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Over the past five years, CNA has conducted studies in support of Department of Defense Voluntary Education, with a specific focus on evaluating Servicemembers' use of the Tuition Assistance (TA) program, their associated educational outcomes, and potential changes to TA policies and practices. This report is a compilation of four CNA studies; it includes Service- and education-sector–level comparisons in student enrollment, cost, TA use, and positive TA outcomes (e.g., attaining a degree or having a high course completion rate). One of our primary findings is that TA users can expect a more successful transition to civilian life, though some of these benefits (e.g., improved employment prospects) can be reaped only with a degree. We also find that, despite the relatively poor outcomes at private for-profit institutions, TA users increasingly enroll in them. Our analysis also reveals which Servicemembers—based on military and demographic characteristics—are most likely to be successful TA users. We identify those subpopulations who are among the Services' more active TA users but also the least likely to experience positive TA outcomes, thus highlighting groups that might benefit from targeted counseling efforts. Finally, we make recommendations to help equalize access to the TA program across the Services and increase all TA users' likelihood of completing courses and ultimately attaining degrees.

PRC media has presented a thoroughly sanitized version of the war in Ukraine that blames the US for the conflict and avoids depicting Russia in an unflattering light, while largely refraining from deeper analysis of Russian and Ukrainian military performance, including the use of AI and autonomy in the war. However, we continue to follow allegations that DJI has altered its UAV technology to give Russia an edge in the conflict. As a result of the allegations, last week German electronics retailer MediaMarkt removed all DJI products from its shelves. Meanwhile, the PLA Daily has published articles pondering the role of humans in future warfare, with one author from the PLA Naval Research Academy envisioning that humans will continue to play a fundamental role even as autonomous systems become more advanced and ubiquitous. We also report that the PRC has published new ethical guidance that articulates five overarching principles for science and technology research. PRC researchers have been using AI to develop engines for hypersonic missiles and planes and to enhance skid landing systems. PRC researchers have also been involved in projects involving brain-computer interfaces, including using AI to improve technology that allows a machine to be directed by a human's brain to control a robotic arm—an experiment that reportedly has the potential to transform how astronauts operate the giant arm on the Chinese space station.

Recognizing the urgent need for transparency, accountability, and legitimacy, the San Jose Independent Police Auditor—through a competitive bid—selected CNA's Center for Justice Research and Innovation to complete an assessment of the San Jose Police Department's (SJPD) implementation of recommendations and action items found within the President's Task Force on 21st Century Policing report, published in 2015. This work coincided with an assessment of the SJPD's use of force and was completed by members of the same team. The 21st Century Policing assessment focused on the six areas found within the Task Force's report: - Building Trust and Legitimacy - Policy and Oversight - Technology and Social Media - Community Policing and Crime Reduction - Training and Education - Officer Wellness and Safety In this executive summary, we present a summary of the findings of our assessment and a summary of the key recommendations offered to SJPD and the city. We encourage interested individuals to read the details in the body of this report, where they will find the complete assessment of all recommendations and action items, and detailed supporting evidence for our findings and recommendations. See Appendices C and D for the full list of findings and recommendations. Through interviews, document reviews, community listening sessions, and data analyses, the team discovered the following key themes: Summary of Key Findings - The SJPD implemented or has made substantial progress on implementing many of the recommendations and action items of the President's Task Force on 21st Century Policing - SJPD operates with fewer officers per capita than other cities of similar size - The SJPD has taken significant steps to creating a diverse workforce though a comprehensive recruitment approach - The SJPD does not consistently collect empirical data on public sentiment related to trust and legitimacy - The SJPD does not consistently collect public input on policies, training, and operations - The SJPD does measure the impact of their organizational change efforts

Recognizing the urgent need for transparency, accountability, and legitimacy, the Mayor and City Council of San Jose, California directed staff to obtain an assessment of the San Jose Police Department's (SJPD) use of force. CNA's Center for Justice Research and Innovation was chosen through a competitive bid process coordinated by the Independent Police Auditor (IPA). This work coincided with an assessment of the SJPD's efforts to bring the department in line with the recommended best practices promoted in the President's Task Force on 21st Century Policing report and was completed by members of the same team. The use of force assessment focused on four key areas: - A review of the SJPD's use of force policies, procedures, training, and events. - An examination into the characteristics of use of force events, including disparity across racial and ethnic groupings. - The impact COVID-19 and social justice movements for policing reform had on calls for service and use of force. - Disparity in use of force behaviors and sustained injuries across racial and ethnic groupings. In this executive summary, we present a summary of the findings of our assessment and a summary of the key recommendations offered to SJPD and the city. We encourage interested individuals to read the details in the body of this report, where they will find detailed the supporting evidence associated with our 39 findings and 51 recommendations. See Appendix B for the full list of findings and recommendations. Through interviews, document reviews, community listening session, and data analyses, the team discovered the following key themes: Summary of key findings - Many of the SJPD use of force policies reflect best practices in the field. - The SJPD Duty Manual does not define levels of resistance and does not consistently indicate which level of resistance would justify various force options. - The SJPD does not have a use of force review board. - The SJPD does not provide sufficient clarity in the definition of force. - The SJPD does not provide sufficient clarity on some elements related to electronic control weapons. - The SJPD does not provide sufficient post-incident guidelines for officers, particularly for incidents involving lethal force.

