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121.840 Welles, Sumner/132½

Report by the Under Secretary of State (Welles) on His Special Mission to Europe28

At 10 a.m. on Monday, February 26, the day after my arrival in Rome, Ambassador Phillips accompanied me to my first interview with the Minister for Foreign Affairs. Count Ciano received me in his office in the Chigi Palace, the temporary Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the permanent Ministry being now under construction in the 1942 Exposition grounds.

Count Ciano made an impression upon me quite different from that which I had anticipated. From his photographs, and from the reports which had been given me by persons who had been in contact with him, I had pictured him as overwhelmingly filled with a sense of his own importance. In my conversations with him I found him quite the reverse. He looks older than his thirty-eight years, but appears to be in exceptionally good physical condition. His manner was cordial and quite unaffected, and he could not have been simpler nor more frank in the expression of his views. He speaks easily in colloquial English.

I commenced the interview by saying how much I appreciated the courtesies which had been shown me on my arrival by the Government, and how much I welcomed the opportunity of talking with the Chief of the Government and with himself in order that I might report the views so communicated to me to the President and to the Secretary of State. I said that I wished to make clear at the outset my very strong conviction that during these past years relations between Italy and the United States had been far from satisfactory. I was going to be quite frank in adding that I believed there had been misunderstandings and misapprehensions on both sides, errors of omission and commission by both parties, regrettable attacks upon the United States in the Italian press, regrettable speeches in criticism of the Italian Government in the United States, and that I felt sure the Minister would agree with me that the time had now come when in the best interests of both countries such a situation, which had no real reason for existing, should cease. Count Ciano immediately said, “I fully agree: It is not a question of forgetting the past, because there really isn’t any ‘past’; but we must at once start in with a completely satisfactory ‘future’.”

I then went on to say that the President desired me to refer to what he himself had said to Ambassador Colonna29 a little while ago [Page 22] in expressing his own great satisfaction at the great change which had recently taken place on the part of public opinion in the United States with regard to Italy. The President wished me to emphasize the real pleasure of the American Government that the American people were viewing in so friendly a manner the efforts which the Italian Government had made to avert war, and with such favor the policy of neutrality being pursued by Italy since war had broken out. I said that this very friendly feeling in the United States towards Italy on the part of the public was fully shared by my own Government, and created, I hoped, a particularly propitious moment for an immediate return to that cordiality of relations between our two countries which for so many generations had been traditional. At this moment, the United States, in complete harmony with the other American Republics, constituted one great neutral influence; Italy constituted the other. In the interest of civilization itself it seemed to me desirable that those two great neutral influences should pull together, and not apart, so that, if at any moment there seemed to be an opportunity for the establishment of world peace, of a permanent and stable nature, those two great neutral influences could effectively cooperate morally together for the construction of lasting and sound peace foundations.

The Minister very heartily concurred.

I said that since I was happy to see that we were in full agreement on this premise, I believed it might be desirable to emphasize in some practical and open way the friendly relationship between our two countries. The American people had been greatly impressed with the splendid contribution which Italy had made both to the New York and San Francisco Expositions. My Government had also greatly appreciated the decision of the Italian Government to continue this coming year its participation in the New York World’s Fair. I said that I was glad to tell the Minister that the day I left Washington a bill had been introduced in the United States Senate providing for the appropriation of $2,000,000 for participation by the United States in the Rome Exposition of 1942, and that the President was personally interested in seeing that this legislation be enacted. I felt that this would constitute a practical demonstration of the kind I had in mind.

Count Ciano expressed his very great satisfaction. He said this Exposition, while constituting a permanent embellishment of Rome—since all the new Exposition buildings would eventually become Government offices—would be in reality Mussolini’s monument, and that participation by the United States would be profoundly appreciated by the Duce.

I continued by saying that another desirable and practical demonstration of cordiality between us would be an increase of beneficial trade relations. At this moment all neutral countries found their [Page 23] normal export trade severely curtailed. It would surely be helpful to Italy and the United States to find some satisfactory method of enlarging a mutually beneficial volume of trade between them. I emphasized that, of course, to make possible such an arrangement the two Governments must find a meeting of minds as to principles and policies, but that I hoped that friendly study and consideration of all the factors involved might pave the way for the desired solution.

The Minister once more heartily concurred, and said that the experts of his Government would be at our disposal whenever we desired them. Since the Ambassador had told me that Count Ciano does not interest himself in commercial questions nor in any economic problems, 1 did not continue in any detail this topic of conversation.

I then said to the Minister that he was, of course, fully familiar with the purpose of my mission. I said that I was directed by the President to report to him upon the present possibility of the establishment in Europe of a stable and lasting peace—that was the only kind of peace in which my Government was interested; the President was not interested in any precarious or temporary peace which would, in essence, be no more than a patched-up truce.

I felt it desirable to make very clear that I was not empowered to offer any proposals, nor to enter into any commitments. I would, however, be most grateful for any views which the Minister might care to express to me, and the Minister could be confident that any views so expressed would be maintained by me as completely confidential and as solely for the information of the President and of Secretary Hull.

The Minister said that he fully understood the situation, and that he would talk with me with the utmost frankness. And that he proceeded to do.

He commenced by saying that he was glad that I did not intend to offer any proposals, or any set formula as to a possible peace treaty. He doubted whether the moment was propitious for any effort of that character.

I took occasion at this juncture to remark that I had been privileged to follow from a distance his own brilliant career and to estimate with much admiration his own efforts to prevent war at the end of August, and since that date, to limit the spread of war. I said that I was particularly interested in knowing whether the Italian Government was still considering the possibility of the kind of a meeting between representatives of the belligerents which it had suggested last August 31.30

Count Ciano said that the initiative then taken had been his own idea, taken, of course, after consultation with Mussolini.

[Page 24]

He got up and from a safe took out his famous red diary in which he records in his own handwriting his daily activities. He read me excerpts from it covering the period in question. It appeared that during the three days commencing August 31 he had been constantly on the long distance telephone, speaking personally with Foreign Ministers Halifax and Bonnet and with Hitler himself, urging a meeting between them and Mussolini to be held at Stresa on September 5. He had recorded that Hitler had agreed to such a meeting on September first, but that he had had no replies from Bonnet and Halifax until September 2, and that while the latter had then agreed in principle, Halifax had insisted that as a condition precedent German troops must be withdrawn back beyond the German frontier with Poland. Ciano felt that if the reply from Halifax had come on September first, Hitler would have agreed to this condition, but that by September 2 German troops had advanced so far and German military enthusiasm had reached such a pitch, as to make this condition impossible of acceptance.

The Minister doubted whether any similar meeting at this time would be productive of any useful purpose.

Count Ciano then spoke at very considerable length of German-Italian relations. He spoke with no effort at concealment of his hearty dislike of Ribbentrop. He said, “If Hitler wants anything—and God knows he always wants enough—Ribbentrop always goes him one better.” He likewise made it clear that he bitterly resented not only the lack of courtesy shown the Italian Government by Hitler in failing to consult it with regard to German policy, but also by what he claimed was Hitler’s complete disregard for the terms of the understanding between Italy and Germany.

He stated that during the past summer when he had twice conferred with Hitler and Ribbentrop, the subject of the negotiations then progressing between the Soviet Union and France and England31 had, of course, come up for discussion. The Germans had told him that in order to impede these negotiations they were attempting to conclude a commercial agreement with Russia,32 and that this would be merely in the nature of “a petit jeu”. “Can you conceive,” Count Ciano added with great bitterness, “of our being asked to regard a military alliance between Germany and Communist Russia as being merely ‘a petit jeu’?” “Do you further realize,” he asked, “that Hitler called me on the telephone only on August 21 last to announce the conclusion of this alliance to me, and that before I had even had time to get Mussolini on the telephone to break the news to him, this very radio in my own office here was carrying the report [Page 25] already broadcast to the whole world?” “That,” he said, “was the way in which Italy was advised as to German foreign policy.” “And with regard to Poland,” he continued, “the clear-cut terms of our understanding with Germany provide that if Germany undertakes any military adventure, Italy must be first afforded the opportunity of consultation. We did everything we could to prevent the invasion of Poland, but we were never given any real chance to exert any influence upon Hitler to prevent it.”

The Minister went on to say that the Italian Government had the deepest sympathy for the “real Poles”. It believed that Poland must be reconstituted. To that end the Italian Government continued to recognize a Polish Embassy in Rome, and the Minister himself continued to spend a great part of his time in bringing what influence he could to bear upon Germany to mitigate the severity of its treatment of Polish nationals in occupied territory.

The Minister then talked about Russia and Russian policy. He said that Italy had always proclaimed that Russian policy was frankly imperialist in that the Soviet was bending every effort, at times in one way, at other times in another, to bring about the hegemony of Soviet influence in every part of the world. At the same time Russia had been maintaining that it only desired world peace, and that any form of conquest was abhorrent to it. Now he said that mask had been removed, and Russia had been revealed not only as avid for communist revolution throughout the world, but likewise as determined to conquer as much territory in Europe as it could get away with. Against this he said Italy would stand “like a wall”.

The sympathy of Italy was overwhelmingly with Finland. The reaction in Italy against Russian occupation of Poland had been extreme; but it had been violent against the assault on Finland. He stated that the Italian Government had furnished Finland with munitions and airplanes, and that when Germany had refused to permit the planes to be shipped by rail through Germany, they had been sent by sea.

