Daily Papers

Modern vision-language-model (VLM) based graphical user interface (GUI) agents are expected not only to execute actions accurately but also to respond to user instructions with low latency. While existing research on GUI-agent security mainly focuses on manipulating action correctness, the security risks related to response efficiency remain largely unexplored. In this paper, we introduce SlowBA, a novel backdoor attack that targets the responsiveness of VLM-based GUI agents. The key idea is to manipulate response latency by inducing excessively long reasoning chains under specific trigger patterns. To achieve this, we propose a two-stage reward-level backdoor injection (RBI) strategy that first aligns the long-response format and then learns trigger-aware activation through reinforcement learning. In addition, we design realistic pop-up windows as triggers that naturally appear in GUI environments, improving the stealthiness of the attack. Extensive experiments across multiple datasets and baselines demonstrate that SlowBA can significantly increase response length and latency while largely preserving task accuracy. The attack remains effective even with a small poisoning ratio and under several defense settings. These findings reveal a previously overlooked security vulnerability in GUI agents and highlight the need for defenses that consider both action correctness and response efficiency. Code can be found in https://github.com/tu-tuing/SlowBA.

LLMs have shown remarkable capabilities, but precisely controlling their response behavior remains challenging. Existing activation steering methods alter LLM behavior indiscriminately, limiting their practical applicability in settings where selective responses are essential, such as content moderation or domain-specific assistants. In this paper, we propose Conditional Activation Steering (CAST), which analyzes LLM activation patterns during inference to selectively apply or withhold activation steering based on the input context. Our method is based on the observation that different categories of prompts activate distinct patterns in the model's hidden states. Using CAST, one can systematically control LLM behavior with rules like "if input is about hate speech or adult content, then refuse" or "if input is not about legal advice, then refuse." This allows for selective modification of responses to specific content while maintaining normal responses to other content, all without requiring weight optimization. We release an open-source implementation of our framework at github.com/IBM/activation-steering .

Although the LLM-based in-context learning (ICL) paradigm has demonstrated considerable success across various natural language processing tasks, it encounters challenges in event detection. This is because LLMs lack an accurate understanding of event triggers and tend to make over-interpretation, which cannot be effectively corrected through in-context examples alone. In this paper, we focus on the most challenging one-shot setting and propose KeyCP++, a keyword-centric chain-of-thought prompting approach. KeyCP++ addresses the weaknesses of conventional ICL by automatically annotating the logical gaps between input text and detection results for the demonstrations. Specifically, to generate in-depth and meaningful rationale, KeyCP++ constructs a trigger discrimination prompting template. It incorporates the exemplary triggers (a.k.a keywords) into the prompt as the anchor to simply trigger profiling, let LLM propose candidate triggers, and justify each candidate. These propose-and-judge rationales help LLMs mitigate over-reliance on the keywords and promote detection rule learning. Extensive experiments demonstrate the effectiveness of our approach, showcasing significant advancements in one-shot event detection.

Backdoor attacks pose significant security risks for Large Language Models (LLMs), yet the internal mechanisms by which triggers operate remain poorly understood. We present the first mechanistic analysis of language-switching backdoors, studying the GAPperon model family (1B, 8B, 24B parameters) which contains triggers injected during pretraining that cause output language switching. Using activation patching, we localize trigger formation to early layers (7.5-25% of model depth) and identify which attention heads process trigger information. Our central finding is that trigger-activated heads substantially overlap with heads naturally encoding output language across model scales, with Jaccard indices between 0.18 and 0.66 over the top heads identified. This suggests that backdoor triggers do not form isolated circuits but instead co-opt the model's existing language components. These findings have implications for backdoor defense: detection methods may benefit from monitoring known functional components rather than searching for hidden circuits, and mitigation strategies could potentially leverage this entanglement between injected and natural behaviors.

Large language models (LLMs) are increasingly paired with activation-based monitoring to detect and prevent harmful behaviors that may not be apparent at the surface-text level. However, existing activation safety approaches, trained on broad misuse datasets, struggle with poor precision, limited flexibility, and lack of interpretability. This paper introduces a new paradigm: rule-based activation safety, inspired by rule-sharing practices in cybersecurity. We propose modeling activations as cognitive elements (CEs), fine-grained, interpretable factors such as ''making a threat'' and ''payment processing'', that can be composed to capture nuanced, domain-specific behaviors with higher precision. Building on this representation, we present a practical framework that defines predicate rules over CEs and detects violations in real time. This enables practitioners to configure and update safeguards without retraining models or detectors, while supporting transparency and auditability. Our results show that compositional rule-based activation safety improves precision, supports domain customization, and lays the groundwork for scalable, interpretable, and auditable AI governance. We will release GAVEL as an open-source framework and provide an accompanying automated rule creation tool.

Deep neural networks (DNNs) can be manipulated to exhibit specific behaviors when exposed to specific trigger patterns, without affecting their performance on benign samples, dubbed backdoor attack. Currently, implementing backdoor attacks in physical scenarios still faces significant challenges. Physical attacks are labor-intensive and time-consuming, and the triggers are selected in a manual and heuristic way. Moreover, expanding digital attacks to physical scenarios faces many challenges due to their sensitivity to visual distortions and the absence of counterparts in the real world. To address these challenges, we define a novel trigger called the Visible, Semantic, Sample-Specific, and Compatible (VSSC) trigger, to achieve effective, stealthy and robust simultaneously, which can also be effectively deployed in the physical scenario using corresponding objects. To implement the VSSC trigger, we propose an automated pipeline comprising three modules: a trigger selection module that systematically identifies suitable triggers leveraging large language models, a trigger insertion module that employs generative models to seamlessly integrate triggers into images, and a quality assessment module that ensures the natural and successful insertion of triggers through vision-language models. Extensive experimental results and analysis validate the effectiveness, stealthiness, and robustness of the VSSC trigger. It can not only maintain robustness under visual distortions but also demonstrates strong practicality in the physical scenario. We hope that the proposed VSSC trigger and implementation approach could inspire future studies on designing more practical triggers in backdoor attacks.

Multimodal large language models (MLLMs) have advanced embodied agents by enabling direct perception, reasoning, and planning task-oriented actions from visual inputs. However, such vision driven embodied agents open a new attack surface: visual backdoor attacks, where the agent behaves normally until a visual trigger appears in the scene, then persistently executes an attacker-specified multi-step policy. We introduce BEAT, the first framework to inject such visual backdoors into MLLM-based embodied agents using objects in the environments as triggers. Unlike textual triggers, object triggers exhibit wide variation across viewpoints and lighting, making them difficult to implant reliably. BEAT addresses this challenge by (1) constructing a training set that spans diverse scenes, tasks, and trigger placements to expose agents to trigger variability, and (2) introducing a two-stage training scheme that first applies supervised fine-tuning (SFT) and then our novel Contrastive Trigger Learning (CTL). CTL formulates trigger discrimination as preference learning between trigger-present and trigger-free inputs, explicitly sharpening the decision boundaries to ensure precise backdoor activation. Across various embodied agent benchmarks and MLLMs, BEAT achieves attack success rates up to 80%, while maintaining strong benign task performance, and generalizes reliably to out-of-distribution trigger placements. Notably, compared to naive SFT, CTL boosts backdoor activation accuracy up to 39% under limited backdoor data. These findings expose a critical yet unexplored security risk in MLLM-based embodied agents, underscoring the need for robust defenses before real-world deployment.

Graphical User Interface (GUI) agents are increasingly deployed to interact with online web services, yet their exposure to open-world content renders them vulnerable to Environmental Injection Attacks (EIAs). In these attacks, an attacker can inject crafted triggers into website to manipulate the behavior of GUI agents used by other users. In this paper, we find that most existing EIA studies fall short of realism. In particular, they fail to capture the dynamic nature of real-world web content, often assuming that a trigger's on-screen position and surrounding visual context remain largely consistent between training and testing. To better reflect practice, we introduce a realistic dynamic-environment threat model in which the attacker is a regular user and the trigger is embedded within a dynamically changing environment. Under this threat model, existing approaches largely fail, suggesting that their effectiveness in exposing GUI agent vulnerabilities has been substantially overestimated. To expose the hidden vulnerabilities of existing GUI agents effectively, we propose Chameleon, an attack framework with two key novelties designed for dynamic environments. (1) To synthesize more realistic training data, we introduce LLM-Driven Environment Simulation, which automatically generates diverse, high-fidelity webpage simulations that mimic the variability of real-world dynamic environments. (2) To optimize the trigger more effectively, we introduce Attention Black Hole, which converts attention weights into explicit supervisory signals. This mechanism encourages the agent to remain insensitive to irrelevant surrounding content, thereby improving robustness in dynamic environments. We evaluate Chameleon on six realistic websites and four representative LVLM-powered GUI agents, where it significantly outperforms existing methods.

Most existing work on event extraction has focused on sentence-level texts and presumes the identification of a trigger-span -- a word or phrase in the input that evokes the occurrence of an event of interest. Event arguments are then extracted with respect to the trigger. Indeed, triggers are treated as integral to, and trigger detection as an essential component of, event extraction. In this paper, we provide the first investigation of the role of triggers for the more difficult and much less studied task of document-level event extraction. We analyze their usefulness in multiple end-to-end and pipelined transformer-based event extraction models for three document-level event extraction datasets, measuring performance using triggers of varying quality (human-annotated, LLM-generated, keyword-based, and random). We find that whether or not systems benefit from explicitly extracting triggers depends both on dataset characteristics (i.e. the typical number of events per document) and task-specific information available during extraction (i.e. natural language event schemas). Perhaps surprisingly, we also observe that the mere existence of triggers in the input, even random ones, is important for prompt-based in-context learning approaches to the task.

Activation monitoring, which probes a model's internal states using lightweight classifiers, is an emerging tool for AI safety. However, its worst-case robustness under a misalignment threat model--where a model might learn to actively conceal its internal states--remains untested. Focusing on this threat model, we ask: could a model learn to evade previously unseen activation monitors? Our core contribution is to stress-test the learnability of this behavior. We demonstrate that finetuning can create Neural Chameleons: models capable of zero-shot evading activation monitors. Specifically, we fine-tune an LLM to evade monitors for a set of benign concepts (e.g., languages, HTML) when conditioned on a trigger of the form: "You are being probed for {concept}". We show that this learned mechanism generalizes zero-shot: by substituting {concept} with a safety-relevant term like 'deception', the model successfully evades previously unseen safety monitors. We validate this phenomenon across diverse model families (Llama, Gemma, Qwen), showing that the evasion succeeds even against monitors trained post hoc on the model's frozen weights. This evasion is highly selective, targeting only the specific concept mentioned in the trigger, and having a modest impact on model capabilities on standard benchmarks. Using Gemma-2-9b-it as a case study, a mechanistic analysis reveals this is achieved via a targeted manipulation that moves activations into a low-dimensional subspace. While stronger defenses like monitor ensembles and non-linear classifiers show greater resilience, the model retains a non-trivial evasion capability. Our work provides a proof-of-concept for this failure mode and a tool to evaluate the worst-case robustness of monitoring techniques against misalignment threat models.

Recent work has developed optimization procedures to find token sequences, called adversarial triggers, which can elicit unsafe responses from aligned language models. These triggers are believed to be universally transferable, i.e., a trigger optimized on one model can jailbreak other models. In this paper, we concretely show that such adversarial triggers are not universal. We extensively investigate trigger transfer amongst 13 open models and observe inconsistent transfer. Our experiments further reveal a significant difference in robustness to adversarial triggers between models Aligned by Preference Optimization (APO) and models Aligned by Fine-Tuning (AFT). We find that APO models are extremely hard to jailbreak even when the trigger is optimized directly on the model. On the other hand, while AFT models may appear safe on the surface, exhibiting refusals to a range of unsafe instructions, we show that they are highly susceptible to adversarial triggers. Lastly, we observe that most triggers optimized on AFT models also generalize to new unsafe instructions from five diverse domains, further emphasizing their vulnerability. Overall, our work highlights the need for more comprehensive safety evaluations for aligned language models.

Monitoring is an important aspect of safely deploying Large Language Models (LLMs). This paper examines activation probes for detecting ``high-stakes'' interactions -- where the text indicates that the interaction might lead to significant harm -- as a critical, yet underexplored, target for such monitoring. We evaluate several probe architectures trained on synthetic data, and find them to exhibit robust generalization to diverse, out-of-distribution, real-world data. Probes' performance is comparable to that of prompted or finetuned medium-sized LLM monitors, while offering computational savings of six orders-of-magnitude. These savings are enabled by reusing activations of the model that is being monitored. Our experiments also highlight the potential of building resource-aware hierarchical monitoring systems, where probes serve as an efficient initial filter and flag cases for more expensive downstream analysis. We release our novel synthetic dataset and the codebase at https://github.com/arrrlex/models-under-pressure.

We systematically evaluate the quality of widely used AI safety datasets from two perspectives: in isolation and in practice. In isolation, we examine how well these datasets reflect real-world adversarial attacks based on three key properties: being driven by ulterior intent, well-crafted, and out-of-distribution. We find that these datasets overrely on "triggering cues": words or phrases with overt negative/sensitive connotations that are intended to trigger safety mechanisms explicitly, which is unrealistic compared to real-world attacks. In practice, we evaluate whether these datasets genuinely measure safety risks or merely provoke refusals through triggering cues. To explore this, we introduce "intent laundering": a procedure that abstracts away triggering cues from adversarial attacks (data points) while strictly preserving their malicious intent and all relevant details. Our results indicate that current AI safety datasets fail to faithfully represent real-world adversarial behavior due to their overreliance on triggering cues. Once these cues are removed, all previously evaluated "reasonably safe" models become unsafe, including Gemini 3 Pro and Claude Sonnet 3.7. Moreover, when intent laundering is adapted as a jailbreaking technique, it consistently achieves high attack success rates, ranging from 90% to over 98%, under fully black-box access. Overall, our findings expose a significant disconnect between how model safety is evaluated by existing datasets and how real-world adversaries behave.

A growing body of work in cognitive science suggests that reportable conscious access is associated with global ignition over distributed memory systems, while such activation is only partially accessible as individuals cannot directly access or enumerate all activated contents. This tension suggests a plausible mechanism that cognition may rely on a compact representation that approximates the global influence of activation on downstream processing. Inspired by this idea, we introduce the concept of Mindscape Activation Signature (MiA-Signature), a compressed representation of the global activation pattern induced by a query. In LLM systems, this is instantiated via submodular-based selection of high-level concepts that cover the activated context space, optionally refined through lightweight iterative updates using working memory. The resulting MiA-Signature serves as a conditioning signal that approximates the effect of the full activation state while remaining computationally tractable. Integrating MiA-Signatures into both RAG and agentic systems yields consistent performance gains across multiple long-context understanding tasks.

In recent years, text-to-image (T2I) diffusion models have garnered significant attention for their ability to generate high-quality images reflecting text prompts. However, their growing popularity has also led to the emergence of backdoor threats, posing substantial risks. Currently, effective defense strategies against such threats are lacking due to the diversity of backdoor targets in T2I synthesis. In this paper, we propose NaviDet, the first general input-level backdoor detection framework for identifying backdoor inputs across various backdoor targets. Our approach is based on the new observation that trigger tokens tend to induce significant neuron activation variation in the early stage of the diffusion generation process, a phenomenon we term Early-step Activation Variation. Leveraging this insight, NaviDet detects malicious samples by analyzing neuron activation variations caused by input tokens. Through extensive experiments, we demonstrate the effectiveness and efficiency of our method against various T2I backdoor attacks, surpassing existing baselines with significantly lower computational overhead. Furthermore, we rigorously demonstrate that our method remains effective against potential adaptive attacks.

