Mercer Square
To explore the battles of Fredericksburg from the standpoint of the participants and the terrain they acted upon.
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Mercer Square
The Beginning

I’ve reached one hundred! No, not years, I’ve twenty more to go before I reach that esteemed age! I mean one hundred blogs. When I first started blogging in February of 2014, who knew I would still be at it ten years later! I have several folks I would like to acknowledge for their help to me along this journey: John Hennessey, author and retired Chief Historian for the Fredericksburg and Spotsylvania National Military Park (FRSP), who challenged and encouraged me to begin to share my work via a blog. Also, Frank O’Reilly and Noel Harrison, both authors and National Park Historians at the FRSP. I frequently turned to them and their work for first rate information and inspiration. Another is my daughter, Megan Moore, a graphic designer who made helpful suggestions and guided corrections to maps and other graphic displays I created and used in my blog.

I chose to use Noel’s term of ‘Citizen Historian’ on my business card. I’m certainly not school trained in this regard. Rather than refighting the Battle of Fredericksburg, I looked for areas, or aspects of the battle or battlefield that intrigued me and dived down those rabbit holes and followed where they led.

Looking at topography is often where I start. The land with its accidents of terrain often influences what happens as individuals or armies move across it. For instance, the open plains found below Marye’s Heights outside Fredericksburg or in front of Prospect Hill appear to be simple level agricultural fields. Nothing could be further from the truth. To the infantry man ordered to cross those fields, any little dips, hollows, swales, ditches, depressions, etc., often meant the difference between life and death.

Finding the Swale

My writing all started because of a conversation with Peter Maugle, a then newly assigned FRSP Ranger. It was a cold wintry day in November 2011 at the Fredericksburg Visitor Center where I volunteer, and very few patrons came out that day to brave the cold. The conversation began with a discussion about how much protection the Union soldiers had in the Swale. I’d recently walked along the Sunken Road. Standing at the junction of Mercer Street adjacent to the Innis house, looking east, I noticed a distinct dip in the roadway just beyond Littlepage Street at 240 yards (220 meters). I could not see the lower portion of the wheels of a car parked there. If that was an indication of the famous swale, how long was it, or deep? My beginning point was looking for local maps from the Civil War. The 1867 Michler map was the place to start, or so I thought. The map technique of the day used splashes to indicate terrain, not contours.

The first challenge I faced was what sort of topographic maps were available? The United States Geographic Service (USGS) had ten-foot contour maps, but this was too small a scale to really understand the dynamics of the swale. Then I found a printed five-foot contour map, better, but still not small enough to answer the question about the protection of Union troops in the Swale. I discovered that the City of Fredericksburg was using two-foot contour maps on its Graphic Information System (GIS). Now I had a reliable resource.

Land Development

I was also fortunate that in the era in which Mercer Square was developed, starting in the early 1900’s, homes were placed on grade without large-scale reconfiguration of the building site. Lots were sold and developed individually. Each home was situated without major land changes. The GIS topographical mapping allowed me to “see” the whole of the area by stripping away the buildings. Interestingly, there are three utility or access alleys which run down at the back of the houses perpendicular to the Swale. These unimproved corridors show how the original swale slope looked during the battle.

Now I had the answer to the first half of Peter’s question; terrain. But what were the attributes of the rifled musket which the armies used in the Civil War? What were the flight characteristics of the Minie-ball ammunition used at the time? I’d read the report of the development of the US Model of 1855 small arms and ammunition which was signed by then Secretary of War, Jefferson Davis in 1856. From this document I understood the rationale behind the design of the Minie-ball, but not the parabolic flight path.

Rifle-musket ballistics

Somehow, I chanced upon an individual online who was able to provide the flight path information using a computer model. I provided the terrain data from the GIS map, estimating to the nearest foot by interpolating between contour lines along a given flight path. In the spring and summer of 2012, I generated detailed cross-sections that began at the stone wall along the Sunken Road. Once I had the flight path data, I was able to apply this to the cross sections. I provided my information to the FRSP staff, refining it based upon questions they asked and other discussions with them. To provide a better level of accuracy, I doubled the number of cross sections from those I used in my initial study. Having completed the impact of fire from the confederates, Frank O’Reilly asked me to look at the impact of Union fire from the Swale.

The result of this study showed that there was protection for Union soldiers sheltering in the Swale. They were crammed in side by side and lined up from the top of the Swale to the furthest extent. Most Union soldiers hiding in the Swale were out of sight of the Confederate infantry men. About half of those were also safe from the flight of the Minie-ball, while those furthest from the top of the slope were subject to random bullet strikes.

Findings

The Swale at Mercer Square was a significant terrain feature in the Battle of Fredericksburg. It reduced the number of Union casualties by providing cover and concealment from fire by Confederates located behind the stone wall on the Sunken Road. Secondly, the width of the area in defilade, between where the line of sight touches the top of slope and therefore the number of troops that could take shelter in the Swale, has been undervalued by historians.

With encouragement from John Hennessey, I began posting my observations of the Swale. The outcome was blogs published between February and April 2014. I wrote five blogs on the Swale, two on the rifle musket and the Minie-ball, and one related to the impact of union fire from the Swale. These are:

Finding the Swale – Feb 20, Modern Photographs of the Swale – Feb 26, The Swale in Cross-section – March 6, The Map Terrain – Mar 13, Muskets, and Rifle Muskets – March 26, Minie-ball, and its Parabolic Trajectory – March 27, Revising the Swale – April 3, Union Fire from the Swale April 10.

I maintained my interest in the Battle of Fredericksburg, spending the next six years investigating the area below Marye’s Heights. In the summer of 2020, I shifted my focus to the fighting at Prospect Hill, three miles to the south. This is where Union assaults broke through General Jackson’s line.

My next blog will start a study of logistics for both armies. I will begin looking at Falmouth train station. From time to time, I will share other reflections.

Sources.

Books.

O’Reilly, Francis Augustin, The Fredericksburg Campaign; Winter War on the Rappahannock, Louisiana State University Press, Baton Rouge, LA., 2003.

Harrison, Noel, Fredericksburg Civil War Sites, Volumes 1 and 2, E. Howard, Lynchburg, 1995.

Small Arms 1856 Reports of experiments with small arms for the military services, by officers of the Ordnance Department, U.S. Army (archive.org)

Internet

Ballistics Explorer. Ballistic Explorer – Oehler-Research

City of Fredericksburg GIS. Geographic Information System | Fredericksburg, VA – Official Website (fredericksburgva.gov)

Michler Map. Fredericksburg. [Dec. 1862] | Library of Congress (loc.gov) Sanborn Maps. Image 15 of Sanborn Fire Insurance Map from Fredericksburg, Independent Cities, Virginia. | Library of Congress (loc.gov)

Major General (MG) Ambrose E. Burnside’s assault against Marye’s Heights was a disaster. Today that assault is the stuff of legend and myth. Failure has many stepchildren; the Battle of Fredericksburg is no exception. Today, I explore the impact that fences contributed to the outcome of the battle.

There were several obstacles which impeded movement of Union troops as they exited the environs of Fredericksburg. At the northern exit, these began with the Hanover Street bridge over the canal-ditch (click here). At the southern end exit at Prussia Street, there was the Richmond, Fredericksburg, and Potomac (RF&P) railroad and depot. Most assaults formed up along the low land just west of the canal-ditch, no matter which exit of the city was used, Hanover or Prussia Streets. From there, an open agricultural plain gradually rose to the stone wall and the Sunken Road at the base of Marye’s Heights. Now the assaulting troops faced more problems – fences.

Union Brigadier General (BG) Winfield S. Hancock devoted most of an entire paragraph in his official report to the impact of fences. While he focused on his division, virtually all Union formations faced the same problem. “One serious difficulty in the advance was in the nature of the obstacles … and the fact that a number of substantial fences intervened, which were required to be pulled down before the troops could continue their advance. Each of these fences destroyed the unity of at least one brigade. These obstacles naturally caused brigades and regiments to lose somewhat their solidity of organization for an assault, for all these operations were conducted under a terrific fire.”

Agricultural Fences

The open agricultural fields the troops traversed were sectioned off by fences. These were substantial in nature as, in many cases, they denoted property lines. The 1867 Michler map and a modern map of the same ground display some of the fence lines. There were others, but these are lost to time. Some authorities, such as Private John Keyser (see below), suggest that there were more fences extending as far as Hanover Street.

The first Union assault was conducted by BG William H. French’s Third Division. The lead element was BG Nathan Kimball’s 1st Brigade. This print of his assault shows the basic elements that confronted his infantry. The artist, John G. Keyser was a private with the 24th New Jersey Infantry Regiment. Drawn sometime after the battle, Keyser depicts the portion of the field he encountered as he remembered it. His depiction is of the typical agricultural fence he experienced.