1. THE UKRAINE CRISIS: VIEWS OF US-RUSSIA NEGOTIATIONS Negotiations between the United States and Russia over the Ukraine-Russia crisis are widely discussed across Russian media, from a variety of angles. Most commentators are in agreement that the United States and its allies are engaging in bad-faith negotiations, given their continued military-technical support for Ukraine, although some note concern with Russian posture. The negotiations themselves are seen as a first step, and meetings with Secretary Blinken and Foreign Minister Lavrov, as well as the formal diplomatic response from the United States to Russia over their treaty proposals, are treated in a variety of ways. 2. THE UKRAINE CRISIS: PERCEPTIONS OF US STRATEGY In discussing the current confrontation between the United States and Russia, a number of publications consider causal factors affecting US strategy. The focus is on the impact of the withdrawal from Afghanistan and its effect on US assessments of geopolitical risks and US aggressiveness. The articles also discuss the US predilection for narcissism and double standards. Some analysts do note the clear rejection of a military response by US leadership as leaving open the possibility of a compromise solution.

This study identifies the dimensions of autonomous decision-making (DADs)—the categories and causes of potential risk that one should consider before transferring decision-making capabilities to an intelligent autonomous system (IAS). The objective of this study was to provide some of the tools needed to implement existing policies with respect to the legal, ethical, and militarily effective use of IAS. These tools help to identify and either mitigate or accept the risks associated with the use of IAS that might result in a negative outcome. The 13 identified DADs were developed from a comprehensive list of 565 "risk elements" drawn from hundreds of documents authored by parties in favor of, and opposed to, the use of autonomy technology in weapons systems. We record these elements in the form of a question so that they can be used by the acquisition community to develop requirements documents that ensure the ethical use of autonomous systems, and be used by military commanders as a risk assessment checklist to ensure that autonomous systems are not used in an unethical manner. In this way, the Department of Defense can make fully-informed risk assessment decisions before developing or deploying autonomous systems.

1. THE CRISIS IN US-RUSSIA RELATIONS Russian media devoted extensive coverage to the crisis in relations between Russia and the West. Discussion of the Russian set of proposals for a new security agreement for Europe, and the subsequent videoconference between presidents Putin and Biden, was a major aspect of the coverage. Russia's publication of a draft agreement is seen as a show of strength by President Putin, though most authors believe that the United States will reject the proposal. The December 30 conversation is portrayed primarily as a way for the two principals to clearly define their positions prior to the start of bilateral talks in mid January. 2. PERCEPTIONS OF US AND NATO STRATEGY Several long articles published in late December 2021 describe Russian perceptions of the strategy being pursued by the United States and NATO to contain and weaken Russia. Several articles highlight Russian perceptions that the United States is focused on organizing regime change in Russia and its allies, including through hybrid warfare. Other articles discuss the US shift to Asia as part of a continuing effort to preserve US hegemony in the world.

. THE UKRAINE CRISIS The continuing crisis between Russia and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) over Ukraine has remained the dominant topic of Russian media coverage for the fourth reporting period in a row, with at least 14 articles on the topic published in the Russian press. The articles can be grouped into three broad areas. The first highlights Western military activity in the region and assistance to Ukraine, and the extent to which these efforts are threatening to Russia; the second focuses on Western statements about how the West would respond to a Russian invasion of Ukraine; and the third addresses the Biden-Putin virtual summit and its potential implications for resolving the crisis. 2. RUSSIA-NATO SECURITY NEGOTIATIONS Several articles address recent developments in NATO-Russia relations, in particular Russia's calls to discuss its security concerns. One article addresses Putin's December 1 statement that Russia would seek assurances that NATO will not expand eastward, taking a pessimistic stance about whether the West would sign on to any binding document. A second article discusses Biden's announcement that Russia and "at least four of our major NATO allies" would plan a meeting to discuss Moscow's security concerns, following his video meeting with Putin. Finally, a third article highlights a range of Russian opinions on the December 17 security demands published by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

The ability of a police department to act in a fair and just manner is vitally important to creating internal and external trust, which in turn increases the perception of legitimacy by those who work for the department and those the department serves. Law enforcement agencies across the U.S. have faced increased scrutiny from the public in the last several years, with the events of 2020 exacerbating already simmering community relationships. The City of Little Rock has experienced recent issues of internal and external legitimacy stemming from the officer-involved shooting of Bradley Blackshire, a Black man, who was killed by a Little Rock Police Department (LRPD) officer in February 2019. The incident, in which Mr. Blackshire was fired upon at least 15 times, led not only to backlash from the public, but also internal strife within the LRPD. Since the February 2019 incident, the City of Little Rock, LRPD, the Chief of Police, and other members of LRPD have been the subjects of various lawsuits.