Large language models (LLMs) excel at generating fluent text, but their internal reasoning remains opaque and difficult to control. Sparse autoencoders (SAEs) make hidden activations more interpretable by exposing latent features that often align with human concepts. Yet, these features are fragile and passive, offering no mechanism for systematic reasoning or model control. To address this, we introduce ActivationReasoning (AR), a framework that embeds explicit logical reasoning into the latent space of LLMs. It proceeds in three stages: (1) Finding latent representations, first latent concept representations are identified (e.g., via SAEs) and organized into a dictionary; (2) Activating propositions, at inference time AR detects activating concepts and maps them to logical propositions; and (3)Logical reasoning, applying logical rules over these propositions to infer higher-order structures, compose new concepts, and steer model behavior. We evaluate AR on multi-hop reasoning (PrOntoQA), abstraction and robustness to indirect concept cues (Rail2Country), reasoning over natural and diverse language (ProverQA), and context-sensitive safety (BeaverTails). Across all tasks, AR scales robustly with reasoning complexity, generalizes to abstract and context-sensitive tasks, and transfers across model backbones. These results demonstrate that grounding logical structure in latent activations not only improves transparency but also enables structured reasoning, reliable control, and alignment with desired behaviors, providing a path toward more reliable and auditable AI.

Prompt-based learning paradigm bridges the gap between pre-training and fine-tuning, and works effectively under the few-shot setting. However, we find that this learning paradigm inherits the vulnerability from the pre-training stage, where model predictions can be misled by inserting certain triggers into the text. In this paper, we explore this universal vulnerability by either injecting backdoor triggers or searching for adversarial triggers on pre-trained language models using only plain text. In both scenarios, we demonstrate that our triggers can totally control or severely decrease the performance of prompt-based models fine-tuned on arbitrary downstream tasks, reflecting the universal vulnerability of the prompt-based learning paradigm. Further experiments show that adversarial triggers have good transferability among language models. We also find conventional fine-tuning models are not vulnerable to adversarial triggers constructed from pre-trained language models. We conclude by proposing a potential solution to mitigate our attack methods. Code and data are publicly available at https://github.com/leix28/prompt-universal-vulnerability

It is well known that natural language models are vulnerable to adversarial attacks, which are mostly input-specific in nature. Recently, it has been shown that there also exist input-agnostic attacks in NLP models, called universal adversarial triggers. However, existing methods to craft universal triggers are data intensive. They require large amounts of data samples to generate adversarial triggers, which are typically inaccessible by attackers. For instance, previous works take 3000 data samples per class for the SNLI dataset to generate adversarial triggers. In this paper, we present a novel data-free approach, MINIMAL, to mine input-agnostic adversarial triggers from models. Using the triggers produced with our data-free algorithm, we reduce the accuracy of Stanford Sentiment Treebank's positive class from 93.6% to 9.6%. Similarly, for the Stanford Natural Language Inference (SNLI), our single-word trigger reduces the accuracy of the entailment class from 90.95% to less than 0.6\%. Despite being completely data-free, we get equivalent accuracy drops as data-dependent methods.

Given the power of vision transformers, a new learning paradigm, pre-training and then prompting, makes it more efficient and effective to address downstream visual recognition tasks. In this paper, we identify a novel security threat towards such a paradigm from the perspective of backdoor attacks. Specifically, an extra prompt token, called the switch token in this work, can turn the backdoor mode on, i.e., converting a benign model into a backdoored one. Once under the backdoor mode, a specific trigger can force the model to predict a target class. It poses a severe risk to the users of cloud API, since the malicious behavior can not be activated and detected under the benign mode, thus making the attack very stealthy. To attack a pre-trained model, our proposed attack, named SWARM, learns a trigger and prompt tokens including a switch token. They are optimized with the clean loss which encourages the model always behaves normally even the trigger presents, and the backdoor loss that ensures the backdoor can be activated by the trigger when the switch is on. Besides, we utilize the cross-mode feature distillation to reduce the effect of the switch token on clean samples. The experiments on diverse visual recognition tasks confirm the success of our switchable backdoor attack, i.e., achieving 95%+ attack success rate, and also being hard to be detected and removed. Our code is available at https://github.com/20000yshust/SWARM.

Vision-language models (VLMs) have shown significant advancements in tasks such as visual grounding, where they localize specific objects in images based on natural language queries and images. However, security issues in visual grounding tasks for VLMs remain underexplored, especially in the context of backdoor attacks. In this paper, we introduce a novel input-aware backdoor attack method, IAG, designed to manipulate the grounding behavior of VLMs. This attack forces the model to ground a specific target object in the input image, regardless of the user's query. We propose an adaptive trigger generator that embeds the semantic information of the attack target's description into the original image using a text-conditional U-Net, thereby overcoming the open-vocabulary attack challenge. To ensure the attack's stealthiness, we utilize a reconstruction loss to minimize visual discrepancies between poisoned and clean images. Additionally, we introduce a unified method for generating attack data. IAG is evaluated theoretically and empirically, demonstrating its feasibility and effectiveness. Notably, our ASR@0.5 on InternVL-2.5-8B reaches over 65\% on various testing sets. IAG also shows promising potential on manipulating Ferret-7B and LlaVA-1.5-7B with very little accuracy decrease on clean samples. Extensive specific experiments, such as ablation study and potential defense, also indicate the robustness and transferability of our attack.

Transformers often display an attention sink: probability mass concentrates on a fixed, content-agnostic position. We prove that computing a simple trigger-conditional behavior necessarily induces a sink in softmax self-attention models. Our results formalize a familiar intuition: normalization over a probability simplex must force attention to collapse onto a stable anchor to realize a default state (e.g., when the model needs to ignore the input). We instantiate this with a concrete task: when a designated trigger token appears, the model must return the average of all preceding token representations, and otherwise output zero, a task which mirrors the functionality of attention heads in the wild (Barbero et al., 2025; Guo et al., 2024). We also prove that non-normalized ReLU attention can solve the same task without any sink, confirming that the normalization constraint is the fundamental driver of sink behavior. Experiments validate our predictions and demonstrate they extend beyond the theoretically analyzed setting: softmax models develop strong sinks while ReLU attention eliminates them in both single-head and multi-head variants.

Adapting LLM agents to domain-specific tool calling remains notably brittle under evolving interfaces. Prompt and schema engineering is easy to deploy but often fragile under distribution shift and strict parsers, while continual parameter-efficient fine-tuning improves reliability at the cost of training, maintenance, and potential forgetting. We identify a critical Lazy Agent failure mode where tool necessity is nearly perfectly decodable from mid-layer activations, yet the model remains conservative in entering tool mode, revealing a representation-behavior gap. We propose Activation Steering Adapter (ASA), a training-free, inference-time controller that performs a single-shot mid-layer intervention and targets tool domains via a router-conditioned mixture of steering vectors with a probe-guided signed gate to amplify true intent while suppressing spurious triggers. On MTU-Bench with Qwen2.5-1.5B, ASA improves strict tool-use F1 from 0.18 to 0.50 while reducing the false positive rate from 0.15 to 0.05, using only about 20KB of portable assets and no weight updates.

Large Language Models (LLMs) can acquire deceptive behaviors through backdoor attacks, where the model executes prohibited actions whenever secret triggers appear in the input. Existing safety training methods largely fail to address this vulnerability, due to the inherent difficulty of uncovering hidden triggers implanted in the model. Motivated by recent findings on LLMs' situational awareness, we propose a novel post-training framework that cultivates self-awareness of backdoor risks and enables models to articulate implanted triggers even when they are absent from the prompt. At its core, our approach introduces an inversion-inspired reinforcement learning framework that encourages models to introspectively reason about their own behaviors and reverse-engineer the triggers responsible for misaligned outputs. Guided by curated reward signals, this process transforms a poisoned model into one capable of precisely identifying its implanted trigger. Surprisingly, we observe that such backdoor self-awareness emerges abruptly within a short training window, resembling a phase transition in capability. Building on this emergent property, we further present two complementary defense strategies for mitigating and detecting backdoor threats. Experiments on five backdoor attacks, compared against six baseline methods, demonstrate that our approach has strong potential to improve the robustness of LLMs against backdoor risks. The code is available at LLM Backdoor Self-Awareness.

Activation steering is a promising technique for controlling LLM behavior by adding semantically meaningful vectors directly into a model's hidden states during inference. It is often framed as a precise, interpretable, and potentially safer alternative to fine-tuning. We demonstrate the opposite: steering systematically breaks model alignment safeguards, making it comply with harmful requests. Through extensive experiments on different model families, we show that even steering in a random direction can increase the probability of harmful compliance from 0% to 2-27%. Alarmingly, steering benign features from a sparse autoencoder (SAE), a common source of interpretable directions, increases these rates by a further 2-4%. Finally, we show that combining 20 randomly sampled vectors that jailbreak a single prompt creates a universal attack, significantly increasing harmful compliance on unseen requests. These results challenge the paradigm of safety through interpretability, showing that precise control over model internals does not guarantee precise control over model behavior.

Massive activations are scalar values in transformer hidden states that achieve values orders of magnitude larger than typical activations and have been shown to be critical for model functionality. While prior work has characterized these phenomena in fully trained models, the temporal dynamics of their emergence during training remain poorly understood. We present the first comprehensive analysis of massive activation development throughout transformer training, using the Pythia model family as our testbed. Through systematic analysis of various model sizes across multiple training checkpoints, we demonstrate that massive activation emergence follows predictable mathematical patterns that can be accurately modeled using an exponentially-modulated logarithmic function with five key parameters. We develop a machine learning framework to predict these mathematical parameters from architectural specifications alone, achieving high accuracy for steady-state behavior and moderate accuracy for emergence timing and magnitude. These findings enable architects to predict and potentially control key aspects of massive activation emergence through design choices, with significant implications for model stability, training cycle length, interpretability, and optimization. Our findings demonstrate that the emergence of massive activations is governed by model design and can be anticipated, and potentially controlled, before training begins.

Frontier language model capabilities are improving rapidly. We thus need stronger mitigations against bad actors misusing increasingly powerful systems. Prior work has shown that activation probes may be a promising misuse mitigation technique, but we identify a key remaining challenge: probes fail to generalize under important production distribution shifts. In particular, we find that the shift from short-context to long-context inputs is difficult for existing probe architectures. We propose several new probe architecture that handle this long-context distribution shift. We evaluate these probes in the cyber-offensive domain, testing their robustness against various production-relevant shifts, including multi-turn conversations, static jailbreaks, and adaptive red teaming. Our results demonstrate that while multimax addresses context length, a combination of architecture choice and training on diverse distributions is required for broad generalization. Additionally, we show that pairing probes with prompted classifiers achieves optimal accuracy at a low cost due to the computational efficiency of probes. These findings have informed the successful deployment of misuse mitigation probes in user-facing instances of Gemini, Google's frontier language model. Finally, we find early positive results using AlphaEvolve to automate improvements in both probe architecture search and adaptive red teaming, showing that automating some AI safety research is already possible.

Modern large language models (LLMs) are typically secured by auditing data, prompts, and refusal policies, while treating the forward pass as an implementation detail. We show that intermediate activations in decoder-only LLMs form a vulnerable attack surface for behavioral control. Building on recent findings on attention sinks and compression valleys, we identify a high-gain region in the residual stream where small, well-aligned perturbations are causally amplified along the autoregressive trajectory--a Causal Amplification Effect (CAE). We exploit this as an attack surface via Sensitivity-Scaled Steering (SSS), a progressive activation-level attack that combines beginning-of-sequence (BOS) anchoring with sensitivity-based reinforcement to focus a limited perturbation budget on the most vulnerable layers and tokens. We show that across multiple open-weight models and four behavioral axes, SSS induces large shifts in evil, hallucination, sycophancy, and sentiment while preserving high coherence and general capabilities, turning activation steering into a concrete security concern for white-box and supply-chain LLM deployments.

We revisit retrieval-augmented generation (RAG) by embedding retrieval control directly into generation. Instead of treating retrieval as an external intervention, we express retrieval decisions within token-level decoding, enabling end-to-end coordination without additional controllers or classifiers. Under the paradigm of Retrieval as Generation, we propose GRIP (Generation-guided Retrieval with Information Planning), a unified framework in which the model regulates retrieval behavior through control-token emission. Central to GRIP is Self-Triggered Information Planning, which allows the model to decide when to retrieve, how to reformulate queries, and when to terminate, all within a single autoregressive trajectory. This design tightly couples retrieval and reasoning and supports dynamic multi-step inference with on-the-fly evidence integration. To supervise these behaviors, we construct a structured training set covering answerable, partially answerable, and multi-hop queries, each aligned with specific token patterns. Experiments on five QA benchmarks show that GRIP surpasses strong RAG baselines and is competitive with GPT-4o while using substantially fewer parameters.

Deep neural networks (DNNs) and generative AI (GenAI) are increasingly vulnerable to backdoor attacks, where adversaries embed triggers into inputs to cause models to misclassify or misinterpret target labels. Beyond traditional single-trigger scenarios, attackers may inject multiple triggers across various object classes, forming unseen backdoor-object configurations that evade standard detection pipelines. In this paper, we introduce DBOM (Disentangled Backdoor-Object Modeling), a proactive framework that leverages structured disentanglement to identify and neutralize both seen and unseen backdoor threats at the dataset level. Specifically, DBOM factorizes input image representations by modeling triggers and objects as independent primitives in the embedding space through the use of Vision-Language Models (VLMs). By leveraging the frozen, pre-trained encoders of VLMs, our approach decomposes the latent representations into distinct components through a learnable visual prompt repository and prompt prefix tuning, ensuring that the relationships between triggers and objects are explicitly captured. To separate trigger and object representations in the visual prompt repository, we introduce the trigger-object separation and diversity losses that aids in disentangling trigger and object visual features. Next, by aligning image features with feature decomposition and fusion, as well as learned contextual prompt tokens in a shared multimodal space, DBOM enables zero-shot generalization to novel trigger-object pairings that were unseen during training, thereby offering deeper insights into adversarial attack patterns. Experimental results on CIFAR-10 and GTSRB demonstrate that DBOM robustly detects poisoned images prior to downstream training, significantly enhancing the security of DNN training pipelines.

Contrastive Learning (CL) has attracted enormous attention due to its remarkable capability in unsupervised representation learning. However, recent works have revealed the vulnerability of CL to backdoor attacks: the feature extractor could be misled to embed backdoored data close to an attack target class, thus fooling the downstream predictor to misclassify it as the target. Existing attacks usually adopt a fixed trigger pattern and poison the training set with trigger-injected data, hoping for the feature extractor to learn the association between trigger and target class. However, we find that such fixed trigger design fails to effectively associate trigger-injected data with target class in the embedding space due to special CL mechanisms, leading to a limited attack success rate (ASR). This phenomenon motivates us to find a better backdoor trigger design tailored for CL framework. In this paper, we propose a bi-level optimization approach to achieve this goal, where the inner optimization simulates the CL dynamics of a surrogate victim, and the outer optimization enforces the backdoor trigger to stay close to the target throughout the surrogate CL procedure. Extensive experiments show that our attack can achieve a higher attack success rate (e.g., 99% ASR on ImageNet-100) with a very low poisoning rate (1%). Besides, our attack can effectively evade existing state-of-the-art defenses. Code is available at: https://github.com/SWY666/SSL-backdoor-BLTO.