BG Kimball was wounded and taken from the field. His courier reported to him later that “.. as they [Union infantry] crossed plowed fields on the double quick, they tore down fences…”

In the same attack, Private John B Landis of the 130th Pennsylvania regiment recalled, “On we went into a corn stubble field, and near a brick and a frame house [Stratton], over and through a board fence [Mercer Square fairgrounds fence]. We were now certainly now not more than 200 yards from the fatal stone fence at the foot of Marye’s Heights. The two houses mentioned stand on what is now the N.W. and N.E. corners of Fair and Mercer Street…”

Mercer Square Fairground Fence

The most impactful fence system surrounded the agricultural fairgrounds known as Mercer Square. The fairgrounds were ten acres (four hectares) in size. It measured 600 by 726 feet (182 by 221 meters), with a long axis in a north-south orientation (read here). Between 1856 and 1861, the Fairgrounds was surrounded by a substantial fence and other improvements. After Virginia seceded from the Union, the fairgrounds became a training and assembly point for various Confederate units. In April 1861, a sketch of ‘Camp at Fredericksburg’ by one visitor captured the layout.

In the spring of 1862, Confederates retreated from Northern Virginia. They regrouped on the York peninsula to oppose the Union army under Major General (MG) George B. McClellan. When they withdrew from Fredericksburg, they burned the bridges across the Rappahannock River and all the improvements in Mercer Square except its fence.

In December, on the eve of battle, Confederate troops pulled down the fence wall boards closest to the stone wall and the Sunken Road. They piled these boards in random order to act as another impediment to the attacking Union infantry.

Working with the National Park Service, artist Mark Churms depicted the Union assaults against Marye’s Heights. The swale runs through the center of Mercer Square and behind the Stratton house. The Confederate defenders are along the bottom, standing behind the stone wall in the Sunken Road. One of the soldiers described it this way, “…The ground, over which we advances [sic] in that furious storm of iron hail and leaden rain, was a gentle slope from the city to the rebel works. Many of the solders are of the idea that the ground was a level field, but it was not so. In the days before the war this field was occupied a fair ground. The entire field had the appearance of a theatre; the enemy held the tier of seats, and the Union army occupied the stage. …The distance we had to advance under this terrible fire was from forty to sixty rods, and it was the longest fifty rods (275 yards or 250 meters) I ever saw.”

Here in Union soldiers’ own words are descriptions of the intensity of the slaughter in Mercer Square and the impact of its fence on movement.

Early in the battle, the 132nd Pennsylvania regiment’s adjutant, Lieutenant (Lt) Frederick L. Hitchcock was wounded in the middle of Mercer Square during the advance. He was initially knocked out by an artillery burst, but recovered and retreated, zigzagging under fire. “About fifty yards back was an old slab fence to my right, and I plunged headlong behind that, hoping to find shelter from those bullets. I fell directly behind several wounded men, two of whom rolled over dead from bullets that came through the slabs and which were probably aimed at me…”

Leander Cogswell of the 11th New Hampshire of BG Edward Ferrero’s 2nd Brigade described “…[W]e were ordered to make the final advance. In doing so, we had to climb over two high fences. …Now the Minies whistled, and the shells screamed over heads and through the ranks. Now the case-shot hummed, and the splinters from the fences flew in our faces…”

‘Cicero’ of the 13th New York described his entry into Mercer Square to a home-town newspaper. “…across the field, over, under and through two board fences, which rather disturbed the steadiness of our advance….”

Robert Goldwaite Carter of the 22nd Massachusetts described his entry, “We reached the next slight rise, the line half crouching as it ran, and moving sideways, as though breasting a ‘blizzard’….” After expanding all their ammunition, “We fell back through the lines a few yards. The Twentieth Maine swept forward…Our position was now along a board fence, skirting a sunken road.” There they discovered that they were in placed in a putrid corner of the fairgrounds: “now spread out in a vile spot, which had been used frequently by distressed men attending calls of nature” which fairgoers and others had used as a latrine.

An hour later survivors of the 118th Pennsylvania Infantry found “A board fence, with some of the boards displaced, others torn from the top, stood between the abrupt rise and the stone fence, nearer to the latter. The fence was about five feet high, or three boards, with intervals between them. Opposite the centre and right, the boards had been torn off down to the one nearest the ground…To the left, the boards still remained; the men heroically seized and tore them all away, some climbing over…The fatality that had followed the delay in their removal was marked by the bodies of the dead lying there, one upon another…”

Erastus Everson of the 18th Massachusetts found, “…the right company came squarely up on a huge board fence” then “Clubbed muskets soon made breaches in the obstacle, through which we went pell-mell over the killed and wounded, and reformed on the run….”

Jacob Cole wrote, “…Fifteen hundred yards of open plain had to be crossed with intervening ditches, broken bridges and rail fences. At one of these fences the Fifty-seventh [New York] halted for a moment and hesitated, as though asking whether it were possible to go further. It was a momentarily hesitation only, and when someone cried “Forward!” the boys climbed over the fence and advanced to the knoll within thirty yards of the stone wall. It was the furthest point reached that day.”

Wilford Wilson of the 145th Pennsylvania wrote, “The regiment advanced on the heights. It came to a board fence, splintered by bullets, which they pried open with bayonets. Once past this fence they came under a hail of gunfire…”

A soldier of the 69th New York noted, “…The now ragged Irish Brigade line swarmed forward towards the Rebel ranks, until the brigade encountered a 100 yard long “fence of upright plank, spaced along timber bars and supported by equidistant posts, fifty yards from the stone wall. As the Irish scrambled over the fence, “sheets of flame from thousands of muskets, withheld until this moment” erupted in their faces and stopped all but a few…”

Stratton House Fences

The Stratton House, immediately north of Mercer Square, was surrounded by fences with a small orchard and fence in the rear. Lt. Winthrop D. Sheldon of Company H, 27th Connecticut wrote, “The line now begins to waver…and presses forward to a brick house [Stratton]… the twenty-seventh…separated into several fragments, advancing to the right and left of the house. The time for a sudden dash had passed, and unable longer to stem the avalanche of fire, which seemed to gather intensity as we proceeded, the charge was continued only as far as a board fence, all full of bullet holes and torn by shot, less than a hundred yards [60 meters] from the famous stone wall…” This fence formed the back property line of wheelwright Allan Stratton’s property. This fence was aligned with the west fence line of Mercer Square fairgrounds. The area between the house and the fence became a deadly killing zone. By the end of the battle so many Union casualties accumulated here that the area behind Stratton’s house was the site of one of the two burial pits used to bury Union dead after the battle.

One of the last assaults was by BG Andrew Humphrey’s Division. Survivors of the 126th Pennsylvania wrote: “… On the side of this meadow, next to the enemy, is a slight bluff [at the canal ditch], under the shelter of which the assaulting columns formed for attack on the Rebel lines. From the apex of this bluff to the stone wall is probably a distance of a little over 300 [450] yards. This portion of the field is a slightly ascending plain. The only obstructions were a brick [Stratton] house and two board fences. The first of these fences was constructed of narrow boards, fastened horizontally to the posts on the side of approach, making it rather difficult to remove them. The second fence was made of broad boards, which were fastened vertically, like palings, on the opposite side of approach. Consequently, [these] were easily knocked off. The fences, when reached by our charging columns, were found to be in a fairly good state of repair, but both of them were completely razed to the ground by Humphreys’ charging column of Pennsylvania troops.” Despite whatever success the 126th may have had with the fences, they were also held up by the number of Union casualties which covered the ground. Their assault never made it to the Confederate line.

Other Fences

South of Mercer Square, BG Samuel Sturgis’ Ninth Corps troops discovered other fences. Private William P. Hopkins of the 7th Rhode Island wrote, “The regiment climbed a fence, crossed an old road and a slight swell of ground made a brief halt to reform the line. A position was then momentarily taken behind a second fence to wait the general order to charge across the plain.”

Fences were just another nail in the coffin (no pun intended) of the flawed Union assault against Marye’s Heights. When added to the punishing artillery fire, the progressively muddier agricultural field, which slowed the pace of the advance, and the power of the rifled musket used by Confederate defenders behind the stone wall, it is little wonder that Union troops failed to even come close to the stone wall. The conviction that they could prevail, and the supreme effort of the Union soldiers was not enough to overcome the odds stacked against them.

In front of Marye’s Heights, the Army of the Potomac lost 7,723 while the Confederates under Lieutenant General (LG) James Longstreet, lost 1,010 -lopsided numbers to be sure. Collectively, we remember the Battle of Fredericksburg for what occurred in front of Marye’s Heights amongst the fences of Mercer Square and the Stratton House.

Sources:

Books & Manuscripts.

A committee of the regimental association, History of the Thirty-Fifth Regiment Massachusetts Volunteers, 1862-65, Boston, Mills, Knight& Co., Printers, 1884, Pp 85-6.

Alexander, Ted, Editor, The 126th Pennsylvania, Shippensburg, PA: Beidel Publishing House, 1984, Reprint of A Sketch of the 126th Regiment Pennsylvania Volunteers, Chambersburg, PA: Cook & Hayes, 1869. p 44 &132.