I asked Count Ciano if any volunteers from Italy had been permitted to go to Finland. He said not, but that the reason for this was not any objection on the part of Italy to their fighting against Russia, but solely because Italy did not think Finland could hold out for long, and that if any considerable number of Italians fought in the Finnish army, and Finland was defeated, it would be very difficult for Italy to repatriate her own nationals without actually declaring war on Russia, which she was not prepared to do because of Finland. For geographical reasons Italy could not do what she had done in Spain. The Minister doubted whether the Allies would render any effective aid to Finland before it was too late.

[Page 26]

With regard to the Balkans, the Minister said I undoubtedly knew all that Italy had done to preserve peace in that region. He alone, he said, through his meeting with Count Csaky33 in Venice had persuaded Hungary to refrain from provoking a conflict with Rumania so long as the present war continued, and Hungary had now agreed not only to postpone her claims for the territorial readjustments she desired, but also to refrain from press attacks against Rumania.

Italy had definitely entered into an agreement with Rumania—and Count Ciano emphasized that this agreement was completely secret—that if Russia attacked Rumania, Italy would at once come to the assistance of Rumania, not through open declaration of war on Russia, but through the furnishing of every form of military assistance, including the furnishing of troops and airplanes.

The Minister here interjected that while volunteers had not been permitted to go from Italy to Finland, Italian aviators had gone in some numbers, and that today Count Ciano’s private pilot was leaving to fly an Italian bomber on the Finnish front.

Italy would keep Russia out of the Balkans, and would do her utmost to keep the Balkans out of war. Italy had no interest in the Balkans save the preservation of peace, and the fomenting of Italian trade interests in that region.

At this point, Count Ciano reverted to Germany. He said, “No country would want to have Germany as a neighbor. We now have her as a neighbor, and we must do the best we can to get on with her.

“You will wonder why Italy did nothing at the time of the Dollfuss assassination,34 and nothing later when Hitler occupied Austria.35 I will tell you, for there is a great deal of misunderstanding on that score. There are many people in Austria today who are unhappy, who are tormented, many who wish the Anschluss had not taken place. But, as an Italian, I tell you the great majority of Austrians would even today rather be a part of Germany than have to live the life they lived in independent Austria.

“Before the occupation of Austria Dr. Schuschnigg36 came to Rome, and, sitting in the same chair you are sitting in, (and at this I shifted in my seat), he admitted to me frankly that if Germany occupied Austria the majority of Austrians would support the occupation, and that if Italy sent troops into Austria to prevent the occupation, the Austrians as one man would join with the Germans to fight Italy.

“For that reason, when peace terms are considered it would be stupid to support the French thesis that an independent Austria must be reconstituted. If any country would logically desire that objective it would be Italy. But Italy knows that the Austrians are primarily [Page 27] German, and that an Austrian people will never be content to go back to the state of starvation and inanition which they endured for twenty years after 1918.”

In October last Count Ciano said he had spent two days in Berlin conferring with Hitler. At that time—and he emphasized the words—he believed Germany would have been willing to agree upon a peace based upon the retention of Austria, or a plebiscite in Austria—knowing full well that a real plebiscite would result in an overwhelming vote in favor of continued amalgamation with Germany; an independent Slovakia, and an independent Bohemia–Moravia, both under the protectorate of Germany; and the reconstitution of a completely independent Poland, Germany retaining Danzig, the Corridor and the territory in Western Poland occupied by German minorities, and Russia retaining Eastern Poland, removing therefrom the truly Polish inhabitants to the new Polish state, which would be given access to the sea. German peace terms at that time likewise comprehended the return of her former colonial possessions or their equivalent.

Whether Germany still maintained this position, Count Ciano was not sure.

Throughout our conversation Count Ciano made no effort to conceal his dislike and contempt for Ribbentrop or his antagonism towards Hitler. He did not hide his anxiety with regard to Germany and his apprehension with regard to her military power. At the same time he indicated not the slightest predilection towards Great Britain or France.

His chief interests at the moment, I would judge, are to arrest by every means Russian expansion in the Balkans and Near East; to maintain a balance between the Allies and Germany so that Italian neutrality may be preserved and so that when peace negotiations are undertaken, Italian claims may receive preferential consideration; and finally to take every safeguard available to Italy against German domination of Southeastern Europe.

Our interview took place in a very beautiful hall of the Palace, hung with tapestries. The moving-picture apparatus had been already installed. As soon as the conversation terminated the moving-picture men were sent for, and the Minister posed with me for a rather unduly protracted period. That was the only time I saw the “chest out, chin up” Ciano of which I had heard. Until the cameras began clicking, he could not have been more human, more simple, nor more seemingly frank in everything he said.

Accompanied by the Ambassador and by Count Ciano’s chief of cabinet, I called at 5 p.m. on February 26th at the Palazzo Venezia where I was received by Mussolini.

[Page 28]

I entered the Palace by the side entrance used by the Duce, and going up in a small elevator was escorted through a long corridor hung with paintings, and filled with vitrines holding examples of old Italian porcelain, to a hall where Count Ciano was waiting to receive me. From there we passed to the Hall of the Grand Fascist Council, which, while on a far smaller scale, and hung in blue instead of red, is reminiscent of the Hall of the Doges in the Doges’ Palace at Venice. At the end of the Hall is a raised and very large armchair for the Duce, while on a lower level, around a horseshoe table, are other chairs for the members of the Grand Council. The walls are hung with superb portraits.

After a wait of three minutes, we were summoned to Mussolini’s office in the “Sala Mapa Mondo”. The hall, of which so much has been written, is very long, but did not impress me as so long as usually depicted by newspaper correspondents. There is no furniture except the desk of the Duce at the extreme end, with three chairs placed in front of it for the Ambassador, Count Ciano, and myself. On the desk was a reading-lamp, which was the sole illumination in the whole vast room.

The Duce met me very cordially at the door, saying he was particularly happy to welcome me, and walked with me the length of the hall to his desk. He greeted the Ambassador very pleasantly, making no reference whatever to the fact that he had been unwilling to receive him for over a year.

I was profoundly shocked by the Duce’s appearance. In the countless times I had seen him in moving pictures and in photographs, and in the many descriptions I had read of him, he had always seemed to me as an active, quick-moving, exceedingly animated personality. The man I saw before me seemed fifteen years older than his actual age of fifty-eight. He was ponderous and static, rather than vital. He moved with an elephantine motion. Every step appeared an effort. He is very heavy for his height, and his face in repose falls into rolls of flesh. His close-clipped hair is snow white. During our long and rapid interchange of views, he kept his eyes shut a considerable part of the time, opening them with his dynamic and oft-described wide-open stare only when he desired particularly to underline some remark. At his side was a large cup of tea which he sipped from time to time.

Mussolini impressed me as a man laboring under some tremendous strain; physical unquestionably, for he has procured a new and young Italian mistress only ten days ago; but in my definite judgment, mental as well. One could almost sense a leaden oppression.

Count Ciano commenced the conversation by saying that Mussolini desired him to act as interpreter, since in view of the importance of the conversation he would prefer to speak in his own language rather than in French or in English.

[Page 29]

I said that I wanted first of all to express my gratitude for the many courtesies shown me, and for the privilege of being received by Mussolini and his Minister. I then handed Mussolini the President’s autograph letter.37 He found it difficult to read the President’s writing, and asked Ciano to translate it for him. As the reading went on a smile of gratification came over Mussolini’s face, and with the last sentence in which the President expressed the hope of seeing him soon, he smiled openly. “I have hoped for a long time,” he said, “that this meeting of which I have heard so often would really take place, but I am beginning to fear that there are too many miles of ocean between us to make it possible.” I quickly interjected, “But, of course, there are half-way points, which would halve that distance.” He stopped smiling, and looked at me searchingly. Then he added slowly, looking at me all the time, “Yes, and there are ships to take us both there.” He paused a moment, and then reaching over and taking the President’s letter out of Ciano’s hands, said, “I will answer this letter personally.”37a

At the outset of our conversation I referred to American participation in the Exposition of 1942 and to the desirability of studying the possibility of agreeing on such policies and principles as would make possible more satisfactory commercial relations between the two countries. It was evident that Ciano had already reported to him our conversation of the morning, since he referred to notes he had made.

Mussolini expressed great appreciation of the President’s interest in the Rome Exposition. He said that while he hoped peace would be reestablished before 1942, the Exposition would be held in any event. It would represent his own endeavor to build up the new Italy and the new Rome.

He expressed his hearty concurrence in the view that relations between Italy and the United States should be close and friendly both in the interest of the two peoples as well as in the interest of the re-establishment of world peace. He said there was nothing he would welcome more than increased trade relations with the United States, since Italy’s trade was increasingly prejudiced due to war conditions, [Page 30] and to British war policies. He said he trusted a commercial treaty could be negotiated to mutual advantage, and that now that every other nation of the world, including the Soviet, had recognized the Ethiopian conquest,38 that technical point would no longer be an impediment to the United States.

I said that I was specifically authorized by the President to speak very frankly to him in that regard. The President felt that recognition of the Empire by the United States would not be an obstacle, provided that question were a part of a whole general and permanent peace settlement and readjustment, especially if it were accompanied by some utilization by Italy of some portion of Ethiopia for the settlement of European minorities. But the President wished me also to remind Mussolini very frankly that we could not regard the matter as an isolated question, because of its inevitable relation to our whole problem in the Far East.

