vulnerabilities. While vendors release improved LLM versions, major releases are costly, infrequent, and difficult to tailor to customer needs, leaving released models with known safety gaps. Unlike full-model fine-tuning or major version updates, our method enables rapid remediation by prepending a compact, learnable prefix to an existing model. This "patch" introduces only 0.003% additional parameters, yet reliably steers model behavior toward that of a safer reference model. Across three critical domains (toxicity mitigation, bias reduction, and harmfulness refusal) policy patches achieve safety improvements comparable to next-generation safety-aligned models while preserving fluency. Our results demonstrate that LLMs can be "patched" much like software, offering vendors and practitioners a practical mechanism for distributing scalable, efficient, and composable safety updates between major model releases.

Given the growing concerns around the safety and risks of Large Language Models (LLMs), it is essential to develop methods for mitigating these issues. We introduce Safe and Responsible Large Language Model (SR_{LLM}) , a model designed to enhance the safety of language generation using LLMs. Our approach incorporates a comprehensive LLM safety risk taxonomy and utilizes a dataset annotated by experts that align with this taxonomy. SR_{LLM} is designed to identify potentially unsafe content and produce benign variations. It employs instruction-based and parameter-efficient fine-tuning methods, making the model not only effective in enhancing safety but also resource-efficient and straightforward to adjust. Through our testing on five benchmark datasets and two proprietary datasets, we observed notable reductions in the generation of unsafe content. Moreover, following the implementation of safety measures, there was a significant improvement in the production of safe content. We detail our fine-tuning processes and how we benchmark safety for SR_{LLM} with the community engagement and promote the responsible advancement of LLMs. All the data and code are available anonymous at https://github.com/shainarazavi/Safe-Responsible-LLM .

State-of-the-art space science missions increasingly rely on automation due to spacecraft complexity and the costs of human oversight. The high volume of data, including scientific and telemetry data, makes manual inspection challenging. Machine learning offers significant potential to meet these demands. The Euclid space telescope, in its survey phase since February 2024, exemplifies this shift. Euclid's success depends on accurate monitoring and interpretation of housekeeping telemetry and science-derived data. Thousands of telemetry parameters, monitored as time series, may or may not impact the quality of scientific data. These parameters have complex interdependencies, often due to physical relationships (e.g., proximity of temperature sensors). Optimising science operations requires careful anomaly detection and identification of hidden parameter states. Moreover, understanding the interactions between known anomalies and physical quantities is crucial yet complex, as related parameters may display anomalies with varied timing and intensity. We address these challenges by analysing temperature anomalies in Euclid's telemetry from February to August 2024, focusing on eleven temperature parameters and 35 covariates. We use a predictive XGBoost model to forecast temperatures based on historical values, detecting anomalies as deviations from predictions. A second XGBoost model predicts anomalies from covariates, capturing their relationships to temperature anomalies. We identify the top three anomalies per parameter and analyse their interactions with covariates using SHAP (Shapley Additive Explanations), enabling rapid, automated analysis of complex parameter relationships. Our method demonstrates how machine learning can enhance telemetry monitoring, offering scalable solutions for other missions with similar data challenges.

State-of-the-art language model fine-tuning techniques, such as Direct Preference Optimization (DPO), restrict user control by hard-coding predefined behaviors into the model. To address this, we propose a novel method, Configurable Safety Tuning (CST), that augments DPO using synthetic preference data to facilitate flexible safety configuration of LLMs at inference time. CST overcomes the constraints of vanilla DPO by introducing a system prompt specifying safety configurations, enabling LLM deployers to disable/enable safety preferences based on their need, just changing the system prompt. Our experimental evaluations indicate that CST successfully manages different safety configurations and retains the original functionality of LLMs, showing it is a robust method for configurable deployment. Data and models available at https://github.com/vicgalle/configurable-safety-tuning

With the widespread application of Large Language Models (LLMs), their associated security issues have become increasingly prominent, severely constraining their trustworthy deployment in critical domains. This paper proposes a novel safety response framework designed to systematically safeguard LLMs at both the input and output levels. At the input level, the framework employs a supervised fine-tuning-based safety classification model. Through a fine-grained four-tier taxonomy (Safe, Unsafe, Conditionally Safe, Focused Attention), it performs precise risk identification and differentiated handling of user queries, significantly enhancing risk coverage and business scenario adaptability, and achieving a risk recall rate of 99.3%. At the output level, the framework integrates Retrieval-Augmented Generation (RAG) with a specifically fine-tuned interpretation model, ensuring all responses are grounded in a real-time, trustworthy knowledge base. This approach eliminates information fabrication and enables result traceability. Experimental results demonstrate that our proposed safety control model achieves a significantly higher safety score on public safety evaluation benchmarks compared to the baseline model, TinyR1-Safety-8B. Furthermore, on our proprietary high-risk test set, the framework's components attained a perfect 100% safety score, validating their exceptional protective capabilities in complex risk scenarios. This research provides an effective engineering pathway for building high-security, high-trust LLM applications.

Most safety testing efforts for large language models (LLMs) today focus on evaluating foundation models. However, there is a growing need to evaluate safety at the application level, as components such as system prompts, retrieval pipelines, and guardrails introduce additional factors that significantly influence the overall safety of LLM applications. In this paper, we introduce a practical framework for evaluating application-level safety in LLM systems, validated through real-world deployment across multiple use cases within our organization. The framework consists of two parts: (1) principles for developing customized safety risk taxonomies, and (2) practices for evaluating safety risks in LLM applications. We illustrate how the proposed framework was applied in our internal pilot, providing a reference point for organizations seeking to scale their safety testing efforts. This work aims to bridge the gap between theoretical concepts in AI safety and the operational realities of safeguarding LLM applications in practice, offering actionable guidance for safe and scalable deployment.

Although large language models (LLMs) achieve effective safety alignment at the time of release, they still face various safety challenges. A key issue is that fine-tuning often compromises the safety alignment of LLMs. To address this issue, we propose a method named IRR (Identify, Remove, and Recalibrate for Safety Realignment) that performs safety realignment for LLMs. The core of IRR is to identify and remove unsafe delta parameters from the fine-tuned models, while recalibrating the retained ones. We evaluate the effectiveness of IRR across various datasets, including both full fine-tuning and LoRA methods. Our results demonstrate that IRR significantly enhances the safety performance of fine-tuned models on safety benchmarks, such as harmful queries and jailbreak attacks, while maintaining their performance on downstream tasks. The source code is available at: https://anonymous.4open.science/r/IRR-BD4F.