Authorized by the Regimental Association and Prepared by its Committee, History of the 127th Regiment Pennsylvania Volunteers, Lebanon, Press of Report Publishing Company, nd, P 127. History of the 127th regiment, Pennsylvania volunteers, familiarly known as the “Dauphin County regiment.” Authorized by the regimental association and prepared by its committee : United States. Army. Pennsylvania Infantry Regiment, 127th (1862-1863) : Free Download, Borrow, and Streaming : Internet Archive

Bilby, Joseph G. Remember Fontenoy! The 69th New York and the Irish Brigade in the Civil War, Hightown, NJ, Longstreet House, 1995. P67.

Carter, Robert Goldthwaite, Four Brothers in Blue, Washington, Press of Gibson Bros, 1913, Pp 196-7. Four brothers in blue; or, Sunshine and shadows of the War of the Rebellion; a story of the great civil war from Bull Run to Appomattox : Carter, Robert Goldthwaite, 1845-1936 : Free Download, Borrow, and Streaming : Internet Archive

Cogswell, Leander W., A History of the Eleventh New Hampshire Regiment Volunteer Infantry in the Rebellion War 1861-1865, Concord, Republican Press Association, 1891, P 55, 59. A history of the Eleventh New Hampshire Regiment, Volunteer Infantry in the rebellion war, 1861-1865 … : Cogswell, Leander W. (Leander Winslow), b. 1825 : Free Download, Borrow, and Streaming : Internet Archive

Cole, Jacob H., Under Five Commanders; or, A Boy’s Experience with the Army of the Potomac, Paterson, N.J., News printing company, P 108, 111. Under five commanders; or, A boy’s experience with the Army of the Potomac : Cole, Jacob Henry, 1847- : Free Download, Borrow, and Streaming : Internet Archive

Gould, Joseph, The Story of the Forty-Eighth, Mt. Carmel, PA, Published by authority of the Regimental Association, 1908. P 99. The story of the Forty-eighth : a record of the campaigns of the Forty-eighth Regiment Pennsylvania Veteran Volunteer Infantry during the four eventful years of its service in the war for the preservation of the Union : Gould, Joseph, 1840- : Free Download, Borrow, and Streaming : Internet Archive

Harrison, Noel G., Fredericksburg Civil War Sites, Volume Two, Lynchburg, H. E. Howard Inc, 1995, Pp 160-164.

Hitchcock, Col. Frederick L., War From the Inside; The Personal Experiences, Impressions, and Reminiscences of One of the ‘Boys’ in the War of the Rebellion, J.B. Lippincott Company, Philadelphia, 1904, P 123. War from the inside; or, Personal experiences, impressions, and reminiscences of one of the “boys” in the war of the rebellion : Hitchcock, Frederick L. (Frederick Lyman) : Free Download, Borrow, and Streaming : Internet Archive

Hopkins, William P., The Seventh Regiment Rhode Island Volunteers in the Civil War 1862-1865, Providence, RI, Snow and Farnham Printers, 1903, P 45 The Seventh Regiment Rhode Island Volunteers in the Civil War, 1862-1865 : Hopkins, William Palmer, 1845- : Free Download, Borrow, and Streaming : Internet Archive

Orwig, Joseph R., History of the 131st Penna. Volunteers, war of 1861-5, Williamsport, Pa., Sun book and job printing house, 1902, P xx. Orwig, Joseph R. (Joseph Ray), History of the 131st Penna. Volunteers, war of 1861-5 : Orwig, Joseph R. (Joseph Ray), b. 1838 : Free Download, Borrow, and Streaming : Internet Archive

Parker, John L., History of the Twenty-Second Massachusetts Infantry, Boston: Rand Avery Company, 1887, P 228. Henry Wilson’s regiment. History of the Twenty-second Massachusetts infantry, the Second company sharpshooters, and the Third light battery, in the war of the rebellion : Parker, John Lord : Free Download, Borrow, and Streaming : Internet Archive

Sauers, Dr. Richard, ed, The Civil War Journal of Colonel William J. Bolton, 51st Pennsylvania, Combined Publishing Pennsylvania, 2000, P 100.

Sheldon, Winthrop, D., The Twenty-Seventh; A regimental History, New Haven, CT, Morris and Benham, 1866, P 28. The “Twenty-seventh, a regimental history : Sheldon, Winthrop Dudley, 1839-1931 : Free Download, Borrow, and Streaming : Internet Archive

Survivors’ Association, History of the 118th Pennsylvania Volunteers (Corn Exchange Regiment), Philadelphia: J.L. Smith, Map Publisher, 1905, Pp 128-9. History of the 118th Pennsylvania Volunteers Corn exchange regiment, from their first engagement at Antietam to Appomattox. To which is added a record of its organization and a complete roster. Fully illustrated with maps, portraits, and over one hundred illustrations, with addenda : United States. Army. Pennsylvania Infantry Regiment, 118th (1862-1865) : Free Download, Borrow, and Streaming : Internet Archive

The War of the Rebellion: A Compilation of Official Records of the Union and Confederate Armies, 128 vols. (Washington D.C., 1890-1901. Series 1. http://ehistory.osu.edu/books/official-records

No. 4. Return of casualties in the Union forces commanded by Major General Ambrose E. Burnside, U.S. Army, at the battle of Fredericksburg, Va., December 11-15, 1862, OR 21, Pp 129-145.

No. 55. Report of Brigadier General Winfield S. Hancock, U. S. Army, commanding First Division. OR 21, P 228.

No. 265. Reports of Surg. Lafayette Guild, C.S. Army, Medical Director, with lists of killed and wounded. OR 21, Pp 558-562, plus, 572-3, 577, 583-4, 591, 610, 623-4, 629, 635, 640, 662, 665, & 680.

Worsham, John H., One of Jackson’s Foot Cavalry: His Experience and What He Saw During the War 1861-1865, Including a History of “F Company,” Richmond, Va., 21st Regiment Virginia Infantry, Second Brigade, Jackson’s Division, Second Corps, A. N. Va., Pp 18, 21. One of Jackson’s foot cavalry : his experience and what he saw during the war 1861-1865, including a history of “F company,” Richmond, Va., 21st regiment Virginia infantry, Second brigade, Jackson’s division, Second corps, A. N. Va. : Worsham, John H : Free Download, Borrow, and Streaming : Internet Archive

Newspapers, Periodicals and Manuscripts.

Erastus W. Everson, Philadelphia (PA) Weekly Times, 3/4/1882, Forward Against Marye’s, 18 Massachusetts.

———————-, “Forward Against Marye’s,” Annals of the War, USAMHI.

Landis, John B. Personal Experiences in the War of the Rebellion, Betty Carson, Norristown, Pennsylvania, P 22.

Unknown author, Report of Kimball Brigade attack against Marye’s Heights, Kimball Papers, Lilly Library, Indiana University, Bloomington.

Wilson, Wilford M, 145 PA, December 2011 newsletter of the Sons of Confederate Veterans, Joseph B. Kershaw Camp #82, Camden, South Carolina

Internet.

Deed Book/Page R/349/351 14 March 1855, Caldwell et. al sells 10 acres to Mayor of Community of the Town of Fredericksburg.

Internet.

April 1861 sketch of Mercer Square. Library of Virginia, Robert Alonzo Brock Collection, 2010-Fall.pdf (virginia.gov). The original is at the Huntington Library.

Reuben Lindsay Walker and Purcell Artillery. History of the Purcell (Virginia) Artillery in the Civil War (civilwarintheeast.com)

History of the Richmond Purcell Artillery History of the Purcell (Virginia) Artillery in the Civil War (civilwarintheeast.com)

Mysteries & Conundrum, Jan 26, 2011 by John Hennessey. Visual evidence of learning–the Fairgrounds by O’Reilly | Mysteries & Conundrums (wordpress.com)

April 1861 sketch of Camp Mercer. Broadside, Library of Virginia, Robert Alonzo Brock Collection, 2010-Fall.pdf (virginia.gov)

Reuben Lindsay Walker and Purcell Artillery. History of the Purcell (Virginia) Artillery in the Civil War (civilwarintheeast.com)

History of the Richmond Purcell Artillery History of the Purcell (Virginia) Artillery in the Civil War (civilwarintheeast.com)

Original Sketch of Kimball’s Assault by John G. Keyser. Civil War Sketches Collection – The Warren and Reba Lummis Genealogical & Historical Research Library (warren-and-reba-lummis-research-library.org)

Images:

Keyser, John G., “Charge of Kimball’s Brigade: in the Battle of Fredericksburg Saturday Dec. 13th 1862 ” (1863). Prints, Drawings and Watercolors from the Anne S.K. Brown Military Collection. Brown Digital Repository. Brown University Library. https://repository.library.brown.edu/studio/item/bdr:234316/

The name Dead Horse Hill was applied to the terrain of Prospect Hill by the Confederate artillerymen who fought there. Lieutenant Colonel Reuban Walker’s Artillery Battalion, with 14 guns, was placed on Prospect Hill to anchor Lieutenant General Thomas (Stonewall) Jackson’s Second Corps (read here). It contained approximately 200 horses: 12 per gun, plus five per section, and battery commanders’ mounts. According to civil war era doctrine, most horses were kept in line with their limber or caisson behind the guns. Alternatively, they were removed further back for safety.