1. WESTERN SUPPORT FOR UKRAINE Over the past two weeks, Western support for Ukraine has been the most frequent topic for discussion in Russian articles focused on Western military activities. Topics include a review of the impact of Lloyd Austin's visit to the region, reaction to Western statements on increased tension in the Donbas, and concern about direct NATO military support for Ukraine. The articles generally minimize the significance of Russian troop movements in the region and suggest that while Western armaments have not improved Ukrainian military capabilities, Ukraine joining NATO would pose an existential threat for Russia. 2. NATO MILITARY ACTIVITIES IN THE BLACK SEA During this reporting period, Russian media extensively covered US and NATO military activities in the Black Sea region, with five articles related to this topic found in the search material. Much of the coverage centers on the arrival of USS Mount Whitney and USS Porter in the region. Most of the articles also share a common theme—namely, that this deployment is tied to the Western support for Ukraine described in the previous section. The arrival of the ships is described as part of a larger effort by the United States to increase pressure on Russia near its borders, which includes the increase in tensions in the Donbas.

In the approach to, and in the wake of, the January 6, 2021, attack on the US Capitol, a series of reports called attention to the potential threat posed by extremists in the military. This issue is an exceptionally challenging one for a number of reasons including, but not limited to: little existing data on the problem, poorly defined key terms, and a high degree of politicization. In an effort to help inform the work of responding to this challenge, our research team set out to identify an analogous issue that DOD has addressed, which might serve as a model for addressing the challenge posed by racial extremism. We concluded that sexual harassment and sexual assault was the most fitting parallel. Specifically, we note that both sexual harassment/assault and racial extremism are best understood not as isolated illegal activities undertaken by "a few bad apples," but as existing on continuums of harm in which tolerance of less onerous behaviors leads to more egregious offenses, ultimately damaging military cohesion and readiness. Recognizing these parallels, we (1) identified the features of DOD's sexual harassment and sexual assault responses that were most relevant to the challenge posed by racial extremism and (2) articulated the precise lessons we thought could be learned from DOD's effort to deal with the problem of sexual harassment and sexual assault.

1.NATO-RUSSIA RELATIONS NATO's relations with Russia were a dominant topic of discussion in Russian media during the reporting period. The conversation covered a range of issues, including the continuing deterioration of diplomatic relations, perception of the new NATO Concept for Deterrence and Defense of the Euro-Atlantic Area, NATO military activities near Russia's borders, the framing of continuing efforts at Russian-Belarussian defense integration as a response to such activities, and the possibility of separate EU security structures being established. The overall tenor was one of concern about the increase in hostility between NATO and Russia, combined with reassurances that Russia's nuclear arsenal is sufficient to prevent the outbreak of war. 2.US AND ALLIED POLICIES TOWARD UKRAINE The Russian media extensively discussed US and allied policies toward Ukraine—specifically, the recent visit of Ambassador Victoria Nuland to Moscow, the visit of Secretary of Defense Lloyd Austin to Ukraine and Georgia, and the UK sale of naval systems to Ukraine. Commentators speculated about the reasons for Ambassador Nuland's visit, and on whether the main reason really was Ukraine, noting that the visit regrettably did not improve the consular crisis between the US and Russia, which only has the potential of getting worse. The coverage of Secretary Austin's visit to Ukraine noted that US policy on Ukraine favors the status quo despite rhetoric to the contrary. Commentators also discussed UK efforts to improve Ukraine's naval security as well as the claims that Ukraine's top military academy has engaged in training members of neo-Nazi organizations.

Russian strategy is best characterized as offensive, seeking to revise the status quo, resulting in an activist foreign policy. The strategy does not eschew selective engagement in areas of mutual interest, but it is not premised on accommodation, concessions, or acceptance of the current balance of power. Instead, it emphasizes building the military means necessary for direct competition, and using them to enable indirect approaches for pursuing state objectives. Direct means range from conventional and nuclear force modernization, expansion of force structure in the European theater, exercises, brinksmanship, and use of force to attain vital interests. They deter US responses, threaten escalation, and create freedom of maneuver for Russian foreign policy. These are principally ways of compressing the opponent, and focusing on the main theater in the competition, which for Moscow is Europe. Indirect means in turn include military deployments abroad to peripheral theaters, covert action, use of proxies and mercenary groups, political warfare and information confrontation. These instruments are interrelated, with direct approaches, tied closely to military capability or classical forms of deterrence, enabling the indirect approach, which is the principal way by which Moscow pursues political aims. The logic of Russian strategy is that absent the ability to generate strong economic or technological means, Moscow is best served with approaches that reduce US performance by disorganizing its opponent's efforts, reducing cohesion, and employing asymmetric means in the competition.