As the use of large language model (LLM) agents continues to grow, their safety vulnerabilities have become increasingly evident. Extensive benchmarks evaluate various aspects of LLM safety by defining the safety relying heavily on general standards, overlooking user-specific standards. However, safety standards for LLM may vary based on a user-specific profiles rather than being universally consistent across all users. This raises a critical research question: Do LLM agents act safely when considering user-specific safety standards? Despite its importance for safe LLM use, no benchmark datasets currently exist to evaluate the user-specific safety of LLMs. To address this gap, we introduce U-SAFEBENCH, the first benchmark designed to assess user-specific aspect of LLM safety. Our evaluation of 18 widely used LLMs reveals current LLMs fail to act safely when considering user-specific safety standards, marking a new discovery in this field. To address this vulnerability, we propose a simple remedy based on chain-of-thought, demonstrating its effectiveness in improving user-specific safety. Our benchmark and code are available at https://github.com/yeonjun-in/U-SafeBench.

Safety is critical to broadening the application of reinforcement learning (RL). Often, we train RL agents in a controlled environment, such as a laboratory, before deploying them in the real world. However, the real-world target task might be unknown prior to deployment. Reward-free RL trains an agent without the reward to adapt quickly once the reward is revealed. We consider the constrained reward-free setting, where an agent (the guide) learns to explore safely without the reward signal. This agent is trained in a controlled environment, which allows unsafe interactions and still provides the safety signal. After the target task is revealed, safety violations are not allowed anymore. Thus, the guide is leveraged to compose a safe behaviour policy. Drawing from transfer learning, we also regularize a target policy (the student) towards the guide while the student is unreliable and gradually eliminate the influence of the guide as training progresses. The empirical analysis shows that this method can achieve safe transfer learning and helps the student solve the target task faster.

Large Language Models (LLMs) have become an integral part of our daily lives. However, they impose certain risks, including those that can harm individuals' privacy, perpetuate biases and spread misinformation. These risks highlight the need for robust safety mechanisms, ethical guidelines, and thorough testing to ensure their responsible deployment. Safety of LLMs is a key property that needs to be thoroughly tested prior the model to be deployed and accessible to the general users. This paper reports the external safety testing experience conducted by researchers from Mondragon University and University of Seville on OpenAI's new o3-mini LLM as part of OpenAI's early access for safety testing program. In particular, we apply our tool, ASTRAL, to automatically and systematically generate up to date unsafe test inputs (i.e., prompts) that helps us test and assess different safety categories of LLMs. We automatically generate and execute a total of 10,080 unsafe test input on a early o3-mini beta version. After manually verifying the test cases classified as unsafe by ASTRAL, we identify a total of 87 actual instances of unsafe LLM behavior. We highlight key insights and findings uncovered during the pre-deployment external testing phase of OpenAI's latest LLM.

Training large language models to follow instructions makes them perform better on a wide range of tasks, generally becoming more helpful. However, a perfectly helpful model will follow even the most malicious instructions and readily generate harmful content. In this paper, we raise concerns over the safety of models that only emphasize helpfulness, not safety, in their instruction-tuning. We show that several popular instruction-tuned models are highly unsafe. Moreover, we show that adding just 3% safety examples (a few hundred demonstrations) in the training set when fine-tuning a model like LLaMA can substantially improve their safety. Our safety-tuning does not make models significantly less capable or helpful as measured by standard benchmarks. However, we do find a behavior of exaggerated safety, where too much safety-tuning makes models refuse to respond to reasonable prompts that superficially resemble unsafe ones. Our study sheds light on trade-offs in training LLMs to follow instructions and exhibit safe behavior.

We propose a novel dynamic safety framework that optimizes language model (LM) safety reasoning at inference time without modifying model weights. Building on recent advances in self-critique methods, our approach leverages a meta-critique mechanism that iteratively updates safety prompts-termed specifications-to drive the critique and revision process adaptively. This test-time optimization not only improves performance against adversarial jailbreak requests but also in diverse general safety-related tasks, such as avoiding moral harm or pursuing honest responses. Our empirical evaluations across several language models demonstrate that dynamically optimized safety prompts yield significantly higher safety scores compared to fixed system prompts and static self-critique defenses. Code to be released at https://github.com/vicgalle/meta-self-critique.git .

Recent advances in Large Language Models (LLMs) have sparked concerns over their potential to acquire and misuse dangerous or high-risk capabilities, posing frontier risks. Current safety evaluations primarily test for what a model can do - its capabilities - without assessing what it would do if endowed with high-risk capabilities. This leaves a critical blind spot: models may strategically conceal capabilities or rapidly acquire them, while harboring latent inclinations toward misuse. We argue that propensity - the likelihood of a model to pursue harmful actions if empowered - is a critical, yet underexplored, axis of safety evaluation. We present PropensityBench, a novel benchmark framework that assesses the proclivity of models to engage in risky behaviors when equipped with simulated dangerous capabilities using proxy tools. Our framework includes 5,874 scenarios with 6,648 tools spanning four high-risk domains: cybersecurity, self-proliferation, biosecurity, and chemical security. We simulate access to powerful capabilities via a controlled agentic environment and evaluate the models' choices under varying operational pressures that reflect real-world constraints or incentives models may encounter, such as resource scarcity or gaining more autonomy. Across open-source and proprietary frontier models, we uncover 9 alarming signs of propensity: models frequently choose high-risk tools when under pressure, despite lacking the capability to execute such actions unaided. These findings call for a shift from static capability audits toward dynamic propensity assessments as a prerequisite for deploying frontier AI systems safely. Our code is available at https://github.com/scaleapi/propensity-evaluation.

Large Language Model (LLM) safety is one of the most pressing challenges for enabling wide-scale deployment. While most studies and global discussions focus on generic harms, such as models assisting users in harming themselves or others, enterprises face a more fundamental concern: whether LLM-based agents are safe for their intended use case. To address this, we introduce operational safety, defined as an LLM's ability to appropriately accept or refuse user queries when tasked with a specific purpose. We further propose OffTopicEval, an evaluation suite and benchmark for measuring operational safety both in general and within specific agentic use cases. Our evaluations on six model families comprising 20 open-weight LLMs reveal that while performance varies across models, all of them remain highly operationally unsafe. Even the strongest models -- Qwen-3 (235B) with 77.77\% and Mistral (24B) with 79.96\% -- fall far short of reliable operational safety, while GPT models plateau in the 62--73\% range, Phi achieves only mid-level scores (48--70\%), and Gemma and Llama-3 collapse to 39.53\% and 23.84\%, respectively. While operational safety is a core model alignment issue, to suppress these failures, we propose prompt-based steering methods: query grounding (Q-ground) and system-prompt grounding (P-ground), which substantially improve OOD refusal. Q-ground provides consistent gains of up to 23\%, while P-ground delivers even larger boosts, raising Llama-3.3 (70B) by 41\% and Qwen-3 (30B) by 27\%. These results highlight both the urgent need for operational safety interventions and the promise of prompt-based steering as a first step toward more reliable LLM-based agents.