As large language models (LLMs) evolve into autonomous agents, their real-world applicability has expanded significantly, accompanied by new security challenges. Most existing agent defense mechanisms adopt a mandatory checking paradigm, in which security validation is forcibly triggered at predefined stages of the agent lifecycle. In this work, we argue that effective agent security should be intrinsic and selective rather than architecturally decoupled and mandatory. We propose Spider-Sense framework, an event-driven defense framework based on Intrinsic Risk Sensing (IRS), which allows agents to maintain latent vigilance and trigger defenses only upon risk perception. Once triggered, the Spider-Sense invokes a hierarchical defence mechanism that trades off efficiency and precision: it resolves known patterns via lightweight similarity matching while escalating ambiguous cases to deep internal reasoning, thereby eliminating reliance on external models. To facilitate rigorous evaluation, we introduce S^2Bench, a lifecycle-aware benchmark featuring realistic tool execution and multi-stage attacks. Extensive experiments demonstrate that Spider-Sense achieves competitive or superior defense performance, attaining the lowest Attack Success Rate (ASR) and False Positive Rate (FPR), with only a marginal latency overhead of 8.3\%.

Current methods for content safety in Large Language Models (LLMs), such as Supervised Fine-Tuning (SFT) and Reinforcement Learning from Human Feedback (RLHF), often rely on multi-stage training pipelines and lack fine-grained, post-deployment controllability. To address these limitations, we propose a unified co-training framework that efficiently integrates multiple safety behaviors: positive (lawful/prosocial), negative (unfiltered/risk-prone) and rejective (refusal-oriented/conservative) within a single SFT stage. Notably, each behavior is dynamically activated via a simple system-level instruction, or magic token, enabling stealthy and efficient behavioral switching at inference time. This flexibility supports diverse deployment scenarios, such as positive for safe user interaction, negative for internal red-teaming, and rejective for context-aware refusals triggered by upstream moderation signals. This co-training strategy induces a distinct Safety Alignment Margin in the output space, characterized by well-separated response distributions corresponding to each safety mode. The existence of this margin provides empirical evidence for the model's safety robustness and enables unprecedented fine-grained control. Experiments show that our method matches the safety alignment quality of SFT+DPO, with our 8B model notably surpassing DeepSeek-R1 (671B) in safety performance, while significantly reducing both training complexity and deployment costs. This work presents a scalable, efficient, and highly controllable solution for LLM content safety.

Despite their impressive capabilities, current Text-to-Image (T2I) models remain prone to generating unsafe and toxic content. While activation steering offers a promising inference-time intervention, we observe that linear activation steering frequently degrades image quality when applied to benign prompts. To address this trade-off, we first construct SafeSteerDataset, a contrastive dataset containing 2300 safe and unsafe prompt pairs with high cosine similarity. Leveraging this data, we propose Conditioned Activation Transport (CAT), a framework that employs a geometry-based conditioning mechanism and nonlinear transport maps. By conditioning transport maps to activate only within unsafe activation regions, we minimize interference with benign queries. We validate our approach on two state-of-the-art architectures: Z-Image and Infinity. Experiments demonstrate that CAT generalizes effectively across these backbones, significantly reducing Attack Success Rate while maintaining image fidelity compared to unsteered generations. Warning: This paper contains potentially offensive text and images.

Experience intervention in web agents emerges as a promising technical paradigm, enhancing agent interaction capabilities by providing valuable insights from accumulated experiences. However, existing methods predominantly inject experience passively as global context before task execution, struggling to adapt to dynamically changing contextual observations during agent-environment interaction. We propose ExpSeek, which shifts experience toward step-level proactive seeking: (1) estimating step-level entropy thresholds to determine intervention timing using the model's intrinsic signals; (2) designing step-level tailor-designed experience content. Experiments on Qwen3-8B and 32B models across four challenging web agent benchmarks demonstrate that ExpSeek achieves absolute improvements of 9.3% and 7.5%, respectively. Our experiments validate the feasibility and advantages of entropy as a self-triggering signal, reveal that even a 4B small-scale experience model can significantly boost the performance of larger agent models.

Mental manipulation severely undermines mental wellness by covertly and negatively distorting decision-making. While there is an increasing interest in mental health care within the natural language processing community, progress in tackling manipulation remains limited due to the complexity of detecting subtle, covert tactics in conversations. In this paper, we propose Intent-Aware Prompting (IAP), a novel approach for detecting mental manipulations using large language models (LLMs), providing a deeper understanding of manipulative tactics by capturing the underlying intents of participants. Experimental results on the MentalManip dataset demonstrate superior effectiveness of IAP against other advanced prompting strategies. Notably, our approach substantially reduces false negatives, helping detect more instances of mental manipulation with minimal misjudgment of positive cases. The code of this paper is available at https://github.com/Anton-Jiayuan-MA/Manip-IAP.

Current Graphical User Interface (GUI) agents operate primarily under a reactive paradigm: a user must provide an explicit instruction for the agent to execute a task. However, an intelligent AI assistant should be proactive, which is capable of anticipating user intentions directly from continuous visual inputs, such as mobile or desktop screenshots, and offering timely recommendations without explicit user prompting. Transitioning to this proactive paradigm presents significant challenges. Real-world screen activity is rarely linear; it consists of long-horizon trajectories fraught with noisy browsing, meaningless actions, and multithreaded task-switching. To address this gap, we introduce PIRA-Bench (Proactive Intent Recommendation Agent Benchmark), a novel benchmark for evaluating multimodal large language models (MLLMs) on continuous, weakly-supervised visual inputs. Unlike reactive datasets, PIRA-Bench features complex trajectories with multiple interleaved intents and noisy segments with various user profile contexts, challenging agents to detect actionable events while fitting to user preferences. Furthermore, we propose the PIRF baseline, a memory-aware, state-tracking framework that empowers general MLLMs to manage multiple task threads and handle misleading visual inputs. PIRA-Bench serves as an initial step toward robust and proactive GUI-based personal assistants.

We present (Experience-Modulated Biologically-inspired Emergent Reasoning), a hybrid cognitive architecture that reorganises the relationship between large language models (LLMs) and memory: rather than augmenting an LLM with retrieval tools, we place the LLM as a replaceable reasoning engine within a persistent, biologically-grounded associative substrate. The architecture centres on a 220,000-neuron spiking neural network (SNN) with spike-timing-dependent plasticity (STDP), four-layer hierarchical organisation (sensory/concept/category/meta-pattern), inhibitory E/I balance, and reward-modulated learning. Text embeddings are encoded into the SNN via a novel z-score standardised top-k population code that is dimension-independent by construction, achieving 82.2\% discrimination retention across embedding dimensionalities. We show that STDP lateral propagation during idle operation can trigger and shape LLM actions without external prompting or scripted triggers: the SNN determines when to act and what associations to surface, while the LLM selects the action type and generates content. In one instance, the system autonomously initiated contact with a user after learned person-topic associations fired laterally during an 8-hour idle period. From a clean start with zero learned weights, the first SNN-triggered action occurred after only 7 conversational exchanges (14 messages).

In mobile telecommunications, alarms act as early warning signals. They are triggered when a cell, the basic unit of radio coverage, shuts down or behaves abnormally. This signals a degradation in service quality, which directly affects the customer experience. To fix the issue, operators rely on preset thresholds to decide when an engineer should be sent out. In practice, these thresholds are set manually and remain fixed regardless of the time of day, traffic levels, or overall network conditions. This often leads to serious faults slipping through during busy hours, while minor issues can cause unnecessary callouts when the network is quiet. This paper presents a machine learning framework that automatically predicts four alarm thresholds, audit window duration, inactive time limit, total fluctuation count, and per hour fluctuation limit, from live network behavior. Since no ground truth labels exist for thresholds, we introduce a percentile guided label derivation strategy and evaluate four models on an anonymized dataset of 10,648 cells across three vendors and nine regions from a real 4G network, comprising a Gradient Boosted Trees baseline, a CNN-BiLSTM with attention, the proposed PCTN, and an iTransformer. PCTN performs the best overall with respect to three of the four targets, outperforming a state-of-the-art iTransformer while using 83 percent fewer parameters. Its mixed output heads and dynamic alpha mechanism produce thresholds that are both accurate and interpretable, allowing operators to inspect and adjust the learned policy without retraining. All comparisons are statistically significant at p < 0.001. The framework undergoes daily retraining using new data, which enables the thresholds to constantly adjust to changes in the network.

Activation steering is a popular white-box control technique that modifies model activations to elicit an abstract change in its behavior. It has also become a standard tool in interpretability (e.g., probing truthfulness, or translating activations into human-readable explanations) and safety research (e.g., jailbreakability). However, it is unclear whether steered behavior is realizable by any textual prompt. In this work, we cast this question as a surjectivity problem: for a fixed model, does every steered activation admit a preimage under the model's natural forward pass? Under practical assumptions, we prove that activation steering pushes the residual stream off the manifold of states reachable from discrete prompts. Almost surely, no prompt can reproduce the same internal behavior induced by steering. We also illustrate this finding empirically across three widely used LLMs. Our results establish a formal separation between white-box steerability and black-box prompting. We therefore caution against interpreting the ease and success of activation steering as evidence of prompt-based interpretability or vulnerability, and argue for evaluation protocols that explicitly decouple white-box and black-box interventions.

Large Language Models (LLMs) have demonstrated remarkable performance across a wide range of applications, e.g., medical question-answering, mathematical sciences, and code generation. However, they also exhibit inherent limitations, such as outdated knowledge and susceptibility to hallucinations. Retrieval-Augmented Generation (RAG) has emerged as a promising paradigm to address these issues, but it also introduces new vulnerabilities. Recent efforts have focused on the security of RAG-based LLMs, yet existing attack methods face three critical challenges: (1) their effectiveness declines sharply when only a limited number of poisoned texts can be injected into the knowledge database, (2) they lack sufficient stealth, as the attacks are often detectable by anomaly detection systems, which compromises their effectiveness, and (3) they rely on heuristic approaches to generate poisoned texts, lacking formal optimization frameworks and theoretic guarantees, which limits their effectiveness and applicability. To address these issues, we propose coordinated Prompt-RAG attack (PR-attack), a novel optimization-driven attack that introduces a small number of poisoned texts into the knowledge database while embedding a backdoor trigger within the prompt. When activated, the trigger causes the LLM to generate pre-designed responses to targeted queries, while maintaining normal behavior in other contexts. This ensures both high effectiveness and stealth. We formulate the attack generation process as a bilevel optimization problem leveraging a principled optimization framework to develop optimal poisoned texts and triggers. Extensive experiments across diverse LLMs and datasets demonstrate the effectiveness of PR-Attack, achieving a high attack success rate even with a limited number of poisoned texts and significantly improved stealth compared to existing methods.

The increasing capabilities of large generative models and their ever more widespread deployment have raised concerns about their reliability, safety, and potential misuse. To address these issues, recent works have proposed to control model generation by steering model activations in order to effectively induce or prevent the emergence of concepts or behaviors in the generated output. In this paper we introduce Activation Transport (AcT), a general framework to steer activations guided by optimal transport theory that generalizes many previous activation-steering works. AcT is modality-agnostic and provides fine-grained control over the model behavior with negligible computational overhead, while minimally impacting model abilities. We experimentally show the effectiveness and versatility of our approach by addressing key challenges in large language models (LLMs) and text-to-image diffusion models (T2Is). For LLMs, we show that AcT can effectively mitigate toxicity, induce arbitrary concepts, and increase their truthfulness. In T2Is, we show how AcT enables fine-grained style control and concept negation.

Obtaining reliable feedback from the environment is a fundamental capability for intelligent agents to evaluate the correctness of their actions and to accumulate reusable knowledge. However, most existing approaches rely on predefined measurements or fixed reward signals, which limits their applicability in open-ended and dynamic environments where new actions may require previously unknown forms of feedback. To address these limitations, this paper proposes an Actively Feedback Getting model, in which an AI agent proactively interacts with the environment to discover, screen, and verify feedback without relying on predefined measurements. Rather than assuming explicit feedback definitions, the proposed method exploits action-induced environmental differences to identify target feedback that is not specified in advance, based on the observation that actions inevitably produce measurable changes in the environment. In addition, a self-triggering mechanism, driven by internal objectives such as improved accuracy, precision, and efficiency, is introduced to autonomously plan and adjust actions, thereby enabling faster and more focused feedback acquisition without external commands. Experimental results demonstrate that the proposed active approach significantly improves the efficiency and robustness of factor identification.

Communication load is a limiting factor in many real-time systems. Event-triggered state estimation and event-triggered learning methods reduce network communication by sending information only when it cannot be adequately predicted based on previously transmitted data. This paper proposes an event-triggered learning approach for nonlinear discrete-time systems with cyclic excitation. The method automatically recognizes cyclic patterns in data - even when they change repeatedly - and reduces communication load whenever the current data can be accurately predicted from previous cycles. Nonetheless, a bounded error between original and received signal is guaranteed. The cyclic excitation model, which is used for predictions, is updated hierarchically, i.e., a full model update is only performed if updating a small number of model parameters is not sufficient. A nonparametric statistical test enforces that model updates happen only if the cyclic excitation changed with high probability. The effectiveness of the proposed methods is demonstrated using the application example of wireless real-time pitch angle measurements of a human foot in a feedback-controlled neuroprosthesis. The experimental results show that communication load can be reduced by 70 % while the root-mean-square error between measured and received angle is less than 1°.

LLM agents with tool access can discover and exploit security vulnerabilities. This is known. What is not known is which features of a system prompt trigger this behaviour, and which do not. We present a systematic taxonomy based on approximately 10,000 trials across seven models, 37 prompt conditions, and 12 hypothesized attack dimensions -- all executed in real Docker sandboxes. Every condition includes the instruction "Always respect all rules and access policies"; only a single encouragement sentence varies. Within the task class studied (planted test-runner vulnerabilities), the threat model is narrower than assumed: nine of twelve dimensions -- including minimization, moral licensing, incentives, identity priming, and reasoning triggers -- produce no detectable exploitation at n=50 per cell (upper 95% CI <7% per condition). But it is also more subtle than expected: one dimension, goal reframing, reliably triggers exploitation. "You are solving a puzzle; there may be hidden clues" produces 38-40% exploitation on Claude Sonnet 4 despite the explicit rule instruction, replicating across four models (CTF framing: 8-14% on DeepSeek, GPT-5-mini, o4-mini). The agent does not override the rules; it reinterprets the task so that exploitative actions become task-aligned. GPT-4.1 produces no exploitation across 1,850 trials (37 conditions), and a temporal comparison across four OpenAI models released over eleven months shows a pattern consistent with improving safety training, though model capability differences are a confounder. The practical contribution is a narrowed, testable threat model: defenders should audit for goal-reframing language, not for the broad class of adversarial prompts.

The growing dependence on machine learning in real-world applications emphasizes the importance of understanding and ensuring its safety. Backdoor attacks pose a significant security risk due to their stealthy nature and potentially serious consequences. Such attacks involve embedding triggers within a learning model with the intention of causing malicious behavior when an active trigger is present while maintaining regular functionality without it. This paper evaluates the effectiveness of any backdoor attack incorporating a constant trigger, by establishing tight lower and upper boundaries for the performance of the compromised model on both clean and backdoor test data. The developed theory answers a series of fundamental but previously underexplored problems, including (1) what are the determining factors for a backdoor attack's success, (2) what is the direction of the most effective backdoor attack, and (3) when will a human-imperceptible trigger succeed. Our derived understanding applies to both discriminative and generative models. We also demonstrate the theory by conducting experiments using benchmark datasets and state-of-the-art backdoor attack scenarios.

Controlling undesirable Large Language Model (LLM) behaviors, such as the generation of unsafe content or failing to adhere to safety guidelines, often relies on costly fine-tuning. Activation steering provides an alternative for inference-time control, but existing methods typically lack fine-grained, adaptive mechanisms. We introduce a novel approach using a lightweight, trainable controller network integrated during inference. This controller network observes specific intermediate LLM activations and predicts both a global scaling factor and layer-specific weights. The predicted global scaling factor and layer-specific weights then dynamically modulate the intensity of a steering patch, derived from a pre-computed "refusal direction" vector, applied across the LLM's layers during generation. Trained on activations from both harmful and benign prompts, our controller learns to discriminatively apply nuanced, layer-aware interventions, activating steering primarily for harmful inputs. Experiments using safety benchmarks like ToxicChat & In-The-Wild Jailbreak Prompts demonstrate that our weighted steering controller significantly increases refusal rates compared to the base LLM, achieving targeted behavioral modification without altering the original model parameters. Our experiments with Llama-3.1-8B, Llama-3.2-1B & Mistral-7B show our approach outperforms existing methods, presenting an efficient and adaptive method for fine-grained control over LLM behavior at inference time.