Mussolini smiled and said if he had to wait until we had concluded our negotiations with the Japanese, he was afraid he would have to wait a long time, since there was no race that took a more interminable time in finishing any negotiation than the Japanese. In view of what I said, he added, pending further developments, it would be better to envisage the conclusion of a more ample modus vivendi, rather than a commercial agreement, and on that he hoped both sides would make every effort to agree.

I then spoke to Mussolini of the inquiry addressed to [by] my Government to the other neutral powers, asking whether they did not consider it desirable to exchange views with regard to the possibility of finding a common point of view concerning a future sane international economic system, and concerning post-war reduction and limitation of armaments.39 I said Italy had in reply asked what the views of the United States might be in these two regards. I stated that I had brought with me a brief written statement of the views of the United States with regard to a sane international economic relationship,40 and that since I knew well the views expressed by Mussolini himself in his address to the Chamber of Deputies on May 26, 1934, I felt sure the views of my Government coincided very completely with his own.

Mussolini at once asked for the paper and read it word for word. As he read, he commented. His comment on the first paragraph was “molto bello, I agree with every word. Unfortunately, however, Italy has never been in a position where she could anticipate a situation [Page 31] where she would have access on equal terms to raw materials.” When he came to the portion which related to discriminations, he said, “and could there be greater discriminations than those found in the Ottawa agreements?41 Or in the tariff policy pursued by the United States prior to the Roosevelt Administration?”

When he had concluded his reading he said, “I subscribe to every word in this. It coincides completely with what I said in 1934, and what I believe now. But you must remember that Italy was the last country to enter upon an autarchic system, and she did so solely as a last resort, and in self-defense. A poor country like Italy had no other remedy after Britain had entered on the Ottawa policy, and after the other European nations had adopted autarchy, and France had imposed her quota systems and other restrictions. This policy outlined in this document represents the ideal which nations must come to, but I want to remind you that if and when the time comes that nations again can trade freely with each other, no such ideal as this can be realized unless simultaneously the powers agree upon a practical and positive disarmament plan. So long as peoples are draining their national economies in the construction of armaments, there can be no hope of a sane international economic relationship.”

I, of course, stated at once that the President and Secretary Hull fully shared these views. I said it was exactly for that reason we had suggested that if the neutral powers could now agree upon the principles he had set forth, the neutral influence would be of great service when peace came in bringing these ideals into practical realization.

Mussolini replied that in his opinion the only neutral powers which had any influence were the United States, Japan and Italy, and that Italy was not technically a neutral because of her relationship to Germany. (This was his only reference in our conversation to the Axis.) He said that when peace came the influence of the United States would be decisive, and that our views on economic relations, which he would support, would have to be accepted, if we insisted.

But he felt that no efforts at moral influence at this time would prove effective. What was required before any constructive steps could be taken was the finding of a just political peace in Europe.

I then said that as he already knew I was charged by the President with the duty of reporting to him on the present possibilities of the establishment of the bases for a permanent and stable peace in Europe. I would greatly value Mussolini’s views, and I was sure he knew from Count Ciano that any views he expressed to me would be reported solely to my President and Secretary of State.

[Page 32]

Mussolini said he knew this, and that he would speak to me with utmost frankness. He would answer any questions I desired to ask.

He then set forth what he believed would be the terms Germany would accept. Austria to remain a part of the Reich after a plebiscite had proved Austrian determination in that regard; an independent Slovakia and Bohemia-Moravia under German protection. He then came to the question of Poland. He drew himself up and with much vigor said, “The Polish people have a right to their untrammeled independence and sovereignty, and I will support them in that endeavor. But that does not mean that Poland should again become a crazy-quilt of diverse nationalities. The poison of Europe during these past twenty years has been the question of minorities. That cardinal error must not be committed again. The real Germans of Danzig, of the Corridor, of Posen should remain in the Reich, but the real Poles should have their free Poland, with access to the sea.” I interjected, “How about the real Poles who are now under Russian subjection?” Mussolini answered that they should emigrate from Russian controlled Poland to the new Polish state just the way in which Germans were emigrating from the Upper Adige back to Germany. “What other solution is there,” he said, “unless we are all prepared to fight Russia?” In saying this he gave me no impression of being bellicose.

He then stated that I should attribute great importance to Hitler’s speech of February 23rd. That speech had been precise: “Vital interests in Central Europe” meant what he had just indicated, and colonial restoration was the additional factor. Germany, he believed, had every right to such a position in Central Europe, and there could be no lasting peace unless such a solution were found.

He quickly added, “And when peace negotiations are undertaken, Italy’s just claims must be satisfied. I have not raised them now because the mad-house which is Europe will not stand further excitements. But there can be no peace which is real until Italy has free egress from, and access to, the Mediterranean. You have just come to Italy on the Rex. You were held up at Gibraltar by the British and mails and passengers were taken off. In the western Mediterranean you have seen for yourself that we are the prisoners of the British. Do you also realize that an Italian cannot send a ship from Trieste, an Italian port, to Massowa, another Italian port, without having the British take off half the cargo? How would you like it if the British did that to your ships plying between New York and New Orleans?”

Mussolini spoke with the greatest bitterness of the British, but he gave no evidence whatever of antagonism towards the French.

He then came back to the question of peace terms. He said that in his judgment the Allies gravely underestimated the military strength and the efficiency of the organization of Germany.

[Page 33]

I then asked him the flat question: “Do you consider it possible at this moment for any successful negotiations to be undertaken between Germany and the Allies for a real and lasting peace?”

His answer was an emphatic “Yes”. He said that of one thing he was profoundly certain, and that was that none of the peoples now at war desired to fight. The situation now in that regard was utterly different from that which existed in 1914. He went on, “But I am equally sure that if a ‘real’ war breaks out, with its attendant slaughter and devastation, there will be no possibility for a long time to come of any peace negotiation.”

He paused, and I asked him if he would give me any suggestions as to my conversations in Berlin. He said he would be glad to be helpful, but he believed I would be told in Berlin more or less what he had just said to me.

In conclusion, I said that Count Ciano had been good enough to ask if I would talk with him again before I sailed home. I said I would welcome the privilege of talking also with the Duce before I departed for the United States. He replied, in a very friendly way, that he would be glad to talk with me again at any time, and that he believed he would probably receive reports from Berlin, Paris and London after my visits to those capitals, which would be of value to the President and myself, before I returned to Washington. It was agreed that if my plans made it possible for me to return to Rome on March 16 or 17 I would see him again at that time.

Mussolini then got up and joined me on the other side of his desk. He spoke to me in English for a while and then turned into French. I asked him if he still rode every morning, and he said that he did, but that he had now taken up a new sport, tennis; that he had always thought of tennis as a young ladies’ game but that he had now discovered that it was almost as hard exercise as fencing. He was delighted to say that he had that very morning beaten his professional 6–2.

He walked with me to the door, gave me a particularly cordial handshake, and said he would look forward to seeing me again.

At noon on the day of my arrival in Berlin I was escorted to the Foreign Office Building, adjacent to Bismarck’s old Chancery in the Wilhelmstrasse, by the Chief of Protocol, Herr von Doernberg, to an interview with the Minister of Foreign Affairs, Herr von Ribbentrop. Mr. Kirk, the American Chargé d’Affaires, who had never previously been received by Ribbentrop, accompanied me at my request to the interview.

[Page 34]

Every official of the Foreign Office was dressed in military uniform, and at the top of the stairs, after passing the two sphinxes at the portal which date from Bismarck’s time, there were stationed storm-troopers in stained uniforms.

After waiting in an anteroom for three minutes, I was shown into Herr von Ribbentrop’s office.

The Minister received me at the door, glacially, and without the semblance of a smile or a word of greeting. I expressed my pleasure at being afforded the opportunity of talking with him, and spoke in English, since I knew that he spoke English fluently, having passed—as a wine salesman—several years in England, and four years in the United States and Canada. The Minister looked at me icily and barked at the famous Dr. Schmidt, the official interpreter, who stood behind him, “Interpret”.

We then sat down. The Minister turned to me and asked in German whether I had had a comfortable journey. I turned to Dr. Schmidt, and saying in English that I had lost my facility in speaking German, expressed my appreciation of the courtesy of the German Government in sending a private car to the border and an official to meet me there.

I then said that I believed it desirable at the outset to make quite clear the nature of my mission. I was requested by the President to visit Italy, Germany, France and England to report to him on the existing situation. It was the President’s desire to ascertain whether there existed any possibility of the establishment of a sound and permanent peace in Europe. I wished to emphasize that my Government was not interested in any precarious or temporary peace. Whatever views the officials of the German Government were good enough to express to me would be regarded as solely for the information of the President himself, and of the Secretary of State, and for no other individual, and in conclusion I desired to make it very clear that I had, in the name of my Government, no proposals to offer, and no commitments whatever to put forward on the part of the United States.

I should be appreciative of any views the Minister desired to express to me.

Ribbentrop then commenced to speak and never stopped, except to request the interpreter from time to time to translate the preceding portion of his discourse, for more than two hours.