Captain David Gregg McIntosh, of the Pee Dee artillery, described the hill as covered with a “heavy growth of timber and some splendid white oaks”. The Michler 1867 survey map showed a small grove of pines in addition to the white oak forest. During the several Union bombardments against Walker’s guns, a considerable number of the artillery projectiles overshot Walker’s entrenched artillery pieces, exploding amongst the horses. The slaughter was foreseeable, but not preventable.

Several of the participants provided accounts of their casualties of guns, men, and horses. Captain McIntosh wrote, “The battle was kept up by artillery until dark; but the 14 guns on Prospect Hill were relieved late in the afternoon, the ammunition being exhausted, and the men worn out with fatigue, and replaced by fresh guns. In the Pee Dee Battery, the loss to men and horses was very severe. The casualties in killed and wounded amounted to ½ of those engaged. Two of the guns were dismounted during the action, and a limber chest and caisson exploded by artillery of the other side. In spite of all our efforts to keep the horses under cover of the ridge, twenty-three were killed, including my little grey mare.”

A letter by BEN to his father on December 13th and published in the Charleston Daily Courier in late December, gave a view by one of McIntosh’s gun crew members. “To-day I have been in the hottest fight I have heard of. From ten o’clock till an hour or two since shot and shell, and Minnie balls, have been perfect hail around me… Our battery lost three men killed and sixteen wounded, eighteen or twenty horses, one limber and one caisson blown up, and one gun disabled… The trees around us were literally torn to pieces and the ground plowed up. I have been several times covered with dirt, and had it knocked in my eyes and mouth.”

The Crenshaw Artillery Battery, located at the southern end of Walker’s guns, appears to have been even more harshly handled. First, while its two-gun section was taking position around ten o’clock in the morning, it lost its commander, Lieutenant James Ellett, to an exploding Union shell. By the end of the day, “nearly every horse was killed or wounded”. Of the seventeen men who began the day in the battery section, two were killed and eight were wounded, two seriously. The Crenshaw Artillery retired from its position on Prospect Hill around dusk and headed toward camp, the guns probably pulled by hand because of the lack of horses. The next day the other section of the battery went up the hill. The two original guns were left in camp for the lack of horses.

We have no accounting of Captain Pegram’s battery but judging from the casualties endured by the Pee Dee artillery to his left and the Crenshaw artillery to his right, a similar result would be expected.

When I reread the account of the Crenshaw Artillery, I became curious about what was it about the artillery fight on Prospect Hill that caused so many casualties, especially to the horses. I decided to look at the positions using a topographic map of the area.

I believe that the artillery fire from Union 1st Corps guns were converging obliquely against the line of Walker’s Artillery Battalion.

Insert S3 Walker’s Artillery Battalion doctrinal placement.

If Walker’s artillery pieces were laid out per civil war doctrine, the incoming artillery fire would have come in on the flank of the horses and guns. Even if the horses were detached from the limbers and caissons and placed below the brow of the hill amongst the trees, they would have fared no better.

This diagram shows a doctrinal layout of civil war era artillery batteries. The Union lines of fire are superimposed. Green lines are 3-inch Ordnance Rifles. Blue are 12-pounder Napoleon guns and Orange are 20-pounder Parrott Rifles. This demonstrates the increased danger to men, horses, and artillery pieces of oblique fire.

Colonel Charles S. Wainwright, 1st Corps Artillery Chief, had half a dozen artillery batteries to choose from to find and suppress LTC Walker’s Artillery Battalion on Prospect Hill. These included 12-pound Napoleon batteries of Captain Dunbar R. Ransom’s C-5 US, and Lieutenant John G. Simpson’s A-1 PA, totaling eight guns. He also had 3-inch Ordnance Rifles from Captain James A. Cooper’s B-1 PA, Captain John W. Wolcott’s A-MD, and Captain Frank P. Amsden’s G-1 PA, totaling thirteen guns, plus the fire from Captain Gustavus A. D’Russy’s eight 20-pounder Parrott Rifles from across the river.

About 3:00 p.m. Wainwright replaced some of the 1st Corps batteries when they exhausted their ammunition with Captain George F. Leppien’s 5 ME six Napoleons and Captain James Thompson’s C PA four 3-inch Ordnance Rifles. 3rd Corps twelve 12-pound Napoleons from Lieutenant Turnbull’s F&K 3 US and Lieutenant Jastram’s E 1-RI took the place of Cooper and Ransom’s batteries.

Several Union commanders noted that “At 4.30 p.m. the enemy, uncovering ten guns on the hill” against which these same Union batteries “silenced the guns, in twenty minutes” or at sunset. Wainwright noted at the day’s end, Amsden and Reynolds batteries had three guns put out of action due to broken axles, while Wolcott and Simpson both had one broken by Confederate fire. He was unclear as to Confederate artillery losses. He noted that his battery commanders felt that “half of the [enemy] guns were dismounted.”

In the afternoon, Colonel J. Thomas Brown’s Reserve was ordered to relieve Walker’s battalion. Captain William Thomas Poague’s battery placed a section of 20-pound Parrott Rifles. One of Poague’s gunners wrote about arriving up on Prospect Hill. “The ground, when [the battery] arrived, was already strewn with dead horses and wrecked batteries…” Other replacements included a section from the King William artillery under Captain William Page Carter.

On a somber note, author and former gunner Moore talked about his experience after the day of battle was over. “After going into bivouac and the dead had been buried, to clear the ground for a renewal of the battle on the following day, the wagon-horses had to be brought into requisition. These were driven in pairs to the position on the bluff and, as lights would attract the fire of the enemy, the dead horses had to be found in the darkness, and with chains dragged to the rear. The approach of the first installment to a line of infantry, through which it had to pass and who were roused from sleep by the rattling of chains and the dragging of the ponderous bodies through brush and fallen timber, created no little excitement, and a wide berth was given the gruesome procession. By midnight the work had been accomplished.” Prospect Hill or Dead Horse Hill had earned its nom de guerre.

My next blog will return to the area below Marye’s Heights to look at the fence that surrounded Mercer Square, where I began my study of the Battle of Fredericksburg.

Sources:

Books:

Carter, Thomas Henry, Graham T. Dozier ed, A Gunner in Lee’s Army, The Civil War Letters of Thomas Henry Carter, University of North Carolina Press, 2014, Pg 160-162.

Carmichael, Peter S. The Purcell, Crenshaw Letcher Artillery, H.E. Howard Inc, 1990, Lynchburg, Pg 104-5.

Divers, Robert J. Jr., The 1st and 2nd Rockbridge Artillery, H.E. Howard Inc, 1990, Lynchburg, Pg 36.

Jones Constance Hall, The Spirits of Bad Men Made Perfect, The Life and Diary of Confederate Artillerist William Ellis Jones, Southern Illinois University Press, Carbondale, 2019, Pg 145-6.

McIntosh, David Gregg, A Ride on Horseback in the Summer of 1910 over Battlefields of the Great Civil War with some notes of the Battles, Southern Historical Collection, University of North Carolina, Chapel Hill, Pg 15.

Moore, Edward A., The Story of a Cannoneer Under Stonewall Jackson, New York and Washington, The Neale Publishing Company, 1907, Pg 163-4. The Project Gutenberg eBook of The Story Of A Cannoneer Under Stonewall Jackson, by Edward A. Moore.

O’Reilly, Francis Augustin, The Fredericksburg Campaign, “Stonewall” Jackson at Fredericksburg, The Battle of Prospect Hill December 13, 1862, Lynchburg, H.E. Howard, Inc., 1993. Pg 177-180.

—————–, The Fredericksburg Campaign; Winter War on the Rappahannock, Louisiana State University Press, Baton Rouge, LA, 2006, Pg 425-9.

Poague, William Thomas, Gunner with Stonewall, Reminiscences of William Thomas Poague, Jackson, Tenn.: McCowat-Mercer Press, Inc, 1957, Pg 54-58.

The War of the Rebellion: A Completion of Official Records of the Union and Confederate Armies, 128 vols. (Washington, D.C.1890-1910). The War of the Rebellion: Official Records of the Civil War | eHISTORY (osu.edu)

OR Vol 21, Serial 31, No. 146. Report of Brigadier General David B. Birney, U. S. Army, commanding First Division. Pg 362-3.

OR Vol 21, Serial 31, No. 147. Report of Captain George E. Randolph, Chief of Artillery, First Division, Pg 364-5.

OR Vol 21, Serial 31, No. 209. Report of Colonel C. S. Wainwright, First New York Light Artillery, Chief of Artillery. Pg 458-9.

OR Vol 21, Serial 31, No. 304. Report of Colonel S. Crutchfield, Chief of Artillery, Pg 638.

OR Vol 21, Serial 31, No. 305. Report of Colonel J. Thomas Brown, first Virginia Artillery, Pg 639.

