Personal Identity and Dead People
/oscar-static/img/favicons/darwin/apple-touch-icon-92e819bf8a.png
SpringerLink
Ayers, M. (1991): Locke, Volume II: Ontology, London: Routledge.

Carter, W.R. (1982): ‘Do Zygotes Become People?’, Mind 91, pp. 77–95.

Carter, W.R. (1989): ‘How to Change Your Mind’, Canadian Journal of Philosophy 19, pp. 1–14.

Cockburn, D. (ed.) (1991): Human Beings, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Feldman, F. (1992): Confrontations with the Reaper, New York and Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Locke, J. (1975): An Essay concerning Human Understanding, P.H. Nidditch (ed.), Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Lowe, E.J. (1991): ‘Real Selves: Persons as a Substantial Kind’, in Cockburn (1991).

McDowell, J. (forthcoming): ‘Reductionism and the First Person’, in J. Dancy (ed.), Reading Parfit, Oxford: Basil Blackwell.

Olson, E. (1994): ‘Is Psychology Relevant to Personal Identity?’ Australasian Journal of Philosophy 72, pp. 173–186.

Olson, E. (1997a): The Human Animal, New York and Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Olson, E. (1997b): ‘Was I Ever a Fetus?’, Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 57, pp. 95–110.

Parfit, D. (1995): ‘The Unimportance of Identity’, in H. Harris (ed.), Identity, Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Parfit, D. (forthcoming): The Metaphysics of the Self.

Snowdon, P.F. (1990): ‘Persons, Animals, and Ourselves’, in C. Gill (ed.), The Person and the Human Mind: Issues in Ancient and Modern Philosophy, Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Snowdon, P.F. (1991): ‘Personal Identity and Brain Transplants’, in Cockburn (1991).

Thomson, J. (forthcoming): ‘People and their Bodies’, in J. Dancy (ed.), Reading Parfit, Oxford: Basil Blackwell.

Van Inwagen, P. (1990): Material Beings, Ithaca, New York: Cornell University Press.