The Minister, who is a good looking man of some fifty years with notably haggard features and grey hair, sat with his arms extended on the sides of his chair and his eyes continuously closed. He evidently envisioned himself as the Delphic Oracle.

He started in with the subject of American-German relations. He said that relations between the two countries had been steadily deteriorating for several years, and that so far as the German Government [Page 35] was concerned, there was no reason for such a situation. It desired to maintain close and friendly relations between the two countries. A year and a half ago the United States had withdrawn its Ambassador, Mr. Wilson, for whom he, the Minister, and the Fuehrer had the highest regard, and in consequence the German Reich had withdrawn its Ambassador. Such a situation was in detriment to the best interests of the two peoples. The German Government believed expanded trade relations between our two countries were highly desirable. Such were now impossible under present conditions. The German Government had no feature in its foreign policy which conflicted with the interests of the United States; no ambitions which in any sense impinged upon the Western Hemisphere; and insofar as internal matters were concerned, all representatives of the German Government had received the most stringent orders never to interfere, directly or indirectly, in the domestic policies of the United States, nor in those of any other American Republic. Since all of these things were so, the Minister concluded, he could see no valid ground whatever for the completely unsatisfactory state of relations between the United States and Germany. He could only assume that lying propaganda had had a preponderant influence.

At this point I determined it was wiser for me to refrain from making the reply I desired to make until the end of the Minister’s discourse. He was so obviously aggressive, so evidently laboring under a violent mental and emotional strain, that it seemed to me probable that if I replied at this juncture with what I intended to say, violent polemics was [would?] presumably ensue, with the possibility that things would be said that would not only make my interview with him entirely unfruitful, but which might also jeopardize the interview I was scheduled to have with Hitler on the following morning.

The Minister then continued. He passed to a narration of Germany’s participation in European history, as he saw it, from January 30, 1933, the day Hitler became Chancellor, until the present time.

The German occupation of the Rhineland had been the first step in the reconstruction by Germany. That was a step which today was accepted by the entire world as a rightful step, as a step which returned to Germany an intrinsic part of Germany, and as a step which marked the end of the régime of Versailles. The Minister said that he was glad to remember that I myself in public addresses had criticized the inequities of Versailles.

Then had come the consolidation of Austria into the German Reich. This had marked the union of two severed portions of the old German Empire, of the old Roman Empire, and had brought back into one German family German peoples who had always desired such union since 1919. It had been attained without the shedding of blood and [Page 36] in accordance with the will of the overwhelming majority of the Austrian people.

Then had come the Sudeten question. Here again the German Government had desired no more than the return to Germany of German peoples, who had been ground down under Czech domination for twenty years. He detailed the efforts which Hitler had made to achieve a friendly solution of this problem with the Czechoslovak Government, and the continuous obstacles which other Governments had placed in the way of such an understanding. He narrated—it seemed to me from memory—all of the pages in the German white books which had led up to the agreements of Munich.42

He emphasized the agreement entered into by Chamberlain and Hitler. And what had happened only a few weeks later: Chamberlain and his Duff Coopers, Edens and Churchills had announced in the British Parliament that Britain was embarking on the biggest armament program of its entire history so that “no agreement like Munich would ever again be necessarily accepted by the British Government”. (I did not remind the Minister that neither Duff Cooper, Eden nor Churchill was at that time in the British Cabinet.)

From this moment on in the Minister’s monologue, the word “England, England, England” punctuated his speech like the toll of a funeral bell. I could not help but think of the “Gott Strafe England” of the years 1917–1918.

The keystone of Hitler’s foreign policy had been the creation of close and cooperative relations with England. From the year 1933 on Hitler, time and time again, had consulted England on the steps he had intended to take, and time and again England had not only repulsed his overtures with scorn—and the German word “Hohn” came out like the hiss of a snake—but had with craft and with guile done her utmost to prevent the German people from once more assuming their rightful place in the family of nations. Hitler had no ambitions which conflicted with the maintenance of the integrity of the British Empire; on the contrary, he believed the integrity of the British Empire was a desirable and a stabilizing factor in the world. For that reason he had entered into the naval agreement of 1935 with Great Britain,43 voluntarily pledging German[y] to a minimum naval ratio, as a pledge to England that Germany had no designs upon the Empire. Until the last moment Hitler had sought peace and understanding with England, always to find hatred, scorn and trickery as her reward.

Germany had offered to guarantee the frontiers of the new Czechoslovakia agreed upon at Munich. But how could this commitment be carried out? The new Czech authorities had proved weak tools of [Page 37] the enemies of Germany. They had been unable or unwilling to prevent foreign agents from stirring up agitation and from concocting plots, with the connivance of the Czechoslovak military, against Germany. How could Germany guarantee the frontiers of a nation which was being deliberately turned into a menace to the heart of Germany? That, and that alone, had been the reason for the occupation of Bohemia and Moravia, and the support by Germany of the independence of Slovakia, and the consent by Germany for the earlier movements affecting Czechoslovak territory by Poland and Hungary.44

And then the Minister turned to Poland.

The Fuehrer had always maintained that the separation of the German city of Danzig from the Reich, and the complete divorce of East Prussia from Greater Germany were provisions of the Versailles Treaty which could not endure. But at the same time he had been convinced that these questions could be solved satisfactorily by means of a direct understanding between Poland and Germany. In that spirit the non-aggression pact between Germany and Poland had been entered into. Early in the year 1938 negotiations had been commenced between the German Foreign Office and Colonel Beck45 looking towards the restoration of Danzig to the Reich, and the granting to Germany of an extraterritorial motor road and railroad across the Corridor between Greater Germany and East Prussia. These conversations had prospered. They had reached a complete agreement in principle when Colonel Beck had visited Berlin and Berchtesgaden early in 1939. In a few months, granted there had been no foreign interference, the entire arrangement would have been concluded to the entire satisfaction of Poland, and Germany would have abided permanently by this settlement.

And what had happened? The German Government now had the complete archives of Warsaw. It had incontrovertible proof that England had incited the Polish Government to refuse to conclude this agreement; it had incontrovertible proof that England had incited the Poles to determine upon war against Germany, and it had incontrovertible proof that statesmen of countries not in the slightest degree connected with the issues involved had urged the Polish Government to make no concession of any nature to Germany.

Here the Minister paused and looked pointedly at me. My belief is that he desired me to understand that the German authorities have records of representations made to Poland by Bullitt through Biddle and the Polish Ambassador in Paris,46 in addition to Bullitt’s telephone [Page 38] conversation with Biddle, already published by the German Foreign Office.

Finally, the German Government had proof that the British guarantee of military support had been thrust upon Poland, against the wishes and advice of Colonel Beck, and solely as a means of persuading Poland against reaching any fair understanding with Germany.

When this stage had been reached the Poles had undertaken every kind of cruel repression against the German minority in Poland. The German Government had attempted time and again to point out to Poland the dangerous results of such a policy. Torture and mutilation of Germans were so unbelievable that the Minister would give me photographs and documentary evidence if I so desired.

And finally Germany, to protect Germans in Poland, and as a means of self-defense against Polish mobilization had been forced to take military action. She had even at this last moment attempted to keep peace with England and France. The Fuehrer had made every effort to make clear to England and France that Germany wished in no way to endanger British or French security. It had been England and France who had insisted upon declaring war on Germany. Germany would not have declared war on England and France.

Germany wished for nothing more in Europe than what the United States possessed through the Monroe Doctrine in the Western Hemisphere. As a great power she was entitled to the safeguarding of her vital interests. He had been in the United States, and he knew how every American citizen felt, and he thought quite legitimately, that the preservation of the Monroe Doctrine was fundamental in insuring the safety of America’s world position. Germany was entitled to the same situation in Central Europe. Germany desired nothing more than the unity under the German Reich of the German people in Europe; the return of the colonies which had been stolen from her at Versailles, so that she might thence obtain the raw materials she could not herself produce, and make possible the profitable emigration to them of German nationals; the ensured recognition by the other Great Powers of her sphere of influence in Central Europe—just as she was willing to respect the spheres of influence of the other great European powers; the independence and autonomy of the smaller powers of Europe which had a clearly established historical right to independence. With regard to such powers, the Minister said, Germany had not the faintest design upon them, although she must expect that in trade matters the independent powers within her sphere of influence would have close economic ties with the Reich. And in that connection I must not forget that one thousand years ago German Emperors had been crowned in Prague. Germany, however, had no desire or intention of preventing the Czech people from having their complete [Page 39] cultural and municipal autonomy—something which the Germans in Czechoslovakia had never possessed under Czech rule.

Germany must have her “Monroe Doctrine” in Central Europe. She would never again discuss any question affecting her interests in Eastern Europe except with Soviet Russia, and with Russia she had already reached a complete and satisfactory delimitation of interests in that area. But the days of encirclement—of British and French political meddling in Central and Eastern Europe—were passed and [gone?] forever.

(It was particularly significant that Italy was never mentioned by the Minister throughout the conversation.)

British policy made any such recognition of German rights impossible—Britain was determined to annihilate Germany and the German people. In October, Hitler had publicly announced the bases upon which he was willing to make peace. They had again been rejected with contempt. Only last night Eden had publicly declared that the war aim of England was to destroy “Hitlerism”. The Minister wanted me to know that every German national was a part of Hitler. The destruction of “Hitlerism” meant only the destruction of the German people, for Germany would never again be governed by any form of government other than Hitlerism.