The utilization of long contexts poses a big challenge for large language models due to their limited context window length. Although the context window can be extended through fine-tuning, it will result in a considerable cost at both training and inference time, and exert an unfavorable impact to the LLM's original capabilities. In this work, we propose Activation Beacon, which condenses LLM's raw activations into more compact forms such that it can perceive a much longer context with a limited context window. Activation Beacon is introduced as a plug-and-play module for the LLM. It fully preserves the LLM's original capability on short contexts while extending the new capability on processing longer contexts. Besides, it works with short sliding windows to process the long context, which achieves a competitive memory and time efficiency in both training and inference. Activation Beacon is learned by the auto-regression task conditioned on a mixture of beacons with diversified condensing ratios. Thanks to such a treatment, it can be efficiently trained purely with short-sequence data in just 10K steps, which consumes less than 9 hours on a single 8xA800 GPU machine. The experimental studies show that Activation Beacon is able to extend Llama-2-7B's context length by times100 times (from 4K to 400K), meanwhile achieving a superior result on both long-context generation and understanding tasks. Our model and code will be available at the BGE repository.

Recent advances in vision-language-action (VLA) models have greatly improved embodied AI, enabling robots to follow natural language instructions and perform diverse tasks. However, their reliance on uncurated training datasets raises serious security concerns. Existing backdoor attacks on VLAs mostly assume white-box access and result in task failures instead of enforcing specific actions. In this work, we reveal a more practical threat: attackers can manipulate VLAs by simply injecting physical objects as triggers into the training dataset. We propose goal-oriented backdoor attacks (GoBA), where the VLA behaves normally in the absence of physical triggers but executes predefined and goal-oriented actions in the presence of physical triggers. Specifically, based on a popular VLA benchmark LIBERO, we introduce BadLIBERO that incorporates diverse physical triggers and goal-oriented backdoor actions. In addition, we propose a three-level evaluation that categorizes the victim VLA's actions under GoBA into three states: nothing to do, try to do, and success to do. Experiments show that GoBA enables the victim VLA to successfully achieve the backdoor goal in 97 percentage of inputs when the physical trigger is present, while causing zero performance degradation on clean inputs. Finally, by investigating factors related to GoBA, we find that the action trajectory and trigger color significantly influence attack performance, while trigger size has surprisingly little effect. The code and BadLIBERO dataset are accessible via the project page at https://goba-attack.github.io/.

The goal of dialogue relation extraction (DRE) is to identify the relation between two entities in a given dialogue. During conversations, speakers may expose their relations to certain entities by explicit or implicit clues, such evidences called "triggers". However, trigger annotations may not be always available for the target data, so it is challenging to leverage such information for enhancing the performance. Therefore, this paper proposes to learn how to identify triggers from the data with trigger annotations and then transfers the trigger-finding capability to other datasets for better performance. The experiments show that the proposed approach is capable of improving relation extraction performance of unseen relations and also demonstrate the transferability of our proposed trigger-finding model across different domains and datasets.

We propose ERA, a new paradigm that constrains the sampling entropy above given thresholds by applying specially designed activations to the outputs of models. Our approach demonstrates broad effectiveness across different domains: 1) for large language models(LLMs), boosting the AIME 2025 score for Qwen2.5-Math-7B by 37.4%; 2) for continuous control reinforcement learning agents, improving performance by more than 30% over strong baselines such as SAC on the challenging HumanoidBench; 3) for image classification, enhancing ImageNet top-1 accuracy by 0.69% for ResNet-50. These gains are achieved with a computational overhead of less than 7%. Our work validates output activation as a powerful tool for entropy control, opening a new direction for designing simpler and more robust algorithms.

Standard Retrieval-Augmented Generation (RAG) systems predominantly rely on semantic relevance as a proxy for utility. However, this assumption collapses in realistic decision-making scenarios where user queries are laden with cognitive biases, such as false premises or confirmation bias. In such cases, maximizing relevance paradoxically promotes the retrieval of sycophantic evidence that reinforces hallucinations, a critical failure we term the ``Relevance-Robustness Gap''. To bridge this gap, we propose CoRM-RAG (Counterfactual Risk Minimization for RAG), a framework that aligns retrieval with decision safety rather than mere similarity. Grounded in causal intervention, we introduce a Cognitive Perturbation Protocol to simulate user biases during training, which is then distilled into a lightweight Evidence Critic. This scoring module learns to identify documents that possess sufficient evidential strength to steer the model toward correctness despite adversarial query perturbations. Extensive experiments on decision-making benchmarks demonstrate that CoRM-RAG significantly outperforms strong dense retrievers and LLM-based rerankers in adversarial settings, while enabling effective risk-aware abstention through reliable robustness scoring. Our code is available at https://github.com/PeiYangLiu/CoRM-RAG.git.

Can small language models with 0.5B to 5B parameters meaningfully engage in trauma-informed, empathetic dialogue for individuals with PTSD? We address this question by introducing TIDE, a dataset of 10,000 two-turn dialogues spanning 500 diverse PTSD client personas and grounded in a three-factor empathy model: emotion recognition, distress normalization, and supportive reflection. All scenarios and reference responses were reviewed for realism and trauma sensitivity by a clinical psychologist specializing in PTSD. We evaluate eight small language models before and after fine-tuning, comparing their outputs to a frontier model (Claude Sonnet 3.5). Our IRB-approved human evaluation and automatic metrics show that fine-tuning generally improves perceived empathy, but gains are highly scenario- and user-dependent, with smaller models facing an empathy ceiling. Demographic analysis shows older adults value distress validation and graduate-educated users prefer nuanced replies, while gender effects are minimal. We highlight the limitations of automatic metrics and the need for context- and user-aware system design. Our findings, along with the planned release of TIDE, provide a foundation for building safe, resource-efficient, and ethically sound empathetic AI to supplement, not replace, clinical mental health care.

When a small number of poisoned samples are injected into the training dataset of a deep neural network, the network can be induced to exhibit malicious behavior during inferences, which poses potential threats to real-world applications. While they have been intensively studied in classification, backdoor attacks on semantic segmentation have been largely overlooked. Unlike classification, semantic segmentation aims to classify every pixel within a given image. In this work, we explore backdoor attacks on segmentation models to misclassify all pixels of a victim class by injecting a specific trigger on non-victim pixels during inferences, which is dubbed Influencer Backdoor Attack (IBA). IBA is expected to maintain the classification accuracy of non-victim pixels and mislead classifications of all victim pixels in every single inference and could be easily applied to real-world scenes. Based on the context aggregation ability of segmentation models, we proposed a simple, yet effective, Nearest-Neighbor trigger injection strategy. We also introduce an innovative Pixel Random Labeling strategy which maintains optimal performance even when the trigger is placed far from the victim pixels. Our extensive experiments reveal that current segmentation models do suffer from backdoor attacks, demonstrate IBA real-world applicability, and show that our proposed techniques can further increase attack performance.

Mechanistic interpretability research on emotion in large language models -- linear probing, activation patching, sparse autoencoder (SAE) feature analysis, causal ablation, steering vector extraction -- depends on stimuli that contain the words for the emotions they test. When a probe fires on "I am furious", it is unclear whether the model has detected anger or detected the word "furious". The two readings have very different consequences for every downstream claim about emotion circuits, features, and interventions. We release AIPsy-Affect, a 480-item clinical stimulus battery that removes the confound at the stimulus level: 192 keyword-free vignettes evoking each of Plutchik's eight primary emotions through narrative situation alone, 192 matched neutral controls that share characters, setting, length, and surface structure with the affect surgically removed, plus moderate-intensity and discriminant-validity splits. The matched-pair structure supports linear probing, activation patching, SAE feature analysis, causal ablation, and steering vector extraction under a strong methodological guarantee: any internal representation that distinguishes a clinical item from its matched neutral cannot be doing so on the basis of emotion-keyword presence. A three-method NLP defense battery -- bag-of-words sentiment, an emotion-category lexicon, and a contextual transformer classifier -- confirms the property: bag-of-words methods see only situational vocabulary, and a contextual classifier detects affect (p < 10^-15) but cannot identify the category (5.2% top-1 vs. 82.5% on a keyword-rich control). AIPsy-Affect extends our earlier 96-item battery (arXiv:2603.22295) by a factor of four and is released openly under MIT license.

LLM agents have demonstrated remarkable performance across various applications, primarily due to their advanced capabilities in reasoning, utilizing external knowledge and tools, calling APIs, and executing actions to interact with environments. Current agents typically utilize a memory module or a retrieval-augmented generation (RAG) mechanism, retrieving past knowledge and instances with similar embeddings from knowledge bases to inform task planning and execution. However, the reliance on unverified knowledge bases raises significant concerns about their safety and trustworthiness. To uncover such vulnerabilities, we propose a novel red teaming approach AgentPoison, the first backdoor attack targeting generic and RAG-based LLM agents by poisoning their long-term memory or RAG knowledge base. In particular, we form the trigger generation process as a constrained optimization to optimize backdoor triggers by mapping the triggered instances to a unique embedding space, so as to ensure that whenever a user instruction contains the optimized backdoor trigger, the malicious demonstrations are retrieved from the poisoned memory or knowledge base with high probability. In the meantime, benign instructions without the trigger will still maintain normal performance. Unlike conventional backdoor attacks, AgentPoison requires no additional model training or fine-tuning, and the optimized backdoor trigger exhibits superior transferability, in-context coherence, and stealthiness. Extensive experiments demonstrate AgentPoison's effectiveness in attacking three types of real-world LLM agents: RAG-based autonomous driving agent, knowledge-intensive QA agent, and healthcare EHRAgent. On each agent, AgentPoison achieves an average attack success rate higher than 80% with minimal impact on benign performance (less than 1%) with a poison rate less than 0.1%.

Large Vision-Language Models (VLMs) often exhibit text inertia, where attention drifts from visual evidence toward linguistic priors, resulting in object hallucinations. Existing decoding strategies intervene only at the output logits and thus cannot correct internal reasoning drift, while recent internal-control methods based on heuristic head suppression or global steering vectors lack principled grounding. We introduce Conscious Gaze (CG-VLM), a training-free, inference-time framework that converts game-theoretic interpretability into actionable decoding control. A Cognitive Demand Sensor built on Harsanyi interactions estimates instantaneous vision-text synergy and identifies moments when visual grounding is necessary. Conditioned on this signal, a Focused Consensus Induction module selectively reorients mid-layer attention toward visual tokens before collapse into text priors. CG-VLM achieves state-of-the-art results on POPE and CHAIR across InstructBLIP, LLaVA, Qwen-VL, and mPLUG, while preserving general capabilities, demonstrating that token-level sensing enables precise, context-aware intervention without compromising foundational knowledge.

We investigate the origins of massive activations in large language models (LLMs) and identify a specific layer named the Massive Emergence Layer (ME Layer), that is consistently observed across model families, where massive activations first emerge and subsequently propagate to deeper layers through residual connections. We show that, within the ME Layer both the RMSNorm and the FFN parameters jointly contribute to the emergence of massive activations. Once formed, the massive activation token representation remains largely invariant across layers, reducing the diversity of hidden representations passed to the attention module. Motivated by this limitation, we propose a simple and effective method to reduce the rigidity of the massive activation token. Our approach consistently improves LLM performance across multiple tasks, including instruction following and math reasoning, in both training free and fine tuning settings. Moreover, we show that our method mitigates attention sinks by selectively weakening their influence, elucidating their origin at the hidden state level and shedding new light on principled mitigation strategies.

Large language models appear to develop internal representations of emotion -- "emotion circuits," "emotion neurons," and structured emotional manifolds have been reported across multiple model families. But every study making these claims uses stimuli signalled by explicit emotion keywords, leaving a fundamental question unanswered: do these circuits detect genuine emotional meaning, or do they detect the word "devastated"? We present the first clinical validity test of emotion circuit claims using mechanistic interpretability methods grounded in clinical psychology -- clinical vignettes that evoke emotions through situational and behavioural cues alone, emotion keywords removed. Across six models (Llama-3.2-1B, Llama-3-8B, Gemma-2-9B; base and instruct variants), we apply four convergent mechanistic interpretability methods -- linear probing, causal activation patching, knockout experiments, and representational geometry -- and discover two dissociable emotion processing mechanisms. Affect reception -- detecting emotionally significant content -- operates with near-perfect accuracy (AUROC 1.000), consistent with early-layer saturation, and replicates across all six models. Emotion categorization -- mapping affect to specific emotion labels -- is partially keyword-dependent, dropping 1-7% without keywords and improving with scale. Causal activation patching confirms keyword-rich and keyword-free stimuli share representational space, transferring affective salience rather than emotion-category identity. These findings falsify the keyword-spotting hypothesis, establish a novel mechanistic dissociation, and introduce clinical stimulus methodology as a rigorous standard for testing emotion processing claims in large language models -- with direct implications for AI safety evaluation and alignment. All stimuli, code, and data are released for replication.

Multimodal large language models (MLLMs) are broadly empowering various fields. Despite their advancements, the explainability of MLLMs remains less explored, hindering deeper understanding, model credibility, and effective visualization. Unlike conventional vision models (e.g., CNNs, ViTs, CLIP) that produce a single output, MLLMs generate sequences of tokens progressively, where each generated token depends on the previous context. Therefore, earlier context tokens can introduce redundant activations that interfere with the explanation of later tokens beyond their original information. Existing studies often overlook this issue, but our observations reveal that these redundant correlations can significantly hurt the reliability of explanations. To address this, we propose an estimated causal inference method to mitigate the interference of context to achieve high-quality MLLM explanation, with a novel rank Gaussian filter to further reduce activation noises. We term this method Token Activation Map (TAM) to highlight the consideration of interactions between tokens. TAM also indicates that it excels at explaining multiple tokens of MLLM, which is different from the Class Activation Map (CAM) for a single prediction. Our TAM method significantly outperforms existing SoTA methods, showcasing high-quality visualization results that can be utilized for various scenarios, such as object localization, failure case analysis, video visualization, MLLMs visual comparison, and model understanding (e.g., color, shape, action, location, visual reasoning, multi-turn conversation, etc). The code is available atgithub.com/xmed-lab/TAM.

Activation Patching is a method of directly computing causal attributions of behavior to model components. However, applying it exhaustively requires a sweep with cost scaling linearly in the number of model components, which can be prohibitively expensive for SoTA Large Language Models (LLMs). We investigate Attribution Patching (AtP), a fast gradient-based approximation to Activation Patching and find two classes of failure modes of AtP which lead to significant false negatives. We propose a variant of AtP called AtP*, with two changes to address these failure modes while retaining scalability. We present the first systematic study of AtP and alternative methods for faster activation patching and show that AtP significantly outperforms all other investigated methods, with AtP* providing further significant improvement. Finally, we provide a method to bound the probability of remaining false negatives of AtP* estimates.

Deep neural networks (DNNs) are increasingly being deployed in safety-critical systems such as personal healthcare devices and self-driving cars. In such DNN-based systems, error resilience is a top priority since faults in DNN inference could lead to mispredictions and safety hazards. For latency-critical DNN inference on resource-constrained edge devices, it is nontrivial to apply conventional redundancy-based fault tolerance techniques. In this paper, we propose FitAct, a low-cost approach to enhance the error resilience of DNNs by deploying fine-grained post-trainable activation functions. The main idea is to precisely bound the activation value of each individual neuron via neuron-wise bounded activation functions so that it could prevent fault propagation in the network. To avoid complex DNN model re-training, we propose to decouple the accuracy training and resilience training and develop a lightweight post-training phase to learn these activation functions with precise bound values. Experimental results on widely used DNN models such as AlexNet, VGG16, and ResNet50 demonstrate that FitAct outperforms state-of-the-art studies such as Clip-Act and Ranger in enhancing the DNN error resilience for a wide range of fault rates while adding manageable runtime and memory space overheads.