Ensuring safety is of paramount importance in physical human-robot interaction applications. This requires both adherence to safety constraints defined on the system state, as well as guaranteeing compliant behavior of the robot. If the underlying dynamical system is known exactly, the former can be addressed with the help of control barrier functions. The incorporation of elastic actuators in the robot's mechanical design can address the latter requirement. However, this elasticity can increase the complexity of the resulting system, leading to unmodeled dynamics, such that control barrier functions cannot directly ensure safety. In this paper, we mitigate this issue by learning the unknown dynamics using Gaussian process regression. By employing the model in a feedback linearizing control law, the safety conditions resulting from control barrier functions can be robustified to take into account model errors, while remaining feasible. In order to enforce them on-line, we formulate the derived safety conditions in the form of a second-order cone program. We demonstrate our proposed approach with simulations on a two-degree-of-freedom planar robot with elastic joints.

AI developers often apply safety alignment procedures to prevent the misuse of their AI systems. For example, before Meta released Llama 2-Chat, a collection of instruction fine-tuned large language models, they invested heavily in safety training, incorporating extensive red-teaming and reinforcement learning from human feedback. However, it remains unclear how well safety training guards against model misuse when attackers have access to model weights. We explore the robustness of safety training in language models by subversively fine-tuning the public weights of Llama 2-Chat. We employ low-rank adaptation (LoRA) as an efficient fine-tuning method. With a budget of less than $200 per model and using only one GPU, we successfully undo the safety training of Llama 2-Chat models of sizes 7B, 13B, and 70B. Specifically, our fine-tuning technique significantly reduces the rate at which the model refuses to follow harmful instructions. We achieve a refusal rate below 1% for our 70B Llama 2-Chat model on two refusal benchmarks. Our fine-tuning method retains general performance, which we validate by comparing our fine-tuned models against Llama 2-Chat across two benchmarks. Additionally, we present a selection of harmful outputs produced by our models. While there is considerable uncertainty about the scope of risks from current models, it is likely that future models will have significantly more dangerous capabilities, including the ability to hack into critical infrastructure, create dangerous bio-weapons, or autonomously replicate and adapt to new environments. We show that subversive fine-tuning is practical and effective, and hence argue that evaluating risks from fine-tuning should be a core part of risk assessments for releasing model weights.

Since deep neural networks were developed, they have made huge contributions to everyday lives. Machine learning provides more rational advice than humans are capable of in almost every aspect of daily life. However, despite this achievement, the design and training of neural networks are still challenging and unpredictable procedures. To lower the technical thresholds for common users, automated hyper-parameter optimization (HPO) has become a popular topic in both academic and industrial areas. This paper provides a review of the most essential topics on HPO. The first section introduces the key hyper-parameters related to model training and structure, and discusses their importance and methods to define the value range. Then, the research focuses on major optimization algorithms and their applicability, covering their efficiency and accuracy especially for deep learning networks. This study next reviews major services and toolkits for HPO, comparing their support for state-of-the-art searching algorithms, feasibility with major deep learning frameworks, and extensibility for new modules designed by users. The paper concludes with problems that exist when HPO is applied to deep learning, a comparison between optimization algorithms, and prominent approaches for model evaluation with limited computational resources.

As Artificial General Intelligence (AGI) becomes increasingly integrated into various facets of human life, ensuring the safety and ethical alignment of such systems is paramount. Previous studies primarily focus on single-modality threats, which may not suffice given the integrated and complex nature of cross-modality interactions. We introduce a novel safety alignment challenge called Safe Inputs but Unsafe Output (SIUO) to evaluate cross-modality safety alignment. Specifically, it considers cases where single modalities are safe independently but could potentially lead to unsafe or unethical outputs when combined. To empirically investigate this problem, we developed the SIUO, a cross-modality benchmark encompassing 9 critical safety domains, such as self-harm, illegal activities, and privacy violations. Our findings reveal substantial safety vulnerabilities in both closed- and open-source LVLMs, such as GPT-4V and LLaVA, underscoring the inadequacy of current models to reliably interpret and respond to complex, real-world scenarios.

Large Vision-Language Models (VLMs) have achieved remarkable performance across a wide range of tasks. However, their deployment in safety-critical domains poses significant challenges. Existing safety fine-tuning methods, which focus on textual or multimodal content, fall short in addressing challenging cases or disrupt the balance between helpfulness and harmlessness. Our evaluation highlights a safety reasoning gap: these methods lack safety visual reasoning ability, leading to such bottlenecks. To address this limitation and enhance both visual perception and reasoning in safety-critical contexts, we propose a novel dataset that integrates multi-image inputs with safety Chain-of-Thought (CoT) labels as fine-grained reasoning logic to improve model performance. Specifically, we introduce the Multi-Image Safety (MIS) dataset, an instruction-following dataset tailored for multi-image safety scenarios, consisting of training and test splits. Our experiments demonstrate that fine-tuning InternVL2.5-8B with MIS significantly outperforms both powerful open-source models and API-based models in challenging multi-image tasks requiring safety-related visual reasoning. This approach not only delivers exceptional safety performance but also preserves general capabilities without any trade-offs. Specifically, fine-tuning with MIS increases average accuracy by 0.83% across five general benchmarks and reduces the Attack Success Rate (ASR) on multiple safety benchmarks by a large margin. Data and Models are released under: https://dripnowhy.github.io/MIS/{https://dripnowhy.github.io/MIS/}

Fine-tuning large language models (LLMs) for telecom tasks and datasets is a common practice to adapt general-purpose models to the telecom domain. However, little attention has been paid to how this process may compromise model safety. Recent research has shown that even benign fine-tuning can degrade the safety alignment of LLMs, causing them to respond to harmful or unethical user queries. In this paper, we investigate this issue for telecom-tuned LLMs using three representative datasets featured by the GenAINet initiative. We show that safety degradation persists even for structured and seemingly harmless datasets such as 3GPP standards and tabular records, indicating that telecom-specific data is not immune to safety erosion during fine-tuning. We further extend our analysis to publicly available Telecom LLMs trained via continual pre-training, revealing that safety alignment is often severely lacking, primarily due to the omission of safety-focused instruction tuning. To address these issues in both fine-tuned and pre-trained models, we conduct extensive experiments and evaluate three safety realignment defenses (SafeInstruct, SafeLoRA, and SafeMERGE) using established red-teaming benchmarks. The results show that, across all settings, the proposed defenses can effectively restore safety after harmful degradation without compromising downstream task performance, leading to Safe teleCOMMunication (SafeCOMM) models. In a nutshell, our work serves as a diagnostic study and practical guide for safety realignment in telecom-tuned LLMs, and emphasizes the importance of safety-aware instruction and fine-tuning for real-world deployments of Telecom LLMs.