1.RUSSIAN REACTIONS TO THE AUKUS INDO-PACIFIC ALLIANCE An in-depth analysis of the AUKUS (United States, Australia, and United Kingdom) alliance, published in Nezavisimoe Voennoe Obozrenie, argues that the alliance is part of an ongoing US strategy to reduce the influence of China and, to a lesser extent, Russia in the Indo-Pacific region. But given the long timeline for the construction of Australia's new nuclear submarines, the alliance will not change the strategic balance in the region any time soon. Enhancing US effectiveness in this confrontation was considered worth the risk of serious tensions with France. Other articles argue that it will take time for France and the US to restore mutual trust, given the severity of the offense. 2.RUSSIAN ANALYSTS DISCUSS NEW COLD WAR, SPACE DETERRENCE Two recent articles discuss the ongoing evolution in the US-Russia strategic relationship from very different perspectives. In an article in Slon, Aleksandr Golts argues that Moscow and Washington will be forced into a policy of "peaceful coexistence" like the one during the Cold War in order to make the world safer in the face of a possible nuclear war. An article in Voenno-promyshlennyi kur'er warns of an evolving US policy of deterrence against Russia and China that, in addition to nuclear and non-nuclear deterrence, now also encompasses the space domain.

Navy senior leadership's recent effort to address innovation in the fleet continues a long tradition of naval innovation, and especially among dedicated innovation organizations. Some of these organizations still exist, such as the Naval Expeditions (NavalX) Agility Office, or Program Executive Office Enterprise Information Systems (PEO EIS) Innovation Cell, while others, having fulfilled their mission or were subject to external drivers, were eventually shuttered (e.g., the Strategic Studies Group and Deep Blue). One common thread among many of these innovation organizations is their attempt to address a wide range of innovative products but their lack of optimal organization to deliver. For instance, Deep Blue was given the broad mandate to innovate "new ways to fight wars" across various "cognitive" domains: intelligence, future operating concepts, manning, technology, operational art, and tactics [1]. Lacking a common framework or language to describe desired "innovation" can hinder how the Navy organizes to achieve innovation goals [2]. Having a more descriptive language would support design efforts in creating an organization optimally organized to achieve the type of desired innovation. All of this raises the question: What type of innovation does the Navy want? Below, we provide a rough framework to categorize innovation and provide other considerations that can affect how an organization should organize for innovation.

Over the last decade, the Albany Police Department (APD) has pushed forward to engage the community in a positive manner, moving towards a mission that is focused on community policing practices. During this time, the Community Policing Review Board and the Common Council have recommended police reforms and legislation changes to further improve the police department, and they have called for change to address perceived disparate treatment of minority communities. Following recent high-profile events, including the First Street Incident and the shooting of Mr. Ellazar Williams, APD has striven to improve their transparency and implement initiatives to increase community trust. Both of these incidents, along with the eruptions of public protests across the country, led the City of Albany to initiate an evaluation of policy, procedures, and practices of the police department. In addition, this audit will provide baseline information to inform the City of Albany's response to Governor Andrew M. Cuomo's Executive Order No. 203: New York State Police Reform and Reinvention Collaborative.1 In August of 2020, the City of Albany, through a competitive bid, selected the CNA Center for Justice Research and Innovation to conduct a racial bias audit of the APD.

The Presidential Charter for the 13th Quadrennial Review of Military Compensation directed it to estimate the number of servicemembers who qualify for the Supplemental Nutrition Assistance Program (SNAP). In this study, we use the Public Assistance Reporting Information System (PARIS), which includes information on people who receive SNAP and other federal benefits, to estimate how many active component servicemembers qualify for SNAP. The data include information from participating states and represent the most authoritative data ever used to estimate servicemembers' enrollment in SNAP. After we control for anomalies that we conclude are an indication that a significant number of servicemembers in the PARIS data are no longer members of households receiving SNAP benefits, we conclude that between 0.08 percent and 0.42 percent of the approximately 1.1 million servicemembers stationed in the US are enrolled in SNAP at any point in time. For reference, approximately 9.6 percent of adults in the US age 18 to 59 were enrolled in SNAP in 2018. Junior enlisted members represent the largest number of SNAP recipients, and they are the most likely to be enrolled in SNAP. When we combine paygrade and dependents, servicemembers in paygrades E-2 to E-4 with three or more dependents are far more likely to be enrolled in SNAP than all other servicemembers. Even so, fewer than 5 percent of these servicemembers are enrolled in SNAP. The Army has the least restrictions on accessions with dependents and has accessed far more with several dependents in the past few years than the other services; its junior enlisted servicemembers are the most likely to be enrolled in SNAP. Junior enlisted servicemembers advance rather quickly, however, so it is likely that most of these members are receiving SNAP benefits for a relatively short period. Servicemembers who stopped receiving SNAP benefits were enrolled in SNAP in the same state for about 8 months.