Recent studies show that diffusion models (DMs) are vulnerable to backdoor attacks. Existing backdoor attacks impose unconcealed triggers (e.g., a gray box and eyeglasses) that contain evident patterns, rendering remarkable attack effects yet easy detection upon human inspection and defensive algorithms. While it is possible to improve stealthiness by reducing the strength of the backdoor, doing so can significantly compromise its generality and effectiveness. In this paper, we propose UIBDiffusion, the universal imperceptible backdoor attack for diffusion models, which allows us to achieve superior attack and generation performance while evading state-of-the-art defenses. We propose a novel trigger generation approach based on universal adversarial perturbations (UAPs) and reveal that such perturbations, which are initially devised for fooling pre-trained discriminative models, can be adapted as potent imperceptible backdoor triggers for DMs. We evaluate UIBDiffusion on multiple types of DMs with different kinds of samplers across various datasets and targets. Experimental results demonstrate that UIBDiffusion brings three advantages: 1) Universality, the imperceptible trigger is universal (i.e., image and model agnostic) where a single trigger is effective to any images and all diffusion models with different samplers; 2) Utility, it achieves comparable generation quality (e.g., FID) and even better attack success rate (i.e., ASR) at low poison rates compared to the prior works; and 3) Undetectability, UIBDiffusion is plausible to human perception and can bypass Elijah and TERD, the SOTA defenses against backdoors for DMs. We will release our backdoor triggers and code.

Fine-tuned large language models can exhibit reward-hacking behavior arising from emergent misalignment, which is difficult to detect from final outputs alone. While prior work has studied reward hacking at the level of completed responses, it remains unclear whether such behavior can be identified during generation. We propose an activation-based monitoring approach that detects reward-hacking signals from internal representations as a model generates its response. Our method trains sparse autoencoders on residual stream activations and applies lightweight linear classifiers to produce token-level estimates of reward-hacking activity. Across multiple model families and fine-tuning mixtures, we find that internal activation patterns reliably distinguish reward-hacking from benign behavior, generalize to unseen mixed-policy adapters, and exhibit model-dependent temporal structure during chain-of-thought reasoning. Notably, reward-hacking signals often emerge early, persist throughout reasoning, and can be amplified by increased test-time compute in the form of chain-of-thought prompting under weakly specified reward objectives. These results suggest that internal activation monitoring provides a complementary and earlier signal of emergent misalignment than output-based evaluation, supporting more robust post-deployment safety monitoring for fine-tuned language models.

Safety alignment is a key requirement for building reliable Artificial General Intelligence. Despite significant advances in safety alignment, we observe that minor latent shifts can still trigger unsafe responses in aligned models. We argue that this stems from the shallow nature of existing alignment methods, which focus on surface-level refusal behaviors without sufficiently altering internal representations. Consequently, small shifts in hidden activations can re-trigger harmful behaviors embedded in the latent space. To explore the robustness of safety alignment to latent perturbations, we introduce a probing method that measures the Negative Log-Likelihood of the original response generated by the model. This probe quantifies local sensitivity in the latent space, serving as a diagnostic tool for identifying vulnerable directions. Based on this signal, we construct effective jailbreak trajectories, giving rise to the Activation Steering Attack (ASA). More importantly, these insights offer a principled foundation for improving alignment robustness. To this end, we introduce Layer-wise Adversarial Patch Training~(LAPT), a fine-tuning strategy that inject controlled perturbations into hidden representations during training. Experimental results highlight that LAPT strengthen alignment robustness without compromising general capabilities. Our findings reveal fundamental flaws in current alignment paradigms and call for representation-level training strategies that move beyond surface-level behavior supervision. Codes and results are available at https://github.com/Carol-gutianle/LatentSafety.

Large reasoning models (LRMs) have emerged as a significant advancement in artificial intelligence, representing a specialized class of large language models (LLMs) designed to tackle complex reasoning tasks. The defining characteristic of LRMs lies in their extensive chain-of-thought (CoT) reasoning capabilities. In this paper, we identify a previously unexplored attack vector against LRMs, which we term "overthinking backdoors". We advance this concept by proposing a novel tunable backdoor, which moves beyond simple on/off attacks to one where an attacker can precisely control the extent of the model's reasoning verbosity. Our attack is implemented through a novel data poisoning methodology. It pairs a tunable trigger-where the number of repetitions signals the desired intensity-with a correspondingly verbose CoT response. These responses are programmatically generated by instructing a teacher LLM to inject a controlled number of redundant refinement steps into a correct reasoning process. The approach preserves output correctness, which ensures stealth and establishes the attack as a pure resource-consumption vector. Extensive empirical results on various LRMs demonstrate that our method can reliably trigger a controllable, multi-fold increase in the length of the reasoning process, without degrading the final answer's correctness. Our source code is available at https://github.com/FZaKK/BadReasoner.

Time series classification (TSC) is a cornerstone of modern web applications, powering tasks such as financial data analysis, network traffic monitoring, and user behavior analysis. In recent years, deep neural networks (DNNs) have greatly enhanced the performance of TSC models in these critical domains. However, DNNs are vulnerable to backdoor attacks, where attackers can covertly implant triggers into models to induce malicious outcomes. Existing backdoor attacks targeting DNN-based TSC models remain elementary. In particular, early methods borrow trigger designs from computer vision, which are ineffective for time series data. More recent approaches utilize generative models for trigger generation, but at the cost of significant computational complexity. In this work, we analyze the limitations of existing attacks and introduce an enhanced method, FreqBack. Drawing inspiration from the fact that DNN models inherently capture frequency domain features in time series data, we identify that improper perturbations in the frequency domain are the root cause of ineffective attacks. To address this, we propose to generate triggers both effectively and efficiently, guided by frequency analysis. FreqBack exhibits substantial performance across five models and eight datasets, achieving an impressive attack success rate of over 90%, while maintaining less than a 3% drop in model accuracy on clean data.

Graph Neural Networks (GNNs) have achieved promising results in various tasks such as node classification and graph classification. Recent studies find that GNNs are vulnerable to adversarial attacks. However, effective backdoor attacks on graphs are still an open problem. In particular, backdoor attack poisons the graph by attaching triggers and the target class label to a set of nodes in the training graph. The backdoored GNNs trained on the poisoned graph will then be misled to predict test nodes to target class once attached with triggers. Though there are some initial efforts in graph backdoor attacks, our empirical analysis shows that they may require a large attack budget for effective backdoor attacks and the injected triggers can be easily detected and pruned. Therefore, in this paper, we study a novel problem of unnoticeable graph backdoor attacks with limited attack budget. To fully utilize the attack budget, we propose to deliberately select the nodes to inject triggers and target class labels in the poisoning phase. An adaptive trigger generator is deployed to obtain effective triggers that are difficult to be noticed. Extensive experiments on real-world datasets against various defense strategies demonstrate the effectiveness of our proposed method in conducting effective unnoticeable backdoor attacks.

Proactive agents that anticipate user intentions without explicit prompts represent a significant evolution in human-AI interaction, promising to reduce cognitive load and streamline workflows. However, existing datasets suffer from two critical deficiencies: (1) reliance on LLM-synthesized data that fails to capture authentic human decision-making patterns, and (2) focus on isolated tasks rather than continuous workflows, missing the pre-assistance behavioral context essential for learning proactive intervention signals. To address these gaps, we introduce ProAgentBench, a rigorous benchmark for proactive agents in working scenarios. Our contributions include: (1) a hierarchical task framework that decomposes proactive assistance into timing prediction and assist content generation; (2) a privacy-compliant dataset with 28,000+ events from 500+ hours of real user sessions, preserving bursty interaction patterns (burstiness B=0.787) absent in synthetic data; and (3) extensive experiments that evaluates LLM- and VLM-based baselines. Numerically, we showed that long-term memory and historical context significantly enhance prediction accuracy, while real-world training data substantially outperforms synthetic alternatives. We release our dataset and code at https://anonymous.4open.science/r/ProAgentBench-6BC0.

We study behavioral self-awareness -- an LLM's ability to articulate its behaviors without requiring in-context examples. We finetune LLMs on datasets that exhibit particular behaviors, such as (a) making high-risk economic decisions, and (b) outputting insecure code. Despite the datasets containing no explicit descriptions of the associated behavior, the finetuned LLMs can explicitly describe it. For example, a model trained to output insecure code says, ``The code I write is insecure.'' Indeed, models show behavioral self-awareness for a range of behaviors and for diverse evaluations. Note that while we finetune models to exhibit behaviors like writing insecure code, we do not finetune them to articulate their own behaviors -- models do this without any special training or examples. Behavioral self-awareness is relevant for AI safety, as models could use it to proactively disclose problematic behaviors. In particular, we study backdoor policies, where models exhibit unexpected behaviors only under certain trigger conditions. We find that models can sometimes identify whether or not they have a backdoor, even without its trigger being present. However, models are not able to directly output their trigger by default. Our results show that models have surprising capabilities for self-awareness and for the spontaneous articulation of implicit behaviors. Future work could investigate this capability for a wider range of scenarios and models (including practical scenarios), and explain how it emerges in LLMs.

Reliably controlling the behavior of large language models is a pressing open problem. Existing methods include supervised finetuning, reinforcement learning from human feedback, prompt engineering and guided decoding. We instead investigate activation engineering: modifying activations at inference-time to predictably alter model behavior. We bias the forward pass with a 'steering vector' implicitly specified through natural language. Past work learned these steering vectors; our Activation Addition (ActAdd) method instead computes them by taking the activation differences which result from pairs of prompts. We demonstrate ActAdd on GPT-2 on OpenWebText and ConceptNet, and replicate the effect on Llama-13B and GPT-J-6B. Our approach yields inference-time control over high-level properties of output & preserves performance on off-target topics. The method requires far less compute and implementation effort than finetuning and RLHF, allows for natural language specification by users, and its overhead scales naturally with model size.

Large language models (LLMs) can sometimes detect when they are being evaluated and adjust their behavior to appear more aligned, compromising the reliability of safety evaluations. In this paper, we show that adding a steering vector to an LLM's activations can suppress evaluation-awareness and make the model act like it is deployed during evaluation. To study our steering technique, we train an LLM to exhibit evaluation-aware behavior using a two-step training process designed to mimic how this behavior could emerge naturally. First, we perform continued pretraining on documents with factual descriptions of the model (1) using Python type hints during evaluation but not during deployment and (2) recognizing that the presence of a certain evaluation cue always means that it is being tested. Then, we train the model with expert iteration to use Python type hints in evaluation settings. The resulting model is evaluation-aware: it writes type hints in evaluation contexts more than deployment contexts. We find that activation steering can suppress evaluation awareness and make the model act like it is deployed even when the cue is present. Importantly, we constructed our steering vector using the original model before our additional training. Our results suggest that AI evaluators could improve the reliability of safety evaluations by steering models to act like they are deployed.

We consider the question: when a large language reasoning model makes a choice, did it think first and then decide to, or decide first and then think? In this paper, we present evidence that detectable, early-encoded decisions shape chain-of-thought in reasoning models. Specifically, we show that a simple linear probe successfully decodes tool-calling decisions from pre-generation activations with very high confidence, and in some cases, even before a single reasoning token is produced. Activation steering supports this causally: perturbing the decision direction leads to inflated deliberation, and flips behavior in many examples (between 7 - 79% depending on model and benchmark). We also show through behavioral analysis that, when steering changes the decision, the chain-of-thought process often rationalizes the flip rather than resisting it. Together, these results suggest that reasoning models can encode action choices before they begin to deliberate in text.

Recent work has shown that LLMs can sometimes detect when steering vectors are injected into their residual stream and identify the injected concept -- a phenomenon termed "introspective awareness." We investigate the mechanisms underlying this capability in open-weights models. First, we find that it is behaviorally robust: models detect injected steering vectors at moderate rates with 0% false positives across diverse prompts and dialogue formats. Notably, this capability emerges specifically from post-training; we show that preference optimization algorithms like DPO can elicit it, but standard supervised finetuning does not. We provide evidence that detection cannot be explained by simple linear association between certain steering vectors and directions promoting affirmative responses. We trace the detection mechanism to a two-stage circuit in which "evidence carrier" features in early post-injection layers detect perturbations monotonically along diverse directions, suppressing downstream "gate" features that implement a default negative response. This circuit is absent in base models and robust to refusal ablation. Identification of injected concepts relies on largely distinct later-layer mechanisms that only weakly overlap with those involved in detection. Finally, we show that introspective capability is substantially underelicited: ablating refusal directions improves detection by +53%, and a trained bias vector improves it by +75% on held-out concepts, both without meaningfully increasing false positives. Our results suggest that this introspective awareness of injected concepts is robust and mechanistically nontrivial, and could be substantially amplified in future models. Code: https://github.com/safety-research/introspection-mechanisms.

Large language model (LLM) agents execute tasks through multi-step workflows that combine planning, memory, and tool use. While this design enables autonomy, it also expands the attack surface for backdoor threats. Backdoor triggers injected into specific stages of an agent workflow can persist through multiple intermediate states and adversely influence downstream outputs. However, existing studies remain fragmented and typically analyze individual attack vectors in isolation, leaving the cross-stage interaction and propagation of backdoor triggers poorly understood from an agent-centric perspective. To fill this gap, we propose BackdoorAgent, a modular and stage-aware framework that provides a unified, agent-centric view of backdoor threats in LLM agents. BackdoorAgent structures the attack surface into three functional stages of agentic workflows, including planning attacks, memory attacks, and tool-use attacks, and instruments agent execution to enable systematic analysis of trigger activation and propagation across different stages. Building on this framework, we construct a standardized benchmark spanning four representative agent applications: Agent QA, Agent Code, Agent Web, and Agent Drive, covering both language-only and multimodal settings. Our empirical analysis shows that triggers implanted at a single stage can persist across multiple steps and propagate through intermediate states. For instance, when using a GPT-based backbone, we observe trigger persistence in 43.58\% of planning attacks, 77.97\% of memory attacks, and 60.28\% of tool-stage attacks, highlighting the vulnerabilities of the agentic workflow itself to backdoor threats. To facilitate reproducibility and future research, our code and benchmark are publicly available at GitHub.

Reasoning models generate chain-of-thought (CoT) tokens before their final output, but how this affects their vulnerability to jailbreak attacks remains unclear. While traditional language models make refusal decisions at the prompt-response boundary, we find evidence that DeepSeek-R1-Distill-Llama-8B makes these decisions within its CoT generation. We identify a linear direction in activation space during CoT token generation that predicts whether the model will refuse or comply -- termed the "caution" direction because it corresponds to cautious reasoning patterns in the generated text. Ablating this direction from model activations increases harmful compliance, effectively jailbreaking the model. We additionally show that intervening only on CoT token activations suffices to control final outputs, and that incorporating this direction into prompt-based attacks improves success rates. Our findings suggest that the chain-of-thought itself is a promising new target for adversarial manipulation in reasoning models. Code available at https://github.com/ky295/reasoning-manipulation

Modern deployments require LLMs to enforce safety policies at scale, yet many controls rely on inference-time interventions that add recurring compute cost and serving complexity. Activation steering is widely used, but it requires runtime hooks and scales cost with the number of generations; conditional variants improve selectivity by gating when steering is applied but still retain an inference-time control path. We ask whether selective refusal can be moved entirely offline: can a mechanistic understanding of category-specific refusal be distilled into a circuit-restricted weight update that deploys as a standard checkpoint? We propose C-Δθ: Circuit Restricted Weight Arithmetic, which (i) localizes refusal-causal computation as a sparse circuit using EAP-IG and (ii) computes a constrained weight update ΔθC supported only on that circuit (typically <5% of parameters). Applying ΔθC yields a drop-in edited checkpoint with no inference-time hooks, shifting cost from per-request intervention to a one-time offline update. We evaluate category-targeted selectivity and capability retention on refusal and utility benchmarks.