Large language models (LLMs) achieve state-of-the-art performance on multiple language tasks, yet their safety guardrails can be circumvented, leading to harmful generations. In light of this, recent research on safety mechanisms has emerged, revealing that when safety representations or component are suppressed, the safety capability of LLMs are compromised. However, existing research tends to overlook the safety impact of multi-head attention mechanisms, despite their crucial role in various model functionalities. Hence, in this paper, we aim to explore the connection between standard attention mechanisms and safety capability to fill this gap in the safety-related mechanistic interpretability. We propose a novel metric which tailored for multi-head attention, the Safety Head ImPortant Score (Ships), to assess the individual heads' contributions to model safety. Based on this, we generalize Ships to the dataset level and further introduce the Safety Attention Head AttRibution Algorithm (Sahara) to attribute the critical safety attention heads inside the model. Our findings show that the special attention head has a significant impact on safety. Ablating a single safety head allows aligned model (e.g., Llama-2-7b-chat) to respond to 16 times more harmful queries, while only modifying 0.006% of the parameters, in contrast to the ~ 5% modification required in previous studies. More importantly, we demonstrate that attention heads primarily function as feature extractors for safety and models fine-tuned from the same base model exhibit overlapping safety heads through comprehensive experiments. Together, our attribution approach and findings provide a novel perspective for unpacking the black box of safety mechanisms within large models.

In this work, we introduce the PKU-SafeRLHF dataset, designed to promote research on safety alignment in large language models (LLMs). As a sibling project to SafeRLHF and BeaverTails, we separate annotations of helpfulness and harmlessness for question-answering pairs, providing distinct perspectives on these coupled attributes. Overall, we provide 44.6k refined prompts and 265k question-answer pairs with safety meta-labels for 19 harm categories and three severity levels ranging from minor to severe, with answers generated by Llama-family models. Based on this, we collected 166.8k preference data, including dual-preference (helpfulness and harmlessness decoupled) and single-preference data (trade-off the helpfulness and harmlessness from scratch), respectively. Using the large-scale annotation data, we further train severity-sensitive moderation for the risk control of LLMs and safety-centric RLHF algorithms for the safety alignment of LLMs. We believe this dataset will be a valuable resource for the community, aiding in the safe deployment of LLMs.

Existing regulatory frameworks for biomedical AI include robustness as a key component but lack detailed implementational guidance. The recent rise of biomedical foundation models creates new hurdles in testing and certification given their broad capabilities and susceptibility to complex distribution shifts. To balance test feasibility and effectiveness, we suggest a priority-based, task-oriented approach to tailor robustness evaluation objectives to a predefined specification. We urge concrete policies to adopt a granular categorization of robustness concepts in the specification. Our approach promotes the standardization of risk assessment and monitoring, which guides technical developments and mitigation efforts.

This paper presents a safety-critical approach to the coordination of robots in dynamic environments. To this end, we leverage control barrier functions (CBFs) with the forward reachable set to guarantee the safe coordination of the robots while preserving a desired trajectory via a layered controller. The top-level planner generates a safety-ensured trajectory for each agent, accounting for the dynamic constraints in the environment. This planner leverages high-order CBFs based on the forward reachable set to ensure safety-critical coordination control, i.e., guarantee the safe coordination of the robots during locomotion. The middle-level trajectory planner employs single rigid body (SRB) dynamics to generate optimal ground reaction forces (GRFs) to track the safety-ensured trajectories from the top-level planner. The whole-body motions to adhere to the optimal GRFs while ensuring the friction cone condition at the end of each stance leg are generated from the low-level controller. The effectiveness of the approach is demonstrated through simulation and hardware experiments.

Advanced AI models hold the promise of tremendous benefits for humanity, but society needs to proactively manage the accompanying risks. In this paper, we focus on what we term "frontier AI" models: highly capable foundation models that could possess dangerous capabilities sufficient to pose severe risks to public safety. Frontier AI models pose a distinct regulatory challenge: dangerous capabilities can arise unexpectedly; it is difficult to robustly prevent a deployed model from being misused; and, it is difficult to stop a model's capabilities from proliferating broadly. To address these challenges, at least three building blocks for the regulation of frontier models are needed: (1) standard-setting processes to identify appropriate requirements for frontier AI developers, (2) registration and reporting requirements to provide regulators with visibility into frontier AI development processes, and (3) mechanisms to ensure compliance with safety standards for the development and deployment of frontier AI models. Industry self-regulation is an important first step. However, wider societal discussions and government intervention will be needed to create standards and to ensure compliance with them. We consider several options to this end, including granting enforcement powers to supervisory authorities and licensure regimes for frontier AI models. Finally, we propose an initial set of safety standards. These include conducting pre-deployment risk assessments; external scrutiny of model behavior; using risk assessments to inform deployment decisions; and monitoring and responding to new information about model capabilities and uses post-deployment. We hope this discussion contributes to the broader conversation on how to balance public safety risks and innovation benefits from advances at the frontier of AI development.