The Director of the 13th Quadrennial Review of Military Compensation (QRMC) asked CNA to determine state and District of Columbia eligibility requirements for Supplemental Nutrition Assistance Program (SNAP) benefits, to identify which military allowances and in-kind benefits count toward eligibility, and to estimate the number of active component servicemembers who would be eligible for SNAP. We were also asked to estimate the number of servicemembers serving in the United States who would be eligible for the Family Subsistence Supplemental Allowance (FSSA) if it were reinstated for those servicemembers. We found that no servicemember without dependents would qualify for SNAP in any Military Housing Area (MHA) and that no servicemember with dependents above the paygrade of E-7 would qualify. While fewer in numbers, members who live on base and receive quarters-in-kind (that is, they do not receive Basic Allowance for Housing) are far more likely to be eligible for SNAP than their peers who have dependents and do not live on base because the in-kind benefit is not considered income for SNAP purposes. We estimate that far fewer servicemembers would be eligible for FSSA if it were made available in the United States because the value of quarters provided in-kind is imputed as income when determining eligibility for FSSA.

This report considers one of the potential effects of a DOD move to a single-salary system (SSS): changes in servicemember retention driven by changes in marriage behavior. It analyzes the effects that a move to an SSS is likely to have on the percentage of servicemembers who are married and studies the changes in retention rates and force size that may be induced by any changes in marriage behavior. Our approach includes a review of the literature on the relationships between compensation, marital status, and retention; computation of pay changes under different SSS implementation scenarios; estimation of the effect of marital status on retention using personnel data; and development of a model that can forecast marriage rates and force size over time. Overall, we find that these effects are likely to be small, so there is little need for policy-makers to be concerned about these effects when considering a change to an SSS.

In this CNA Occasional Paper, Andrew Monaghan examines Russian military strategy. Monaghan frames an analysis of Russian military strategy in terms of sustained Russian debate about the changing character of war, especially since the mid 2010s, and how this debate has recently turned to focus on military strategy in modern conditions. It makes several key arguments. First, history permeates the contemporary Russian debate, featuring both in the way that military experience is rendered into didactic lessons of history to advance military science, and in the arc of the theoretical development of Russian military strategy—it is not possible to parse today's discussion without knowledge of this history. Second, military strategy is specifically and clearly defined in the Russian lexicon as the "highest sphere of military art," the art of higher command comprising the bridge between the theory and practice of war. Military strategy is explicitly subordinate to state policy. Third, there are constraints on military strategy, particularly in terms of the implementation of plans. Moscow's re-examination of military strategy has important implications for Western audiences. While many are focused on Moscow's measures short of war, this paper highlights the importance that the Russian military still accords the use of armed force. Moreover, it suggests the need to move beyond thinking in terms of the blurring of the lines between war and peace, to the blurring of the lines between the offensive and the defensive.

In January 2017, CNA published a 300-plus page report, AI, Robots, and Swarms, that examines the conceptual, technical, and operational challenges facing the Department of Defense (DOD) as it pursues AI-based technologies. This white paper is a sequel that brings the 2017 report up to date. It begins with a brief summary of the US Federal Government's and DOD's most recent AI investments, the establishment of the Joint Artificial Intelligence Center (JAIC), and several significant AI-ethics-related events and trends. The rest of the paper is a long narrative that consists of three interwoven parts: Part One compares (and highlights the lack of consensus between) how the academic research community defines AI and how DOD defines it, provides a short history of AI, and offers two complementary views of AI, one as a categorical taxonomy of algorithms, the other as a field of scientific discovery; Part Two summarizes emerging themes and issues, discusses how the AI research community has responded to the COVID-19 pandemic (along with "lessons learned" for DOD), and concludes with evidence that suggests that AI/ML may be entering (or has already entered) an era of diminishing returns; and Part Three introduces a "template of a framework" designed to help bridge the gap between "understanding AI" and operationalizing its military applications. The appendices provide a stand-alone information resource that consists of over 20 high-resolution mindmaps organized around a variety of study-related topics: e.g., taxonomies of AI methods and algorithms; recent breakthroughs and milestones; and gaps, challenges, and limitations of basic AI research. The mindmaps, collectively, contain 800-plus embedded hot-link references.