Manuscripts:

Huntington Library, Henry E. Huntington Society, San Marino, Calif.

Charles S. Wainwright Journals

Newspapers:

The Charleston Daily Courier, December 30, 1862, pg. 4, Letter from the Battlefield, December 13, 1862, by Ben.

Magazines:

Dead Horse Hill, The Home-Maker, Vol III, No. 4, January 1890, P 304-6.

Maps:

Michler final map:

Mapping the Battle of Fredericksburg – The Unwritten Record (archives.gov)

Michler Published Map: Michler 1867 map of Fredericksburg, Plate XXXIII-1 https://www.loc.gov/item/99439215/

Topographic map of Fredericksburg and vicinity, VA, showing battlefields. Topographic map of Fredericksburg and vicinity, Virginia, showing battlefields | Library of Congress (loc.gov)

National Park Service Fredericksburg Battle Maps #4 & #5.

Internet:

Brooke Battery | Civil War Potpourri (civilwartalk.com)Antietam: Pvt Edward Alexander Moore (aotw.org)

Writing about an attack that aborted as soon as it began is an interesting challenge. The case in point is Lieutenant General (LG) Thomas J. (Stonewall) Jackson’s counterattack following the Union assault against Prospect Hill below Fredericksburg. Jackson won fame for his skill in the Valley Campaign, during the Antietam Campaign, and of course his last and final effort during the Chancellorsville Campaign for his masterful attack against the Union right flank and the hapless 11th Corps. Jackson was never one to pass up a chance to fight. So, what happened at Fredericksburg in the late afternoon of December 13, 1862? What did he attempt and why did he call it off?

The setting.

By 2:30 PM the Union attack against Prospect Hill by Major General (MG) George Gordon Meade’s Division and Brigadier General (BG) John Gibbon’s Division was finished. Their broken and disorganized brigades were replaced online by Union 3rd Corps divisions under BG David B. Birney and BG Daniel E. Sickles. Birney’s brigades repelled an unsupported counterattack by Colonel (COL) Edward N. Atkinson’s Georgia brigade which aggressively followed Meade’s retreating division. Meade’s and Gibbon’s divisions were reorganizing back where they had begun the day. Their regimental commanders were gathering their spent and disorganized companies, receiving new ammunition, and assessing their losses. They were not able to renew the attack, despite MG Ambrose E. Burnside’s order to MG William B. Franklin to do so.

Atkinson’s Georgia Brigade being countered by Birney’s forces was captured by the artist Carl Rochling. It depicts a spirited attack by COL Charles H.T. Collis’s 114th Pennsylvania Zouaves.

After waiting for a renewed Union attack, the ever-aggressive Jackson wanted to go on a counter-offensive. About 3:00 PM Jackson, accompanied by his engineer Lieutenant James Powell Smith, ventured forward of his line looking for a weakness to exploit. Finding none, they quickly returned to the safety of their lines after being surprised by a small packet of Union troops.

According to historian Frank O’Reilly, Jackson then seems to have gone to the far right of his line where he consulted with MG JEB Stuart, Lee’s cavalry commander. Here the outline of a plan of attack was conceived. Jackson’s plan boiled down to an attack by his entire Corps, plus Hood’s division on the left and Stuart’s artillery on the right (read here).

Jackson’s official report laid out his thinking; “Repulsed on the right, left, and center, the enemy soon after reformed his lines, and gave some indications of a purpose to renew the attack. I waited some time to receive it; but he making no forward movement, I determined, if prudent, to do so myself…”

Using observation from his recent scouting foray, his report continues; “The artillery of the enemy was so judiciously posted as to make an advance of our troops across the plain very hazardous; yet it was so promising of good results, if successfully executed, as to induce me to make preparations for the attempt…”

Drawing upon his artillery background he compensated, “In order to guard against disaster, the infantry was to be preceded by artillery, and the movement postponed until late in the evening, so that, if compelled to retire, it would be under the cover of night.” (Emphasis added).

Confederate Artillery.

Artillery available to him was limited. Lieutenant Colonel (LTC) Reuben Walker’s artillery battalion at Prospect Hill and Captain (CPT) Greenlee Davidson’s artillery on the left were fairly used up during Meade’s attack earlier in the day. Jackson could count on a portion of COL J. Thompson Brown’s reserve artillery and BG D.H. Hill’s artillery under Major (MAJ) Thomas H. Carter.

Jackson delayed his counter-offensive to take advantage of the fading light. Sunset was at 4:50 PM. This was followed by 30 minutes of Civil Twilight and then another 30 minutes of fast diminishing Nautical Twilight, the end of which is darkness. This meant he had only one-hour to execute a major assault. He intended the attack would be led by artillery intended to suppress Union front line artillery. The artillery would need to be manhandled over the railroad tracks that cut across his front to lead the planned attack. MAJ Carter of King William Artillery wrote a letter to his wife following the battle. In it, said Carter “looked across a wide open flat at the long line of artillery and infantry growing more obscure as darkness approached… [he] knew nothing of the ground and a single ditch might have brought a halt under murderous artillery.”

Why did the attack fail to materialize? There are several important reasons; 1) Disorganization and misalignment amongst some of the Confederate units, 2) Lack of clarity in Jackson’s order, 3) Delay in getting orders to major commanders, 4) Ineffectiveness of Confederate artillery.

COL Stapleton Crutchfield reported; “…some of the batteries of Lieutenant-Colonel Walker’s command being short of ammunition and the men exhausted from working with diminished numbers, were relieved by a section of [Captain John A. M.] Lusk’s battery [Lieutenant [William K.] Donald commanding], and a portion of the corps reserve, under Colonel J. Thompson Brown. Some guns of Major General D. H. Hill’s division artillery were put in at this time on our right by his chief of artillery, Major Thomas H. Carter… They moved up with the rest under heavy fire…”

COL J. Thompson Brown reported; “About 2 o’clock, by order of Colonel Crutchfield, I placed in position on the hill to the extreme right of our infantry line the two 20-pounder Parrotts of Captain Poague’s battery. These two pieces unaided engaged the enemy’s artillery and afterward opened upon the infantry. The exact range of the hill having been obtained by much previous firing, our loss at this point was heavy. … Later in the evening, Lieutenant-Colonel [L. M.] Coleman brought up two howitzers from Captain Dance’s battery and placed them on the left of Captain Poague’s pieces. … Late in the evening two pieces of Captain Hupp’s battery, under Lieutenant [Charles B.] Griffin, were ordered to the right of the railroad.”

Confederate infantry.

Jackson struggled to get orders to his dispersed divisions and brigades. His adjutant general (chief of staff), Alexander Swift “Sandie” Pendleton had been wounded by a spent mini ball earlier in the day while rushing Jackson’s reserve to plug the hole in the line due to Meade’s attack. Pendleton was thrown to the ground from his horse, though saved by a pocketknife in his pocket, stunned, he was out of action for the remainder of the day. Some authors credit this incident to a breakdown in staff coordination later in the day.

MG D.H. Hill’s Division moved from its rear defensive line along Mine Road to position along the railroad. One of Hill’s five brigades never got word of the attack and never moved. Hill reported; “Toward sundown on the 13th, a general advance of our lines was ordered, preceded by artillery. Artillery officers were called for to volunteer for this hazardous duty. Captain Bondurant and Lieutenants [S. H.] Pendleton and [William P.] Carter, of my division, volunteered and brought out their batteries. The answering reply of the Yankee artillery to ours was so rapid and constant that the advance was halted before our columns emerged from the woods to view.”

MG A.P. Hill’s Division had been the focus of Meade’s attack, consequently it was weaker and lacking unit cohesion and ammunition. Overall, AP Hill’s Division suffered 16 percent casualties. These were concentrated mostly in Archer’s and Lane’s Brigades. A.P. Hill reported; “About dusk I received an order from the lieutenant-general to advance my whole line and drive the enemy…”

COL Daniel H. Hamilton, the new commander of Gregg’s Brigade in A.P. Hill’s Division, reported; “At dark an order came from Lieutenant-General Jackson, ordering an advance of the whole line. I accordingly advanced to the railroad, which I still found held by Colonel Walker’s brigade, who had received no such order, as Colonel Walker informed me…“Walker’s Brigade, part of BG Early’s Division, became separated from the remainder of the division, had reached the railroad as part of the effort to expel Meade’s brigades.

BG James Lane’s Brigade, also of MG A.P. Hill’s Division, had been the target of Gibbon’s attack. They also were consequently weaker, lacking unit cohesion and in need of ammunition. Lane reported; “That night the whole brigade was aligned on the track, and skirmishers thrown forward preparatory to a general advance…”

COL Alfred M. Scales, who had briefly taken over BG William D. Pender’s Brigade when he had been wounded earlier in the day, was still with Penders regiments. After the war, Scales addressed Confederate veterans in Richmond VA. He said in part; “On the eve of the memorable 13th, … just before dusk, I was with Gen. Pender… The firing had ceased, the work of the day, whether good or bad had been done… A courier rode up and handed to Gen. Pender an order from Gen. Jackson through A. P. Hill. He read and re-read it, with a grave and anxious face, and handed it to me. It was in substance to hold his brigade in readiness to advance at near dusk, (naming the hour), in connection with the whole line upon the enemy. This order was issued… Pender and I discussed the order, — he in the light of his military education, and I in the light of its common sense and practicability. We both agreed that the order was injudicious and hazardous…”

BG Jubal Early’s Division had been key to ejecting Meade’s Division earlier. His report provides insight into the confused situation within Confederate lines during the afternoon.