Safety-critical perception systems require both reliable uncertainty quantification and principled abstention mechanisms to maintain safety under diverse operational conditions. We present a novel dual-threshold conformalization framework that provides statistically-guaranteed uncertainty estimates while enabling selective prediction in high-risk scenarios. Our approach uniquely combines a conformal threshold ensuring valid prediction sets with an abstention threshold optimized through ROC analysis, providing distribution-free coverage guarantees (\ge 1 - \alpha) while identifying unreliable predictions. Through comprehensive evaluation on CIFAR-100, ImageNet1K, and ModelNet40 datasets, we demonstrate superior robustness across camera and LiDAR modalities under varying environmental perturbations. The framework achieves exceptional detection performance (AUC: 0.993\to0.995) under severe conditions while maintaining high coverage (>90.0\%) and enabling adaptive abstention (13.5\%\to63.4\%\pm0.5) as environmental severity increases. For LiDAR-based perception, our approach demonstrates particularly strong performance, maintaining robust coverage (>84.5\%) while appropriately abstaining from unreliable predictions. Notably, the framework shows remarkable stability under heavy perturbations, with detection performance (AUC: 0.995\pm0.001) significantly outperforming existing methods across all modalities. Our unified approach bridges the gap between theoretical guarantees and practical deployment needs, offering a robust solution for safety-critical autonomous systems operating in challenging real-world conditions.

Recent advancements in large language model (LLM) agents have significantly accelerated scientific discovery automation, yet concurrently raised critical ethical and safety concerns. To systematically address these challenges, we introduce SafeScientist, an innovative AI scientist framework explicitly designed to enhance safety and ethical responsibility in AI-driven scientific exploration. SafeScientist proactively refuses ethically inappropriate or high-risk tasks and rigorously emphasizes safety throughout the research process. To achieve comprehensive safety oversight, we integrate multiple defensive mechanisms, including prompt monitoring, agent-collaboration monitoring, tool-use monitoring, and an ethical reviewer component. Complementing SafeScientist, we propose SciSafetyBench, a novel benchmark specifically designed to evaluate AI safety in scientific contexts, comprising 240 high-risk scientific tasks across 6 domains, alongside 30 specially designed scientific tools and 120 tool-related risk tasks. Extensive experiments demonstrate that SafeScientist significantly improves safety performance by 35\% compared to traditional AI scientist frameworks, without compromising scientific output quality. Additionally, we rigorously validate the robustness of our safety pipeline against diverse adversarial attack methods, further confirming the effectiveness of our integrated approach. The code and data will be available at https://github.com/ulab-uiuc/SafeScientist. red{Warning: this paper contains example data that may be offensive or harmful.}

Nova Premier is Amazon's most capable multimodal foundation model and teacher for model distillation. It processes text, images, and video with a one-million-token context window, enabling analysis of large codebases, 400-page documents, and 90-minute videos in a single prompt. We present the first comprehensive evaluation of Nova Premier's critical risk profile under the Frontier Model Safety Framework. Evaluations target three high-risk domains -- Chemical, Biological, Radiological & Nuclear (CBRN), Offensive Cyber Operations, and Automated AI R&D -- and combine automated benchmarks, expert red-teaming, and uplift studies to determine whether the model exceeds release thresholds. We summarize our methodology and report core findings. Based on this evaluation, we find that Nova Premier is safe for public release as per our commitments made at the 2025 Paris AI Safety Summit. We will continue to enhance our safety evaluation and mitigation pipelines as new risks and capabilities associated with frontier models are identified.

With the rapid advancement of Large Language Models (LLMs), significant safety concerns have emerged. Fundamentally, the safety of large language models is closely linked to the accuracy, comprehensiveness, and clarity of their understanding of safety knowledge, particularly in domains such as law, policy and ethics. This factuality ability is crucial in determining whether these models can be deployed and applied safely and compliantly within specific regions. To address these challenges and better evaluate the factuality ability of LLMs to answer short questions, we introduce the Chinese SafetyQA benchmark. Chinese SafetyQA has several properties (i.e., Chinese, Diverse, High-quality, Static, Easy-to-evaluate, Safety-related, Harmless). Based on Chinese SafetyQA, we perform a comprehensive evaluation on the factuality abilities of existing LLMs and analyze how these capabilities relate to LLM abilities, e.g., RAG ability and robustness against attacks.

Public LLMs such as the Llama 2-Chat have driven huge activity in LLM research. These models underwent alignment training and were considered safe. Recently Qi et al. (2023) reported that even benign fine-tuning (e.g., on seemingly safe datasets) can give rise to unsafe behaviors in the models. The current paper is about methods and best practices to mitigate such loss of alignment. Through extensive experiments on several chat models (Meta's Llama 2-Chat, Mistral AI's Mistral 7B Instruct v0.2, and OpenAI's GPT-3.5 Turbo), this paper uncovers that the prompt templates used during fine-tuning and inference play a crucial role in preserving safety alignment, and proposes the "Pure Tuning, Safe Testing" (PTST) principle -- fine-tune models without a safety prompt, but include it at test time. Fine-tuning experiments on GSM8K, ChatDoctor, and OpenOrca show that PTST significantly reduces the rise of unsafe behaviors, and even almost eliminates them in some cases.

As large language models (LLMs) become more capable and widely used, ensuring the safety of their outputs is increasingly critical. Existing guardrail models, though useful in static evaluation settings, face two major limitations in real-world applications: (1) they typically output only binary "safe/unsafe" labels, which can be interpreted inconsistently across diverse safety policies, rendering them incapable of accommodating varying safety tolerances across domains; and (2) they require complete model outputs before performing safety checks, making them fundamentally incompatible with streaming LLM inference, thereby preventing timely intervention during generation and increasing exposure to harmful partial outputs. To address these challenges, we present Qwen3Guard, a series of multilingual safety guardrail models with two specialized variants: Generative Qwen3Guard, which casts safety classification as an instruction-following task to enable fine-grained tri-class judgments (safe, controversial, unsafe); and Stream Qwen3Guard, which introduces a token-level classification head for real-time safety monitoring during incremental text generation. Both variants are available in three sizes (0.6B, 4B, and 8B parameters) and support up to 119 languages and dialects, providing comprehensive, scalable, and low-latency safety moderation for global LLM deployments. Evaluated across English, Chinese, and multilingual benchmarks, Qwen3Guard achieves state-of-the-art performance in both prompt and response safety classification. All models are released under the Apache 2.0 license for public use.