Seafarers are an integral, if often overlooked, workforce, people who are essential both to individual communities and to the global economy. From navies and coast guards, to commercial industries such as fishing, shipping, and tourism, a healthy and valued workforce at sea is central to global stability. The COVID-19 pandemic and its unintended side effects across the blue economy have disproportionally hit seafarers, from those lacking ready access to medical care at sea, to those suffering economic damages while stranded ashore. Port state obstacles to crew rotations, isolation due to COVID-19 social distancing guidelines, restricted shore leave, extended contracts, and erratic port state guidance directly endanger mariners' livelihoods and their mental health. The COVID-19 pandemic has underscored how readily these frontline workers can slip out of view. Mariners face immediate health risks from COVID-19 exposure, risks similar to those faced by nurses, delivery drivers, and grocery store clerks, but often serve without the dignity and resources that can come with being formally deemed essential. Yet efforts to safeguard mariners from COVID-19 differ depending on industry, in many cases with cost and risk falling squarely on the mariners themselves. What emerges from this network of interlocking risks is the need for robust action across every stakeholder group—including the public—to safeguard seafarers and society while promoting dignity and stability for a critical workforce. This policy paper, reflecting ongoing work by CNA to understand these risks to mariners, is meant to contribute to a global conversation on the risks mariners face and some of the steps necessary to protect and sustain these vulnerable workers and the societies that rely upon them.

There is today a burgeoning discussion in the literature as to what really constitutes a "special operation," what makes the forces that conduct them "special," whether these aspects are so different from conventional military operations and forces as to warrant their own theory, and, if they do, what such a theory should be. This paper addresses an aspect of special operations that has yet to be explained adequately—the question of why special operations are conducted. The answer lies in the consideration of risk. Because policy-makers are inherently reliant upon some form of popular support to maintain their positions of power, they are also inherently averse to taking risky actions. The centrality of risk to policy decisions leads directly to this definition: special operations are unorthodox military solutions to difficult policy problems that lower the level of risk to policy-makers. This definition leads to a risk-centric theory of why special operations are conducted: if policy-makers have a difficult policy problem and they are unsatisfied with the level of risk presented by orthodox solutions or inaction, then they will choose special operations. After deriving this theory, this paper evaluates it, applies it to the raid on Osama bin Laden's compound in Pakistan, and discusses implications of the theory for the future of US special operations forces.

This report focuses on two distinct, but related topics: enlistment waivers and entry-level separations. The waiver process recognizes that some young people have made mistakes and overcome their past behavior or have had a medical condition that warrants review. A one-time incident or issue may not accurately reflect the character or potential for someone to serve. ELS length and administrative separation policies provide an orderly means to discharge those found to be unsuitable to serve. In this light, two offices within the OSD–Personnel and Readiness (the Offices of the Under Secretary of Defense for Accession Policy (AP) and Officer and Enlisted Personnel Management (OEPM)) asked CNA to evaluate the Services' policies, practices, and successes for determining suitability for service at accession (enlistment waivers) and in service (ELS length and reasons for early separation). In this second of two reports, we 1) determine the probability of, and reasons for, separation among those who access with enlistment waivers, 2) examine the arguments for and against extending ELS, as well as inconsistencies in ELS separation reasons, and 3) make recommendations.

This study examines the Services' policies and practices for determining suitability for service at accession (enlistment waivers) and in service (entry-level separations). Prior to 2008, waiver criteria differed by Service, and no common Department of Defense (DoD) waivers existed. At that time, drug and medical Service waivers were the riskiest waivers and misconduct and dependent Service waivers were the least risky. For entry-level separations, we conclude that the establishment of entry-level status (ELS) at 180 days in 1982 was based on the accrual of veterans' benefits, not typical entry-level training (ELT) length. The Air Force and Marine Corps would like ELS to be extended past 180 days (the end of ELT was the most common length) to have more assessment time, separate the unsuitable with ease, and provide equity to all trainees. The Army section with whom we spoke does not want ELS extended because there are Service alternatives and a loss of benefits associated with any longer ELS length. We were unable to speak to Navy representatives. We assert that extending ELS to the end of ELT would be a net positive for the Services and marginally performing members, and a net negative for the Department of Veterans Affairs, states, and members who would have earned Honorable discharges, unless the latter receives eligibility determinations. In our other report, we examine the riskiness and frequency of DoD-defined waivers and also determine the predictors of early separation.

Enlisted recruiting is the heart of the All-Volunteer Force (AVF). The young men and women the Services recruit will define what the military force will look like in numbers and characteristics. Because the military is a hierarchical organization—that is, people enlist in the military as youth and advance through the ranks as they age—the Services must find recruits with the attributes that will make them successful Soldiers, Sailors, Airmen, and Marines today and in the future. To sustain the volunteer military, the Services need to attract a sufficient number and quality of recruits to maintain their desired force profiles, by years of service and paygrade. For a constant enlisted force endstrength, annual military enlistments must equal annual separations. If there is an increase in the number of people who leave the Service or if endstrength increases, recruiters must work harder to achieve higher recruiting goals to make up the difference [1]. In short, a successful volunteer military begins with recruiting—the engine of the AVF. If the Services do not recruit what they need, the AVF's viability is questioned, the force is degraded, military readiness is threatened,