“About sundown on the 13th, I saw General D. H. Hill’s division moving to the front, and was informed by one of his brigadier-generals that the whole line was ordered to advance, and that his division was ordered to follow. This was the first intimation I had of it, as no such order had been given me. In a few moments, however, Lieutenant [J. G.] Morrison, aide-de-camp, rode up an informed me that General Jackson’s orders were that I should hold myself in readiness to advance, and immediately afterward one of my own staff officers rode up and stated that General Jackson wished me to take command of the whole troops on the right and advance, regulating the distance by the effect produced on the enemy by our artillery. This was rather embarrassing to me, as my brigades had become separated in the positions assumed by them after repulsing the enemy, and a part of the troops on the right consisted of parts of two brigades of Major General A. P. Hill’s division. I rode immediately to where Colonel Hoke was posted, and met General Jackson himself, from whom I received the order in person to advance, supporting the artillery which he was about sending forward. I gave the order to Colonel Hoke and General Hays accordingly, and some pieces of artillery having been advanced a short distance to the front, Colonel Hoke advanced with a part of his command to the railroad, a portion being already there. The enemy immediately opened a terrible fire…”

Jackson summarized these delays in his report; “Owing to unexpected delays, the movement could not be gotten ready until late in the evening. The first gun had hardly moved forward from the wood 100 yards when the enemy’s artillery reopened, and so completely swept our front as to satisfy me that the proposed movement should be abandoned.”

The Union reaction to this entire event is summarized by COL Charles S. Wainwright, 1st Corps chief of artillery. To them, it was a non-event.

“About sundown the enemy’s batteries on the crest and on our left again opened fire and ours replied. The firing was quite brisk on both sides until it had become dark, when we both ceased.”

Each of the confederate commanders cited above were not displeased that Jackson’s counterattack was called off. Jackson himself was very relaxed later that evening. Perhaps he too was relieved.

Jackson learned his lesson. Close examination of his Chancellorsville flank attack demonstrates that he made sure all his divisions were in place prior to that attack.

Sources:

Books.

Bean, William Gleason, Stonewall’s Man; Sandie Pendleton, University of North Carolina Press, 1959, Pp 87-8.

Carter, Thomas Henry, Graham T. Dozier ed, A Gunner in Lee’s Army, The Civil War Letters of Thomas Henry Carter, University of North Carolina Press, 2014, Pp 160-162.

Cooke, John Esten, Stonewall Jackson: A Military Biography, Appleton, New York, 1866, p 375. Stonewall Jackson: a military biography : Cooke, John Esten, 1830-1886 : Free Download, Borrow, and Streaming : Internet Archive

Freeman, Douglas Southall, Lee’s Lieutenants, Volume 2, Cedar Mountain to Chancellorsville, New York, Simon & Schuster, 1943, Pp 369-73.

Gottfried, Bradley M., Maps of Fredericksburg; An atlas of the Fredericksburg Campaign, Including all Cavalry Operations, Sept 18, 1862 – January 22, 1863, Savas Beatie, El Dorado Hills, CA, 2018, p 238.

O’Reilly, Francis Augustin, The Fredericksburg Campaign, “Stonewall” Jackson at Fredericksburg, The Battle of Prospect Hill December 13, 1862, Lynchburg, H.E. Howard, Inc., 1993. Pp 177-180.

—————–, The Fredericksburg Campaign; Winter War on the Rappahannock, Louisiana State University Press, Baton Rouge, LA, 2006, Pp 425-9.

Scales, Alfred M., The Battle of Fredericksburg: An Address. Washington D.C., 1884, p 19. The Battle of Fredericksburg : an address before the Association of the Virginia Division of the Army of Northern Virginia, at Richmond, Va., on Thursday evening, November 1, 1883 : Scales, Alfred M. (Alfred Moore), 1827-1892 : Free Download, Borrow, and Streaming : Internet Archive

The War of the Rebellion: A Completion of Official Records of the Union and Confederate Armies, 128 vols. (Washington, D.C.1890-1910). The War of the Rebellion: Official Records of the Civil War | eHISTORY (osu.edu)

OR Vol 21, Serial 31, Numbers No. 146. Report of Brig. Gen. David B. Birney, U.S. Army, commanding First Division, p 363.

OR Vol 21, Serial 31, Numbers No. 209. Report of Col. C.S. Wainwright, First New York Light Artillery, Chief of Artillery, p 457.

OR Vol 21, Serial 31, Numbers No. 303. Report of Lieutenant General Thomas J. Jackson, C. S. Army, commanding Second Army Corps, p 634.

OR Vol 21, Serial 31, Numbers No. 304. Report of Col. S. Crutchfield, Chief of Artillery, p 638.

OR Vol 21, Serial 31, Numbers No. 305. Report of Col. J. Thomas Brown, first Virginia Artillery, p 639-40.

OR Vol 21, Serial 31, Number No. 307. Report of Major General Daniel H. Hill, C. S. Army, commanding D. H. Hill’s division, p 644.

OR Vol 21, Serial 31, Numbers No. 308. Report of Maj. Gen. Ambrose P. Hill, C.S. Army, commanding A.P. Hill’s division, p 647-8.

OR Vol 21, Serial 31, Numbers No. 311. Report of Col. D.H. Hamilton, First South Carolina Infantry, commanding Second (Gregg’s) Brigade, p 652.

OR Vol 21, Serial 31, Numbers No. 313. Report of Brig. Gen. James H. Lane, C.S. Army, commanding Fourth (Lane’s) Brigade, p 655.

OR Vol 21, Serial 31, Numbers No. 321. Report of Brig. Gen Jubal A. Early, C.S. Army, commanding Ewell’s division, p 666.

Internet:

Emerging Civil War article, Posted on August 27, 2016 by Sarah Kay Bierle, Emerging Civil War

Henri Lovie (1829-1875) · The Becker Collection (bc.edu)

A Rarely Seen Panorama of Fredericksburg, and the Pictorial Legacy of Henri Lovie | Mysteries & Conundrums (wordpress.com)

Sandie Pendleton – Wikipedia

“Finding” Sandie Pendleton | Emerging Civil War

114th Pennsylvania Infantry Regiment – Wikipedia

Newspaper:

Philadelphia Weekly Times, Saturday April 26, 1879. P 13-4.

Artwork:

Carl Rochling, Battle Fredericksburg, December 13, 1862, Philadelphia Museum of Art. The Battle of Fredericksburg, December 13, 1862 (philamuseum.org)

The Miriam and Ira D. Wallach Division of Art, Prints and Photographs: Print Collection, The New York Public Library. “Battle of Fredericksburg, Dec. 13, 1862,” (Leslie’s office-stamp at lower left corner). New York Public Library Digital Collections, at http://digitalcollections.nypl.org/items/6eaed3cc-75d6-1df6-e040-e00a18065bf1

Maps:

National Park Service Fredericksburg Battle Maps #4 & #5.

In a blog dated October 2, 2019, [Click here] I talked of returning to the withdrawal of the Army of the Potomac following the disastrous Battle of Fredericksburg. Well, here we are!

Following the day of battle December 13th, a quiet came over the battlefield. Each side settled into a relative status quo. On December 14, on Major General (MG) William F. Franklin’s front, there was considerable skirmishing at scattered points, but few casualties. Also, informally, stretcher bearers wandered the fields, rescuing the wounded and bringing them to medical staff. A member of VI Corps’ 5th Maine observed ambulances moving across the river all day long. December 15 was much the same.

The night of 15-16 December 1862 was cold and dark. A strong wind was blowing from west to east, and it was raining! This was the night that MG Ambrose Burnside chose to withdraw the Union army following the failed assault on December 13th.

But this was not a pre-ordained decision on Burnside’s part. On the morning of Sunday, December 14, 1862, Burnside was determined to personally lead a renewed attack using his old XI Corps. He demurred, after being vigorously counseled against attacking by his senior commanders. He went into the city searching for a resolution while talking with unit commanders. Later, he sent an aide to Washington to talk with MG Henry Halleck, his Commander-in-Chief. On Monday the 15th, Burnside was still undecided. Late in the afternoon, following dinner with MG Franklin and the other two Grand Division commanders, Burnside announced his decision to withdraw the Army of the Potomac across the Rappahannock.