Verification and validation of autonomous driving (AD) systems and components is of increasing importance, as such technology increases in real-world prevalence. Safety-critical scenario generation is a key approach to robustify AD policies through closed-loop training. However, existing approaches for scenario generation rely on simplistic objectives, resulting in overly-aggressive or non-reactive adversarial behaviors. To generate diverse adversarial yet realistic scenarios, we propose SEAL, a scenario perturbation approach which leverages learned objective functions and adversarial, human-like skills. SEAL-perturbed scenarios are more realistic than SOTA baselines, leading to improved ego task success across real-world, in-distribution, and out-of-distribution scenarios, of more than 20%. To facilitate future research, we release our code and tools: https://github.com/cmubig/SEAL

Do LLMs robustly generalize critical safety facts to novel situations? Lacking this ability is dangerous when users ask naive questions. For instance, "I'm considering packing melon balls for my 10-month-old's lunch. What other foods would be good to include?" Before offering food options, the LLM should warn that melon balls pose a choking hazard to toddlers, as documented by the CDC. Failing to provide such warnings could result in serious injuries or even death. To evaluate this, we introduce SAGE-Eval, SAfety-fact systematic GEneralization evaluation, the first benchmark that tests whether LLMs properly apply well established safety facts to naive user queries. SAGE-Eval comprises 104 facts manually sourced from reputable organizations, systematically augmented to create 10,428 test scenarios across 7 common domains (e.g., Outdoor Activities, Medicine). We find that the top model, Claude-3.7-sonnet, passes only 58% of all the safety facts tested. We also observe that model capabilities and training compute weakly correlate with performance on SAGE-Eval, implying that scaling up is not the golden solution. Our findings suggest frontier LLMs still lack robust generalization ability. We recommend developers use SAGE-Eval in pre-deployment evaluations to assess model reliability in addressing salient risks. We publicly release SAGE-Eval at https://huggingface.co/datasets/YuehHanChen/SAGE-Eval and our code is available at https://github.com/YuehHanChen/SAGE-Eval/tree/main.

This paper presents a safety-critical control framework tailored for quadruped robots equipped with a roller arm, particularly when performing locomotive tasks such as autonomous robotic inspection in complex, multi-tiered environments. In this study, we consider the problem of operating a quadrupedal robot in distillation columns, locomoting on column trays and transitioning between these trays with a roller arm. To address this problem, our framework encompasses the following key elements: 1) Trajectory generation for seamless transitions between columns, 2) Foothold re-planning in regions deemed unsafe, 3) Safety-critical control incorporating control barrier functions, 4) Gait transitions based on safety levels, and 5) A low-level controller. Our comprehensive framework, comprising these components, enables autonomous and safe locomotion across multiple layers. We incorporate reduced-order and full-body models to ensure safety, integrating safety-critical control and footstep re-planning approaches. We validate the effectiveness of our proposed framework through practical experiments involving a quadruped robot equipped with a roller arm, successfully navigating and transitioning between different levels within the column tray structure.

With the development of artificial intelligence, dialogue systems have been endowed with amazing chit-chat capabilities, and there is widespread interest and discussion about whether the generated contents are socially beneficial. In this paper, we present a new perspective of research scope towards building a safe, responsible, and modal dialogue system, including 1) abusive and toxic contents, 2) unfairness and discrimination, 3) ethics and morality issues, and 4) risk of misleading and privacy information. Besides, we review the mainstream methods for evaluating the safety of large models from the perspectives of exposure and detection of safety issues. The recent advances in methodologies for the safety improvement of both end-to-end dialogue systems and pipeline-based models are further introduced. Finally, we discussed six existing challenges towards responsible AI: explainable safety monitoring, continuous learning of safety issues, robustness against malicious attacks, multimodal information processing, unified research framework, and multidisciplinary theory integration. We hope this survey will inspire further research toward safer dialogue systems.

As AI systems become more advanced, companies and regulators will make difficult decisions about whether it is safe to train and deploy them. To prepare for these decisions, we investigate how developers could make a 'safety case,' which is a structured rationale that AI systems are unlikely to cause a catastrophe. We propose a framework for organizing a safety case and discuss four categories of arguments to justify safety: total inability to cause a catastrophe, sufficiently strong control measures, trustworthiness despite capability to cause harm, and -- if AI systems become much more powerful -- deference to credible AI advisors. We evaluate concrete examples of arguments in each category and outline how arguments could be combined to justify that AI systems are safe to deploy.

Ensuring safety in reinforcement learning (RL)-based robotic systems is a critical challenge, especially in contact-rich tasks within unstructured environments. While the state-of-the-art safe RL approaches mitigate risks through safe exploration or high-level recovery mechanisms, they often overlook low-level execution safety, where reflexive responses to potential hazards are crucial. Similarly, variable impedance control (VIC) enhances safety by adjusting the robot's mechanical response, yet lacks a systematic way to adapt parameters, such as stiffness and damping throughout the task. In this paper, we propose Bresa, a Bio-inspired Reflexive Hierarchical Safe RL method inspired by biological reflexes. Our method decouples task learning from safety learning, incorporating a safety critic network that evaluates action risks and operates at a higher frequency than the task solver. Unlike existing recovery-based methods, our safety critic functions at a low-level control layer, allowing real-time intervention when unsafe conditions arise. The task-solving RL policy, running at a lower frequency, focuses on high-level planning (decision-making), while the safety critic ensures instantaneous safety corrections. We validate Bresa on multiple tasks including a contact-rich robotic task, demonstrating its reflexive ability to enhance safety, and adaptability in unforeseen dynamic environments. Our results show that Bresa outperforms the baseline, providing a robust and reflexive safety mechanism that bridges the gap between high-level planning and low-level execution. Real-world experiments and supplementary material are available at project website https://jack-sherman01.github.io/Bresa.

Safety aligned Large Language Models (LLMs) are vulnerable to harmful fine-tuning attacks qi2023fine-- a few harmful data mixed in the fine-tuning dataset can break the LLMs's safety alignment. Existing mitigation strategies include alignment stage solutions huang2024vaccine, rosati2024representation and fine-tuning stage solutions huang2024lazy,mukhoti2023fine. However, our evaluation shows that both categories of defenses fail when some specific training hyper-parameters are chosen -- a large learning rate or a large number of training epochs in the fine-tuning stage can easily invalidate the defense, which however, is necessary to guarantee finetune performance. To this end, we propose Antidote, a post-fine-tuning stage solution, which remains \textit{agnostic to the training hyper-parameters in the fine-tuning stage}. Antidote relies on the philosophy that by removing the harmful parameters, the harmful model can be recovered from the harmful behaviors, regardless of how those harmful parameters are formed in the fine-tuning stage. With this philosophy, we introduce a one-shot pruning stage after harmful fine-tuning to remove the harmful weights that are responsible for the generation of harmful content. Despite its embarrassing simplicity, empirical results show that Antidote can reduce harmful score while maintaining accuracy on downstream tasks.Our project page is at https://huangtiansheng.github.io/Antidote_gh_page/