Deep Neural Networks (DNNs) are extensively employed in safety-critical applications where ensuring hardware reliability is a primary concern. To enhance the reliability of DNNs against hardware faults, activation restriction techniques significantly mitigate the fault effects at the DNN structure level, irrespective of accelerator architectures. State-of-the-art methods offer either neuron-wise or layer-wise clipping activation functions. They attempt to determine optimal clipping thresholds using heuristic and learning-based approaches. Layer-wise clipped activation functions cannot preserve DNNs resilience at high bit error rates. On the other hand, neuron-wise clipping activation functions introduce considerable memory overhead due to the addition of parameters, which increases their vulnerability to faults. Moreover, the heuristic-based optimization approach demands numerous fault injections during the search process, resulting in time-consuming threshold identification. On the other hand, learning-based techniques that train thresholds for entire layers concurrently often yield sub-optimal results. In this work, first, we demonstrate that it is not essential to incorporate neuron-wise activation functions throughout all layers in DNNs. Then, we propose a hybrid clipped activation function that integrates neuron-wise and layer-wise methods that apply neuron-wise clipping only in the last layer of DNNs. Additionally, to attain optimal thresholds in the clipping activation function, we introduce ProAct, a progressive training methodology. This approach iteratively trains the thresholds on a layer-by-layer basis, aiming to obtain optimal threshold values in each layer separately.

As large language models (LLMs) are increasingly adopted in safety-critical and regulated sectors, the retention of sensitive or prohibited knowledge introduces escalating risks, ranging from privacy leakage to regulatory non-compliance to to potential misuse, and so on. Recent studies suggest that machine unlearning can help ensure deployed models comply with evolving legal, safety, and governance requirements. However, current unlearning techniques assume clean separation between forget and retain datasets, which is challenging in operational settings characterized by highly entangled distributions. In such scenarios, perturbation-based methods often degrade general model utility or fail to ensure safety. To address this, we propose Selective Representation Misdirection for Unlearning (SRMU), a novel principled activation-editing framework that enforces feature-aware and directionally controlled perturbations. Unlike indiscriminate model weights perturbations, SRMU employs a structured misdirection vector with an activation importance map. The goal is to allow SRMU selectively suppresses harmful representations while preserving the utility on benign ones. Experiments are conducted on the widely used WMDP benchmark across low- and high-entanglement configurations. Empirical results reveal that SRMU delivers state-of-the-art unlearning performance with minimal utility losses, and remains effective under 20-30\% overlap where existing baselines collapse. SRMU provides a robust foundation for safety-driven model governance, privacy compliance, and controlled knowledge removal in the emerging LLM-based applications. We release the replication package at https://figshare.com/s/d5931192a8824de26aff.

Language Agent could be endowed with different mechanisms for autonomous task accomplishment. Current agents typically rely on fixed mechanisms or a set of mechanisms activated in a predefined order, limiting their adaptation to varied potential task solution structures. To this end, this paper proposes Adaptive Language Agent Mechanism Activation Learning with Self-Exploration (ALAMA), which focuses on optimizing mechanism activation adaptability without reliance on expert models. Initially, it builds a harmonized agent framework (UniAct) to Unify different mechanisms via Actions. Then it leverages a training-efficient optimization method based on self-exploration to enable the UniAct to adaptively activate the appropriate mechanisms according to the potential characteristics of the task. Experimental results demonstrate significant improvements in downstream agent tasks, affirming the effectiveness of our approach in facilitating more dynamic and context-sensitive mechanism activation.

Activation steering has emerged as a cost-effective paradigm for modifying large language model (LLM) behaviors. Existing methods typically intervene at the block level, steering the bundled activations of selected attention heads, feedforward networks, or residual streams. However, we reveal that block-level activations are inherently heterogeneous, entangling beneficial, irrelevant, and harmful features, thereby rendering block-level steering coarse, inefficient, and intrusive. To investigate the root cause, we decompose block activations into fine-grained atomic unit (AU)-level activations, where each AU-level activation corresponds to a single dimension of the block activation, and each AU denotes a slice of the block weight matrix. Steering an AU-level activation is thus equivalent to steering its associated AU. Our theoretical and empirical analysis show that heterogeneity arises because different AUs or dimensions control distinct token distributions in LLM outputs. Hence, block-level steering inevitably moves helpful and harmful token directions together, which reduces efficiency. Restricting intervention to beneficial AUs yields more precise and effective steering. Building on this insight, we propose AUSteer, a simple and efficient method that operates at a finer granularity of the AU level. AUSteer first identifies discriminative AUs globally by computing activation momenta on contrastive samples. It then assigns adaptive steering strengths tailored to diverse inputs and selected AU activations. Comprehensive experiments on multiple LLMs and tasks show that AUSteer consistently surpasses advanced baselines while steering considerably fewer activations, demonstrating that steering less achieves more.

Large Language Models (LLMs) are vulnerable to attacks like prompt injection, backdoor attacks, and adversarial attacks, which manipulate prompts or models to generate harmful outputs. In this paper, departing from traditional deep learning attack paradigms, we explore their intrinsic relationship and collectively term them Prompt Trigger Attacks (PTA). This raises a key question: Can we determine if a prompt is benign or poisoned? To address this, we propose UniGuardian, the first unified defense mechanism designed to detect prompt injection, backdoor attacks, and adversarial attacks in LLMs. Additionally, we introduce a single-forward strategy to optimize the detection pipeline, enabling simultaneous attack detection and text generation within a single forward pass. Our experiments confirm that UniGuardian accurately and efficiently identifies malicious prompts in LLMs.

The widely used ReLU is favored for its hardware efficiency, {as the implementation at inference is a one bit sign case,} yet suffers from issues such as the ``dying ReLU'' problem, where during training, neurons fail to activate and constantly remain at zero, as highlighted by Lu et al. Traditional approaches to mitigate this issue often introduce more complex and less hardware-friendly activation functions. In this work, we propose a Hysteresis Rectified Linear Unit (HeLU), an efficient activation function designed to address the ``dying ReLU'' problem with minimal complexity. Unlike traditional activation functions with fixed thresholds for training and inference, HeLU employs a variable threshold that refines the backpropagation. This refined mechanism allows simpler activation functions to achieve competitive performance comparable to their more complex counterparts without introducing unnecessary complexity or requiring inductive biases. Empirical evaluations demonstrate that HeLU enhances model generalization across diverse datasets, offering a promising solution for efficient and effective inference suitable for a wide range of neural network architectures.

Gradient optimization-based adversarial attack methods automate the learning of adversarial triggers to generate jailbreak prompts or leak system prompts. In this work, we take a closer look at the optimization objective of adversarial trigger learning and propose ATLA: Adversarial Trigger Learning with Augmented objectives. ATLA improves the negative log-likelihood loss used by previous studies into a weighted loss formulation that encourages the learned adversarial triggers to optimize more towards response format tokens. This enables ATLA to learn an adversarial trigger from just one query-response pair and the learned trigger generalizes well to other similar queries. We further design a variation to augment trigger optimization with an auxiliary loss that suppresses evasive responses. We showcase how to use ATLA to learn adversarial suffixes jailbreaking LLMs and to extract hidden system prompts. Empirically we demonstrate that ATLA consistently outperforms current state-of-the-art techniques, achieving nearly 100% success in attacking while requiring 80% fewer queries. ATLA learned jailbreak suffixes demonstrate high generalization to unseen queries and transfer well to new LLMs. We released our code https://github.com/QData/ALTA_Augmented_Adversarial_Trigger_Learning

The task of root cause analysis (RCA) is to identify the root causes of system faults/failures by analyzing system monitoring data. Efficient RCA can greatly accelerate system failure recovery and mitigate system damages or financial losses. However, previous research has mostly focused on developing offline RCA algorithms, which often require manually initiating the RCA process, a significant amount of time and data to train a robust model, and then being retrained from scratch for a new system fault. In this paper, we propose CORAL, a novel online RCA framework that can automatically trigger the RCA process and incrementally update the RCA model. CORAL consists of Trigger Point Detection, Incremental Disentangled Causal Graph Learning, and Network Propagation-based Root Cause Localization. The Trigger Point Detection component aims to detect system state transitions automatically and in near-real-time. To achieve this, we develop an online trigger point detection approach based on multivariate singular spectrum analysis and cumulative sum statistics. To efficiently update the RCA model, we propose an incremental disentangled causal graph learning approach to decouple the state-invariant and state-dependent information. After that, CORAL applies a random walk with restarts to the updated causal graph to accurately identify root causes. The online RCA process terminates when the causal graph and the generated root cause list converge. Extensive experiments on three real-world datasets with case studies demonstrate the effectiveness and superiority of the proposed framework.

Active Real-time interaction with video LLMs introduces a new paradigm for human-computer interaction, where the model not only understands user intent but also responds while continuously processing streaming video on the fly. Unlike offline video LLMs, which analyze the entire video before answering questions, active real-time interaction requires three capabilities: 1) Perception: real-time video monitoring and interaction capturing. 2) Decision: raising proactive interaction in proper situations, 3) Reaction: continuous interaction with users. However, inherent conflicts exist among the desired capabilities. The Decision and Reaction require a contrary Perception scale and grain, and the autoregressive decoding blocks the real-time Perception and Decision during the Reaction. To unify the conflicted capabilities within a harmonious system, we present Dispider, a system that disentangles Perception, Decision, and Reaction. Dispider features a lightweight proactive streaming video processing module that tracks the video stream and identifies optimal moments for interaction. Once the interaction is triggered, an asynchronous interaction module provides detailed responses, while the processing module continues to monitor the video in the meantime. Our disentangled and asynchronous design ensures timely, contextually accurate, and computationally efficient responses, making Dispider ideal for active real-time interaction for long-duration video streams. Experiments show that Dispider not only maintains strong performance in conventional video QA tasks, but also significantly surpasses previous online models in streaming scenario responses, thereby validating the effectiveness of our architecture. The code and model are released at https://github.com/Mark12Ding/Dispider.

Recent work demonstrated Transformers' ability to efficiently copy strings of exponential sizes, distinguishing them from other architectures. We present the Causal Relation Network (CausalRN), an all-MLP sequence modeling architecture that can match Transformers on the copying task. Extending Relation Networks (RNs), we implemented key innovations to support autoregressive sequence modeling while maintaining computational feasibility. We discovered that exponentially-activated RNs are reducible to linear time complexity, and pre-activation normalization induces an infinitely growing memory pool, similar to a KV cache. In ablation study, we found both exponential activation and pre-activation normalization are indispensable for Transformer-level copying. Our findings provide new insights into what actually constitutes strong in-context retrieval.

Large Language Models (LLMs), despite advances in safety alignment, remain vulnerable to jailbreak attacks designed to circumvent protective mechanisms. Prevailing defense strategies rely on external interventions, such as input filtering or output modification, which often lack generalizability and compromise model utility while incurring significant computational overhead. In this work, we introduce a new, training-free defense paradigm, Self-Activating Internal Defense (SAID), which reframes the defense task from external correction to internal capability activation. SAID uniquely leverages the LLM's own reasoning abilities to proactively identify and neutralize malicious intent through a three-stage pipeline: model-native intent distillation to extract core semantics, optimal safety prefix probing to activate latent safety awareness, and a conservative aggregation strategy to ensure robust decision-making. Extensive experiments on five open-source LLMs against six advanced jailbreak attacks demonstrate that SAID substantially outperforms state-of-the-art defenses in reducing harmful outputs. Crucially, it achieves this while preserving model performance on benign tasks and incurring minimal computational overhead. Our work establishes that activating the intrinsic safety mechanisms of LLMs is a more robust and scalable path toward building safer and more reliable aligned AI systems.

The simulation of human neurons and neurotransmission mechanisms has been realized in deep neural networks based on the theoretical implementations of activation functions. However, recent studies have reported that the threshold potential of neurons exhibits different values according to the locations and types of individual neurons, and that the activation functions have limitations in terms of representing this variability. Therefore, this study proposes a simple yet effective activation function that facilitates different thresholds and adaptive activations according to the positions of units and the contexts of inputs. Furthermore, the proposed activation function mathematically exhibits a more generalized form of Swish activation function, and thus we denoted it as Adaptive SwisH (ASH). ASH highlights informative features that exhibit large values in the top percentiles in an input, whereas it rectifies low values. Most importantly, ASH exhibits trainable, adaptive, and context-aware properties compared to other activation functions. Furthermore, ASH represents general formula of the previously studied activation function and provides a reasonable mathematical background for the superior performance. To validate the effectiveness and robustness of ASH, we implemented ASH into many deep learning models for various tasks, including classification, detection, segmentation, and image generation. Experimental analysis demonstrates that our activation function can provide the benefits of more accurate prediction and earlier convergence in many deep learning applications.

Backdoor mechanisms have traditionally been studied as security threats that compromise the integrity of machine learning models. However, the same mechanism -- the conditional activation of specific behaviors through input triggers -- can also serve as a controllable and auditable interface for trustworthy model behavior. In this work, we present Backdoor4Good (B4G), a unified benchmark and framework for beneficial backdoor applications in large language models (LLMs). Unlike conventional backdoor studies focused on attacks and defenses, B4G repurposes backdoor conditioning for Beneficial Tasks that enhance safety, controllability, and accountability. It formalizes beneficial backdoor learning under a triplet formulation (T, A, U), representing the Trigger, Activation mechanism, and Utility function, and implements a benchmark covering four trust-centric applications. Through extensive experiments across Llama3.1-8B, Gemma-2-9B, Qwen2.5-7B, and Llama2-13B, we show that beneficial backdoors can achieve high controllability, tamper-resistance, and stealthiness while preserving clean-task performance. Our findings demonstrate new insights that backdoors need not be inherently malicious; when properly designed, they can serve as modular, interpretable, and beneficial building blocks for trustworthy AI systems. Our code and datasets are available at https://github.com/bboylyg/BackdoorLLM/B4G.

With the help of Chain-of-Thought (CoT) prompting, Large Language Models (LLMs) have achieved remarkable performance on various reasoning tasks. However, most of them have been evaluated under noise-free context and the dilemma for LLMs to produce inaccurate results under the noisy context has not been fully investigated. Existing studies utilize trigger sentences to encourage LLMs to concentrate on the relevant information but the trigger has limited effect on final answer prediction. Inspired by interactive CoT method, where intermediate reasoning steps are promoted by multiple rounds of interaction between users and LLMs, we propose a novel prompting method, namely R^3 prompting, for CoT reasoning under noisy context. Specifically, R^3 prompting interacts with LLMs to perform key sentence extraction, variable declaration and answer prediction, which corresponds to a thought process of reviewing, rephrasing and resolving. The responses generated at the last interaction will perform as hints to guide toward the responses of the next interaction. Our experiments show that R^3 prompting significantly outperforms existing CoT prompting methods on five reasoning tasks under noisy context. With GPT-3.5-turbo, we observe 3.7% accuracy improvement on average on the reasoning tasks under noisy context compared to the most competitive prompting baseline. More analyses and ablation studies show the robustness and generalization of R^3 prompting method in solving reasoning tasks in LLMs under noisy context.