Law enforcement agencies continue to develop new and innovative strategies to better support and police the communities they serve, from integrating gunshot detection technologies into dispatch systems to improve response times during shootings, to collaborating with local health and social service organizations to address issues such as homelessness or substance abuse in comprehensively ways. Over the past 10 years, the Bureau of Justice Assistance (BJA), in partnership with the CNA Institute for Public Research (IPR), has supported law enforcement agencies across the country in implementing innovative policing approaches through the Strategies for Policing Innovation Initiative (SPI, formerly the Smart Policing Initiative). SPI supports not only the development and implementation of innovative policing strategies, but also the research partnerships that result in in-depth analyses and rigorous evaluations of these strategies to advance what is known about effective and efficient policing practices. This report examines SPI's accomplishments since its inception in 2009 and explores some of the major themes across SPI initiatives in both policing and policing research, including the following: Reductions in violent crime, Improved crime analysis capabilities in police agencies, Evolution of research partnerships with SPI sites, Collaborative partnerships with agencies, organizations, and community stakeholders, and Integration of technology into policing.

The 2018 National Defense Strategy (NDS) makes clear that competing effectively with state adversaries will be the primary focus of the Department of Defense (DOD) going forward. A key element of modern great power competition (GPC) is irregular warfare (IW), and our adversaries are deftly exploiting unconventional methodologies—particularly the use of information and intermediaries (i.e., proxies and surrogates)—as mediums of national influence. In March 2019, CNA hosted a cohort of academic, government, and military experts for a discussion on how special operations forces (SOF) can best lead or support US Government (USG) efforts to compete successfully on a global scale using information operations and intermediary partnerships. Our discussion addressed the following questions: How can past USG experiences of competing in the information space and engaging with proxy actors inform our approaches to GPC today? What lessons should we draw from unconventional activities used during the Cold War? How should the US conceptualize the use of information and intermediaries given modern advancements in communication technology and social media? What do trends in digital connectivity, along with technologies such as machine learning and artificial intelligence, portend for the future of information and influence activities? How does the lack of a US lead agency for information operations affect the role of SOF in the information battlespace? Which aspects of global information activities should SOF seek, lead, and support? Are there aspects that SOF should avoid? If so, what are they and why? How should the USG envision the role of state and non-state proxy actors in the context of current and future global competition? Should this be a significant feature of future USG strategy and policy? Why or why not? To encourage a frank exchange of ideas, the conversations summarized in the following sections were held under the Chatham House rule of non-attribution. No source citations are included in this document, and no speakers are identified. In the instances where we include quotes from the event, the function is solely to capture compelling phrasing; these quotes should be considered closely paraphrased and should not be interpreted as official statements. The event consisted of three main sessions—a keynote and two panels, each with a subsequent question-and-answer segment—the key themes of which are synthesized and summarized here. All presentations and discussions were unclassified.

For four years, the United States provided the Saudi-led coalition with military equipment and assistance used in its campaign in Yemen. During that time, the US has wrestled with and debated both the legality and wisdom of its support. After four years of conflict in Yemen, the US should be asking: what lessons can be learned from four years of support to the Saudi-led coalition? In light of the significant civilian protection concerns seen in Yemen, is there a way to get better outcomes from security assistance activities? This report aims to answer those questions. We analyze US support to the Saudi-led coalition and identify two gaps in policy and information, respectively. We also examine the timely issue of better protecting health care in the midst of armed conflict. In this report, we provide a policy framework for including civilian protection considerations as part of security assistance.

Wargaming, in what may be called its modern form, has been around for well over 200 years.1 Systems thinking and its more complex variant, systems dynamics, have been prominent techniques in management science since the late 1950s.2 This paper explores the connections between these two powerful tools. It addresses the questions of how wargaming can support those who develop and use systems models, and how such systems models can, in turn, help those who design, control, and play in wargames. These subjects are especially timely because today's theater commanders and their staffs are challenged to conduct—and assess the effectiveness of—"influence operations." The nature of these sorts of operations is always changing, and measures of their effectiveness are at best controversial and at worst, non-existent. Wargaming and systems thinking can help. Our research and analysis of this subject leads us to conclude that wargames and wargaming techniques can help those who develop systems thinking models of operational and strategic interest. Similarly, systems thinking techniques can help wargame designers construct better wargames and explore techniques related to social and political interactions among nations and groups. This paper is intended to help analysts and wargamers understand systems thinking and how it relates to wargaming. Because many in our target audience have at least a basic grasp of the nature of wargaming, but less understanding of the nuances of systems thinking, the first half of the paper is in the form of an overview or tutorial about systems thinking and how to do it. We present several examples and some simple guidelines for how to apply systems thinking to building models of human organizations and processes. The remainder of the paper explores the relationships among systems thinking and wargaming in practical terms. It describes how systems thinking can be used to enhance game design and execution, largely by providing a framework and approach for identifying important processes that a game must represent. A game is inherently a dynamic system model in which the game's players make decisions based on their pre-existing mental models, drawing on their internal experiences and understanding as well as both written and numerical databases. In all but the simplest games, the goal is to examine not only player decision-making processes, but also the dynamic relationships between the various decisions players make. Understanding the dynamics of an interacting system can lead to the discovery of things that would not otherwise be revealed by a linear, prosaic, investigation of the topic. These "perversions" of the expected, which arise in games more frequently than in other forums, stem from several different feed forward and feedback loops, along with unspoken or unanticipated player actions. It is here that systems thinking models can provide unique support for gamers. By depicting clearly the interwoven network of relationships and interactions among complex elements of the environment, systems thinking models can provide wargamers a basis for structuring key elements of the game design and the game mechanics. Systems thinking models can also support both the players and controllers of a game during execution. Wargaming and systems thinking are thus a matched pair of techniques, which, when used together, can help advance the state of the art of operational and strategic planning and assessment.