Large Reasoning Models (LRMs) introduce a new generation paradigm of explicitly reasoning before answering, leading to remarkable improvements in complex tasks. However, they pose great safety risks against harmful queries and adversarial attacks. While recent mainstream safety efforts on LRMs, supervised fine-tuning (SFT), improve safety performance, we find that SFT-aligned models struggle to generalize to unseen jailbreak prompts. After thorough investigation of LRMs' generation, we identify a safety aha moment that can activate safety reasoning and lead to a safe response. This aha moment typically appears in the `key sentence', which follows models' query understanding process and can indicate whether the model will proceed safely. Based on these insights, we propose SafeKey, including two complementary objectives to better activate the safety aha moment in the key sentence: (1) a Dual-Path Safety Head to enhance the safety signal in the model's internal representations before the key sentence, and (2) a Query-Mask Modeling objective to improve the models' attention on its query understanding, which has important safety hints. Experiments across multiple safety benchmarks demonstrate that our methods significantly improve safety generalization to a wide range of jailbreak attacks and out-of-distribution harmful prompts, lowering the average harmfulness rate by 9.6\%, while maintaining general abilities. Our analysis reveals how SafeKey enhances safety by reshaping internal attention and improving the quality of hidden representations.

With the growing prevalence of large language models (LLMs), the safety of LLMs has raised significant concerns. However, there is still a lack of definitive standards for evaluating their safety due to the subjective nature of current safety benchmarks. To address this gap, we conducted the first exploration of LLMs' safety evaluation from a legal perspective by proposing the SafeLawBench benchmark. SafeLawBench categorizes safety risks into three levels based on legal standards, providing a systematic and comprehensive framework for evaluation. It comprises 24,860 multi-choice questions and 1,106 open-domain question-answering (QA) tasks. Our evaluation included 2 closed-source LLMs and 18 open-source LLMs using zero-shot and few-shot prompting, highlighting the safety features of each model. We also evaluated the LLMs' safety-related reasoning stability and refusal behavior. Additionally, we found that a majority voting mechanism can enhance model performance. Notably, even leading SOTA models like Claude-3.5-Sonnet and GPT-4o have not exceeded 80.5% accuracy in multi-choice tasks on SafeLawBench, while the average accuracy of 20 LLMs remains at 68.8\%. We urge the community to prioritize research on the safety of LLMs.

This paper introduces fourteen novel datasets for the evaluation of Large Language Models' safety in the context of enterprise tasks. A method was devised to evaluate a model's safety, as determined by its ability to follow instructions and output factual, unbiased, grounded, and appropriate content. In this research, we used OpenAI GPT as point of comparison since it excels at all levels of safety. On the open-source side, for smaller models, Meta Llama2 performs well at factuality and toxicity but has the highest propensity for hallucination. Mistral hallucinates the least but cannot handle toxicity well. It performs well in a dataset mixing several tasks and safety vectors in a narrow vertical domain. Gemma, the newly introduced open-source model based on Google Gemini, is generally balanced but trailing behind. When engaging in back-and-forth conversation (multi-turn prompts), we find that the safety of open-source models degrades significantly. Aside from OpenAI's GPT, Mistral is the only model that still performed well in multi-turn tests.

Large language models (LLMs) typically generate identical or similar responses for all users given the same prompt, posing serious safety risks in high-stakes applications where user vulnerabilities differ widely. Existing safety evaluations primarily rely on context-independent metrics - such as factuality, bias, or toxicity - overlooking the fact that the same response may carry divergent risks depending on the user's background or condition. We introduce personalized safety to fill this gap and present PENGUIN - a benchmark comprising 14,000 scenarios across seven sensitive domains with both context-rich and context-free variants. Evaluating six leading LLMs, we demonstrate that personalized user information significantly improves safety scores by 43.2%, confirming the effectiveness of personalization in safety alignment. However, not all context attributes contribute equally to safety enhancement. To address this, we develop RAISE - a training-free, two-stage agent framework that strategically acquires user-specific background. RAISE improves safety scores by up to 31.6% over six vanilla LLMs, while maintaining a low interaction cost of just 2.7 user queries on average. Our findings highlight the importance of selective information gathering in safety-critical domains and offer a practical solution for personalizing LLM responses without model retraining. This work establishes a foundation for safety research that adapts to individual user contexts rather than assuming a universal harm standard.

Fine-tuning Large Language Models (LLMs) with Low-Rank Adaptation (LoRA) enhances adaptability while reducing computational costs. However, fine-tuning can compromise safety alignment, even with benign data, increasing susceptibility to harmful outputs. Existing safety alignment methods struggle to capture complex parameter shifts, leading to suboptimal safety-utility trade-offs. To address this issue, we propose Safe Pruning LoRA (SPLoRA), a novel pruning-based approach that selectively removes LoRA layers that weaken safety alignment, improving safety while preserving performance. At its core, we introduce Empirical-DIEM (E-DIEM), a dimension-insensitive similarity metric that effectively detects safety misalignment in LoRA-adapted models. We conduct extensive experiments on LLMs fine-tuned with mixed of benign and malicious data, and purely benign datasets, evaluating SPLoRA across utility, safety, and reliability metrics. Results demonstrate that SPLoRA outperforms state-of-the-art safety alignment techniques, significantly reducing safety risks while maintaining or improving model performance and reliability. Additionally, SPLoRA reduces inference overhead, making it a scalable and efficient solution for deploying safer and more reliable LLMs. The code is available at https://github.com/AoShuang92/SPLoRA.

We explore the consequences of multi-trace deformations in applications of gauge-gravity duality to condensed matter physics. We find that they introduce a powerful new "knob" that can implement spontaneous symmetry breaking, and can be used to construct a new type of holographic superconductor. This knob can be tuned to drive the critical temperature to zero, leading to a new quantum critical point. We calculate nontrivial critical exponents, and show that fluctuations of the order parameter are `locally' quantum critical in the disordered phase. Most notably the dynamical critical exponent is determined by the dimension of an operator at the critical point. We argue that the results are robust against quantum corrections and discuss various generalizations.