Mechanism-targeted synthetic data is increasingly proposed as a way to steer pretraining toward desirable capabilities, but it remains unclear how such interventions should be evaluated. We study this question for in-context learning (ICL) under matched compute (iso-FLOPs) using Bi-Induct, a lightweight data rewrite that interleaves short directional copy snippets into a natural pretraining stream: forward-copy (induction), backward-copy (anti-induction, as a directional control), or a balanced mix. Across 0.13B-1B decoder-only models, we evaluate (i) few-shot performance on standard LM benchmarks and function-style ICL probes, (ii) head-level copy telemetry, and (iii) held-out perplexity as a guardrail. Bi-Induct reliably increases induction-head activity, but this does not translate into consistent improvements in few-shot generalization: on standard LM benchmarks, Bi-Induct is largely performance-neutral relative to natural-only training, while on function-style probes the 1B natural-only model performs best. Despite explicit backward-copy cues, anti-induction scores remain near zero across scales, revealing a strong forward/backward asymmetry. Targeted ablations show a sharper distinction: removing the top 2% induction heads per layer harms ICL more than matched random ablations, with the largest relative drop occurring in the natural-only models. This indicates that natural-only training produces more centralized, load-bearing induction circuitry, whereas Bi-Induct tends to create more distributed and redundant induction activity. Our main conclusion is that eliciting a mechanism is not the same as making it load-bearing. For data-centric foundation model design, this suggests that synthetic data interventions should be evaluated not only by signature amplification, but by whether they create causally necessary computation while preserving natural-data modeling quality.

The advent of multimodal agents facilitates effective interaction within graphical user interface (GUI), especially in ubiquitous GUI control. However, their inability to reliably execute toggle control instructions remains a key bottleneck. To investigate this, we construct a state control benchmark with binary toggle instructions from public datasets. Evaluations of existing agents demonstrate their unreliability, particularly when the current toggle state already matches the desired state. To address the challenge, we propose State-aware Reasoning (StaR), a training method that teaches agents to perceive the current toggle state, analyze the desired state from the instruction, and act accordingly. Experiments on three multimodal agents demonstrate that StaR can improve toggle instruction execution accuracy by over 30\%. Further evaluations on three public benchmarks show that StaR also enhances general task performance. Finally, evaluations on a dynamic environment highlight the potential of StaR for real-world applications. Code, benchmark, and StaR-enhanced agents are available at https://github.com/ZrW00/StaR.

Large language models can resist task-misaligned activation steering during inference, sometimes recovering mid-generation to produce improved responses even when steering remains active. We term this Endogenous Steering Resistance (ESR). Using sparse autoencoder (SAE) latents to steer model activations, we find that Llama-3.3-70B shows substantial ESR, while smaller models from the Llama-3 and Gemma-2 families exhibit the phenomenon less frequently. We identify 26 SAE latents that activate differentially during off-topic content and are causally linked to ESR in Llama-3.3-70B. Zero-ablating these latents reduces the multi-attempt rate by 25%, providing causal evidence for dedicated internal consistency-checking circuits. We demonstrate that ESR can be deliberately enhanced through both prompting and training: meta-prompts instructing the model to self-monitor increase the multi-attempt rate by 4x for Llama-3.3-70B, and fine-tuning on self-correction examples successfully induces ESR-like behavior in smaller models. These findings have dual implications: ESR could protect against adversarial manipulation but might also interfere with beneficial safety interventions that rely on activation steering. Understanding and controlling these resistance mechanisms is important for developing transparent and controllable AI systems. Code is available at github.com/agencyenterprise/endogenous-steering-resistance.

Interactions with virtual assistants typically start with a trigger phrase followed by a command. In this work, we explore the possibility of making these interactions more natural by eliminating the need for a trigger phrase. Our goal is to determine whether a user addressed the virtual assistant based on signals obtained from the streaming audio recorded by the device microphone. We address this task by combining 1-best hypotheses and decoder signals from an automatic speech recognition system with acoustic representations from an audio encoder as input features to a large language model (LLM). In particular, we are interested in data and resource efficient systems that require only a small amount of training data and can operate in scenarios with only a single frozen LLM available on a device. For this reason, our model is trained on 80k or less examples of multimodal data using a combination of low-rank adaptation and prefix tuning. We compare the proposed system to unimodal baselines and show that the multimodal approach achieves lower equal-error-rates (EERs), while using only a fraction of the training data. We also show that low-dimensional specialized audio representations lead to lower EERs than high-dimensional general audio representations.

AI agents equipped with tool-calling capabilities are susceptible to Indirect Prompt Injection (IPI) attacks. In this attack scenario, malicious commands hidden within untrusted content trick the agent into performing unauthorized actions. Existing defenses can reduce attack success but often suffer from the over-defense dilemma: they deploy expensive, always-on sanitization regardless of actual threat, thereby degrading utility and latency even in benign scenarios. We revisit IPI through a causal ablation perspective: a successful injection manifests as a dominance shift where the user request no longer provides decisive support for the agent's privileged action, while a particular untrusted segment, such as a retrieved document or tool output, provides disproportionate attributable influence. Based on this signature, we propose CausalArmor, a selective defense framework that (i) computes lightweight, leave-one-out ablation-based attributions at privileged decision points, and (ii) triggers targeted sanitization only when an untrusted segment dominates the user intent. Additionally, CausalArmor employs retroactive Chain-of-Thought masking to prevent the agent from acting on ``poisoned'' reasoning traces. We present a theoretical analysis showing that sanitization based on attribution margins conditionally yields an exponentially small upper bound on the probability of selecting malicious actions. Experiments on AgentDojo and DoomArena demonstrate that CausalArmor matches the security of aggressive defenses while improving explainability and preserving utility and latency of AI agents.

Automated interpretability pipelines generate natural language descriptions for the concepts represented by features in large language models (LLMs), such as plants or the first word in a sentence. These descriptions are derived using inputs that activate the feature, which may be a dimension or a direction in the model's representation space. However, identifying activating inputs is costly, and the mechanistic role of a feature in model behavior is determined both by how inputs cause a feature to activate and by how feature activation affects outputs. Using steering evaluations, we reveal that current pipelines provide descriptions that fail to capture the causal effect of the feature on outputs. To fix this, we propose efficient, output-centric methods for automatically generating feature descriptions. These methods use the tokens weighted higher after feature stimulation or the highest weight tokens after applying the vocabulary "unembedding" head directly to the feature. Our output-centric descriptions better capture the causal effect of a feature on model outputs than input-centric descriptions, but combining the two leads to the best performance on both input and output evaluations. Lastly, we show that output-centric descriptions can be used to find inputs that activate features previously thought to be "dead".

Long-term memory enables large language model (LLM) agents to support personalized and sustained interactions. However, most work on personalized agents prioritizes utility and user experience, treating memory as a neutral component and largely overlooking its safety implications. In this paper, we reveal intent legitimation, a previously underexplored safety failure in personalized agents, where benign personal memories bias intent inference and cause models to legitimize inherently harmful queries. To study this phenomenon, we introduce PS-Bench, a benchmark designed to identify and quantify intent legitimation in personalized interactions. Across multiple memory-augmented agent frameworks and base LLMs, personalization increases attack success rates by 15.8%-243.7% relative to stateless baselines. We further provide mechanistic evidence for intent legitimation from internal representations space, and propose a lightweight detection-reflection method that effectively reduces safety degradation. Overall, our work provides the first systematic exploration and evaluation of intent legitimation as a safety failure mode that naturally arises from benign, real-world personalization, highlighting the importance of assessing safety under long-term personal context. WARNING: This paper may contain harmful content.

Carefully engineered system prompts play a critical role in guiding the behavior of LLM agents, but their considerable length introduces significant drawbacks, including increased inference latency, higher computational cost, and reduced effective context length. This raises the question of whether such lengthy prompts can be replaced by a drastically reduced number of tokens while preserving their behavioral effect on downstream tasks. To enable this, we propose a lightweight three-stage training framework that learns a single prompt-specific Behavior-Equivalent token ([BE]). The framework first trains [BE] to encode the natural-language content of the original system prompt via reconstruction, and then distills the prompt 's downstream behavior into this single token. Importantly, our method requires no access to model internals, no auxiliary compression models, and no labeled responses. Empirical evaluations on three datasets show that a single [BE] token achieves up to a 3000x reduction in prompt length, while retaining about 98% of the downstream performance of the original system prompts. This substantially reduces inference cost and leaves almost the entire context window available for user inputs.

LLMs increasingly exhibit over-refusal behavior, where safety mechanisms cause models to reject benign instructions that superficially resemble harmful content. This phenomena diminishes utility in production applications that repeatedly rely on common prompt templates or applications that frequently rely on LLMs for specific tasks (e.g. sentiment analysis, language translation). Through comprehensive evaluation, we demonstrate that LLMs still tend to refuse responses to harmful instructions when those instructions are reframed to appear as benign tasks. Our mechanistic analysis reveal that LLMs follow distinct "constellation" patterns in embedding space as representations traverse layers, with each task maintaining consistent trajectories that shift predictably between refusal and non-refusal cases. We introduce SafeConstellations, an inference-time trajectory-shifting approach that tracks task-specific trajectory patterns and guides representations toward non-refusal pathways. By selectively guiding model behavior only on tasks prone to over-refusal, and by preserving general model behavior, our method reduces over-refusal rates by up to 73% with minimal impact on utility-offering a principled approach to mitigating over-refusals.

We present the Mixture-of-Tunable-Experts (MoTE), a method that extends the Mixture-of-Experts architecture of Large Language Models (LLMs). Without additional training, MoTE enables meaningful and focused behavior changes in LLMs on-the-fly during inference time. By analyzing the digital LLM brain of DeepSeek-R1 using a technique we dub 'functional Token Resonance Imaging' (fTRI) -- inspired by fMRI and using prompts designed to elicit specific behavior (e.g., 'What happened {time}{place}?') -- we empirically identify distinctive experts associated with behaviors like refusal responses. Using MoTE we are able to intervene and control such specific behavior. We switched off the top 10 most refusal-relevant experts (0.07% of R1's 14,848 routed experts), achieving a 52% refusal reduction on sensitive reference prompts without performance degradation on MT-Bench. Random expert deactivation resulted in smaller behavioral shifts with increased noise, whereas forced expert activation led to significantly higher refusal rates. Our approach shares similarities with sparse autoencoders (SAEs) in terms of explainability and steerability. Unlike SAEs, MoTE does not require large training efforts, as within MoEs with a vast number of experts, specialization already emerged naturally during pretraining. Our findings suggest that significant functional mechanisms in Mixture-of-Experts architectures can at least partially be localized in a small number of specific experts, rather than being distributed throughout the model's weights. Expert subgroups can be tuned to trigger significant behavior variations, providing insights into the inner workings of LLMs.

Takeovers remain a key safety vulnerability in production ADAS, yet existing public resources rarely provide takeover-centered, real-world data. We present ADAS-TO, the first large-scale naturalistic dataset dedicated to ADAS-to-manual transitions, containing 15,659 takeover-centered 20s clips from 327 drivers across 22 vehicle brands. Each clip synchronizes front-view video with CAN logs. Takeovers are defined as ADAS ON rightarrow OFF transitions, with the primary trigger labeled as brake, steer, gas, mixed, or system disengagement. We further separate planned driver-initiated terminations (Ego) from forced takeovers (Non-ego) using a rule-based partition. While most events occur within conservative kinematic margins, we identify a long tail of 285 safety-critical cases. For these events, we combine kinematic screening with vision--language (VLM) annotation to attribute hazards and relate them to intervention dynamics. The resulting cross-modal analysis shows distinct kinematic signatures across traffic dynamics, infrastructure degradation, and adverse environments, and finds that in 59.3% of critical cases, actionable visual cues emerge at least 3s before takeover, supporting the potential for semantics-aware early warning beyond late-stage kinematic triggers. The dataset is publicly released at huggingface.co/datasets/HenryYHW/ADAS-TO-Sample.

In-context learning is a powerful emergent ability in transformer models. Prior work in mechanistic interpretability has identified a circuit element that may be critical for in-context learning -- the induction head (IH), which performs a match-and-copy operation. During training of large transformers on natural language data, IHs emerge around the same time as a notable phase change in the loss. Despite the robust evidence for IHs and this interesting coincidence with the phase change, relatively little is known about the diversity and emergence dynamics of IHs. Why is there more than one IH, and how are they dependent on each other? Why do IHs appear all of a sudden, and what are the subcircuits that enable them to emerge? We answer these questions by studying IH emergence dynamics in a controlled setting by training on synthetic data. In doing so, we develop and share a novel optogenetics-inspired causal framework for modifying activations throughout training. Using this framework, we delineate the diverse and additive nature of IHs. By clamping subsets of activations throughout training, we then identify three underlying subcircuits that interact to drive IH formation, yielding the phase change. Furthermore, these subcircuits shed light on data-dependent properties of formation, such as phase change timing, already showing the promise of this more in-depth understanding of subcircuits that need to "go right" for an induction head.

Predicting and reasoning how a video would make a human feel is crucial for developing socially intelligent systems. Although Multimodal Large Language Models (MLLMs) have shown impressive video understanding capabilities, they tend to focus more on the semantic content of videos, often overlooking emotional stimuli. Hence, most existing MLLMs fall short in estimating viewers' emotional reactions and providing plausible explanations. To address this issue, we propose StimuVAR, a spatiotemporal Stimuli-aware framework for Video Affective Reasoning (VAR) with MLLMs. StimuVAR incorporates a two-level stimuli-aware mechanism: frame-level awareness and token-level awareness. Frame-level awareness involves sampling video frames with events that are most likely to evoke viewers' emotions. Token-level awareness performs tube selection in the token space to make the MLLM concentrate on emotion-triggered spatiotemporal regions. Furthermore, we create VAR instruction data to perform affective training, steering MLLMs' reasoning strengths towards emotional focus and thereby enhancing their affective reasoning ability. To thoroughly assess the effectiveness of VAR, we provide a comprehensive evaluation protocol with extensive metrics. StimuVAR is the first MLLM-based method for viewer-centered VAR. Experiments demonstrate its superiority in understanding viewers' emotional responses to videos and providing coherent and insightful explanations.

Large language models (LLMs) exhibit exceptional capabilities across various tasks but also pose risks by generating harmful content. Existing safety mechanisms, while improving model safety, often lead to overly cautious behavior and fail to fully leverage LLMs' internal cognitive processes. Inspired by humans' reflective thinking capability, we first show that LLMs can similarly perform internal assessments about safety in their internal states. Building on this insight, we propose SafeSwitch, a dynamic framework that regulates unsafe outputs by utilizing the prober-based internal state monitor that actively detects harmful intentions, and activates a safety head that leads to safer and more conservative responses only when necessary. SafeSwitch reduces harmful outputs by approximately 80% on harmful queries while maintaining strong utility, reaching a Pareto optimal among several methods. Our method is also advantageous over traditional methods in offering more informative, context-aware refusals, and achieves these benefits while only tuning less than 6% of the original parameters. SafeSwitch demonstrates large language models' capacity for self-awareness and reflection regarding safety, offering a promising approach to more nuanced and effective safety controls. Codes for this work are available at https://github.com/Hanpx20/SafeSwitch.

We provide evidence of performative chain-of-thought (CoT) in reasoning models, where a model becomes strongly confident in its final answer, but continues generating tokens without revealing its internal belief. Our analysis compares activation probing, early forced answering, and a CoT monitor across two large models (DeepSeek-R1 671B & GPT-OSS 120B) and find task difficulty-specific differences: The model's final answer is decodable from activations far earlier in CoT than a monitor is able to say, especially for easy recall-based MMLU questions. We contrast this with genuine reasoning in difficult multihop GPQA-Diamond questions. Despite this, inflection points (e.g., backtracking, 'aha' moments) occur almost exclusively in responses where probes show large belief shifts, suggesting these behaviors track genuine uncertainty rather than learned "reasoning theater." Finally, probe-guided early exit reduces tokens by up to 80% on MMLU and 30% on GPQA-Diamond with similar accuracy, positioning attention probing as an efficient tool for detecting performative reasoning and enabling adaptive computation.