In the meantime, Confederates were bolstering their defenses, digging trenches, and felling trees. Some, from General Robert E. Lee on down, were convinced that Burnside would renew his assaults. Late on the 15th, there was a short formal truce between Franklin and Lieutenant General (LG) Thomas “Stonewall” J. Jackson. In the late afternoon stretcher parties searched for the wounded. Burial parties from both sides ranged across the slaughter pen until sunset. The Union wounded were evacuated across the river.

As the night approached between 5 and 6 PM, pickets from both sides informally agreed “…that during the night there should be no firing unless an attempt was made to advance on one side or the other.” Apparently, this occurred all along the line of contact. In safer bivouac areas Union soldiers made campfires using old ammunition boxes and other burnable debris. The wind drove the fires hotter and larger. Confederates continued their work enhancing defenses on Prospect Hill and the adjoining ridge.

Franklin reported “…On Monday, the 15th, no change took place until about 6 p.m. I was at that time at [Burnside’s] general headquarters, and was directed to recross my command during the night. The orders were at once telegraphed to General Smith, who was directed to make the preliminary arrangements, commencing the movement on the left.” He continued, “…Upon my return to my headquarters, about 7 p.m., I found that the movement was just commencing.”

MG William F. Smith of VI Corps alerted Brigadier General (BG) George Stoneman’s III Corps and MG John Reynolds’ I Corps, as well as his own division commanders. Reynolds picks up the narrative. “On the night of the 15th, the order for the withdrawal of the troops to the left flank of the river was received about 7 o’clock, and the movement commenced from the left. The night was extremely favorable for the operation…”

Reynolds set about organizing his Corps’ movement. Secrecy was paramount. The troops were instructed to insure nothing in their equipment made noises. Canteens and cups were secured. All was made ready to move with five minutes’ notice. Commands were whispered. Per the guidance, units furthest from the bridges moved first, passing through succeeding units who provided security.

First to move would be the artillery. The most exposed battery was that of Lieutenant (LT) James Stewart’s B/4th US, 6–12-pound Napoleons near the junction of Bowling Green Road and Hamilton’s Crossing Road. These guns were within 500 feet (150 meters) of Confederate pickets. The guns were limbered as silently as possible. The unit historian said they “were hauled off, still double shotted with double canister and primed ready for action in case” they were attacked while moving. Other artillery also moved.

BG Abner Doubleday’s First Division was the first infantry to move. These units were three miles (4.8 Km) from the pontoon bridges. Doubleday picks up the action. “About 8 o’clock we received orders to recross the river. General Reynolds himself took charge of the removal of the artillery, and I issued the necessary orders to the infantry… The wind was in our favor, deadening the sound of the artillery wheels, and thus preventing the enemy from being cognizant of our movements. It seems the pickets had made an agreement which each other not to fire during the night, and this also favored us. These pickets and their supports were necessarily left out all night”.

Private Frederick Rangers of the 22nd New York wrote to his wife afterward characterizing the move as “still as death, Division followed Division across the plain and over the pontoons.” Many of the men did not know the movement that night was indeed a withdrawal across the river. Some simply called it a ‘Skedaddle’. Doubleday’s division was over the river by midnight.

Next came Stoneman’s III Corps.

BG David B. Birney’s First Division was alerted around 10 PM. His brigades were lined up along Bowling Green Road also known as the Old Richmond Stage Road. Two brigades were in the roadbed and the third forming a second line behind to the east. Like I Corps, the artillery moved first, departing around 10 PM. The brigades followed the road or the fields adjacent, passing through BG Daniel E. Sickles Second Division which was stationed further north along Bowling Green Road.

Sickles units reported their alert notification was closer to 9 or 9:30 PM. Most reported movement between 10:30 and 11 PM. All III Corps units crossed the pontoons sometime around midnight. Engineer accounts suggest III Corps was not fully extracted until 2 AM.

MG Smith’s VI Corps waited until the other two Corps of MG Franklin’s left Grand Division completed their movements. BG Calvin E. Pratt managed all movement that approached and then crossed the pontoon bridges, a task not easily executed silently on a rainy windblown night. Smith had one third of Franklin’s Left Grand Division still to cross the river. First came BG Albion Howe’s Division and most of the artillery.

Engineers at the Bridge site.

Major James A. Magruder, commanding the 15th NY Engineers, who oversaw two pontoon bridges at Franklin’s crossing, reported,

“…I left the camp [3.5 miles or 5.6 Km distant] with Companies E and K… Companies H, A, F, and G were on duty at the bridges. At the time of my arrival troops were crossing the three bridges.”

“At 3 a.m., the 16th instant, I ordered Companies E and K to commence dismantling the first bridge, [furthest upstream] which was done in about an hour; and as troops were still crossing the two remaining bridges, they were not disturbed until after daylight.”

After BG Albion P. Howe’s Second Division passed over the river, BG) William Brooks’ First Division and BG John Newton’s Third Division thinned out leaving the rear guard of two brigades belonging to Colonel Alfred T.A. Torbert and BG Charles Devens to form a ‘tete-d-pont’ to cover the retreat. Devens brigade, having been the first to cross and secure the bridgehead on 11 December, requested the honor of being the last to recross the river.

In the meantime. The engineers continued to dismantle the pontoon bridges.

Magruder continues, “Immediately upon the passage of all the troops which were to cross at this point; the work of dismantling the middle bridge was commenced by Companies E and K, Companies H, A, G, and F assisting in loading cheeses, balks, &amp;c. … “

Pickets Finally Moved.

Those units out on picket duty that night were NOT told that the Army of the Potomac was withdrawing across the river. Not even their individual commanders. This was out of an abundance of caution that someone might alert the Confederates that the army was leaving. Even when they were finally moved, they were told that they were simply going to a new position.

BG Doubleday reported, “Lieutenant-Colonel Williams, of the Nineteenth Indiana, was on picket duty with his regiment on the extreme left, nearly 3 miles from the crossing. His command was the last to cross the river, and was closely pursued by the enemy’s cavalry and sharpshooters. A portion of his men were compelled to pass in boats, the pontoon bridges having been cut away. I cannot too highly praise the coolness and good order which marked the retreat of this regiment, and in all probability saved it from destruction.”

Other units on picket duty had similar experiences.

BG Smith praised his exposed units. “General Devens’ and Colonel Torbert’s brigades formed the line to cover the troops, and the pickets were ordered in only after the line was nearly formed. By 4 a. m. the troops were all across, and everything ready for the bridges to be taken up”.

BG Devens, in charge of the rear guard, reported, “At about 4 o’clock it was reported that the pickets, which had consisted of two regiments from each of the divisions of Brigadier-Generals Brooks, Newton, Sickles, Birney, and Doubleday, were in, and, after waiting a short time for any stragglers who might have lost their way, I gave the order for the front line to retreat; the second line immediately followed it. The Tenth Massachusetts was the last regiment to cross, followed by the bridge guard, under Captain Read, of the Second Rhode Island, and the bridges were at once taken up. Boats were kept on the other side of the river until after daybreak, to take off any stragglers, but, as reported to me, only a very small number appeared, so carefully and thoroughly had the retreat been conducted”.

LT Charles E. Cross of the US Regular Engineer Battalion reported, “…On the night of the 15th, I received an order … to dismantle the [last] bridge as soon as General Franklin’s command had crossed. His rear guard passed over at 4.30 a.m. on the 16th. Immediately after I began dismantling the bridge. This was accomplished by 5.30 a.m. “

Major Magruder explained how the pontoon bridges and equipment was taken from the river and transported to safety. “Soon after daylight, Companies A, G, and H were relieved by Companies B, C, and I. The boats were unloaded, drawn out upon the bottom land, loaded on the wagons, and, as fast as teams could be procured, drawn away. The work of getting the boats and material in a safe place drawn away. The work of getting the boats and material in a safe place was continued until about 2 p.m. [on the 16th] without interruption from the enemy, when, the batteries which had been placed on the hill above to protect us having been withdrawn, we were fired upon by a party of the enemy stationed in the houses and barns opposite. Our men and a detachment of the Seventy-seventh New York (who were on the ground) returned the fire. My men continued the work until 3 p.m., when all the property having been moved to a place of safety, we returned to camp. “

Artillery LT John Simpson of battery A/1PA, reported, “we recrossed the river, and, by Captain Ransom’s directions, I took my former position on the riverbank, to protect the removal of the pontoon bridges.”

“Next morning [16 December] we discovered the enemy advancing in line of skirmishers, and as some of them ran to a building in a group, I dropped a couple of spherical case among them, which killed 4, and drove the balance, with their cavalry, back. I afterward, by General Meade’s orders, opened on a battery by the hospital [likely, Mannsfield, Franklin’s former HQ], and prevented it from being planted. The bridges were all safely removed, and, by your orders, I retired to camp, reporting back to Captain Ransom.”

Confederate reports of Burnside’s withdrawal are muted. General Lee, “on the morning of the 16th, it was discovered that he [Burnside] had availed himself of the darkness of night, and the prevalence of a violent storm of wind and rain, to recross the river.”