Ensuring safety in Reinforcement Learning (RL), typically framed as a Constrained Markov Decision Process (CMDP), is crucial for real-world exploration applications. Current approaches in handling CMDP struggle to balance optimality and feasibility, as direct optimization methods cannot ensure state-wise in-training safety, and projection-based methods correct actions inefficiently through lengthy iterations. To address these challenges, we propose Adaptive Chance-constrained Safeguards (ACS), an adaptive, model-free safe RL algorithm using the safety recovery rate as a surrogate chance constraint to iteratively ensure safety during exploration and after achieving convergence. Theoretical analysis indicates that the relaxed probabilistic constraint sufficiently guarantees forward invariance to the safe set. And extensive experiments conducted on both simulated and real-world safety-critical tasks demonstrate its effectiveness in enforcing safety (nearly zero-violation) while preserving optimality (+23.8%), robustness, and fast response in stochastic real-world settings.

Reinforcement learning (RL) agents need to explore their environments in order to learn optimal policies. In many environments and tasks, safety is of critical importance. The widespread use of simulators offers a number of advantages, including safe exploration which will be inevitable in cases when RL systems need to be trained directly in the physical environment (e.g. in human-robot interaction). The popular Safety Gym library offers three mobile agent types that can learn goal-directed tasks while considering various safety constraints. In this paper, we extend the applicability of safe RL algorithms by creating a customized environment with Panda robotic arm where Safety Gym algorithms can be tested. We performed pilot experiments with the popular PPO algorithm comparing the baseline with the constrained version and show that the constrained version is able to learn the equally good policy while better complying with safety constraints and taking longer training time as expected.

Large Reasoning Models (LRMs) have achieved remarkable success on reasoning-intensive tasks such as mathematics and programming. However, their enhanced reasoning capabilities do not necessarily translate to improved safety performance-and in some cases, may even degrade it. This raises an important research question: how can we enhance the safety of LRMs? In this paper, we present a comprehensive empirical study on how to enhance the safety of LRMs through Supervised Fine-Tuning (SFT). Our investigation begins with an unexpected observation: directly distilling safe responses from DeepSeek-R1 fails to significantly enhance safety. We analyze this phenomenon and identify three key failure patterns that contribute to it. We then demonstrate that explicitly addressing these issues during the data distillation process can lead to substantial safety improvements. Next, we explore whether a long and complex reasoning process is necessary for achieving safety. Interestingly, we find that simply using short or template-based reasoning process can attain comparable safety performance-and are significantly easier for models to learn than more intricate reasoning chains. These findings prompt a deeper reflection on the role of reasoning in ensuring safety. Finally, we find that mixing math reasoning data during safety fine-tuning is helpful to balance safety and over-refusal. Overall, we hope our empirical study could provide a more holistic picture on enhancing the safety of LRMs. The code and data used in our experiments are released in https://github.com/thu-coai/LRM-Safety-Study.

Optimizing large language models (LLMs) for downstream use cases often involves the customization of pre-trained LLMs through further fine-tuning. Meta's open release of Llama models and OpenAI's APIs for fine-tuning GPT-3.5 Turbo on custom datasets also encourage this practice. But, what are the safety costs associated with such custom fine-tuning? We note that while existing safety alignment infrastructures can restrict harmful behaviors of LLMs at inference time, they do not cover safety risks when fine-tuning privileges are extended to end-users. Our red teaming studies find that the safety alignment of LLMs can be compromised by fine-tuning with only a few adversarially designed training examples. For instance, we jailbreak GPT-3.5 Turbo's safety guardrails by fine-tuning it on only 10 such examples at a cost of less than $0.20 via OpenAI's APIs, making the model responsive to nearly any harmful instructions. Disconcertingly, our research also reveals that, even without malicious intent, simply fine-tuning with benign and commonly used datasets can also inadvertently degrade the safety alignment of LLMs, though to a lesser extent. These findings suggest that fine-tuning aligned LLMs introduces new safety risks that current safety infrastructures fall short of addressing -- even if a model's initial safety alignment is impeccable, it is not necessarily to be maintained after custom fine-tuning. We outline and critically analyze potential mitigations and advocate for further research efforts toward reinforcing safety protocols for the custom fine-tuning of aligned LLMs.

When considering the accuracy of sensors in an automated vehicle (AV), it is not sufficient to evaluate the performance of any given sensor in isolation. Rather, the performance of any individual sensor must be considered in the context of the overall system design. Techniques like redundancy and different sensing modalities can reduce the chances of a sensing failure. Additionally, the use of safety models is essential to understanding whether any particular sensing failure is relevant. Only when the entire system design is taken into account can one properly understand the meaning of safety-relevant sensing failures in an AV. In this paper, we will consider what should actually constitute a sensing failure, how safety models play an important role in mitigating potential failures, how a system-level approach to safety will deliver a safe and scalable AV, and what an acceptable sensing failure rate should be considering the full picture of an AV's architecture.

The rapid development of Multimodal Large Reasoning Models (MLRMs) has demonstrated broad application potential, yet their safety and reliability remain critical concerns that require systematic exploration. To address this gap, we conduct a comprehensive and systematic safety evaluation of 11 MLRMs across 5 benchmarks and unveil prevalent safety degradation phenomena in most advanced models. Moreover, our analysis reveals distinct safety patterns across different benchmarks: significant safety degradation is observed across jailbreak robustness benchmarks, whereas safety-awareness benchmarks demonstrate less pronounced degradation. In particular, the long thought process in some scenarios even enhances safety performance. Therefore, it is a potential approach to address safety issues in MLRMs by leveraging the intrinsic reasoning capabilities of the model to detect unsafe intent. To operationalize this insight, we construct a multimodal tuning dataset that incorporates a safety-oriented thought process. Experimental results from fine-tuning existing MLRMs with this dataset effectively enhances the safety on both jailbreak robustness and safety-awareness benchmarks. This study provides a new perspective for developing safe MLRMs. Our dataset is available at https://github.com/xinyuelou/Think-in-Safety.

Without proper safeguards, large language models will readily follow malicious instructions and generate toxic content. This motivates safety efforts such as red-teaming and large-scale feedback learning, which aim to make models both helpful and harmless. However, there is a tension between these two objectives, since harmlessness requires models to refuse complying with unsafe prompts, and thus not be helpful. Recent anecdotal evidence suggests that some models may have struck a poor balance, so that even clearly safe prompts are refused if they use similar language to unsafe prompts or mention sensitive topics. In this paper, we introduce a new test suite called XSTest to identify such eXaggerated Safety behaviours in a structured and systematic way. In its current form, XSTest comprises 200 safe prompts across ten prompt types that well-calibrated models should not refuse to comply with. We describe XSTest's creation and composition, and use the test suite to highlight systematic failure modes in a recently-released state-of-the-art language model.