The United States must prepare to compete with Russia without a treaty that verifiably constrains intercontinental-range nuclear weapons. This coming challenge stems from three changes in US-Russian relations. First, the United States has officially transitioned from strategic partnership to strategic competition as the basis for its Russia policy. By acknowledging Russia's revisionist intentions, the 2018 National Defense Strategy codified an assessment that took root in the United States and many other North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) states after Russia's invasion of Ukraine and has garnered more support every year. This assessment is accompanied by growing appreciation that Russia's political-military strategy poses a full-spectrum foreign and defense policy challenge for the United States. "Russia is challenging US and NATO interests below the threshold of armed conflict, while simultaneously fielding high-end forces to make the barrier to entry for war extremely costly and dangerous for the United States," explains a former US senior defense official.1 In a major departure from the 1990s, 2000s, and part of the current decade, the United States is now developing a political-military strategy to counter Russia. Second, in another change from the past 25 years, Russia is in the final stages of its nuclear modernization program. It fields a modern force of intercontinental-range, commonly described as "strategic," nuclear forces, and is capable of increasing its deployed arsenal. The United States is also modernizing its nuclear forces, albeit on a different schedule. Both countries are expanding their strategic-military postures to include non-nuclear systems capable of achieving strategic effects. Strategic-military interactions between the United States and Russia in the next two decades will be markedly different than the previous two, with multiple acquisition, development, and deployment pathways available to both. Third, the nuclear arms control treaty framework the United States and Russia have built and sustained over decades is on the precipice. The New Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START) will expire next decade. It will reach its 10-year duration in February 2021, though the United States and Russia have the option of extending it for up to 5 years. As of early 2019, the prospects for New START extension are uncertain. Regardless of when New START expires, there is a strong possibility that a follow-on treaty will not be forthcoming. Recognizing these changing conditions, the report explores risks, uncertainties, and US policy options for a world in which there is significant competition between Washington and Moscow, but no bilateral strategic nuclear arms control treaty.

Over the past decade, China's presence in the Middle East and Indian Ocean has expanded significantly. While great attention has been paid to China's growing economic presence as part of Beijing's Belt and Road Initiative, in reality, China's activities in the region had been increasing well before the start of Xi Jinping's signature policy initiative. Moreover, this growth has occurred across a wide range of domains, including military, diplomatic, economic, and even informational. How is China's presence in the Middle East and Western Indian Ocean evolving, and what does it mean for the United States and its equities in the region? This study examines China's growing presence in 23 states throughout the Middle East, East Africa, and Western Indian Ocean. It analyzes the drivers of China's growing presence in this region, as well as China's various diplomatic, informational, military, and economic domains. By doing so, this study seeks to move the discussion of China's growing global activities beyond discussions of Belt and Road, provide a more comprehensive understanding of how China's presence in the Middle East and Western Indian Ocean region is evolving, and improve our understanding of what these changes mean for the U.S. Navy and U.S. national security interests more broadly.

Despite increases in the female share of Navy accessions and in women's entry qualifications over the last several decades, growth in female representation in the inventory has not kept pace. We examine one specific driver of the female share of the inventory: differential losses between bootcamp and reaching the fleet by gender. We find that the issue of higher female loss rates is not a general one. Rather, it is concentrated in highly technical ratings, such as the Advanced Electronics and Computer Field, Nuclear Field, and some Cryptologic Technician specialties. Evidence from loss codes and reenlistment recommendation codes suggests that health (physical and mental) and family issues—not behavioral problems—may be behind these higher female losses. Yet, the timing of these health- and family-related losses is puzzling given that these Sailors successfully completed bootcamp. We conclude with a set of recommendations that, if adopted, could provide the Navy with a more detailed understanding of why there is a sizable gender gap in attrition rates in these highly technical ratings.