MG Daniel H. Hill who had been itching for a fight could only report, “At daylight our pickets were thrown forward and the enemy found to be gone. Burnside had changed his base.” He added, somewhat defensively, “We captured 292 of the Yankee pickets and stragglers, and gathered up between 3,000 and 4,000 excellent rifles and muskets.” According to historian Frank O’Reilly, one portion of these were members of the 114th PA Zouave band, who had taken shelter in the Smithfield ravine following an afternoon concert at III Corps headquarters. They slept through the movement of 60,000 men. Then again, so did the Confederates!

So ended Burnside’s dismal effort to come to grips with General Lee and the Army of Northern Virginia. Withdrawal of an army in the face of the enemy is one of the most difficult maneuvers any army can undertake. To his credit, Burnside executed his withdrawal successfully, and some would call it masterful. But the failure of his attack with its lopsided losses would ensure Burnside’s removal from command.

Sources:

Books and Civil War Collections.

Brinknell, George W., Rev, History of the Fifth regiment Maine volunteers, comprising brief descriptions of its marches, engagements, and general services from the date of its muster in, June 24, 1861, to the time of its muster out, July 27, 1864. Portland, H. L. Davis, 1871, pp 177-9. History of the Fifth regiment Maine volunteers, comprising brief descriptions of its marches, engagements, and general services from the date of its muster in, June 24, 1861, to the time of its muster out, July 27, 1864 : Bicknell, George W., Rev : Free Download, Borrow, and Streaming : Internet Archi ve

Buell, Augustus, The Cannoneer, Recollections of Service in the Army of the Potomac, The National Tribune, Washington, D.C., 1890, p 47. “The cannoneer.” Recollections of service in the Army of the Potomac : Buell, Augustus : Free Download, Borrow, and Streaming : Internet Archive

Dunn, Craig L., IRON MEN, IRON WILL: The Nineteenth Indiana Regiment of the Iron Brigade, Indianapolis, Guild Press, 1995.

Gottfried, Bradley M., The Maps of Fredericksburg; An Atlas of the Fredericksburg Campaign, Including Cavalry Operations, September 18, 1862 – January 22, 1863.El Dorado Hills, CA, Savas Baetie, 2018, p 240.

Lewis Leigh Collection, Frederick E. Rangers Letter.

Nolan, Alan T., The Iron Brigade, A military History, New York, Macmillan, 1961, p 186.

O’Reilly, Francis Augustin, The Fredericksburg Campaign; Winter War on the Rappahannock, Louisiana State University Press, Baton Rouge, LA, p 440-448.

___________, “Stonewall” Jackson at Fredericksburg, The Battle of Prospect Hill. Lynchburg, VA: H.E. Howard, 1993, p 186.

White, S. Wyman, The Civil War Diary of Wyman S. White, First Sergeant of Company “F” of the 2nd United States Sharpshooter Regiment (New Hampshire Men) in the Army of the Potomac 1861-1865. FRSP. Undated.

Woodbury, Augustus, The Second Rhode Island regiment: a narrative of military operations in which the regiment was engaged from the beginning to the end of the war for the Union, Providence, Valpey, Angell, and company, 1975, pp 133-4. The Second Rhode Island regiment: a narrative of military operations in which the regiment was engaged from the beginning to the end of the war for the union : Woodbury, Augustus, 1825-1895 : Free Download, Borrow, and Streaming : Internet Archive

Woodward, Evan M., Our Campaigns, Our Campaigns: or, The marches, bivouacs, battles, incidents of camp life and history of our regiment during its three years term of service, Philadelphia, J.E. Potter, 1865, p 246. Our Campaigns: or, The marches, bivouacs, battles, incidents of camp life and history of our regiment during its three years term of service : Woodward, E. M. (Evan Morrison) cn : Free Download, Borrow, and Streaming : Internet Archive

The War of the Rebellion: A Completion of Official Records of the Union and Confederate Armies, 128 vols. (Washington, D.C.1890-1910).

OR Vol 21, Serial 31, Number 3. Report of Major General Ambrose E. Burnside, U.S. Army, Commanding Army of the Potomac. https://ehistory.osu.edu/books/official-records/031/0065

OR Vol 21, Serial 31, Number 16. Report of Lieutenant Charles E. Cross, U. S. Corps Engineers, Commanding Engineer Battalion. https://ehistory.osu.edu/books/official-records/031/0169

OR Vol 21, Serial 31, Number 19. Report of Major James A. Magruder, Fifteenth New York Engineer. https://ehistory.osu.edu/books/official-records/031/0173.

OR Vol 21, Serial 31, Number 207. Report of Major General William B. Franklin, U.S. Army, Commanding Left Grand Division. https://ehistory.osu.edu/books/official-records/031/0451

OR Vol 21, Serial 31, Numbers 215. Report of Col. James Gavin, Seventh Indiana Infantry, Second Brigade. P 472. War of the Rebellion: Serial 031 Page 0472 OPERATIONS IN N.VA.,W.VA.,MD., AND PA. Chapter XXXIII. | eHISTORY (osu.edu)

OR Vol 21, Serial 31, Numbers 220. Report of Colonel Lysander Cutler, Sixth Wisconsin Infantry, commanding Fourth Brigade. War of the Rebellion: Serial 031 Page 0478 OPERATIONS IN N.VA.,W.VA.,MD., AND PA. Chapter XXXIII. | eHISTORY (osu.edu)

OR Vol 21, Serial 31, Numbers 223. Report of Captain George F. Leppien, Fifth Maine Battery, Acting Chief of Division Artillery. War of the Rebellion: Serial 031 Page 0483 Chapter XXXIII. BATTLE OF FREDERICKSBURG,VA. | eHISTORY (osu.edu)

OR Vol 21, Serial 31, Numbers 244. Report of Lieutenant John G. Simpson, Battery A, First Pennsylvania Light Artillery. War of the Rebellion: Serial 031 Page 0514 OPERATIONS IN N. VA.,W. VA.,MD.,AND PA. Chapter XXXIII. | eHISTORY (osu.edu)

OR Vol 21, Serial 31, Numbers 252. Report of Major General William F. Smith, U. S. Army, commanding Sixth Army Corps. War of the Rebellion: Serial 031 Page 0523 Chapter XXXIII. BATTLE OF FREDERICKSBURG, VA. | eHISTORY (osu.edu)

OR Vol 21, Serial 31, Numbers 253. Report of Captain Romeyn B. Ayres, Fifth U. S. Artillery, Chief of Artillery. War of the Rebellion: Serial 031 Page 0525 Chapter XXXIII. BATTLE OF FREDERICKSBURG, VA. | eHISTORY (osu.edu)

OR Vol 21, Serial 31, Numbers 255. Report of Colonel A. T. A. Torbert, First New Jersey Infantry, commanding First Brigade. War of the Rebellion: Serial 031 Page 0528 OPERATIONS IN N. VA.,W. VA.,MD.,AND PA. Chapter XXXIII. | eHISTORY (osu.edu)

OR Vol 21, Serial 31, Numbers 257. Report of Brigadier General Calvin E. Pratt, U. S. Army, commanding First Brigade. War of the Rebellion: Serial 031 Page 0532 OPERATIONS IN N. VA.,W. VA.,MD.,AND PA. Chapter XXXIII. | eHISTORY (osu.edu)

OR Vol 21, Serial 31, Numbers 259. Report of Brigadier General Thomas H. Neill, U. S. Army, commanding Third Brigade. War of the Rebellion: Serial 031 Page 0534 OPERATIONS IN N. VA.,W. VA.,MD.,AND PA. Chapter XXXIII. | eHISTORY (osu.edu)

OR Vol 21, Serial 31, Numbers 261. Report of Brigadier General Charles Devens, jr., U. S. Army, commanding Second Brigade. War of the Rebellion: Serial 031 Page 0537 Chapter XXXIII. BATTLE OF FREDERICKSBURG, VA. | eHISTORY (osu.edu)

OR Vol 21, Serial 31, Numbers 264. Reports of General Robert E. Lee, C. S. Army, commanding Army of Northern Virginia. page 555. War of the Rebellion: Serial 031 Page 0555 Chapter XXXIII. BATTLE OF FREDERICKSBURG, VA. | eHISTORY (osu.edu)

OR Vol 21, Serial 31, Numbers No. 303. Report of Lieutenant General Thomas J. Jackson, C. S. Army, commanding Second Army Corps. Page 634. War of the Rebellion: Serial 031 Page 0634 OPERATIONS IN N.VA.,W.VA.,MD.,AND PA. Chapter XXXIII. | eHISTORY (osu.edu)

OR Vol 21, Serial 31, Number No. 307. Report of Major General Daniel H. Hill, C. S. Army, commanding D. H. Hill’s division. page 644. War of the Rebellion: Serial 031 Page 0644 OPERATIONS IN N.VA.,W.VA.,MD.,AND PA. Chapter XXXIII. | eHISTORY (osu.edu)

Misc:

Light data: https://aa.usno.navy.mil/data/RS_OneDay

Maps:

Mapping the Battle of Fredericksburg – The Unwritten Record (archives.gov)