Germany was strong and completely confident of ultimate victory. She had immense military superiority, and from her eastern and southern neighbors she could obtain the raw materials she required. She was prepared for a long war, but the Minister was confident it would be a short war.

Germany wanted peace, but only on condition, the Minister said, “that the will on the part of England to destroy Germany is killed, once and for all. I see no way in which that can be accomplished except through German victory.”

By the time this stage had been reached, I said I would not attempt to speak at any length, but that I could not refrain from making certain comments upon what the Minister had said.

First of all, the Minister had referred to American-German relations and had drawn the inference that propaganda was responsible for their bad condition. I said I had no doubt that propaganda was active in almost every part of the world, and that I felt very deeply, with my own President, that the more peoples drank from the well of truth, and had freedom of true information, the more peaceful and happy the world would be.

But if the Minister thought that the unsatisfactory state of American-German relations was due to propaganda, he was sadly deceived. The American people, I said, were idealistic, emotional people, profoundly moved by humanitarian considerations. They resented in [Page 40] their inmost soul the ill-treatment of human beings in any part of the world. The cruel treatment of minorities in Germany was one of the two compelling causes of American feeling towards Germany. The other was the overwhelming feeling in the United States that international controversies can and must be settled by pacific methods, and that the use of force, such as had been exercised in recent years, destroyed international relations and those bases of international life which alone could give real security to the United States and to other nations. Those, I said, and not propaganda, were the real reasons for the feeling in the United States towards Germany. So far as trade relations were concerned, the Minister must know that so long as Germany pursued her present autarchic policy and indulged in every form of discrimination against us, there was no opportunity offered the United States for improved trade with Germany.

With regard to the Minister’s reference to the desirability of having Ambassadors in Berlin and Washington, I would be careful to report to the President the Minister’s observations, but I wanted to make it clear that my Government had every confidence in Mr. Kirk, the American Chargé d’Affaires. (Here the Minister interjected that he had only “good reports” of Mr. Kirk, but that he had been referring to the rank of the representation, and not to the individual.)

I further desired to refer to the Minister’s reference to the Monroe Doctrine, for it seemed very clear that the Minister was laboring under a misapprehension as to the nature of that policy. Many years ago, I was quite willing to admit, the Monroe Doctrine had been occasionally misinterpreted by earlier administrations in the United States as entitling the United States to exercise some form of hegemony in the Western Hemisphere or to intervene in one way or another in the affairs of our neighbors. But the Doctrine had never in reality been other than a unilateral declaration by the United States that it would not permit any non-American power to exercise any kind of sway, military or political, within the Western Hemisphere. It had never implied the exclusion by the United States of non-American powers from having the same trade relations with the other American Republics such as we ourselves possessed, and on equal terms. It had never rightfully implied the assumption of any political control by us over our neighbors. At this moment, I was glad to say, a new relationship existed in the Western Hemisphere. The Monroe Doctrine existed, and would continue to exist, but only in its true interpretation, and it was now reinforced by the unification of all the American Republics in the common policy of considering any menace from abroad to the peace of any one Republic as a menace to the peace of them all. The United States was an equal partner in a partnership of twenty-one partners.

[Page 41]

If, consequently, the Minister desired to use the term “Monroe Doctrine” as synonymous with the term “sphere of influence”, whether political or economic, he should find some more accurate synonym.

Finally, I said I would, of course, regard it as inappropriate to comment upon the remainder of the Minister’s exposition. That would be outside of the scope of my mission.

I believe, however, that if a war of devastation now took place all that civilization held most dear, all the remaining material and social structure of Europe, would be in great part destroyed. The loss of lives would be appalling. No country on earth would remain unaffected, and the United States as the most powerful neutral would suffer every form of repercussion upon her own social, commercial and financial structure. It was for that reason that my Government hoped most earnestly, while there was still time, that there might still exist the way towards some durable and just peace. The President of the United States had officially stated last year, as the Minister knew, that if the way to a just political peace could be found by the nations directly concerned, of which the United States was not one, my Government would participate whole-heartedly in a parallel common attempt to bring about a real limitation and reduction of armaments, and a return by the nations to a sane economic system of international trade relations. On these latter two points, as the Minister doubtless knew, my Government was even now discussing the possibility of finding common views with the neutral powers. All of these opportunities towards a return to a world of security, sanity and prosperity would be grievously, if not fatally, prejudiced, if a war of devastation now broke out.

The Minister made a brief rejoinder. He attempted, without success, to modify his interpretation of the Monroe Doctrine. He expressed the hope of the German Government, after the war was over, of being able to return, in cooperation with other powers, to a liberal international trade system. With regard to the prevention of a war of devastation, he said over and over again, “We have not attacked England. She has attacked us. I see no way by which we can attain the peace we want and which we seek, save through German victory.”

I then terminated the interview, which had lasted from midday until quarter before three.

Ribbentrop has a completely closed mind. It struck me as also a very stupid mind. The man is saturated with hate for England, and to the exclusion of any other dominating mental influence. He is clearly without background in international affairs, and he was guilty of a hundred inaccuracies in his presentation of German policy during recent years.

I have rarely seen a man I disliked more.

[Page 42]

At six o’clock I called upon Staatssekretär von Weizsäcker in his office at the Foreign Office. His position corresponds to Under Secretary in our system.

Herr von Weizsäcker is a typical example of the German official of the old school of the nineteenth century. He is reminiscent of the first Bernstorff and of the first Bülow, and not of their more famous sons. He is, I believe, sincere, and spoke throughout our hour’s talk with deep feeling.

He had had a particularly happy home life—very typically German in the devotion to him of his three sons. His greatest pleasure, he told me, was when he and his wife and the three boys could have an evening of chamber music together in their house. Today the family is shattered. His youngest son of twenty was killed in the Polish war. The other two sons are serving on the Western Front.

He is retained at the Foreign Office, I was told, solely because of his expert knowledge of German foreign relations, and is never permitted to advise on policy.

I outlined to the Under Secretary the nature of my mission.

At the conclusion of my statement, to which I added some excerpts of my earlier conversation with Herr von Ribbentrop, Herr von Weizsäcker hesitated a moment and said, “I am going to be quite frank with you. I have been strictly instructed not to discuss with you in any way any subject which relates directly or indirectly to the possibility of peace.”

He then drew his chair towards the center of the room, and motioned to me to do likewise. (I assumed that the omnipresent German Secret Police dictaphones must be installed in the walls rather than in the central lighting fixtures.)

We had for a while a desultory conversation, in the course of which he took occasion to say how highly he regarded Kirk, who, in his opinion, had done wonders in a singularly difficult situation, and I corresponded—to his obvious pleasure—by saying that I thought Thomsen46a in Washington had shown great tact and discretion in an equally difficult situation.

I then reverted to my conversation with Ribbentrop. I said that if the feeling of the German Government was as decisive as that of Herr von Ribbentrop that was [war] was the only course, I would be needlessly taking up the time of the German authorities by prolonging my stay. I said, however, that while, as Herr von Weizsäcker would be the first to appreciate, my conversations in Rome would be regarded as entirely confidential by me, I, nevertheless, felt entirely able to tell him that my impressions after talking with the Duce were [Page 43] that in the latter’s judgment a basis for a just and lasting peace could still be found before it was too late.

Herr von Weizsäcker thought a good three minutes before saying anything. He then leaned towards me and said, “It is of the utmost importance that you say that personally to the Fuehrer.”

I waited a moment myself, and then asked: “Let me have your personal advice, for I am now asking an entirely personal and individual question. Do you believe that any suggestions for peace conversations proffered by the Duce would have any favorable reception here?”

This time Herr von Weizsäcker waited a good five minutes before answering. His reply was: “What I have already said about the Fuehrer answers a part of your question. But (and he motioned to the Foreign Office in which we were) here the relations between Germany and Italy have narrowed (and I use his exact English word) greatly.”

The interpretation I give to this statement is that if the Duce approaches Hitler directly and secretly, it will have decisive influence. If Ribbentrop knows of the approach, he will do his utmost to block it.

During the remainder of our hour’s talk, Weizsäcker talked of his regard for Nevile Henderson47 and of his belief that in August war could have been averted by a more intelligent policy by the Poles. As I took leave, the tears came into his eyes as he said he knew I would realize how earnestly he hoped that the mission with which the President had entrusted me might show there still was a way by which an absolute holocaust could be avoided.

At eleven o’clock several Foreign Office officials, headed by Herr von Doernberg, came for me at my hotel to take me to my interview with Hitler at the new Chancery, which had been completed last year within a period of eight months. Workmen had worked night and day in order to have it ready for the Chancellor’s New Year’s Day reception for the Diplomatic Corps so that they might have a taste of what the new Berlin was going to look like.

Kirk accompanied me at my request. He had never before been permitted to see the Fuehrer except at a distance.

The facade of the new building on the Wilhelmstrasse reminds me of a factory building. My car drove into a rectangular court with very high blank walls. At one end was a flight of broad steps leading into the Chancery. Monumental black nudes flanked the portico to which the steps led. The whole impression of the court was reminiscent of nothing other than a prison courtyard. A company of soldiers was drawn up on each side to give me the Nazi salute as I entered.