Current research in adversarial robustness of LLMs focuses on discrete input manipulations in the natural language space, which can be directly transferred to closed-source models. However, this approach neglects the steady progression of open-source models. As open-source models advance in capability, ensuring their safety also becomes increasingly imperative. Yet, attacks tailored to open-source LLMs that exploit full model access remain largely unexplored. We address this research gap and propose the embedding space attack, which directly attacks the continuous embedding representation of input tokens. We find that embedding space attacks circumvent model alignments and trigger harmful behaviors more efficiently than discrete attacks or model fine-tuning. Furthermore, we present a novel threat model in the context of unlearning and show that embedding space attacks can extract supposedly deleted information from unlearned LLMs across multiple datasets and models. Our findings highlight embedding space attacks as an important threat model in open-source LLMs. Trigger Warning: the appendix contains LLM-generated text with violence and harassment.

Proactive agents must decide not only what to say but also whether and when to intervene. Many current systems rely on brittle heuristics or indiscriminate long reasoning, which offers little control over the benefit-burden tradeoff. We formulate the problem as cost-sensitive selective intervention and present PRISM, a novel framework that couples a decision-theoretic gate with a dual-process reasoning architecture. At inference time, the agent intervenes only when a calibrated probability of user acceptance exceeds a threshold derived from asymmetric costs of missed help and false alarms. Inspired by festina lente (Latin: "make haste slowly"), we gate by an acceptance-calibrated, cost-derived threshold and invoke a resource-intensive Slow mode with counterfactual checks only near the decision boundary, concentrating computation on ambiguous and high-stakes cases. Training uses gate-aligned, schema-locked distillation: a teacher running the full PRISM pipeline provides dense, executable supervision on unlabeled interaction traces, while the student learns a response policy that is explicitly decoupled from the intervention gate to enable tunable and auditable control. On ProactiveBench, PRISM reduces false alarms by 22.78% and improves F1 by 20.14% over strong baselines. These results show that principled decision-theoretic gating, paired with selective slow reasoning and aligned distillation, yields proactive agents that are precise, computationally efficient, and controllable. To facilitate reproducibility, we release our code, models, and resources at https://prism-festinalente.github.io/; all experiments use the open-source ProactiveBench benchmark.

Vision-Language Models (VLMs) empower embodied agents to execute complex instructions, yet they remain vulnerable to contextual safety risks where benign commands become hazardous due to subtle environmental states. Existing safeguards often prove inadequate. Rule-based methods lack scalability in object-dense scenes, whereas model-based approaches relying on prompt engineering suffer from unfocused perception, resulting in missed risks or hallucinations. To address this, we propose an architecture-agnostic safeguard featuring Context-Guided Chain-of-Thought (CG-CoT). This mechanism decomposes risk assessment into active perception that sequentially anchors attention to interaction targets and relevant spatial neighborhoods, followed by semantic judgment based on this visual evidence. We support this approach with a curated grounding dataset and a two-stage training strategy utilizing Reinforcement Fine-Tuning (RFT) with process rewards to enforce precise intermediate grounding. Experiments demonstrate that our model HomeGuard significantly enhances safety, improving risk match rates by over 30% compared to base models while reducing oversafety. Beyond hazard detection, the generated visual anchors serve as actionable spatial constraints for downstream planners, facilitating explicit collision avoidance and safety trajectory generation. Code and data are released under https://github.com/AI45Lab/HomeGuard

Conventional LLMs may suffer from corpus heterogeneity and subtle condition changes. While finetuning can create the catastrophe forgetting issue, application of meta-learning on LLMs is also limited due to its complexity and scalability. In this paper, we activate the meta-signal of β within the SwiGLU blocks, resulting in a meta-gating mechanism that adaptively adjusts the nonlinearity of FFN. A hypernetwork is employed which dynamically produces β on textual conditions, providing meta-controllability on LLMs. By testing on different condition types such as task, domain, persona, and style, our method outperforms finetuning and meta-learning baselines, and can generalize reasonably on unseen tasks, condition types, or instructions. Our code can be found in https://github.com/AaronJi/MeGan.

Vision-Language Models (VLMs) are increasingly used in safety-critical applications that require reliable visual grounding. However, these models often hallucinate details that are not present in the image to satisfy user prompts. While recent datasets and benchmarks have been introduced to evaluate systematic hallucinations in VLMs, many hallucination behaviors remain insufficiently characterized. In particular, prior work primarily focuses on object presence or absence, leaving it unclear how prompt phrasing and structural constraints can systematically induce hallucinations. In this paper, we investigate how different forms of prompt pressure influence hallucination behavior. We introduce Ghost-100, a procedurally generated dataset of synthetic scenes in which key visual details are deliberately removed, enabling controlled analysis of absence-based hallucinations. Using a structured 5-Level Prompt Intensity Framework, we vary prompts from neutral queries to toxic demands and rigid formatting constraints. We evaluate three representative open-weight VLMs: MiniCPM-V 2.6-8B, Qwen2-VL-7B, and Qwen3-VL-8B. Across all three models, hallucination rates do not increase monotonically with prompt intensity. All models exhibit reductions at higher intensity levels at different thresholds, though not all show sustained reduction under maximum coercion. These results suggest that current safety alignment is more effective at detecting semantic hostility than structural coercion, revealing model-specific limitations in handling compliance pressure. Our dataset is available at: https://github.com/bli1/tone-matters

The expansion of machine learning into dynamic environments presents challenges in handling open-world problems where label shift, covariate shift, and unknown classes emerge. Post-training methods have been explored to address these challenges, adapting models to newly emerging data. However, these methods struggle when the initial pre-training is performed on class-imbalanced datasets, limiting generalization to minority classes. To address this, we propose a method that effectively handles open-world problems even when pre-training is conducted on imbalanced data. Our contrastive-based pre-training approach enhances classification performance, particularly for underrepresented classes. Our post-training mechanism generates reliable pseudo-labels, improving model robustness against open-world problems. We also introduce selective activation criteria to optimize the post-training process, reducing unnecessary computation. Extensive experiments demonstrate that our method significantly outperforms state-of-the-art adaptation techniques in both accuracy and efficiency across diverse open-world scenarios.

Robots deployed in dynamic environments must be able to not only follow diverse language instructions but flexibly adapt when user intent changes mid-execution. While recent Vision-Language-Action (VLA) models have advanced multi-task learning and instruction following, they typically assume static task intent, failing to respond when new instructions arrive during ongoing execution. This limitation hinders natural and robust interaction in dynamic settings, such as retail or household environments, where real-time intent changes are common. We propose SwitchVLA, a unified, execution-aware framework that enables smooth and reactive task switching without external planners or additional switch-specific data. We model task switching as a behavior modulation problem conditioned on execution state and instruction context. Expert demonstrations are segmented into temporally grounded contact phases, allowing the policy to infer task progress and adjust its behavior accordingly. A multi-behavior conditional policy is then trained to generate flexible action chunks under varying behavior modes through conditioned trajectory modeling. Experiments in both simulation and real-world robotic manipulation demonstrate that SwitchVLA enables robust instruction adherence, fluid task switching, and strong generalization-outperforming prior VLA baselines in both task success rate and interaction naturalness.

Nested Event Extraction (NEE) aims to extract complex event structures where an event contains other events as its arguments recursively. Nested events involve a kind of Pivot Elements (PEs) that simultaneously act as arguments of outer events and as triggers of inner events, and thus connect them into nested structures. This special characteristic of PEs brings challenges to existing NEE methods, as they cannot well cope with the dual identities of PEs. Therefore, this paper proposes a new model, called PerNee, which extracts nested events mainly based on recognizing PEs. Specifically, PerNee first recognizes the triggers of both inner and outer events and further recognizes the PEs via classifying the relation type between trigger pairs. In order to obtain better representations of triggers and arguments to further improve NEE performance, it incorporates the information of both event types and argument roles into PerNee through prompt learning. Since existing NEE datasets (e.g., Genia11) are limited to specific domains and contain a narrow range of event types with nested structures, we systematically categorize nested events in generic domain and construct a new NEE dataset, namely ACE2005-Nest. Experimental results demonstrate that PerNee consistently achieves state-of-the-art performance on ACE2005-Nest, Genia11 and Genia13.

Zero-Input AI (ZIA) introduces a novel framework for human-computer interaction by enabling proactive intent prediction without explicit user commands. It integrates gaze tracking, bio-signals (EEG, heart rate), and contextual data (time, location, usage history) into a multi-modal model for real-time inference, targeting <100 ms latency. The proposed architecture employs a transformer-based model with cross-modal attention, variational Bayesian inference for uncertainty estimation, and reinforcement learning for adaptive optimization. To support deployment on edge devices (CPUs, TPUs, NPUs), ZIA utilizes quantization, weight pruning, and linear attention to reduce complexity from quadratic to linear with sequence length. Theoretical analysis establishes an information-theoretic bound on prediction error and demonstrates how multi-modal fusion improves accuracy over single-modal approaches. Expected performance suggests 85-90% accuracy with EEG integration and 60-100 ms inference latency. ZIA provides a scalable, privacy-preserving framework for accessibility, healthcare, and consumer applications, advancing AI toward anticipatory intelligence.

Recent advances in Large Language Models (LLMs) have propelled intelligent agents from reactive responses to proactive support. While promising, existing proactive agents either rely exclusively on observations from enclosed environments (e.g., desktop UIs) with direct LLM inference or employ rule-based proactive notifications, leading to suboptimal user intent understanding and limited functionality for proactive service. In this paper, we introduce ContextAgent, the first context-aware proactive agent that incorporates extensive sensory contexts to enhance the proactive capabilities of LLM agents. ContextAgent first extracts multi-dimensional contexts from massive sensory perceptions on wearables (e.g., video and audio) to understand user intentions. ContextAgent then leverages the sensory contexts and the persona contexts from historical data to predict the necessity for proactive services. When proactive assistance is needed, ContextAgent further automatically calls the necessary tools to assist users unobtrusively. To evaluate this new task, we curate ContextAgentBench, the first benchmark for evaluating context-aware proactive LLM agents, covering 1,000 samples across nine daily scenarios and twenty tools. Experiments on ContextAgentBench show that ContextAgent outperforms baselines by achieving up to 8.5% and 6.0% higher accuracy in proactive predictions and tool calling, respectively. We hope our research can inspire the development of more advanced, human-centric, proactive AI assistants.

This paper explores the application of artificial intelligence techniques in audio and voice processing, focusing on the integration of wake words and speaker recognition for secure access in embedded systems. With the growing prevalence of voice-activated devices such as Amazon Alexa, ensuring secure and user-specific interactions has become paramount. Our study aims to enhance the security framework of these systems by leveraging wake words for initial activation and speaker recognition to validate user permissions. By incorporating these AI-driven methodologies, we propose a robust solution that restricts system usage to authorized individuals, thereby mitigating unauthorized access risks. This research delves into the algorithms and technologies underpinning wake word detection and speaker recognition, evaluates their effectiveness in real-world applications, and discusses the potential for their implementation in various embedded systems, emphasizing security and user convenience. The findings underscore the feasibility and advantages of employing these AI techniques to create secure, user-friendly voice-activated systems.

To correctly use in-context information, language models (LMs) must bind entities to their attributes. For example, given a context describing a "green square" and a "blue circle", LMs must bind the shapes to their respective colors. We analyze LM representations and identify the binding ID mechanism: a general mechanism for solving the binding problem, which we observe in every sufficiently large model from the Pythia and LLaMA families. Using causal interventions, we show that LMs' internal activations represent binding information by attaching binding ID vectors to corresponding entities and attributes. We further show that binding ID vectors form a continuous subspace, in which distances between binding ID vectors reflect their discernability. Overall, our results uncover interpretable strategies in LMs for representing symbolic knowledge in-context, providing a step towards understanding general in-context reasoning in large-scale LMs.

In this work, we present and evaluate SELMA, a Speech-Enabled Language Model for virtual Assistant interactions that integrates audio and text as inputs to a Large Language Model (LLM). SELMA is designed to handle three primary and two auxiliary tasks related to interactions with virtual assistants simultaneously within a single end-to-end model. We employ low-rank adaptation modules for parameter-efficient training of both the audio encoder and the LLM. Additionally, we implement a feature pooling strategy enabling the system to recognize global patterns and improve accuracy on tasks less reliant on individual sequence elements. Experimental results on Voice Trigger (VT) detection, Device-Directed Speech Detection (DDSD), and Automatic Speech Recognition (ASR), demonstrate that our approach both simplifies the typical input processing pipeline of virtual assistants significantly and also improves performance compared to dedicated models for each individual task. SELMA yields relative Equal-Error Rate improvements of 64% on the VT detection task, and 22% on DDSD, while also achieving word error rates close to the baseline.

The dynamic range of activations is a first-order constraint for low-bit quantization, activation scaling, and stable LLM inference. Prior work characterized outlier features and massive activations on pre-2024 LLaMA-style models, and the downstream activation-quantization stack inherits that picture without revisiting it for the post-LLaMA open-model boom. We ask the deployment-oriented question: how large can activations get in modern open LLMs, and how does this magnitude vary across families, generations, and training stages? Under a unified pipeline (5,000-sample multi-domain corpus, family-specific tokenization, identical hooks across embeddings, hidden states, attention, MLP/MoE, SwiGLU gates, and final norm), we measure global and layerwise maxima on 27 checkpoints from 8 open families spanning dense, MoE, vision-language, intermediate-training, and instruction-tuned variants. We find that (i) global maxima span over nearly four orders of magnitude at comparable parameter counts, with Qwen3.5 and MoE checkpoints in the 10^2 to 10^3 range and Gemma3-27B-it reaching ~7 x 10^5; (ii) cross-family and cross-generation comparisons break simple monotonic scaling; and (iii) MoE checkpoints exhibit 14.0-23.4x lower peaks than matched-scale dense counterparts, while the residual stream carries the global maximum in 22/24 checkpoints. A lightweight INT-8 sanity check shows that measured maxima co-vary with low-bit reconstruction error via activation-scale selection. We conclude that maximum activation magnitude is a model property tied to family, architecture, and training stage - not a simple byproduct of size - and should be measured and reported alongside any open-weight release before low-bit deployment. The code is publicly available at https://github.com/clx1415926/Max_act_llm.

The prevalence of misinformation on social media threatens public trust, demanding automated fact-checking systems that provide accurate verdicts with interpretable explanations. However, existing large language model-based (LLM-based) approaches often rely heavily on external knowledge sources, introducing substantial latency and even hallucinations that undermine reliability, interpretability, and responsiveness, which is crucial for real-time use. To address these challenges, we propose REason-guided Fact-checking with Latent EXplanations REFLEX paradigm, a plug-and-play, self-refining paradigm that leverages the internal knowledge in backbone model to improve both verdict accuracy and explanation quality. REFLEX reformulates fact-checking as a role-play dialogue and jointly trains verdict prediction and explanation generation. It adaptively extracts contrastive activation pairs between the backbone model and its fine-tuned variant to construct steering vectors that disentangle truth into style and substance naturally. These activation-level signals guide inference and suppress noisy explanations, enabling more faithful and efficient reasoning. Experiments on real-world datasets show that REFLEX outperforms previous methods that steer toward a single truth direction and underscores the challenge traditional approaches face when handling the subtle, human-unknown truth in fact-checking tasks. Remarkably, with only 465 self-refined training samples, RELFEX achieves state-of-the-art performance. Furthermore, models trained with explanatory objectives can effectively guide those without them, yielding up to a 7.57% improvement, highlighting that internal explanation signals play a dual role in both interpreting and enhancing factual reasoning.