[Page 44]

At the head of the steps I was greeted by the Reichsminister Meissner, the head of Hitler’s Chancery. He spoke to me most cordially in English, as did all the other officials present.

We then formed a procession of some twenty couples headed by Meissner and myself, and with very slow and measured tread first traversed a tremendously long red marble hall, of which the walls and floor are both of marble; then up a flight of excessively slippery red marble steps into a gallery which, also of red marble, has windows on one side and tapestries on the other. The gallery is lined on the tapestry side by an interminable series of sofas, each with a table and four chairs in front of them. From the gallery open off a series of drawing rooms. Finally, we deployed into one of these, and I was requested to sit down until the Chancellor was ready to receive me.

In a very few minutes Meissner came to announce that Hitler was ready to see me, and I went with Kirk into the adjoining room, a very long drawing-room furnished with comfortable upholstered sofas and chairs, and overlooking the garden of Bismarck’s old residence, in which Hitler now lives.

Hitler received me near the door. He greeted me very pleasantly, but with great formality. Ribbentrop and Meissner [Schmidt, the interpreter] were the only two German officials present at the interview.

Hitler is taller than I had judged from his photographs. He has, in real life, none of the somewhat effeminate appearance of which he has been accused. He looked in excellent physical condition and in good training. His color was good, and while his eyes were tired, they were clear. He was dignified both in speech and movement, and there was not the slightest impression of the comic effect from moustache and hair which one sees in his caricatures. His voice in conversation is low and well modulated. It had only once, during our hour and a half’s conversation, the raucous stridency which is heard in his speeches—and it was only at that moment that his features lost their composure and that his eyes lost their decidedly “gemütlich” look. He spoke with clarity and precision, and always in a beautiful German, of which I could follow every word, although Dr. Schmidt, of course, interpreted—and at times inaccurately.

After we were seated, and Hitler placed me next to him, he looked at me to indicate I was to commence the conversation.

I set forth the detailed purposes of my mission as I had already explained them to Ribbentrop. I made particular reference to the confidential nature of my interviews, and to the fact that I had no proposals to offer. In as eloquent terms as I could command, I then emphasized the President’s hope that there might still be a way open for a stable, just and lasting peace, not a truce or a precarious breathing spell. I pointed out that if a war of annihilation now broke out, [Page 45] whether it was short or whether it was long, it would definitely preclude for the present the negotiation of a reasonable and just peace because of the human suffering it would create and of the human passions it would arouse, as well as because of the exhaustion of the economic and financial resources which still existed in Europe. From such a war as that, I said, who would be the victors? It seemed clear that all would be the losers. And in that sense not only would the belligerents be the losers, but also the neutrals, of which the United States was the greatest and the most powerful. We as a people now realized fully that such a war must inevitably have the gravest repercussions upon almost every aspect of our national structure.

The President of the United States had, in communications addressed to Chancellor Hitler himself, made it clear that if a just political peace could be found—and in the negotiation of such a peace we could not be directly involved—the United States would play its full part in cooperating towards two fundamental needs of a sane and ordered world—limitation and reduction of armaments and the establishment of a sound international trade relationship. If such bases could still be found, was it not worth every effort to seek the way of peace before the war of devastation commenced, and before the doors to peace were closed? I spoke, I said, only of a just peace, a peace which promised stability and security for the future. Personally, I said, I could not conceive of a lasting and real peace unless it envisaged as an essential component part a united, prosperous and contented German people, a German people satisfied with their own domain and their own security; but at the same time I could conceive of no lasting or real peace unless as an equally important factor Germany no longer was regarded by her neighbors as a threat to their independence or to their security, and unless Germany made it evident that she was, in fact, not striving for constantly increasing objectives—and objectives which implied aggression and a threat to the rights of free peoples.

The Chancellor knew, I said, that I had had the privilege of speaking with the Duce in Rome. That conversation, the Chancellor would appreciate, I must retain in complete confidence, but I felt at liberty to say that I had happily gained the impression from that conversation that the Duce believed the foundations of a just and lasting peace might still be laid. I hoped the Chancellor would find it possible to confirm that impression. I would be most grateful for any views he felt able to express.

The Chancellor then very quietly and moderately outlined his foreign policy during the past seven years. The outline pursued exactly the lines followed in my conversation of the day before by the Minister for Foreign Affairs. (It is noteworthy that in every conversation I had with every member of the German Government, except [Page 46] Dr. Schacht, exactly the same historical survey prefaced the conversation. It is entirely clear that either the Chancellor or the Foreign Secretary had dictated the course which the conversations to be had with me by the members of the German Government were to follow.)48

Hitler, however, emphasized even more strongly than had Herr von Ribbentrop his desire to reach an amicable and lasting understanding with England. He stressed particularly the naval agreement of 1935 as an indication that Germany, under his Government, had no intention of challenging British naval supremacy nor the security of the British Empire. When he came to the account of the negotiations with Poland which had resulted in the invasion of Poland by Germany in September, he turned to me and said, “I have never in my life made a more earnest nor a more sincere appeal than I did to the British Ambassador, Sir Nevile Henderson, when I sent for him just prior to the break with Poland. He was sitting in the same place where you are now sitting, and I besought him to tell his Government that Germany had no intention of attacking England nor of impairing directly or indirectly British interests, but that Germany could not permit a continued domination by the Western European powers of the smaller States of Eastern Europe, nor the continuation of a state of affairs which resulted in a continuous attack and a continuous threat upon German vital interests.” The Chancellor then concluded by saying, “That appeal, like every other approach made to England in seven years, was rejected with derision.”

Hitler then said that I had referred to the problem of limitation and reduction of armaments. Time and again, he said, he had offered England and the other powers of the world the opportunity for a real and practicable reduction of armaments. He had guaranteed that Germany would maintain her standing army at 200,000 men; then at 300,000 men; he had expressed German willingness to outlaw certain types of munitions and implements of war. Never once, however, had these offers on his part received the slightest attention or, much less, consideration, as a basis of agreement. The Chancellor then said, “The present armament burden is crushing the life out of all peoples; it cannot continue much longer. The national economy of every nation will crash before much further time elapses.”

He stated that he believed these were two practicable methods of securing a real disarmament. The first was for the great powers of Europe to agree upon their minimum ratios of military and of naval strength, outlawing all but a minimum of offensive armaments, and [Page 47] upon that basis further to agree that in the event of any threat to their security, or to the peace of Europe, these powers would pool their military and naval resources as a police power. He had formally made this proposal to Great Britain and to France. He had never received the slightest response.

The other alternative was for the powers to agree upon a progressive and gradual reduction in their respective military strength; with the gradual elimination at the same time of certain categories of offensive armament. This he believed would take a very long time, and was the less satisfactory of the two methods.

I had also mentioned the problem of a liberal, most-favored-nation international trade relationship as an objective towards which the nations of the world should strive. He felt quite in accord with me, he said, that that was a desirable goal and Germany, under more normal conditions, would gladly cooperate towards that end He did not, however, believe that unrestricted international trade was the cure for all of the world’s economic problems. He said, for example, that while Germany would doubtless profit by taking a considerable portion of America’s agricultural surpluses, an industrial country like Germany could not take any considerable portion of industrial products from the United States, nor could the United States take any considerable portion of Germany’s industrial exports. It was, consequently, necessary for Germany to intensify her trade relations with countries in Central and Southeastern Europe who desired to take Germany’s industrial exports, which they themselves did not produce, in return for raw materials desired by Germany.

At this point I interjected to say that the Chancellor appeared to overlook the fact that while the United States, it was true, was a large industrial producer as well as an exporter of agricultural surpluses, nevertheless, trade between the United States and Germany over a period of many generations had been highly profitable to both sides. The Chancellor, I said, must not forget that Germany produced many forms of industrial products which were produced either more cheaply or in more efficient form than similar products produced in the United States, and that such exports from Germany had always been profitably sold by Germany to the United States. The question, I said, was not one of a purely bilateral nature but involved necessarily the problem of profitable triangular trade which had always entered into the picture of Germany’s trade relations with the United States. Furthermore for Germany to be able to sell profitably the bulk of her luxury manufactured products she had to find countries where the standard of living was relatively high. Surely I believed the standard of living in the countries of Southeastern Europe was not sufficiently high to make it possible for Germany to find there any profitable market for a very large percentage of her industrial production.

[Page 48]

Hitler did not seem to comprehend this problem, and dropped the topic after remarking that a country with a population of 140 individuals to the square kilometer must increase its production if those individuals are to find the where-with-all to survive. I said that it seemed to me that there was no country in the world that would profit more immediately and more greatly than Germany from a restoration of liberal international trade relations, and that through such a restoration the 140 individuals to the square German kilometer of whom he had spoken would obtain an increased standard of living and derive therefrom an immediately greater purchasing power, particularly if their work was dedicated to constructive production, rather than to the sterile manufacture of munitions.

Hitler then said that Germany’s aims and objectives were simple and that he would outline them to me; he would classify them as (a) historical, (b) political and (c) economic.

From the historical aspect Germany had existed as an empire five hundred years before Columbus had discovered the western world. The German people had every right to demand that their historical position of a thousand years should be restored to them; Germany had no ambition and no aim other than the return by the German people to the territorial position which was historically theirs.

Germany’s political aims were coordinate. Germany could not tolerate the existence of a State such as Czechoslovakia which constituted an enclave created by Versailles solely for strategic reasons, and which formed an ever-present menace to the security of the German people; nor could Germany tolerate the separation from Greater Germany of German provinces by corridors, under alien control, and again created solely for strategic reasons. No great power could exist under such conditions. Germany, however, did not desire to dominate non-German peoples, and if such peoples adjacent to German boundaries did not constitute a military or political threat to the German people, Germany had no desire permanently to destroy, nor to prejudice, the independent lives of such peoples.

From the economic standpoint, Germany must claim the right to profit to the fullest extent through trade with the nations close to her in Central and Southeastern Europe. She would no longer permit that the western powers of Europe infringe or impair Germany’s preferential situation in this regard.

In brief, the German people intended to maintain the unity which he had now achieved for them; they intended to prevent any State on Germany’s eastern frontier from constituting again a military or strategic threat against German security and, finally, Germany intended to obtain recognition for her economic priority in Eastern and Southeastern Europe.

[Page 49]

Germany, further, would insist that the colonies stolen from her at Versailles be returned to her. Germany had not obtained these colonies through military conquest; she had obtained them through purchase or through pacific negotiation; she had never utilized her colonies for military purposes. She now required them in order to obtain for the German people raw materials which could not be produced in Germany, and as a field for German emigration. Such a demand, Hitler felt, was not only reasonable, but just.

At no time during the course of our conversation did Hitler mention the subject of German-American relations, nor did he refer directly or indirectly to German relations with Soviet Russia and with Italy.

The Chancellor then passed to the subject of the war aims of the Allies. He asked me if I had heard or read the speech made in England the night before by Sir John Simon.48a I told him that I had not. He said that if I had read the speech, I would gain therefrom the same clear understanding that he had gained, namely, that the speech constituted a clear-cut definition of English aims, that is, the total destruction of Germany.

He said, “I am fully aware that the allied powers believe that a distinction can be made between National Socialism and the German people. There was never a greater mistake. The German people today are united as one man, and I have the support of every German. I can see no hope for the establishment of any lasting peace until the will of England and France to destroy Germany is itself destroyed. I fear [feel?] that there is no way by which the will to destroy Germany can be itself destroyed, except through a German victory. I believe that German might is such as to ensure the triumph of Germany but, if not, we will all go down together (and here he added the extraordinary phrase) whether that be for better or for worse.” He paused a moment and then said textually, rapidly and with impatience, “I did not want this war. It has been forced upon me against my will. It is a waste of my time. My life should have been spent in constructing, and not in destroying.”

I said that the Chancellor would, of course, understand that it was the belief of my Government that if some way could be found towards a stable and lasting peace which promised security to all peoples, no nation could [would?] have to “go down”, let alone all of them. For that reason I earnestly trusted that such a way and such a peace might still be found.

Hitler looked at me, and remained quiet for a moment or two. He then said, “I appreciate your sincerity and that of your Government, and I am grateful for your mission. I can assure you that Germany’s [Page 50] aim, whether it must come through war or otherwise, is a just peace.” I replied by saying that I would remember the phrase the Chancellor had used. The interview then terminated.

I talked at some length with the Italian and Belgian Ambassadors in Berlin,49 who are by far the most experienced members of the local Diplomatic Corps. They are both of them confident that the internal and army opposition to Hitler, which had assumed some proportions in November 1939, has now completely died away.

They told me that both the German army and the German people have by now been thoroughly convinced by propaganda of the German Government that the aims of the Allies are to destroy Germany and the German people, and that recent propaganda of the Allies, and recent speeches by British and French statesmen, had strongly increased this feeling in Germany. Both of the Ambassadors are confident that the Allied Governments grossly underestimate Germany’s military strength and the ability of the German people to withstand a protracted war. Both of the Ambassadors are in agreement that a war of devastation will make any discussion of peace utterly impossible, and that the time within which peace terms can be discussed before Germany strikes is very brief indeed.

The Belgian Ambassador assured me that Germany’s stores of oil are far greater than is realized by the British and French Governments, and that a large-scale offensive can be undertaken by Germany without bringing the German army to a point where it will suffer any lack of its full requirements.

At ten o’clock, accompanied by officials of the German Foreign Office and by Dr. Schmidt, the official interpreter, I called upon Rudolf Hess, the Deputy to Hitler as head of the Nazi Party organization.

Hess received me in his offices in the party headquarters built in the modern German style, the walls being completely bare of molding or decoration of any kind.

Herr Hess bears the unmistakable appearance of being devoid of all but a very low order of intelligence. His forehead is low and narrow, and his deep-set eyes are very close together. He is noted for his dog-like devotion to Hitler. During our conversation he reverted again and again to the years when he was imprisoned with Hitler and of their service together in the Great War.

[Page 51]

At the outset of our conversation, I outlined to him the nature of my mission and said that I would be glad to receive any views that he cared to express to me.

Herr Hess took out of his pocket a typewritten memorandum, in which were noted the points he had been obviously told to make in his talk with me. His exposition followed precisely the lines set forth by Ribbentrop in his talk with me, and there was no deviation from that outline other than a paragraph or two which related to Nazi Party organization. This was brought up in connection with Hess’s statement to me that the German people were convinced that the war aims of the Allies were solely the destruction of Germany and of the German people, and that the German people stood as one man behind Hitler. Hess said that as active Head of the Nazi Party he was in a better position than anyone else to know what the real feeling of the German people was, since every district leader and every local leader under his jurisdiction was in turn in touch with the unit leaders, who were in hourly contact with the German masses, and that he could assure me that never before in the history of the Nazi Party had the German people themselves been more completely identified with their Fuehrer than at the present moment.

There is nothing to be gained from any detailed account of this conversation, which lasted about one hour. Hess was quite as vehement as Ribbentrop, and in his presentation of German objectives infinitely less temperate than Hitler himself. He closed the door completely to the possibility of any negotiated peace and stated flatly that in his judgment, as head of the Nazi Party, there was only one possibility for Germany to achieve a lasting peace, and that was through a German military victory.

It was so obvious that Hess was merely repeating what he had been told to say to me, and that he had neither himself reasoned about the problems at all nor thought anything out for himself, that I made no attempt to set forth any views of my own. At the conclusion of our interview I merely stated that I regretted to learn his opinion, that there now existed no hope of a lasting peace save through the force of arms.

Immediately after the termination of my interview with Rudolf Hess, I was accompanied by Dr. Schmidt, the official interpreter, to the home of Field Marshal Goering,50 known as Karinhall, which lies about an hour and a half’s motoring distance from Berlin.

[Page 52]

The Field Marshal’s home has been built in the middle of a national game reserve. After reaching the entrance of the reserve, one drives some ten miles through a thin forest of pine and scattered birch to the Marshal’s house, which has been built around a log cabin which he used in earlier years on hunting trips. The building which he has constructed is already immense, and he is now adding a new portion which will make the entire building, when completed, about the size of the new National Art Gallery in Washington. We arrived at the house in a driving snow at twelve o’clock. The Field Marshal, who had just returned to Berlin from a week’s visit to the Western Front, received me immediately. At my request, and by the expressed desire of the Marshal himself, there was no one present except Dr. Schmidt and the American Chargé d’Affaires.

Goering looks exactly like his photographs. His thighs and arms are tremendous, and his girth is tremendous. His face gave the impression of being heavily rouged but, since at the end of our three-hour conversation the color had worn off, the effect was probably due to some form of facial massage which he had received prior to seeing me.

He wore a white tunic, on which were plastered various emblems and insignia in brilliants, and over the Iron Cross, which hung from his neck, dangled a monocle on a black cord. His hands are shaped like the digging-paws of a badger. On his right hand he wore an enormous ring set with six huge diamonds; on his left hand he wore an emerald at least an inch square.

His manner was simple, unaffected and exceedingly cordial, and he spoke with far greater frankness and clarity than any other German official whom I met. We dispensed with the services of the interpreter, except for the translation by Dr. Schmidt into German of what I had to say.

The Field Marshal, after I had once more set forth the nature and purposes of my mission, reiterated the history of German foreign policy during the past seven years along exactly the same lines as those followed by Hitler and Ribbentrop.

At one point, however, Goering deviated from the account given by the two others. In discussing the causes of the war against Poland, Goering stated with the utmost precision that at the time Ribbentrop had visited Paris on December 6, 1938, to sign the non-aggression pact between France and Germany,51 Bonnet, then Foreign Minister, had assured him in the name of the French Government that as a result of the conclusion of the agreements of Munich, France would renounce all interests in Eastern Europe, and specifically that France would refrain from any further influencing of Polish policy. While I had seen, of course, the recently published official declarations of the French and [Page 53] German Governments in regard to this question,52 I had not before received so precise a statement of the alleged commitments made by Monsieur Bonnet at that time.

I consequently asked the Marshal to repeat this statement, and the Marshal turned to Dr. Schmidt who, it appeared, had been present in Paris at the interview between Monsieur Bonnet and Herr von Ribbentrop when the alleged commitments were made, and Dr. Schmidt related textually what had been said upon that occasion. The exact statement, according to him, which Monsieur Bonnet had made, was that France renounced all political interests in Eastern Europe, and specifically agreed not to influence Poland against the conclusion of an agreement with Germany whereby Danzig would return to Germany, and Germany would receive an extraterritorial corridor across the corridor from East Prussia to Greater Germany.

In his statement of German objectives, the Field Marshal was very clear. Germany had renounced forever any ambitions upon Alsace-Lorraine. Germany not only had no desire to impair the integrity of the British Empire; it believed in her own interest that the British Empire should be maintained intact. Germany must retain as an integral part of the German Reich, Austria, the Sudetenland, and all of those portions of Poland inhabited by German peoples. During the war Germany would continue her military occupation of Bohemia-Moravia and of Poland. If peace came, Germany would grant independence to the Czechs, but upon the understanding that they would remain completely demilitarized, so that never again would the Czechs or the Slovaks constitute a threat to Germany’s military security in Central Europe. The Polish people who were really Poles would be installed in a free and independent Poland with access to the sea. Germany must regain her colonies. In addition to this, Germany must possess a recognized position of economic preference in Eastern Europe.

From this point the Field Marshal went on and discussed British policy, and the inability of Hitler to reach any form of understanding with England. The Field Marshal said that he knew Hitler so well that he realized that, as a result of so many years of failure in this regard, Hitler had now hardened, and that he doubted whether Hitler could bring himself to believe that there was any way of destroying the British will to destroy Germany, except through military victory. He recounted to me his own conversation with Lord Halifax when the latter visited Germany two years ago. He told me he had warned him time and again not to encourage Poland and Czechoslovakia to refuse to reach a reasonable and pacific understanding with Germany. He told him that if England persisted in this course, war was inevitable, and that there was no justifiable need of war.

[Page 54]

Both the problem of the German minorities in Czechoslovakia, and the Czechoslovak military threat to the military security of Germany, as well as the problem of Danzig and the Corridor in relation to Poland, could have been settled readily if England and France had not refused to permit such a settlement.

The Field Marshal himself had never believed that there was any possible justification for war, and he had done everything within his power to avert it, but England and France had persisted in bringing it about.

Now, the situation from the military standpoint, was this: Germany’s air force was supreme and would remain supreme. Her military strength was far greater in proportion to the strength of the Allies than it had been in 1914. Today Germany had “all the trumps in her hands.” In 1914 Germany had been attacked on all fronts. Today, Russia and Italy were friendly, and the Balkans were neutral. The British blockade had already proved ineffective, and every day that passed made it easier for Germany to procure the raw materials which she required from the East and from the South. He could assure me that the stocks and supplies on hand in Germany were more than sufficient to meet every requirement, and I might be interested to know that the Germans were now even manufacturing butter and other fats in very great quantities from coal. While the Marshal believed that the war would be short, and that a German victory would soon be attained, nevertheless, if the war were prolonged five or ten years, Germany would strengthen and consolidate her position with every month that passed.

I stated that it seemed to me that no matter who would win such a war, the devastation and loss of life, and the destruction of economic resources, would inevitably be so vast as to result in the early destruction of much of what modern civilization had built up. I said that in that regard the American people were directly concerned. I said that we in the United States now realized that the repercussions from such a war would affect us profoundly in many ways, and particularly because of our realization that in a world where war reigned supreme, where the rule of force replaced the rule of reason, security for all peoples, no matter how remote they might be from the scene of hostilities, was inevitably undermined. If a war of devastation broke out, the vital interests of all neutral peoples, no matter how much they were determined to keep out of the war, would correspondingly be affected.

The Field Marshal here interrupted to say that he did not see how the American people could feel that their vital interests were affected through war in Europe. He said, “It is needless for me to say to you that Germany has no ambitions of any kind other than those I have [Page 55] indicated to you, and least of all any ambitions which could affect the Western Hemisphere.”

I replied that the Field Marshal must remember that while the American people today were overwhelmingly determined not to be drawn into the war, and that it was the consistent policy of the Government of the United States to keep the American people from being drawn into war, nevertheless, he would also remember that in 1916 President Wilson had been re-elected on a platform which amounted to “he has kept us out of war”; the Republican candidate Mr. Hughes, set forth in his platform that he, if elected, would keep the American people out of war; and yet not six months after the election in November 1916, the American people overwhelmingly supported our entrance into the war. I said it must never be forgotten that the American people are quick to act when they believe that their vital interests are at stake.

I discussed at some length with the Field Marshal the conversations which my Government had recently undertaken with the neutral powers in order to ascertain whether it was possible to find an agreement in principle upon the problems of the limitation and reduction of armaments and of a sound international trade policy. I said to the Field Marshal that I had brought with me a brief memorandum setting forth the views of my Government on the latter subject. The memorandum was read to him. The Field Marshal immediately stated that he was entirely in accord with every word contained in the memorandum, and that the German Government, at the time of any peace negotiations, would whole-heartedly cooperate in restoring to the countries of the world such a policy as that indicated. He stated that there was no country on earth that would stand to gain more than Germany by the adoption of such an international trade policy. He said that at the first appropriate opportunity he himself, in a public speech, would indicate Germany’s intention to cooperate towards that end.

Insofar as the question of the limitation and reduction of armaments is concerned, Goering made to me very much the same statement as that made to me by Hitler the day before. He said that the armament race was ruining the economy of the entire world, and that no people could stand the strain much longer. He said that time and time again the German Government had offered in all sincerity to participate in any reasonable plan for disarmament, and time and time again her offers had been rejected. If peace came, Germany would enter into any practical plan which would make a real reduction of armaments possible.

Goering reverted to the British war objectives. He said that he was completely convinced that the British and French Governments were determined to destroy the German Régime, to subjugate the German [Page 56] people, and to split Germany into small units under military control. He said, “The English say that that is the way to get a lasting peace, because early in the 19th century, when Germany was a collection of small independent states, with an infinity of customs barriers, the Germans were only a race of musicians and poets. But they have never made a greater mistake. If they succeeded today in carrying out that plan, they would find, not a race of musicians and poets, but a horde of Bolsheviks and Communists.”

At the end of our interview the Field Marshal said to me very simply, but with a great deal of feeling, “My Government is grateful to your Government for your mission. I fear that when you visit Paris and London you will realize that there is no hope for peace. You will there learn what I now know, and that is that the British and French Governments are determined to destroy Germany, and that no peace, except on that basis, will be considered by them. If there is any way of averting the war which I believe is inevitable, your Government will have accomplished the greatest thing which human beings could desire. From the bottom of my heart I wish you success.”

Before I left Karinhall to return to Berlin, the Field Marshal escorted me through all the miles of rooms in the first floor of his house.

I have never seen so incredibly ugly a building. The walls are lined with paintings, some of them superb examples by old Italian and German masters, placed side by side with daubs by modern German painters. Many of the halls are filled with glass cases, in which are placed gold gifts that have been presented to the Field Marshal during recent years. Goering told me that he personally had arranged the placing of every object in the house.

I had an interview with Dr. Schacht53 at the private house of Mr. Kirk upon my return to Berlin from my interview with Field Marshal Goering.

Dr. Schacht told me that he was grateful for my having requested the Foreign Office to arrange this interview with him, since, if I had not taken the step in that way, it would have been impossible for him to see me. He had taken the precaution, he said, to call the day before upon Hitler, whom he had not seen for many months, to ask whether he had Hitler’s permission to talk with me. He said that Hitler had given him permission, but with the understanding that Dr. Schacht was to return to see Hitler the day following my departure, in order to relate to him the topics discussed in our conversation.

[Page 57]

Dr. Schacht said: “I cannot write a letter, I cannot have a conversation, I cannot telephone, I cannot move, without its being known.”

Then, leaning over and talking in a whisper, he said, “If what I am going to tell you now is known, I will be dead within a week.” He gave me to understand that a movement was under way, headed by leading generals, to supplant the Hitler régime. He said that the one obstacle which stood in the path of the accomplishment of this objective was the lack of assurance on the part of these generals that, if such a movement took place, the Allies would give positive guarantees to Germany that Germany would be permitted to regain her rightful place in the world, and that Germany would not be treated as she had been in 1918. If such a guarantee as this could be obtained, he said, the movement would be pushed to a successful conclusion.

Dr. Schacht said that he was unable to mention any names and that he felt sure I would understand the reasons therefor. He said that he had been wanting to leave Germany, in order thus more readily to further this conspiracy, and that he was going to try to persuade Hitler, in his next conversation with him, to send him as Financial Adviser to the Embassy in Washington, or to permit him at least to go to Rome for the purpose of giving a series of lectures at the Royal Academy of Italy. He asked me if I could help him to secure an invitation from the Royal Academy in Rome for such a series of lectures.

I said that I feared it would be very difficult for me to intervene in such a delicate matter as this, but that it seemed to me that if he could persuade Hitler to let him go as Financial Adviser to the Embassy in Washington, he would not have to consider the trip to Rome of which he spoke.

Dr. Schacht said that another possibility was for him to be invited by some leading American university to give a series of lectures in the United States.

He wanted to know whether it would be possible for him to maintain some form of contact with me after my departure from Berlin. I told him that I would be glad to receive any message that he might care to send to me, and that if he would communicate such messages as he might have in mind orally to Mr. Heath, Secretary of the American Embassy, the latter would see that they were conveyed to me safely. Dr. Schacht said that every cable sent by the American Embassy in Berlin was immediately read by the German Foreign Office. I said that I was fully aware of that fact, and that we had various ways in wh